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SIDELIGHTS ON
THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

SIDELIGHTS ON THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

BY
HUBERT G. R. READE

VOL. III.

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TO MY BROTHER

MAJOR GENERAL R. N. R. READE, C.B., C.M.G.,

and

TO MY FRIEND

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIR REGINALD RANKIN, Bt.,

Who has pictured with his pen so many of our modern wars

THIS BOOK

IS DEDICATED

in gratitude for their kindness and for their encouragement to me
in my task.

ERRATUM

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CHAPTER XLV., p. 493, l. 5.

For "Henry VIII." read "Henry VII."

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issa, 23 May, 1627 ; pp. 139-140, Importance of Flanders to Catholicism ;
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April 7, Isabella to Philip IV. ; Preparations for the Fleet at Dunkirk.

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French news, p. 97, Oct. 23 ; Danish news, pp. 101-102 ; Nov. 13, p. 105,
30 Dec., Danish news.

Rooses : Rubens, op. cit., Vol. IV., 1627, p. 89 ; pp. 91-96, The Rhine-
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The Isle of Rhé ; pp. 149-150, Sept. 30, Mexia's proposals for the con-
federation of the Spanish dominions.

Johnson : "Sailing Directions with Maps," by William Johnson [Amster-
dam, 1614] : Map of West Coast of Denmark, Sylt.

Royal Historical MSS. Commission Reports, Great Yarmouth : Pp. 309-
310, The threatened invasion of 1626-1627.

Rye : p. 179, p. 185, p. 189, p. 190, p. 191 : Preparations in connection
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Aldeburgh : Pp. 289-294, Preparations against the threatened invasion,
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Earl Delawarr : P. 289, 1626, June 12, The plans for Invasion discussed in
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Wodehouse, E. R. : Pp. 442-453, Musters of Suffolk Trainbands during
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The possibility of an invasion discussed.

Gawdy : P. 123, Threats of invasion in 1626.

Lord Kenyon : Pp. 33-35, Lancashire defences, 1626.

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Cabot, Sebastian: Mappe Monde, 1530; Mercator, Gerhard: Map of Ireland [Duisberg, 1569]; Gerritz, Hessel: "Histoire du Pays nommé Spitsberghe, 1613" [Amsterdam, 1613, 1 Vol.]; "Map of Arctic Ocean, extending from 69° to 82° North Lat., and from 5° to 105° Long., east of Ferro," Copied in Conway: "Early Voyages [Dutch and English] to Spitsbergen, in the Seventeenth Century," by Sir W. Martin Conway [London, 1904, 1 Vol.]; Blaeu: Map of Ireland [Amsterdam, 1640]; Humann: Map of Ireland [Nuremberg, 1716].

THE DYKE AT LA ROCHELLE.

Murray: "Guide to France" (2 Vols., London, John Murray, 1891), by John Murray, Vol I., pp. 191-192, La Rochelle, The Dyke, Towers, Fort St. Louis.

ENGLISH PREPARATIONS AGAINST INVASION.

ROYAL HISTORICAL MSS. COMMISSION REPORTS.

Earl Cowper: Vol. I., Coke Papers, 1626-1627-1628; Aldeburgh: Pp. 287-294; Rye: Pp. 185, 189, 190, 191; Wodehouse, E. R.: Pp. 440-451; Yarmouth, Great: Pp. 309-310; Kenyon, Lord: Pp. 33-35; Delawarr, Earl: P. 289.

MANUSCRIPT.

XV.—BELGIUM IN 1627. THE INVASION OF IRELAND, SPAIN.

Brussels, E et G.

No. 196: Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXI. (Janvier-Mai, 1627), 1627, Jan. 4, Infanta to Philip IV. Has informed Aytona that she accepts Friedland's offer of service and suggests that, when he has expelled the enemy from Silesia, he should march on the Elbe and occupy a point on its right bank as far down the river as possible, when she would send a representative to concert operations with him. Urges Aytona to get peace made with Bethlen Gabor and the Turks so as to leave Friedland free to act.

Jan. 7, Philip IV. to Infanta. On account of the state of his finances the Council of State say it is urgent to make peace on favourable terms with England and Holland, but, for the sake of his prestige, it is necessary to constrain them to make one by force of arms. In accordance with Olivares' "opinion," which he sends her, she should begin secret negotiations in England, Holland, and Germany, in the former through the Provincial of the English Jesuits, in the Hanse Towns through Gabriel de Roy. She must inquire as to whether any design can be carried out against England, Scotland, or Ireland; leaves himself entirely in her hands as to the diplomatic negotiations.

Jan. 8, do. to do. The Emperor has explained that the Catholic League cannot help Spain against the Dutch, and has made difficulties as to aiding Spain to obtain a port from the Duke of Pomerania or King of Poland, especially as the Prince of Poland will not guarantee that the port will be handed back at the peace. He thinks that under these circumstances it would be unwise for Spain to assist the League in a long and costly war in

Germany. All he wishes is to effect a general peace in Germany, but, in return, the League ought to aid him against the Dutch. He leaves the Infanta full powers as to all these matters.

Feb. 4, Infanta to Philip IV. If peace is not made with Denmark, troops might be sent from Belgium to seize a port in East Friesland or in the Baltic. If peace is made such a port can be got still more easily. It is unnecessary to hire ships from the Hanse Towns as she has already more than she can man.

Feb. 28, Philip IV. to Infanta. Had seen Aytona's letter with Friedland's plans for building two forts on the Elbe, below Hamburg, to intercept the Dutch trade. She must not, however, engage the name of Spain in this project, as if she did so it would make negotiations with the Dutch still more difficult.

March 7, Infanta to Philip IV. Has told Schwarzenberg, Philip IV. will only enter into a treaty with the Catholic League if they will agree that all the Princes of the Empire should aid one another in maintaining the Emperor's authority, and putting down rebellions in one another's territories, that is to say, aid Spain in her Burgundian dominions, which included Holland.

April 17, do to do. Gives particulars as to Rubens' conversation with Gerbier. Charles I. would be glad if Spain and Denmark could negotiate, but wishes the Dutch and, if Spain can arrange it, the Palatine should be included in the negotiations. England would make peace with France if she cannot do so with Spain. Wishes the Dutch would give up the point as to "Free" in the Truce and consent to open the Scheldt, but it will be useless to negotiate with the Dutch for a perpetual peace if they are required to disclose their views as to "Sovereignty" and Religion.

April 22, do. to do. Poland had asked for the help of twelve Spanish ships for use in the Baltic. As the Dunkirk ships could not pass the Sound, these might have to be bought in the Baltic, but they should certainly be given, as they could do so much to hamper Dutch trade and thus shorten the war.

April 23, Philip IV. to Infanta. [Cf. *Brussels*, E. et G., No. 195, Infanta to Philip IV., 22 Dec., 1626.] Acknowledges her letter of Dec. 22, 1626, as to Eric Larsen's request that Swedish copper might be admitted into Spain. This cannot be granted [on account of the "Brass Money"], for it would open the door to similar requests as to prohibited goods. It might, moreover, offend the Prince of Poland. She must, however, keep the negotiation going without appearing in it herself, so as not to throw Sweden into the arms of England and Holland. He was sending twenty-four ships to the Baltic to be placed under the command of the Prince of Poland. 2,100 Walloons should be sent to man the fleet. Gabriel de Roy, whilst at Vienna, was to arrange for it being fitted out.

May 23, Infanta to Philip IV. There are no Walloons to send, Germans should be employed. Sends an account of Rubens' conversations with the Ambassador of Savoy. Rubens' negotiations. The Invasion of Ireland.

Feb. 4, Infanta to Philip IV. Rubens is reporting to the King through D. Diego Mexia, his conversations with an envoy of Buckingham's.

Jan. 13, Philip IV. to Infanta. Has received her letter of Dec. 27, 1626, enclosing Eugenio O'Neil's proposals and will discuss them with him when he arrives.

Feb. 4, Infanta to Philip IV. Has received his letter of Jan 13, and sends him her views as to an Irish rebellion.

March 5, Philip IV. to Infanta. His observations on her despatch of Feb. 4.

March 20, Infanta to Philip IV. Will prepare for an expedition to Ireland as he wishes. Is sending the ships at Dunkirk to sea to harass Dutch trade as he wishes.

April 11, Philip IV. to Infanta. Thinks the expedition to Ireland might sail in September.

May 23, Infanta to Philip IV. Past experience shows that it will be necessary to send a very large force to Ireland. P. 178 [Undated] "The reasons why the Duke of Buckingham has made the proposals which I have given M. Rubens in writing." Signed de Gerbier. [Sent with a covering letter by the Infanta to Philip IV. on Feb. 28.] One from Gerbier to Rubens, undated, and Rubens' reply, are printed in *Sainsbury N.* "Original Unpublished Papers illustrative of the life of Sir Peter Paul Rubens as an artist and diplomatist." [London, 1859, 8vo.] P. 71 and p. 250.

March 22, Philip IV. to Infanta. Replies to her letter of Feb. 28, and urges her to comply with Buckingham's suggestions and arrange a Suspension of Arms between Spain and England and Denmark, and, as for that with the Dutch, leaves the negotiation in her hands to conduct on the lines he has already suggested. Aytona has urged him to come to terms with Denmark so that Spain may not have to send troops to the Imperial Armies.

April 11, Philip IV. to Infanta. Reasons why they must come to terms with France. Doing so will not hinder an arrangement with England.

May 23, Infanta to Philip IV. Comments on the conversation between the Savoyard Ambassador and Rubens. Spain would do well to take advantage of this opportunity to come to terms with England and Holland. Reasons for this. Scaglia was anxious that the settlement between Spain and England should be concluded before that between England and France, as it would lead to a general settlement with the United Provinces and Germany. The Duke of Savoy would allow him to prolong the negotiations between France and England for two years. The opportunity for peace between Spain and England was a very good one.

Do., Do. 197. Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXII., Juin-Décembre, 1627. June 1, Philip IV. to Infanta. Sends news from England forwarded by Dr. John Bates, who was in the King's Bed Chamber and one of Inojosa's spies. Reinforcements are being sent to Ireland. Bates is anxious that the vacant Irish Primacy should be given to his friend, Mgr. John Talbot, who might be sent to Ireland to inquire as to the prospects for a rising there, but Philip IV. fears that the native Irish would dislike an English Irishman.

June 1, Philip IV. to Infanta [Printed in Villamecil, C. "Rubens diplomatico español." [Madrid, Carlos Bailly—Bailliére, 1874], p. 158]. Sends her powers to negotiate with England but does not give her any to treat with the Dutch. Gives his reasons. Has instructed Mirabel that he wishes to remain on good terms with France, whilst negotiating with England. If the negotiations fail Spain will join France in attacking her. He empowers the Infanta to treat with the Dutch for a suspension of hostilities for a year. She is to inquire as to the possibilities of an expedition to Ireland, and of checking the supply of naval stores from the Baltic to the Dutch. Frederickstadt must be secured as a base for the Spanish fleet, with the aid of the Hanse Towns.

June 15, do. to do. Is determined to undertake the expedition to Ireland. Tyrone might be sent to Spain to discuss it. If an expedition were sent from Dunkirk to Scotland, Lord Hamilton and others might organize a rising there.

July 22, Infanta to Philip IV. Replies to his letter of June 15. Will wait for Mexia's arrival at Brussels to discuss the Irish Expedition with him.

Gives an account of the origin of Gerbier's mission. The English fleet has put to sea and may attack the Spanish coast.

Aug. 5. Philip IV. to Infanta. She might send an expedition of 1,500 men to land in England during the absence of the English fleet, which has attacked the Isle of Rhé.

Aug. 7. do. to do. Has offered to send 25 or 30 ships to join the French fleet.

Sept. 12. do to do. The Spanish ships arrived too late to take part in the relief of Rhé but have joined the French fleet on the Brittany coast.

Oct. 14. do. to do. Suggests the Emperor should appoint Count Mansfeldt to command the Baltic fleet. Dantzic and Putzig, as Polish ports, would be open to it, and it might prove possible to secure some Pomeranian harbour.

Dec. 22. do. to do. Urges the Infanta for the sake of Catholicism to proceed with the Irish expedition, discusses the proclamation to be issued when it starts, and the organisation of an Irish Republic. Scotland could be secured by promising Liberty of Conscience under the Palatine as King whilst the Hanse Towns could be won over by pointing out the tyranny which England exercises over the rest of the world. Philip IV. bases these remarks on a paper signed by Tyrone which has been laid before him by Sergeant Major O'Neil. In his answer to Lord Tyrone, Philip IV. says that as he is at war with England and so cannot make diplomatic representations to the King on behalf of the Catholics he is willing to support the Earl with troops for the sake of Religion. He informs the Infanta that he has decided to support Tyrone and urges her to hasten the preparations for the Expedition. She is to try and reconcile Tyrone and Tyrconnel, and to avoid jealousies, is to consult the heads of the Irish Government on every occasion. She is to draw up plans for organizing the Aristocracy to act as a Government during the conquest of the country. He thinks highly of O'Neil himself. The heads of departments must be most carefully chosen as they are to be the "bearleaders (*ayos*) of these boys," i.e., of Tyrone and Tyrconnel.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH REGARD TO SCAGLIA'S MISSION TO TREAT FOR PEACE WITH ENGLAND THROUGH RUBENS, AND RELATING TO THE RECALL OF MARQUIS SPINOLA.

June 15. Philip IV. to Infanta. Is annoyed that a painter should have been selected to open such important negotiations, and that Scaglia should have addressed himself in the first instance to Rubens. She must negotiate through Gerbier with both England and Holland. He is willing to receive the Duke of Savoy with open arms if he will bring about a settlement in Italy and come to terms with Genoa. [Cf. *Turin*, Ing. 4, Scaglia, Brussels, May 13, 14, 1627.]

Nov. 25. do. to do. Learns from Aytona that the Emperor is willing to occupy a port on the Baltic. Entrusts her with a commission to negotiate with Friedland to arrange for this being done.

Nov. 11. do. to do. Has seen her letter to Olivares in which she asks that Spinola may come to Spain to discuss the affairs of the Provinces. The King grants him three months leave for the purpose.

Dec. 11. Infanta to Philip IV. Spinola will set out for Spain directly he has arranged for the administration of the Netherlands during his absence. Wishes him to return as soon as possible. As d'Auchi writes that Poland cannot fit out a fleet until the following year, no seamen need be sent at present from Flanders to man it.

Do., No. 301. Correspondance de l'Archiduchesse Isabelle avec Olivares. [1625-1633.] Pp. 83-86, "Plan for a descent upon Ireland given by an Irish Archbishop of the Franciscan Order to Count Olivares, and referred by him to the Infanta, 1627." [The Archbishop was Brother Florence Conroy, Archbishop of Tuam.]

Jan. 30, Olivares to the Infanta, Pardo. Encloses "A Memorial drawn up by the Archbishop of Tuam." She should make a draft of the Proclamation to be published by the Earls on their landing. It should point out that the Catholics in Ireland live in a worse state than the Christians "who live under the Turk." The Irish can fight quite as well as the Dutch have done. The expedition should be carried out entirely by the native Irish, and none of the Anglicized Irish from Flanders should be employed in it. The chief reliance should be placed on artillery and engineers, for petards, for example, had never been heard of in Ireland, and not a single fortress was fortified to withstand them.

March 12, do. to do. Encloses a paper given him by the Archbishop showing how important it was that the two earls should be reconciled, and be allied by marriage.

April 13, Infanta to Olivares. Nothing can be done about Ireland at present. Tyrconnel's sister will not marry Tyrone.

London, S.P.O.

S.P.For. Ministers of State, Newsletters, Flanders, 19.

Brussels, January 27, 1627. The Irish Friars at Brussels talk amongst themselves of an intended invasion of Ireland the next summer.

London, British Museum, Manuscript Department, Add. MSS., 34,311. Sir Isaac Wake's Letter Books, Vol II., 1626-1630.

Aug. 17-27, 1626, Wake to Conway, Turin. His intelligencer at Rome "doth still alarme mee with feare of an invasion in England, as your Lp. may see by his letter here inclosed, wherein you will find more zeale than courtship." This letter is missing.

Hart, 6,988. Charles I. to Buckingham, 22 July, 2, 20 Sept., 1 October, 13 November, 1627. King of Bohemia to do., 26 Dec., 1627. Queen of Bohemia to do., 16 January, 1628. Letters written to Buckingham during the Expedition to the Isle of Rhé, and after his return to England.

Turin, Spagna, 19 [1627-1628].

1627, Jan. 22, Tarantaise to Duke, Madrid. It was rumoured that Spinola had taken the Isle of Wight, "but it seems that his action has not been greatly approved of here, and they say an Express has been sent to Flanders, as quickly and secretly as possible, taking express orders to Spinola not to get himself entangled in that island, but to withdraw at once, so that he may not share the fate which has befallen others, to the great cost of this Crown, with fearful loss of life amongst the soldiers and nobility, and no small hurt to the prestige of the nation."

March 20, do. to do. The Spanish Government has seized the money belonging to the Genoese merchants, which came by the Flota, and has re-arranged the Funds, assigned to them for the payment of their loans, on terms such that they must lose 25%.

April 13, do. to do. Government have made a contract with a Captain Shirley, who came to Italy with another as Persian Ambassador in Pope Clement's time [Clement VIII., Aldobrandini, 1591-1604] to raise a fleet of 50 vessels to keep the seas free from pirates. He was on the first Cadiz expedition, but afterwards served the Spanish Crown on various occasions. [*D.N.B.*, Vol. LII., pp. 121-124, *Shirley, Antony, Sir* [1565-1635], the well-known Persian traveller.]

Do. Spagna, 18, cit Tarantaise to Duke, Madrid, 1627, Jan 22. Manner of creating Grandees. Difference between the Eighteen Old Grandees and

the others. D. Pedro de Toledo created an "Old Grandee," June 28. The expense of the liveries for Tarantaise's household. The Inventory of Tarantaise's valuables. His "Diaries" or "Commentaries" on his life. His account of the Prince of Wales' visit to Madrid. Aug. 5, Dr. D. Bartolommeo Saputi to Duke, Madrid. Announces Tarantaise's death on Aug. 4. He had not left money enough to bury him. Olivares regrets him.

Do., Spagna, 19. 1627, Oct. 4., Saputi to Duke, Madrid. Encloses the Proclamation fixing the price of everything. Money had gone up to 75% and was then more than 40%. All prices had gone up over 50%. Nov. 23, The flota had brought 2,080,438 Pesos [£416,087] for H.M., and 11,421,211 Pesos for private persons [£2,284,242] from Terra Firma and New Spain, making a total of 13,501, 249 Pesos [£2,700,249].

Do. *Inghilterra*, Mazzo 4 [Anni 1621 in 1629]. "Lettere del' Abbate Scaglia al Duca di Savoia, Anni 1626, 1627, 1628, e 1631." Undated, Beginning of 1628 (?), Scaglia to Duke, Brussels (?). Spinola has gone to Spain with the Infanta's consent to seek to counteract the intrigues, which had been set at work to secure his recall on the pretexts that he was doing no good in Flanders, and was wasting the King's money. He is taking statements to show that unless matters are put on a sound footing in Flanders, they must remain on the defensive, but he is trying to make it appear that he is going on other business. Spinola and the Infanta are in thorough agreement but every one else at Brussels is opposed to him, "as they don't wish to be dominated over by the Infanta and the Marquis," and keep making these accusations against him in Spain. It is thought he will carry his point, especially as his son has just been named General of Cavalry in the State of Milan, to the great displeasure of his father's rivals in Belgium. Cueva is the only minister in favour of an arrangement with England. This would have been declared, however, had not Spain wished to leave France to waste away in the Rochelle War, which, it is thought, would come to an end, if Spain made peace with England. Richelieu is most anxious to induce Louis XIII. to leave Rochelle blockaded and to attack Savoy on account of Monferrat, but is deterred from doing so by his fear that, in that event, Spain and England would come to terms.

1627, May 13, do to do., *Brussels*. General wish for peace in Belgium. Shared by Spinola. Rising of the Belgians feared. Peace with England, if Savoy does not favour a peace between England and France, can easily be made. The English and Spaniards love one another, but the English and French are natural enemies. Only Charles I., out of pique, and Buckingham, are against Spain. [Cf. *Brussels, E. et G.*, No. 197, Philip IV. to Infanta, June 15, 1627.]

June 10, do. to do. Character of the Infanta. She longs for peace as does Spinola, the only person who carries weight with her. She thinks she can win over the Dutch through their trade interests. Cardinal de la Cueva, Spinola's chief rival, has the Infanta against him. Pecquius supports Spinola. June 12, *Amsterdam*, Description of Breda and Holland. The Dutch are longing for Peace. June 22, *The Hague*. Was trying with Carleton's help to arrange for trade between Amsterdam and Villefranche, July 12, Montagu will try to prevent hostilities between England and France. July 26, Mexia's mission to negotiate peace with the Dutch. Many of the Dutch wish the War to continue as they fear that were peace to come about Barneveldt's faction would raise its head again. Describes Rubens' negotiations with Gerbier. England refuses a peace through the mediation of Savoy, because of her failure in the Isle of Rhé. Aug. 4, The value of the Dutch East India trade. Despite the war the wealth of Holland, especially of Amsterdam, increases every day. Sept. 11, Montagu

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

was commissioned to tell the Duke that Charles I. would gladly help him about Geneva, if occasion served. They would devise the means from the documents sent by the Duke, and Scaglia would see that the person sent to Turin was in favour of the undertaking. Sept. 27, It would be well if Savoy could arrange terms between England and France whilst Fort St Martin was still holding out. Peace could easily be made if Buckingham could go back to the King with some advantages to show. Both France and England really need one. Nov. 7, *London*. Buckingham had written to Lord Holland that he was forced to raise the siege for sheer want of supplies and reinforcements. Nov. 1, *London*. England will not separate herself from Holland and Germany in her negotiations with Spain. Difficult to divert English trade from Leghorn to Villefranche, as all the shippers to the Levant had their correspondents at Leghorn from whom they took up the money with which they traded to the East. Nov. 21, The King had almost decided to negotiate for a suspension of arms through Savoy, when he changed his mind on hearing from Buckingham that he could hold his ground. Dec. 28, Some French and Spanish vessels are cruising off the English coast, but the English think that if part of their fleet fell in with them, they could get the upper hand of them without much difficulty. Dec. 31, Buckingham said the French war was unavoidable as France had broken all her promises to the Huguenots. M. de la Ramée who had come over with letters to the Queen replied that Louis XIII. only wished to reduce Rochelle to obedience, and, once this was done, would treat the Huguenots very differently.

Genoa, Spagna, 25 [Anni 1627-1630]. *Marco Felice Salluzzo—Pallavicino* to Government of Genoa, Madrid. 1627, Aug. 18. An English fleet of sixty sail is said to have appeared off the Isle de Leon. This will make it difficult for D. Federigo di Toledo to assemble his galleons either at Corunna or near the French coast.

Nov., "A list of what is come by the Flota of the present year, 1627, which arrived at San Lucar on November 19":

From Terra Firma (i.e., Peru and Columbia), for H.M. in Bullion	Ducats	1,455,862
From New Spain (i.e., Mexico and Central America), for H.M. in Bullion	621,876
	Ducats	2,080,438
From Terra Firma for Private Persons in Gold and Silver Bullion and Specie	Ducats	3,238,526
From New Spain, do.	2,350,668
	Ducats	5,589,194
In Country Produce	Ducats	1,831,250
Total value of the Flota. For H.M.	2,080,438
Do. Do. For Private Persons	7,420,444
Total Ducats	9,500,882

Taking the ducats as Pieces of Eight, say 4/-, the total value of the Flota would be, £1,900,176 8s. od.

Dec. 21, do. to do. The French Ambassador has announced to Olivares the capture of the English envoy, Montagu, on his way back from the Duke

of Savoy and Count of Soissons on the frontiers of Lorraine. Toledo and his fleet have joined the French fleet near Morbihan. He writes that they have no forces of any value. Spinola and Mexia are in favour of the French and Spanish fleets uniting to invade England. The rest of the Council of State are opposed to it, and the plan may be dropped after Spinola reaches Madrid.

Dec. 30, do. to do. Spinola has been ordered to visit the French King's quarters, either before Rochelle or elsewhere, it is thought to discuss the plan for an offensive alliance for joint operations.

Mantua, Archivio Patrio Gonzaga. E. xv. 3, Francia, Busta 675, op. cit. Priandi to Duke, Paris, 1627, Feb. 27. The Rochellers are in great alarm because Louis XIII. has told the Protestant Deputies that he means to be absolute master in his sea ports. Probably the Treaty between Rochelle and England has leaked out. Aug. 16, The Expedition to the Isle of Rhé. The French are afraid the Rochellers will go over to the English as they are devoted to them. Sept. 18, Louis XIII. is leaving for the Camp before Rochelle. Sept. 24, Richelieu was very angry with Buckingham, and seemed to have received some personal affront from him. Supplies had been thrown into Fort St. Martin, and it was thought the English would have to evacuate the island. Oct. 2, The Siege of Rochelle had been formed and lines of blockade were being laid out. Oct. 8, Rochelle had not admitted any English forces, possibly to assert its independence, though the populace adored England. [Cf. *Mervault*, *Dernier Siège*, etc., Jan. 13, 1628.] Oct. 16, Rochelle and some towns in Lower Languedoc have sworn a union with England. It would now be difficult to expel the English from France. Oct. 23, The English are preparing to evacuate Rhé. Buckingham had been recalled by the King to defend England in case it should be invaded by France and Spain. Nov. 8, Rochelle is said to be treating with Louis XIII. Nov. 13, Defeat of the English at Rhé from which they have been expelled. Possibly Rochelle may place itself in English hands. Nov. 20, There are great divisions of opinion at Rochelle, where some persons nearly opened one of the gates to the French. Nov. 27, The King means to remain with the army before Rochelle. Dec. 12, The English are preparing another expedition. The blockading works round Rochelle are being hurried forward. Dec. 24, Nearly every sovereign except Mantua had already sent letters of congratulation to Louis XIII. on his victory over the English.

Do., E. xiv. 3, *Spagna*, Busta, 617 [1626-1628]. *Alessandro Striggi* to Duke, Madrid, 1627, undated. There are fears that an English Fleet will attack the Spanish coasts. It was rumoured that the English had landed in France, and tried to surprise a fortress [Calais?]. Jan. 21, Spinola was said to have surprised the Isle of Wight, and to have taken four hundred head of cattle. March 24, As he could not see Olivares in any other way, he had got "the most famous painter in these parts" to paint two portraits of the King and Olivares on horseback, "which he is sending to Mantua." He then got Olivares to lend him his own portrait to be copied, as he did not think the others good likenesses. Olivares, however, was pleased with them, and when he found that they were for the Duke of Mantua, said that Velasquez could do them far better, and at once ordered Velasquez to take the work in hand. Striggi took advantage of Olivares' good humour to induce him to send orders to Villela, the Spanish Ambassador in Rome, to support the Duke of Mantua's suit for the dissolution of his marriage. April 19, Both Olivares and the King had given the painter short sittings for the "Ritrattini" which he was sending to Mantua. Striggi had, through his steward, given the painter a chain worth twenty-seven doubloons [£18 6s. 9d.], with which he was very well pleased. [Do., November, 1626,

Striggi to Marliani, reckons 266½ doubloons as 6,916 Lire Mant. A doubloon was, therefore, worth £o 13s. 7d.]. July 20, His stable expenses. Aug. 10, Tarantaise's death on Aug. 5. Dec. 4, Spinola was coming to Madrid. Philip IV. was said to intend to consult him as to fitting out a large fleet against the Dutch. *N.B.*, Striggi was nephew of Chancellor Striggi, who was looked upon at Madrid as the head of the Anti-Spaniards in Mantua.

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XVI.—BELGIUM, 1628. SPAIN, LA ROCHELLE, BUCKINGHAM.

Villa: Ambrosio Spinola, op. cit., pp. 461-472.

Rooes: Rubens, op. cit. Vol. IV., p. 163; pp. 175-177. Gerbier to Rubens, 18 Feb., 1628. Spinola's journey to Spain, p. 183. Spinola discusses the Dutch peace proposals in the Council at Madrid, pp. 193-194. Rubens sends the result of the discussion to Buckingham and Vosberghen, the Danish Envoy, pp. 210-214. Peace discussions continued, pp. 227-234. Rubens summoned to Spain by Philip IV., pp. 346-347. Death of Vincenzo II., Duke of Mantua.

Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, Jan., 1628. Has read Bacon's "Life of Henry VII.," pp. 356-357. Spinola and the Fine Arts, pp. 380-381. Spinola arrives at Madrid, pp. 399-400, 4 May. The Monferrat question, pp. 422-423, Rochelle. Vacchero's Conspiracy at Genoa, pp. 445-447, Rochelle. The Mantuan question, p. 456. The State of Spain, Aug., 1628, Vol. V., pp. 11-12. 2 Dec., Rubens at Rochelle.

Riezler, S. *Gesch. Bayerns*, op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 323-324, 1628. The Upper Palatinate. Changes of Religion, p. 328, 1627-1628. Spain and Wallenstein, p. 334. Maximilian learns of Wallenstein's designs.

MAPS OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN.

London, British Museum Map Room.

Gerritz. Hessel: Map of 1613 of Arctic Ocean [Press Mark 572 d. 2.] Cf. Conway. *Early Voyages*, op. cit.; *Mercator*: Gerhard, Map of 1569, reproduced in *Nordenskjöld*. Facsimile Atlas [1889], p. 95. *Keith Johnston*. Atlas. ["European Russia, Northern."]; *Stanford*, Universal Atlas [Stanford, London].

THE DESIGN AGAINST CALAIS.

Lefebvre, op. cit. *Histoire de Calais*, Tome II., pp. 502-508. Conspiracy to deliver Calais to England, 1628. *Gibbs, George*, "Life of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham." Lampoon Epitaph, "What Calais and Rhé have to say of him."

Calendar of State Papers, Domestic: Charles I., 1627-1628, p. 456; 1627, Dec. 3. Hipposley to Buckingham, Dover Castle, p. 457; Dec. 5. Plans for seizing fortified town in France. [Cf. *London, Brit. Mus., MSS. Dept.*, Add. 34,311. Sir Isaac Wake's Letter Books, Vol. II.; 1629, Feb. 10, Wake to Conway, Turin. Valencé, Governor of Calais, is discontented with Richelieu.]

Calendar of State Papers, Foreign, Venetian: Vol. XXI., 1628-1629. 1628, Aug. 7, Alvise Contarini to Doge, London. Plot at Calais discovered, p. 215; Aug. 7, p. 248, Corner to Doge, Turin; p. 628, Dec. 29, Corner to Doge, Wake and Valencé.

NEWS OF ROCHELLE.

1628, May 29, Alvise Contarini to Doge, London. March 31, May 20, Zorzi to Doge, Paris. June 12, Soranzo to Doge, The Hague. May 15, Contarini to Zorzi, London. Oct., 25, Zorzi to Contarini, Paris (cf. April 12, Zorzi to Doge, Paris), Dec. 10. Corner to Doge, Dec. 18, Soranzo to Doge.

MONTAGU'S MISSION.

Pp. 131, 132, 351, 354-356 [very important], 429. *Bassompierre*, op. cit., Vol. II. Disputes with the Huguenots; p. 332, 1625, Thoyras occupies the Isle of Rhé; 1625-1626, Bassompierre's Embassy to Switzerland; 1626-1627, His Mission to England.

Mervault: "Journal des Choses les plus Mémorables qui se sont passées au dernier Siège de "La Rochelle," par *Pierre Mervault*. [A Rouen, chez Jean Bertholin, 1648 (1 Tome). 1627, July 20, English Fleet arrives; Oct. 17, Letter from Sieur de Mabel to Louis XIII. [Bibl. de La Rochelle, No. 2066] shows that the plan for a Digue goes back to 1607. Its object was to flood as well as to isolate the town. [Cf. *Mantua*, Francia, 673, Priandi, Paris, Nov. 18, 1625]. Oct. 20, Mission to England leaves; Oct. 27, Vincent proposes to Town Council of Rochelle to negotiate with Spain; Dec. 25, French Fleet arrives off port.

THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENGLAND.

1627, Dec. 25; 1628, Jan. 29, Feb. 11, David, Vincent, Dehinsse. Envoys in London, to Town Council of Rochelle, London. 1628, Jan. 13, Buckingham proposes to the delegates that they should admit an English garrison into Rochelle. They refuse. [Cf. *Mantua*, Francia, 675, Priandi, Paris; 1627, Oct. 8], Jan. 22, Buckingham unwilling to undertake a second expedition to the Isle of Rhé; March 30, the Council accept the Treaty with England. It engages Charles I. to assist Rochelle only in general terms. pp. 224-228; Aug. 23, the death of Buckingham; Sept. 28, the news reaches Rochelle; Nov. 1, Louis XIII. enters Rochelle.

"The Book of Common Prayer, etc." [London, Bonham, Norton and John Bill, 1626].

HARLEIAN MISCELLANY, VOL. 8.

[London, White and Cochrane, 1811]. *Wotton*, a short view of the Life and Death of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, by *Sir Henry Wotton, Kt.* [London, printed for William Sheares, 1642]; p. 610, his conduct at Rhé, 1627; pp. 621-622, his attitude towards the third Expedition to Rochelle; p. 624, Character of Buckingham.

THE SOMERS COLLECTION OF TRACTS.

2nd Edition edited by Walter Scott, Esq. [London, T. Cadell, 1810].

Wotton, "Some observations by way of parallel of Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, and George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham," written by *Sir Henry Wotton, Kt.* (really by Lord Clarendon in his youth).

Pp. 162-165, Summary of their two characters.

Morre, "Description of the principal tombs in the Old Church at Delft," by *Dr. G. Morre*, translated by *D. Goslings*. [Delft, P. J. Koumans, 1907]. P. 5, tomb of Pieter Pieterz, Hein.

The Abergavenny St. Mary's Parish Magazine, August, 1913 [Chronicle Office, Abergavenny]. *The Walking Parson*. "A Walk to Lourdes" describes the origin of Ox Tail Soup, invented during the Siege of La Rochelle.

Khevenhüller, op. cit., Vol. X., page 1329 [1626]. The Flota of 1626,

Vol. XI., p. 400 [1628]. Piet Hein takes the Spanish Flota at Matanzas ; Sept. 8, 1628, do. p. 879 [1629] precautions taken about the Flota in 1629 ; do. p. 321 [1628], Vacchero's Conspiracy at Genoa. Attitude of Genoa to Spain ; p. 805 [1629], Spain conciliates Genoa, which refuses M. de Sabran's offers from France.

Reigersborch, Brieven op. cit., pp. 108-109, 2 July, 1628. Pp. 110-111, 6 January, 1629, Carlisle's negotiations. *Lombard*, "Un Volontaire de 1792," par *Jean Lombard*. [Paris, 1903, 1 tome], pp. 2, 3, quoting *De Mazamet*, "Histoire de la Révolution à Marseille et en Province, etc." [Marseille, 1838], par *C. de Mazamet*. Legal status of La Rochelle and Marseilles.

ROYAL HISTORICAL MSS. COMMISSION'S REPORTS.

County of Wilts, p. 142 (1661), p. 143 (1662), p. 144 (1662), Pensions to Soldiers wounded at Rhé. Cf. pp. 83-85 [1610-1611] for system of Pensions to Soldiers.

Plymouth (Supplementary), p. 542, 1628-9, La Rochelle.

Halifax and Lansdown Tracts, Vol. 10, *Cotton*, "The danger wherein the Kingdom now standeth, and the remedy," by *Sir Robert Cotton*, Bt. [Printed 1628]; pp. 12-19, Causes of differences between King and Parliament ; pp. 19-21, Buckingham should advise a Parliament to be called.

Bacon, "Considerations touching a warre with Spaine, etc." Written by the Rt. Hon. *Francis Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Albans*. [Printed 1629]; pp. 42-46, English dominions compact. Those of Spain scattered. Small population of Spain. Money makes her greatness. *Do.*, Vol. 11, *Wadsworth*, "The Present State of Spain," by *James Wadsworth* [London, 1630]; p. 11, Character of Spinola ; pp. 83-84, the Brass Money.

D.N.B. [London, Smith, Elder and Co, 1887], Vol. X., p. 67. Charles I. (1600-1649), Vol. LVIII., p. 336. "Villiers, George, 1st Duke of Buckingham (1592-1628), His Murder," Vol. XXV., p. 429. "Henrietta Maria (1607-1669)."

ROYAL COMMISSION MSS. COMM. REP.

Plymouth ; p. 542, News of Denbigh's expedition. *Lowndes G.A.* News of Rochelle 11 July, 1628.

Bassompierre. "Journal de Ma Vie," Mémoires du Maréchal de Bassompierre, par le Ms. de Cantenac. [Paris, Lib. Renouard, 1875, Tomes 4].

Tome III. P. 32, Note 2, Guitton appointed Maire of La Rochelle 1622 ; p. 182, Note 2, Fort Louis ; pp. 199-202, the Huguenots and Fort Louis, 1625, Blavet ; p. 210, M. de Saint Luc occupies the Isle of Rhé, 15 September, 1625 ; pp. 254-282, Mission of Bassompierre to England, 1626 ; pp. 271-272, the Lord Mayor's Show, 1626 ; pp. 290-292, the Troubles at La Rochelle, 1627 ; pp. 292-343, the Expedition to the Isle of Rhé, Siege of La Rochelle, 1627 [Cf. *Les Mémoires du Maréchal de Bassompierre* (Cologne, 1692), op. cit. Tome II. ; p. 402 *et seqq.*] ; pp. 343-370, the Siege of La Rochelle during the Winter of 1627-1628 ; pp. 376-419, the Third English Expedition, 1628, the Town entered by Louis XIII., Nov. 1. *Corbett*, "Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816," Edited with elucidations from contemporary authorities by *Julian S. Corbett*, LL.D. [Printed for the Navy Records Society, 1905, 1 Vol.] Part III., Carolingian I., Viscount Wimbledon, 1625, II. The Earl of Lindsey, 1635 ; pp. 63-72, Sir Thomas Love's Instructions, 11th October, 1625 ; pp. 50-51. These are very important for the "Order of Fight" in the attack on the Digue at La Rochelle, 1628.

The Dutch assist Louis XIII, against Rochelle, 1625. Reigersborch

cit. R. to Grotius, 1 Dec., 1628. The preachers in Zealand angry because the Dutch had assisted the French King against the Rochellers. Aerssens blamed, Cf. *Bassompierre*, cit. Vol. I., p. 332., for Dutch vessels with Thoyras' fleet at the capture of the Isle of Rhé.

MANUSCRIPT.

XVI.—BELGIUM, MADRID, 1628. LA ROCHELLE, BUCKINGHAM.

Brussels, E. et G.

No. 198, Correspondence de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV, Tome XXIII. (Janvier-Juin), 1628, 1628, Infanta to Philip IV.; Jan. 2, Has sent Visconti to Prague to arrange with Wallenstein as to the plan of campaign. The fleet from Dunkirk, with ships from Spain, should sail straight for the Sound, and, if victorious, join the Baltic fleet there. She was having the ports occupied by Wallenstein surveyed so as to choose one as a base for the fleet. To this plan Wallenstein agreed, although he had been intending to invade France, if he was not called into Denmark. He was seizing Pomerania and Mecklenburg to close the door to the Kings of Denmark and Sweden, and Schleswig and Jutland to secure the two fleets. If he could restore peace to Germany, he would seize the Bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt and use their revenues to carry on war with the Turks and Danes, without any charge to the Emperor. [Cf. *Brussels, E. et G.*, No. 197. Infanta to Philip IV., Dec. 19, 1627.]

Jan. 17, Philip IV. to Infanta. The Emperor must push on the war with Denmark, 30 ships will be sent from Spain to assist him. Poland will also lend ships. Arnim has offered through Wallenstein to burn the Swedish Fleet [Cf. *Forster*, "Wallenstein's Briefe," Vol. I.; pp. 124-126, 143-144. Wallenstein to Arnim, Nov. 2, Nov. 22, 1627], Calderon could arrange to burn the Dutch ships. Wallenstein, by occupying East Friesland, has put great pressure on the Hanse Towns to join the Emperor.

March 10, Philip IV. to Aytona. Offers the Emperor large sums if he will arrange a favourable peace between Spain and the Dutch. The points as to "Sovereignty" and "Freedom of Religion" must be agreed to by the Dutch before the negotiations begin, and they must give up the India Trade.

Feb. 12, Infanta to Philip IV. Gives an account of the ships at Dunkirk, eleven in number. They will sail in three squadrons to raid the Dutch transports which, at that season, were bringing grain from France.

April 14, De la Ville, then Lorraine envoy, who had been in England, told her that Buckingham now asked for peace with Spain and war with France, but the Council and people were against him. Kessler, who was negotiating with the Dutch, said that they now wished for a Truce without raising the questions of Sovereignty and Independence. Spinola thought that Wallenstein's and Tilly's victories had frightened them into this.

May 1, Philip IV. to Infanta. Desires her to procure from Rubens all the letters, etc., which he has received from England, as he wishes to see on what foundations the negotiations are based.

May 31, Infanta to Philip IV. The Dunkirk fleet cannot be used in the Baltic, as Wallenstein requests, because they have no pilots who know those seas, and the vessels are not fitted for such a voyage. Rubens has written honestly as to his negotiations, for she has been able to test his accounts through the Lorraine envoy and others. Kessler was resuming his negotiations.

June 7. do. to do. She had seen Carlisle when on his way through

Brussels to Lorraine and Savoy, but he had told her nothing of his mission, and had not brought her a message from Charles I.

[There is not a word about Ireland in this Register, nor is any explanation given as to the reasons why the plan for an expedition to Ireland had been laid aside.]

Do. No. 199, Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., 1628. Tome XXIV. (Juillet—Décembre, 1628), July 2, Infanta to Philip IV. Kessler had seen the Burghermaster of Rotterdam, who, with the consent of the Prince of Orange and the States General, was to meet him at Rosendaal to treat about the Truce.

July 6, Philip IV. to Infanta. Rubens had offered to come to Spain bringing his papers with him. The Infanta should get the English to send an agent secretly to one of the Cantabrian ports.

August 3, Infanta to Philip IV. Dutch would treat for a Truce in a new form. Would allow the question of Independence to be settled in the form proposed by Spain, but could not treat at Rosendaal, as to opening the Scheldt nor make any concessions on the Religious question on account of the violence of the preachers. The Infanta would not give way on the Religious point. Spain must treat with the Dutch on account of her financial condition.

August 13, do. to do. Was sending Rubens to Madrid. The Dutch deputies thought the Provinces would give way as to Religion if pressed.

Sept. 6, do. to do. Was sending Zapata to Madrid to represent the condition of their finances. Scaglia had arrived from England, bringing Gerbier who was going to Italy and Antonio Porter, who was to go to Spain with Zapata, with him. Scaglia said that Buckingham was inclined to peace with Spain rather than with France. He wished the Palatine, Denmark, Dutch, etc., to be included in it, but would throw over the Dutch if necessary. They, on their side, were trying to loosen their connection with England, as they were afraid of being sacrificed to the Palatine. The Catholics must not be named in the negotiations, or they would be broken off at once. Savoy could do much for them. If the Palatine's eldest son married the Emperor's daughter, this would mean that a Catholic would succeed to the English throne, as the children would be brought up as Catholics but secretly so as not to offend the English. [Charles I. was at the time childless.] England should put pressure on France by aiding the Huguenots in Normandy and at Rochelle. Gerbier had stated, though secretly, that the Council were pressing Buckingham and the King to make terms with France, who would listen to them, before trying to relieve Rochelle. The King was coming round to their views. Gerbier was very suspicious of both Scaglia and Porter.

Sept. 21, do. to do. Announces Buckingham's death. It was uncertain what the effect would be. Rochelle was treating for terms.

Oct. 24, Philip IV. to Infanta. Asks how Buckingham's death will affect the negotiations with England. Cottington wrote that the King was most anxious for peace, as he had been disgusted with the war with Spain ever since the failure of the Cadiz Expedition, and had himself commissioned Scaglia and Gerbier to treat for it. Cottington wrote that he would come to Spain himself either with or without a commission from the King, whilst Porter said that Buckingham, who had already an agent in Spain, would come privately himself. Buckingham had certainly had a commission from the King to treat with France and listen to their proposals for Peace, but to return no answer until he saw how matters stood with Spain. Holland seemed inclined to treat with France, and had written to "El Mehrossa" [possibly the Duc de Chevreuse] that Buckingham's death would not affect the negotiations.

Oct. 26, Infanta to Philip IV. Weston and Cottington had written to Coloma to confirm Antony Porter's mission to Spain, although it was known that the leader of the expedition to Rochelle was treating with France.

Oct. 31, Philip IV. to Infanta. Orders levies for Italy and the Siege of Casale to be pressed on even if he has to sell his plate and consume all his possessions to raise the million for the expenses. Otherwise the French, now the War of Rochelle is over, may do him a bad turn in Italy.

Nov. 20, Infanta to Philip IV. Has heard from Mirabel of the Surrender of Rochelle. There is not a ducat in Flanders to pay for sending men to Savoy, although the French forces are being hurried from Rochelle to the Grisons.

Dec. 7, Infanta to Philip IV. Weston had written to Coloma that Buckingham's death would not affect the negotiations with Spain (Weston to Coloma, Nov. 2, 1628). Coloma had written to Cottington that he would be welcomed at Brussels, "as a friend of many years' standing. The King of Spain is only too anxious for peace." [Coloma to Cottington, Brussels, Dec. 6, 1628.] Cottington was going to the Hague to see the Palatine, and to endeavour to arrange the marriage between his son and the Emperor's daughter.

Dec. 21, Infanta to Philip IV. If Spain treats with England and Holland, an attempt to bring about peace in Germany should be made at the same time. The ships at Dunkirk and Ostend were too poorly fitted out to occupy Frederickstadt and Sylt with the help of Duke Frederick of Holstein, as Philip IV. wished.

Dec. 29, Philip IV. to Infanta. Had asked Porter to write to Cottington to say that he would be most welcome in Spain.

Do. No. 126, Correspondance d'Ambroise Spinola avec l'Infante Isabelle, 1626, 1628, 1629.

1628, May 1, Spinola to Infanta, Madrid. Both H.M. and Olivares are anxious that something of importance should be effected against the Dutch this year. They were going to ask the Emperor to get Friedland to lend her troops, and suggested that she should either lay siege to Rees or attack Veluwe and Groningen. A raid into the Veluwe would bring the Dutch to treat. Olivares approves of the Veluwe plan.

May 31, Infanta to Spinola. Sends him copies of two letters from Jacques Bruneau, who has been on a mission to Prague and Munich. From these it is plain that there is not the slightest chance that either the Emperor or the Catholic League will help them against the Dutch. The Duke of Bavaria said that Friedland was the greatest enemy the League had. His one object was to make himself supreme in the Empire, and those about him spoke with contempt even of the Emperor. The Chancellor of Mainz had told Bruneau that if Friedland helped the Infanta, the common people in Germany would look on it as a proof that Spain and the Empire were leagued together to make the Empire hereditary and to establish Universal Monarchy, although every well informed person knew that this was untrue. Friedland was playing only for his own hand. Bruneau mistrusted him on account of the way in which he allowed himself to be influenced by Astrology. The Catholic League would never break with the Dutch, so long as Friedland remained in command, and the Dutch could not be placed in the Ban without the consent of the Diet. The Germans knew, however, that there could be no solid peace in the Empire, of which the Dutch were members, until the Dutch question was settled, but until a King of the Romans was elected the Emperor dare not break with the Electors. Friedland said himself that he could spare no troops for Holland, whilst North Germany lay

open to the attacks of the Danish fleet, and added that the power of the English fleet at sea would soon force the Imperialists to treat for peace, although Bruneau assured him that he knew from what he had seen in England in 1625 that the English fleet was very inefficient, and that they lived in dread of a sortie from Dunkirk, particularly as the land forces in England were small. Tilly could be more useful to Spain than Friedland, but Bruneau thought they ought to treat with the Dutch for a truce at once, as the Dutch were still afraid of being attacked from Germany.

The Infanta thought that they must remain on the defensive in Belgium that year and think themselves lucky if they were left alone by the Dutch. Bruneau said that he thought that Cardinal Clesel could do more good than any one else if he would excommunicate Wallenstein.

Feb. 15, Count Henri de Berg to Spinola. Had been approached by a Dutch agent, who said the Dutch were willing to treat on terms satisfactory to Spain.

April 11, Spinola to Infanta, Madrid. Had written to Berg to say that before negotiations were begun with the Dutch they should find out what conditions the Dutch would be willing to concede.

April 30, do. to do. Comments on Kessler's account of his negotiations at Rosendaal. Thinks that they might agree to terms by which the Catholics might be allowed to worship privately in their own houses. No time should be lost in coming to an agreement with the Dutch.

May 31, Infanta to Spinola. The King has sanctioned Kessler's negotiations. She has told H.M. that they have no money in Belgium to undertake active operations.

August 4, do. to do. Has heard that the Dutch Fleet, in place of blockading Mardyck, is sailing for Havanna to attack the Flota with the aid of the India Company's Fleet.

Oct. 13, Spinola to Infanta, Madrid. Olivares wished to send an envoy from Madrid and some persons of rank from Brussels to take the negotiations out of Kessler's hands. He had protested against this as the despatch of such a mission would only call attention to the treaty which was in progress, and all the enemies of Spain would combine to break it off.

Nov. 6, Infanta to Spinola. Thoroughly approves of his advice to Olivares as to the conduct of the negotiations.

Nov. 18, Spinola to Infanta. Olivares could not find another *maravedi* for Flanders. He said that the Infanta had written to him that the 450,000 ducats [£112,500] already sent would last her till the end of the year.

Dec. 3, Infanta to Spinola. Had no recollection of having written any such letter to Olivares. In any case money must be sent her at once, as she was uncertain if even the bills which had already been sent her would be paid in full.

Do. No. 208, Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle concernant Rubens, 1628 (1629). 1628, July 23, Olivares to the Infanta. If France continues to send troops to Italy, they must continue negotiations with England, if only to prevent the English from coming to a settlement with France. She is to see that these negotiations are kept going.

August 13, Infanta to Olivares. She will comply with his wishes, but adds in her own hand that now that Rubens has returned to Flanders, she has no means of corresponding directly with England.

Oct. 20, Copy of the letter from Don Franco. Cottington to D. Carlos Coloma.

Nov. 6, Coloma to Cottington. Copy [Cf. *Brussels, E. et G.*, No. 199, Nov. 20, Infanta to Philip IV.].

Do., *Etat et de l'Audience*. No. 631. Correspondance Historique 1628. 1628, Jan. 22, D'Aubermont, Commander of Bois-le-Duc, to his uncle, Baron de Grobbendonck. Gives an account of the bad state of the fortifications of Bois-le-Duc, which could be surprised by the Dutch at any time.

Jan. 26, do. to do. The Dutch were advancing from Arnheim.

Jan. 28, Henri de Berg to Infanta. The Dutch were marching to Emden and Germany.

Sept. 4, Resolution of the States General. Advise the Spanish mutineers at Boxmeer, to seize some frontier town when they will help them.

Oct. 31, News letter from Rotterdam. Peace between France and England is looked on as certain. If one is made between the Dutch and Spain, it will be the ruin of the maritime population, who would find difficulty in getting employment if they had to make short voyages to Spain in place of long ones to the Indies.

Nov. 17, do. do. Announces the capture of the Flota by Piet Hein, "1,800 miles East of Havana."

Turin, Spagna, 19.

Saputi to Duke, Madrid.

1628, Jan. 22. The Spaniards were annoyed because neither they nor the Emperor had been informed of the Mantuan Marriage beforehand. It was said that both powers were inviting Savoy to join them in attacking Mantua and Monferrat.

Jan. 26. That day the coaches had been ordered to go and receive Marquis Spinola.

May 2. Spinola had been ordered to return to Flanders. News had been received of Vacchero's conspiracy to hand over Genoa to the Prince of Piedmont, or to Prince Thomas of Savoy.

Secretary Pietro Lorenzo Barozzi was in May, 1628, sent from Turin to Brussels, London and Madrid to induce Charles I. and Philip IV. to make an attempt to prevent the French from assisting the Duke of Nevers in his attempt to take possession of Mantua and Monferrat. His letters from Brussels are in this bundle.

May 6, Brussels. Cardinal de la Cueva told him that the Emperor, whose wife Leonora Gonzaga was a Mantuan Princess, and whose favourite Prince Eggenberg supported her, as he claimed the Marquisate of Livorno, would, but for Aytona, the Spanish Ambassador, have prevented Savoy from laying siege to Casale. The Duke and Duchess Dowager of Lorraine were against Nevers and had sent de la Ville to England to oppose him. Describes his escape from brigands on his way from Namur, and his interview with the Infanta.

May 8. His difficulty in reaching England by either Dunkirk or Holland on account of the trouble as to passports. In a letter written in December, 1628, he gives an account of his interview with M. de la Ville, who spoke of Olivares' grief at the death of Buckingham, and of his own journey across the St. Gothard, through a country where in one village, Polacchio, near Bellinzona, 13 had died of the plague in one day. The plague was so bad in Alsace that he had had to pass round Colmar and other cities. [As to De la Ville, cf. Barozzi to Duke, Nancy, Dec. 30.] In a letter of Dec. 29 Barozzi gives an account of Lord Carlisle's quarrel with the Magistrates of Basle because they had not received him officially as they had done Bassompierre when on his mission to the Grisons in 1626. [Cf. Bassompierre's Memoirs, op. cit. Vol. II.], and of the discussion between Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden as to closing the passes to Spanish troops, because Spain had not paid for their levies, and the Governor of Milan had detained grain which they had bought in Piedmont.

President de Monthoux to Duke, Madrid, 1628, Nice, June 16. Spain

and Savoy could support Guastalla, the Spanish claimant to Mantua, without declaring war against France, just as in Cleves and Juliers they had supported Neuburg against Brandenburg, the English and Dutch candidate, without breaking the Truce with Holland.

Oct. 5, Madrid. Olivares was greatly afflicted by the Duke of Buckingham's death, which he thought would interrupt the negotiations with England. Bristol, however, would certainly continue them. Sept. (sic.) 9, gives an account of Kessler's negotiations at Rosendaal [Cf. Brussels, E. et G., 198-199.] It is thought they will succeed. Oct. 31, No arrangements between Spain and England will ever be effected on the basis of restoring the Palatine. Nov. 1, Spain had told the Emperor, that they would not be bound by any arrangement into which he might enter with Nevers. Mantua must be garrisoned by the Emperor and Monferrat held on deposit by Spain, until arrangements could be made with Savoy, or a just division of the inheritance he effected between Rethel, Nevers' son, and Guastalla. Nevers had hoisted the Imperial flag over Casale, thinking this would satisfy the demands of Imperial Law. Dec. 26, Colonel Clausel, the envoy from the Duke of Rohan, who was at Madrid to treat with Spain, said that the Palatine could not be included in the Peace between Spain and England. The three Ecclesiastical Electors had opposed the negotiations, because they had been excluded by the burghers from their Episcopal cities, whilst the Palatinate included a great deal of ecclesiastical property which had been usurped by the Palatine's grandfather and uncle. Dec. 3, Bautru, the new French Ambassador, and Olivares had had a discussion as to the action of the French King in assisting rebels and heretics. Bautru had proved that Spain did the same. [Cf. *Mantua*, E. XIV., 3. *Venezia*, Francesco Battuino to Duke, Venice, 22 Oct., 1622.] The theologians said that Spain could do it. Olivares said they had better be at open war with France. The little money France gave the Dutch cost Spain 4,000,000 ducats [£1,000,000] a year. Dec. 29, Olivares said that Savoy, the Emperor, and Spain, should make a League, which might be joined by any power, even by Nevers himself, if he chose. Sept. 3, Lorraine claimed Monferrat as heir under the Laws of the Empire, Monferrat being an Imperial Fief conferred on the Gonzagas by a grant from Charles V.

Mantua, Archivio Patrio Gonzaga.

E. II. 3, Busta 495, Corte Cesarea (1628-1629).

Vincenzo Agnelli, Vescovo di Mantova, 1628, Agnelli to Duke, Prague, April 15. Account of Bruneau's Mission to Prague to induce the Emperor to undertake a naval expedition from the Baltic against the Dutch with the help of Spain, but though Wallenstein liked the scheme, the state of Italy was against any such action being taken. March 4, April 8, Wallenstein says plainly he will not give a man to serve against the Duke of Mantua, as the war is an unjust one. May 13, Neuburg was utterly disgusted because the Emperor had refused to give him the Electorate after the death of the Elector of Bavaria, or to hand over to him any part of the Palatinate, as Bavaria had to be compensated for her outlay on the war, and for giving up Upper Austria. July 26, Eggenberg told him that, if France came to a rupture with the Emperor about Mantua, he had given Wallenstein orders to enter France. Nov. 22, News arrives of the Fall of Rochelle.

Do. E. XV., 3, Francia, Busta, 676, op. cit.

Girolamo Priandi to Duke, Paris.

1628, Jan. 22, Describes his visit to Louis XIII. at the Camp before La Rochelle.

Rudolfo Hippolito, Count of Gazzoldo, to Duke, Paris.

1628, May 25. The departure of the English Fleet from Rochelle described. Visits the Camp before Rochelle, describes Louis XIII.'s quarters. His conversation with Richelieu. Oct. 7, the third English attempt to relieve Rochelle. Nov. 7, Richelieu to Duke of Mantua. Announces Fall of Rochelle.

Genoa, R. Archivio di Stato.

Spagna, 25 [Anni 1627 in 1630.]

Marco Felice Saluzzo Pallavicino to Doge.

Madrid, 1628, March 1. Spinola has been received at Madrid with the greatest honours. The Council will arrange for him to return to Flanders as soon as possible. They were deliberating whether they would make an offensive and defensive alliance with France against England, and conclude a Truce with the Dutch. March 9, Mexia and Spinola wish for an alliance with France on account of the position of affairs in Flanders. Most people are against it. Sept. 16, the Infanta of Flanders, Lorraine, and Savoy are trying to negotiate peace between Spain and England. It is thought Bristol will soon be back again at Madrid as Ambassador. Oct. 6, the news of Buckingham's murder had just arrived. Count Olivares felt it very much. Porter has arrived to negotiate for England. Oct. 23, the negotiations with the Dutch and England are being pushed forward. The Dutch have occupied a position on the Rio de la Plata. Dec. 23, announces the news of the capture of the Flota. The loss is shown by the Bills of Lading to amount to four millions two hundred thousand ducats (£1,050,000).

Winchester Castle. Records of the County of Hampshire. Liber Ordinum of the Justices of the Peace in Quarter Sessions, April, 1628-April, 1649.

Quarter Sessions April 2, 1628.

Orders for Holden Beacons. Orders to repair Beacons at Tootehill and elsewhere.

Do. July 8, 1628.

Further orders as to the Beacons. The hobblers (charcoal carriers) are exempted from contributing to them or attending to watching at them.

Do. Dec. 31, 1628.

Further orders in order to prevent claims for exemption being made by persons falsely claiming to be hobblers. The hobblers are exempted on the ground that the services which they render are quite as useful to the public as if they watched at the Beacons.

London, British Museum, Manuscript Department :

Add MSS. 34,311. Sir Isaac Wake's Letter Books. Vol. II., 1626-1630, 1628, Dec. 20, Turin. Wake to Conway. France certainly had her eye on Genoa. "The credit of ye Genoese is so weakened that at the last faire of Piancerola no bills of theirs could be accepted, and now ye Kinge of Spayne is inforced to serve himselfe of ye credit of ye Portugese and of ye Fuccheri [Fuggers] of Austourg, who do supply his present wants, but not so abundantly but that his wants too visibly appeare." [Cf. Brussels, E. et G., 199. 1628, Nov. 20, Infanta to Philip IV.]

London, S.P.O. Conway's Preparations in Isle of Wight :

S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 89. No. 138 (Conway's Papers). Conway's Orders as Captain General of Isle of Wight, 15 August, 1626. [Cf. *Privy Council Register* a few days earlier, and *Times*, 14 Nov., 1905. "Nomination of Sheriffs."]

PRINTED.

XVII.—BELGIUM, 1629-1633; SPAIN, BOIS-LE-DUC, WESEL.

Riezler : "Geschichte Bayerns," op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 338-340, France and Bavaria, 1629; pp. 341-345, The Edict of Restitution, 1629; pp. 347-349, Spain and the Catholic League, 1629; pp. 351-352, Bavaria and the Mantuan Question, 1629; pp. 354-356, France, Rome, and Bavaria, 1629.

Nugent : "The Grand Tour," op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 215-217, Bois-le-Duc; p. 217, Grave; p. 218, Gertrudenburg; Vol. III., p. 346, Emmerich, Wesel.

Uit onzen Bloeitijd.

Serie III., No. 4, "De Kinderdoop de Gereformeerder" ["Infant Baptism in the Reformed Church"], door Prof. Dr. S.D. van Veen [Baarn, Hollandia-Druk, 1911]. Pp. 22-23, Children baptized as Protestants at Bois-le-Duc, after the capture of the Town. Sept., 1629, *Khevenhüller*, op. cit., part XI., p. 829 (1629), Gustaf Adolf and Spain, 1629; p. 831, The Campaign of 1629; p. 877 (1628-9), The booty taken by the Dutch in the Silver Fleet of 1628; p. 882, Dutch Imports from the East Indies; p. 890, The State of Spain in 1629.

Riezler : *Geschichte Bayerns*, op. cit., Vol. V.; pp. 363-365, The Palatine and the Electoral Diet at Ratisbon, 1630.

Royal Historical MSS. Comm. Reports. Round, James, pp. 277-278, Letters of Robert, Lord Oxford, from Bois-le-Duc, 1629. *Rosses* : *Rubens*, op. cit., Vol. V. (6 September, 1628, to 26 December, 1631); pp. 14-17, Madrid, 29 Dec., 1628, The loss of the Flota; pp. 25-26, Perfumery at Madrid; pp. 28-30, The Treaty of Susa, Madrid, 22 April, 1629; p. 33, Philip IV. to Infanta, 27 April, 1629, do p. 291, April 8, 1630, are concerned with Rubens' Mission to England; pp. 225-226, Monson tries to secure Villefranche from Savoy as a Naval Base for England; pp. 80-82, English political parties in June, 1629; pp. 115-117, Rubens' views as to Parliament; The State of the English Court; pp. 126-128, Rubens to Olivares, July 22, 1629, Charles I. and Henrietta Maria; pp. 147-148, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, August 8, 1629, Description of England; pp. 152-156, do. to Peirex; pp. 164-165, The Spanish Council and Bribery in England; pp. 174-178, Rubens on Peace with England; pp. 339-341, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, Antwerp, October, 1630; Comments on Spinola's Death.

Green, M. A. : "Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia," op. cit., pp. 268-270, 1629, The Queen of Bohemia and the Siege of Bois-le-Duc, The Fall of Bois-le-Duc.

Reigersborch : Op. cit., pp. 116-118, R. to Grotius, 27 May; pp. 121-124, do. to do., 20 July; pp. 777-778, J. van R. to G., 28 July; pp. 779-781, do. to do., 25 Aug., 1629, The Siege of Bois-le-Duc, Henri de Berg's Campaign in the Veluwe.

RICHELIEU'S POLICY TO THE HUGUENOTS AFTER 1629.

Rankin : "The Marquis d'Argenson and Richard II," by Lt.-Col. Sir Reginald Rankin, Bt. [London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1907, 1 Vol.]; pp. 99-101, Comments on M. d'Argenson's statements in his Memoirs, Vol. V., pp. 328-34. [Paris, Rathery, 1825, 5 Vols.] showing that the policy advocated by M. de Chasteauneuf as regards the Huguenots (Cf. Sidelights, etc. Vol. III., pp. 446-447, at the English Court, was that which had been originally employed by Henri III., until he laid it aside at the instigation of some of his courtiers. It had been recommended by President

Jeannin to Henri IV., and is explained by Marquis d'Argenson in his *Memoirs*, Vol. V., pp. 328-334.

MANUSCRIPT.

XVII.—BELGIUM, 1629-1633, BOIS-LE-DUC, WESEL, SPAIN.

Brussels, Etat et Guerre.

No. 200. Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXV, (Janvier-Mai, 1629-1629). 1629, Jan. 6, Infanta to Philip IV., Encloses her expert's report on the Island of Sylt. Spain ought to induce Duke of Holstein to hand it over to her as a guarantee for the safety of Spaniards trading in those parts. Feb. 13, do. to do. Dutch using part of money taken in Silver Fleet to fit out a force to take the field at the end of March. They expect great successes as Spain is in such a bad state. She has not got a farthing but what she raises by felling forests and selling trading licenses to the Dutch. Jan. 30, Philip IV. to Infanta. Asks the Obedient Provinces to lend Spain some money. March 3, Infanta to Philip IV. Dutch deputies at Rosendaal are referring his letter to Spinola to the States General. They are fitting out eighty sail for the West Indies, etc., March 27. Dutch intend to seize Matanzas in Cuba as a basis for operations against New Spain. Fears answer of States General will be unfavourable as they have made such great preparations and threaten Antwerp, Hulst, Dunkirk, or Mardyck, etc. England at the request of Savoy was fitting out a fleet to make a diversion in France. Charles I. would send a Minister to Spain, if Spain would send one to England, and would try to bring about a General Peace. Feb. 14, Philip IV. to Infanta. Has ordered Spinola to arrange a Suspension of Hostilities with the Dutch for two years, so as to give him time to treat for a Truce. April 5, do. to do. As he is treating with France for a Suspension of Arms in Italy, thinks Truce should be arranged with the Dutch for ten or twelve years, to show that he wishes to end the war. The Infanta may make any terms she pleased except as to the point of "Free." Has no ships to occupy Sylt. April 29, Infanta to Philip IV. Fears the French successes in Italy will lead Genoa to declare war on Spain. The consequences would be the interruption of all communications between Flanders and Spain. The Dutch will come to a conference at Rosendaal. May 3, do. to do. The Dutch are besieging Bois-le-Duc. May 14, Philip IV. to Infanta. Rubens may conclude a Suspension of hostilities, if England sends Weston and Cottington to Spain. Bois-le-Duc must be relieved at all costs. Has written in urgent terms to the Emperor, Bavaria, and the Catholic Electors to send forces to assist in its relief. May 17, Infanta to Philip IV. Anxious about Bois-le-Duc. Its loss would be a blow to Catholicism. May 18, do. to do. The Dutch are trying to get over the difficulty about "Free." Gives reasons why the King should meet their wishes now that Bois-le-Duc is in such danger. May 27, do. to do. "Bax" [Hales?], the Secretary of the English Minister Wake at Turin, has passed through Brussels. Thinks French will not give up Susa. To the disgust of the English, France has offered to help Savoy to conquer Geneva and Vaud and to restore them Bresse, if they will hand back to France the Marquisate of Saluzzo. England, though it has made peace with France, wishes to make peace with Spain as they do not trust the French. If she cannot relieve Bois-le-Duc, it will be because she has not received the subsidies from Spain. [Cf. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. For., Sav. Sard. 16. Wake, 2 May, 1629.]

Do., No. 201. Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXVI. (Juin-Décembre, 1629). 1629, June 3, Infanta to Philip IV.

Encloses copy of the conditions for a Truce given to Kessler by the Dutch envoys, who said that they represented the final offer of the States General. These offers were that the Truce should be for 34 years, or, if the Spaniards preferred it, for forty, and should be identical with that of 1609. The States General would send deputies to discuss the question of opening the Scheldt. If no agreement was come to this should not prejudice the main question as to the Truce. The arguments for concluding the Truce were that until a settlement was come to in Holland, no progress could be made with the war in Italy, secondly, the insertion of the word "Free" in the First Article would have no practical effect, lastly, if the war was renewed it would be a long one and the French, now that they had put down the Huguenots, would be free to help the Dutch. The Dutch would be precluded from conquering the West Indies. A revolt in Belgium was possible. H.M. would do well, therefore, to pretend to agree to an article which, in no way, prejudiced Spain. Bois-le-Duc was in the greatest danger. She was urging the Emperor and Catholic Electors to assist her now peace was on the point of being signed with Denmark. June 23, Philip IV. to Infanta. Authorises her to sign a Truce for forty years, and when she has done so, to send as large a force as possible to the French frontier. July 14, do. to do. Has named Spinola Governor of Milan, though he is to retain the posts he holds in the Netherlands and in the Palatinate without a salary. July 26, do. to do. Is sorry she did not sign the Truce at once, as if Bois-le-Duc falls, the Dutch may make harder terms. He hopes they will make a declaration in writing that they will observe the conditions of the Truce as to the Indies. Will abandon the title of "Count of Holland" and sends the Infanta Powers in which it is not used, but which are only to be published if the Dutch will not accept those containing it. July 28, Infanta to Philip IV. As it is hopeless to attempt to relieve Bois-le-Duc, she is sending forces into the Veluwe. The Imperial forces were nearing Wesel. The Emperor and his ministers were very angry that Friedland was sending forces into West Friesland at the request of Spain. Aug. 14, do. to do. The Dutch were asking for guarantees that if they signed the Truce, they should not be attacked by the Emperor's forces. She thought they did this solely to gain time to take Bois-le-Duc. Aug. 18, Philip IV. to Infanta. The Emperor wished Friedland and his forces to go to Italy at once. Aug. 18, do. to Spinola. The Emperor had ordered Friedland to go to Italy instead of to Friesland as the Infanta wished. Had he done so, the Dutch would have raised the siege of Bois-le-Duc and signed the Truce. Spinola was to remain on good terms with Friedland as it was in the interest of Spain to keep in close alliance with the Emperor, but he was to try and get Friedland to make peace with Nevers, and was not to allow any German troops to enter the Milanese, but sovereigns who had behaved badly during this crisis might be punished by having "such guests" quartered on them. It would be ruinous to Spanish prestige in Italy, if any German troops were quartered in the Spanish territories. He was asking the Emperor to send troops into Champagne to force the French to keep at home, as any fire lighted in Italy might ruin Spain and the Catholic Religion. Sept. 9, Infanta to Philip IV. If Friedland had invaded Friesland, the Dutch would have raised the siege of Bois-le-Duc. The Emperor was going to send 8,000 men to Bois-le-Duc, to take the places of those who should have entered Friesland, but he had not yet done so. She describes Henri de Berg's raid into the Veluwe, which was rendered useless by the Fall of Wesel, and the preparations for a final attempt to relieve Bois-le-Duc. The Dutch now never mentioned the Truce but were apparently waiting till they saw the fate of Bois-le-Duc. Describes Fall of Wesel. Sept. 28, do. to do. An-

nounces the Fall of Bois-le-Duc. The Dutch think the Belgians will revolt and join them. She has just heard that the Dutch were ready to sign the Truce if the Spaniards would evacuate the positions they held on the Yssel, but would not allow Wesel to be handed back to the Duke of Neuburg. She had told Kessler that she would sign the Truce without any mention of Wesel. Kessler and Gerard van Berkel, the Dutch Commissioner, were to meet at Rosendaal to draw up a list of plenipotentiaries to do so. Oct. 18, Philip IV. to Infanta. Mirabel wrote the French were very anxious that, in view of a settlement in Italy, Spain should propose that Monferrat should be deposited in the Pope's hands. Philip IV. will not agree to this, as these questions must be left solely for the Emperor to decide. Nov. 14, Infanta to Philip IV. The discussions as to the Truce were still going on between Kessler and van Berkel and Count Henri de Berg and the Prince of Orange. The India Company was opposing it, although the Prince had convened the States General at the Hague to discuss it, and was doing all in his power to get it concluded, but the French were offering the Dutch two million crowns to reject it. Cardinal de la Cueva was leaving for Rome agreeably to the King's orders, as soon as he could be given the money to pay his debts in Belgium. Spinola could not return to Flanders till matters were settled in Italy. Oct. 3, Cardinal de la Cueva to Philip IV. Brings serious accusations against Count Henri de Berg of treachery during the campaign. [Cf. Dublin, Trinity College, Library, MSS. Dept. No. 806. *Miscellanea*, p. 363, *The Order of the Prince of Orange, his encamping and siege of Bois-le-Duc, etc.*, July, 1629.] Dec. 6, Infanta to Philip IV. There is no chance of the Dutch agreeing to the Truce. He must effect a settlement in Italy and send reinforcements from there to Flanders without any delay. Dec. 13, Philip IV. to Infanta. She must break off the negotiations for the Truce as it is useless to continue them. If, however, they stand by what they have proposed she is to sign it without further reference to him. Dec. 13, Philip IV. to Spinola. Directs him to send reinforcements to Flanders. Their composition. He is sending the Infanta 3,400,000 crowns at 10 reals [£850,000].

Do., *Etat et de l'Audience*. No. 632. *Correspondance Historique* (Janvier-Mars, 1629). 1629, Jan. 30, An intercepted letter from Lord Clare's son, Hon. Denzil Holles, to Lord Berkeley, giving an account of the proceedings in the English Parliament. Relates the discovery of the Jesuits in Clerkenwell. [Cf. Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K.S., 486/23, op. cit. *Letters from London*, 2 Aug., N.S., 1625, etc.] The Resolutions as to Religion, etc. Jan. 1, "Clan" to Infanta and De la Faille. Dutch massing large forces at Gertruydenberg, etc. Piet Hein and his prizes have arrived in England. Jan. 4, Guillaume de Wassenaer to Grobbendonck, Heusden. Asks him to arrest and send back to his tutor at Leyden a young man named Charles de Nassau, a natural son of the late Prince Maurice, who has deserted and gone off to Bois-le-Duc. Jan. 6, Grobbendonck to Infanta. Refers the matter to H.R.H. Nassau says he killed a Frenchman in the Prince of Orange's guards. This Grobbendonck doubts. Jan. 6, do. to De la Faille. Asks him to deal with the matter at once. Jan. 9, Infanta to Grobbendonck. The Bishop of Bois-le-Duc must examine Nassau to see if there are any hopes of his conversion. If there are none, he must be sent back as Wassenaer requests. Jan. 14, Balançon to Infanta. Sends her copies of the handbills announcing the capture of the Flota, which are being distributed in Breda probably by Protestants who have re-entered it. Jan. 20, Bishop of Bois-le-Duc to Infanta. Has examined Nassau. He is very boyish and seems quite ready to become a Catholic, but without any real

convictions. If he could be kept in Belgium for some time it would be easier to see whether his inclinations were sincere or not. Feb. 7, Cueva to Don Carlos Coloma. Soldiers at Bois-le-Duc must be paid regularly in view of a possible siege, and barley and hops provided. March 10, Spies announce that Orange means to besiege Breda. A proposal to attack Wesel had been rejected. If Bois-le-Duc is attacked it will be at the beginning of April. March 17, Balançon to Infanta. No money has reached Breda for seven weeks. The garrison is quite insufficient to defend it.

Do., *E. et A.* No. 633. *Correspondance Historique* (Avril—Juillet, 1629.) Nearly all the contents of this volume consist of letters from Baron de Grobbendonck to the Infanta. He was Governor of Bois-le-Duc, and gives a full account of the events of the siege.

Do., *E. et A.* No. 634. *Correspondance Historique* (Aout—Décembre, 1629.) Gives an account of the siege of Bois-le-Duc down to the surrender of the place on Sept. 14, 1629, after a bombardment. Sept. 22, Cardinal de la Cueva to Spinola. Gives an account of the fall of Wesel.

Do., *E. et A.* No. 1188 bis. *Correspondance Historique* (1632.) "Negotiations de Paix qui eurent lieu en 1629 entre les députés des Etats des Provinces obéissantes de S. M. et les députés des Etats des Provinces Rebelles." (P. 5 bis.) This was drawn up in pursuance of a vote passed on Sept. 7, 1632, by the States General at Brussels. The causes of the defeats are traced to the discontent in the Army due to the delay in paying it, as the money received from Spain was expended on the payment of Gifts, Pensions, Grants, etc., and to the promotion of inexperienced officers to high commands. In reality, the negotiations referred to in the heading were those undertaken in pursuance of the vote of the States General at Brussels on Sept. 7, 1632. The report refers to the representations made to Philip IV. by the States General after the fall of Bois-le-Duc and Wesel in 1629 through Counts de Solre and d'Estaires, which the King mentions in his despatches to the Infanta of 1630.

Do., *Etat et Guerre.* No. 126. *Correspondance d'Ambroise Spinola avec l'Infante Isabelle*, 1626, 1628, 1629, op. cit.

1629, Jan. 3, Infanta to Spinola. Is afraid that disorders may break out owing to the want of money. As the Dutch know this, they will not agree to the Truce as proposed by Kessler. Jan. 23, Spinola to Infanta. Only 2,400,000 ducats can be sent her in bills but she may sell 1,200,000 ducats worth of Crown Lands. Begs that Kessler should meet the Dutch deputies and ascertain exactly all about each point in dispute. Spinola would try to arrange them. June 6, do. to do. Had with great reluctance proposed to H.M. that Breda might be given up to save Bois-le-Duc. Thinks forces for the relief of Bois-le-Duc could be withdrawn from Italy and reach the Netherlands by the end of August. Suggests she should storm Emmerich. June 20, do. to do. Is delighted at the reports as to the progress of the negotiations for the Truce. H.R.H. should sign it at once. Is being pressed to go to Italy, where things are upside down because the Emperor has sent to seize a Pass in the Grisons and, as the Truce is to be signed, he cannot be needed in Flanders. July 10, Infanta to Spinola. The enemy is so strongly entrenched before Bois-le-Duc that it will be almost hopeless to attempt to relieve it. Expects a rising in Belgium at any moment. Is eagerly waiting for the Emperor's forces. July 26, Spinola to Infanta. Feels the failure to throw reinforcements into Bois-le-Duc deeply. Every one from H.M. downwards is grieved at the failure of the negotiations for the Truce. They still hope that the Infanta has signed it. [July 10, Infanta to Spinola. Says the failure was occasioned by the delays in Spain, and the want of any decided policy there.]

Do., *Etat et Guerre.* No. 125. *Correspondance de l'Archiduc Albert*

avec Spinola (1600), etc., 1629. July 30, Infanta to Spinola. [*Misplaced.*] Announces the raid into the Veluwe. [On July 29, she had sent Spinola a copy of a letter from Count Henri de Berg to herself and asked him what she should do about it. [Cf. *E. et G.*, 126.]

Do., *Etat et Guerre*, No. 202. Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXVII. (Janvier-Mai, 1630).

1630, Jan. 8, Philip IV. to Infanta. Sends her an account of the position of the Catholics in Holland and suggests that the Dutch Bishoprics should be filled up. Accusations of treachery brought by a Religious against Count Henri de Berg. It would be difficult, however, to remove him from his post as he had such influence in the army and, as Governor of Guelderland, in the districts beyond the Meuse. Feb. 1, Had given the Infanta Maria as Queen of Hungary a dowry of 500,000 crowns. As such a sum could not be found by Castile alone the whole Empire ought to contribute to it. Cannot for want of money accept Wallenstein's offer to march against the Dutch when peace is declared in Italy. Feb. 16, Infanta to Philip IV. Is consulting Mirabel and Aytona as to the charges against Berg. Feb. 28, Ph. IV. to Inf. Cardinal de la Cueva must leave for Rome at once. March 9, Inf. to Ph. IV. The Spanish Councillors of State in Belgium have found Count Henri de Berg guilty, but all that can be done is to strengthen the Spanish forces and to try and find him some other employment. The Infanta writes in her own hand that she thoroughly agrees with this, but that nothing can be done till Leganes arrives from France. The Dutch are too much puffed up to accept a Truce. She fears they may attack Brabant. Wallenstein would do anything Spain wished and either invade France or attack Holland. March 14, Philip IV. to Infanta. He sends 400,000 ducats to bribe Emperor's advisers to secure the publication of the Ban against the Dutch. Bruneau is to try to get a general settlement for Germany arranged at the approaching meeting of Electors. He will not break off negotiations with England, and so drive them into the arms of the Protestant princes in the North. March, Emperor to Philip IV. Will not break with the Dutch at present. Philip IV. to Infanta, March 31, Cannot give Wallenstein Lingen as it makes such a good base for an attack on Friesland. April 26, Infanta to Philip IV. Kessler writes that the Prince of Orange and the States General incline to a Truce. April 29, do. to do. He must pay Wallenstein what he asks if he invades Friesland, as his army cannot live on such a small country. May 18, do. to do. Has asked Bavaria to occupy the posts held by the Spaniards in Westphalia as the Dutch are advancing. They have agreed to do so. May 27, Philip IV. to Infanta. The negotiations with England are making good progress.

Do., *Etat et Guerre*, No. 203. Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXVIII., (Juin-Décembre, 1630). 1630, June 2, Philip IV. to Infanta. Is to break off negotiations with Wallenstein as his price is too high. She should consider whether she should not recall Kessler and break off the negotiations for a Truce with the Dutch. June 19, Infanta to Philip IV. The garrisons in Westphalia were to be handed over to Tilly and the Catholic League. The Dutch think of seizing Setubal in Portugal. July 6, do. to do. England cannot be asked to withdraw her troops from Holland, nor will the Dutch give back Wesel and Bois-le-Duc. July 15, Philip IV. to Infanta. Has heard of Gustaf Adolf's landing in Germany, and of Wallenstein's arrival in Alsace. He should be asked to invade France, so as to make the Emperor and the Catholic League more inclined to break with the French and the Dutch. Sends a paper drawn up by Pappenheim giving the reasons for the Dutch successes. Aug. 20, Infanta to Philip IV. As the Dutch have gained all they wanted they now want

to make a Truce, but will not sign a permanent peace. She cannot remove Henri de Berg. No charges have been brought against him publicly and he would be supported by the Belgians. Fears a general mutiny as her troops are unpaid. She has few Spaniards or Walloons. Aug. 28, Philip IV. to Infanta. The Articles of Peace were signed with England. They were on the lines of the Peace of 1604. Tursi, his Ambassador in Germany, is to do nothing about the Palatine, until Charles I. has ratified the Peace. Sept. 20, do. to do. The Emperor is making grants in the Lower Palatinate, and seems to intend to retain possession of it. She must write to ask him not to do so, as his actions might prevent the conclusion of peace with England. Oct. 10, Infanta to Philip IV. Wants to know if the restoration of "ante Bellum" conditions in the Treaty will prevent the English from trading with the East Indies. This they will never agree to, and their competition there is a source of constant friction with the Dutch. Nov. 1, do. to do. Asks him to restore the Church Lands in the Palatinate after peace is made with England. Nov. 24, do. to do. Bavaria and the Electors offer to mediate between him and the Dutch if the English mediation fails. Dec. 8, Philip IV. to Infanta. Will not give up the Church lands in the Palatinate as they are his only guarantee for the repayment of his expenses. The Protestants have usurped them in the part they hold, and the Duke of Bavaria has got a Brief from the Pope granting him those he occupies for a term of years. Dec. 18, Infanta to Philip IV. Peace was to be proclaimed in England on Dec. 15 or 17. As England was to be represented at Madrid only by Cottington's Secretary, Coloma should be withdrawn. Do., *Etat et Guerre*, No. 204. Correspondance de l'Infanta Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXIX. (Janvier, 1631, Avril, 1632). 1631, Jan 7, Philip IV. to Infanta. Greatly as he would like to engage the Electors in a war with Holland, should the Dutch refuse their mediation, he cannot accept their offer to negotiate as he has already given full powers to England to do so. Jan. 15, do. to do., Reasserts this.

NOTE ON GILLESPIE GRUACH [THE EARL OF ARGYLL.]

Lady Argyll had made an attempt to get her son Henry, who had spoken to Coloma very sensibly on the subject, taken into the Spanish service. As the Infanta in writing to Philip IV. on Feb. 19, 1631, said, she had refused Lord Tyrone's request to have his regiment placed on the footing of the Spanish regiments, on the ground that only Spaniards or Italians had ever held commissions in Spanish regiments, and that if she made such an innovation, she would offend many other foreign officers, it is probable that his request was refused. Philip IV., writing to the Infanta on Dec. 14, 1630 Brussels, [*E. et G.*, 203.] said that Argyll was in such poverty that he could not even find the money to go for two months to Scotland, whilst his elder sons were flaunting their Protestantism in England. The family would be only too glad if an allowance of 200 ducats a month could be found for Don Henry in Flanders. If the young man stayed in England, his conscience would run great risks from the bad company which he would be forced to keep.

Genoa, *Spagna*, 25, cit. M. Felice Saluzzo Pallavicino to Doge, Madrid, 1629. Jan. 6, Has bolted, barred, and locked the doors to any offer of pecuniary help, and this will prevent Spain from putting undue pressure on Genoa. Gives an account of the capture of the Flota. It is hoped that the disaster may lead to a settlement with France. (Cf. For attitude of Genoa, *Brussels, E. et G.*, 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 29 April, 1629.) May 1, Rubens is taking offers to Holland and England, which may

lead to a settlement. Will not accept the arrangements Don Gonzales de Cordoba entered into. In any case the French must withdraw their forces from Italy. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 200. May 5. Proclamation of Philip IV. Will acknowledge Nevers as Duke of Mantua and Monferrat, if French will withdraw from Susa, Monferrat, Piedmont, and Italy.] Oct. 6, People connected with Inojosa had been leaving insulting letters at Olivares' door. He had greater authority than ever, but the hatred against him was intense and shared by men of weight. Oct. 29, The King talks of going to Italy and Flanders to look after his affairs there, after he has escorted his sister, the Queen of Hungary, to Barcelona. 1630, Feb. 15, They will remain on the defensive in Flanders, but if they have to take the offensive, Tilly will be named Commander-in-Chief. This had been arranged at the suggestion of D. Diego Mexia. Count Henri de Berg was to be left in command of the forces serving outside Flanders and Brabant, in which D. Diego was in supreme command.

Dublin, Trinity College, University Library, MSS. Department, No. 806, Miscellanea, p. 361. "An extract from a letter from Captain Coldwell to Sir Abraham Williams from the Leaguer before the Bosch, 16-26 July, Stilo Novo, 1629." [*Cf. Reigersborch N. op. cit.*, pp. 63-73, 75-87, Letters of 20, 28 July, 25 August, 1629.] P. 362, "An extract of a letter from Sir Ed. Vere to Sir Abraham Williams from the Leaguer before the Bosch, 8 Aug., Stilo Novo, 1629." [*Cf. Reigersborch, p. cit.*, pp. 68-75, 78-79, letters 20, 28 July, 1629.] P. 363, The Order of the Prince of Orange, his encamping and seidge of Bois-le-Duc and what observed there, July, 1629. [*Cf. Reigersborch, op. cit.*, pp. 61-73, Letters of 27 May, 20 July, 1629. *Brussels, E. et G.*, No. 202, Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXVII. (Janvier-Mai, 1630). 1630, Philip IV. to Infanta, Jan. 8, as to Henri de Berg's treachery. See this "Order, etc.," Feb. 16, Infanta to Philip IV. March 9, do. to do. *Genoa*, Spagna, 25, Saluzzo Pallavicino to Doge, Feb. 15.]

Do., No. 959, Miscellanea, K. 3, 20. "Descripcion (sic) de la Ciudad de Bolduque, planta, y sitio que se le puso," fol. 248, is mentioned in "Indice de los papeles contenidos en este volumen," but is missing. Marked 'Sp. 20 March, 1798, bought of Egerton, Esq.,' with a bookplate, 'Antony Keck, Esq.,' and ink inscription, 'Ex dono Guilielmi Shaw Mason.' Cf. his letter in K. 3, 19. Mrs. Antony Keck was an ancestor of the Powys Kecks, of Leicestershire. Information from Mrs. Williams, 6 Brock Street, Bath.

Munich, *Kgl. Bayr. Allgem. Reichsarchiv*, 30 Jährig Krieg, No. 232, Ao. 1629. 1629, April 19, Instructions from the Electors of Mainz, Treves, Cologne, Bavaria, and the Bishops of Würzburg and Bamberg as Chiefs of the Catholic League to their Envoy to the Kaiser. Heidelberg, 19 April, 1629, Contains the resolutions adopted by the League at its meeting at Heidelberg. Protest against the exactions of the soldiery. Nothing must be done to lead to any rupture with Holland, which might draw the war from the Netherlands into Germany. As they had resolved at Würzburg on Sept. 28, 1628, their army must in no case be used to put pressure on the Dutch, even if Spain or the Infanta ask for help. The Emperor may, however, intervene indirectly if he can do so without offending the Dutch. They would resist any concessions to Palatine Frederick unless some compensation were provided for Maximilian.

May 8, Maximilian to Electors of Cologne and Mainz. Points out that if they gave the Infanta any help against the Dutch, the latter would regard it as a breach of neutrality. May 16, Emperor to Elector of Bavaria, Vienna. Encloses a letter of May 2 from the Infanta Isabella asking for immediate help, and one of May 16 from Aytona to himself, asking that the

Imperial troops may be sent to make a diversion to relieve Bois-le-Duc, but as the place is in great danger, and the army of the Catholic League is far nearer, he asks that part of it may be sent to fight in Belgium as auxiliary corps. May 24, Maximilian to Aytona. Feels the bad and good fortunes of Spain as if they were his own. The League, however, is determined not to commit any breach of neutrality against Holland, and he cannot override the resolutions they have adopted at Heidelberg, and involve the Empire in a war for the sake of a few of its members. They would do all they could to help Spain by peaceful means. May 23, Maximilian to Emperor. Is well aware that it is impossible to send the Imperial troops employed against the Danes to assist the Infanta against the Dutch, but the Catholic League will not be drawn into a Netherlands war. May 6, Gubern to Tilly, Lingen. Henri de Berg has ordered him to send the two Spanish Companies he has at Lingen to Diest, as the Dutch with 260 companies and 76 troops of horse, laid siege to Bois-le-Duc on May 1.

Do., A. 234, Ao. 1629. 1629, April 11, Emperor to Maximilian. Is sending him Antony, Abbot of Kremsmunster, to treat with him about the negotiations with Denmark and Italian War. Begs him to induce the Catholic League to allow their troops to be employed in Italy, as France has assumed a very threatening attitude. May 2, Bishop of Würzburg. May 7, Electors of Cologne and Treves, think it undesirable to send the forces of the League to Italy. May 13, Elector of Cologne to Elector of Mainz. Peace should be made with Denmark so as to set the Army of the League free to defend Germany, should France invade it because no settlement has been made in Italy. May 22, Maximilian to Elector of Cologne. Approves of his suggestions as to peace with Denmark. Undated, Marchville (?) to Elector of Treves. [Cf. do., A. 195, 30 jähr Krieg, 1626. 1626, Dec. 6, Paris, Instructions of Marchville for his mission to Germany. France only wishes to free Italy and Germany from the oppression of the House of Austria. They desire to expel Friedland as a foreigner from the Empire; to force the Spaniards to retire from the Grisons, and the Emperor and Spain to withdraw their forces from Germany; finally, to hold a Free Diet to settle the affairs of the Empire. Suggests Electors might form an offensive League with France, and take up arms to expel Friedland. Undated, Bishop of Verdun to King of France. Asks him to prevent French officials from deciding suits in his diocese which should come before the Imperial Chamber at Spiers, and from seizing the property of the Emperor and the See of Verdun. [Cf. *Mantua, Francia*, xv., 3, Busta 675, 1627. Jan. 15, Priandi to Duke. Do., Dec. 12, as to Metz.]

Do. 30, *jähr Krieg*, A. 238. [Cf. *Munich, Geh. St. Arch.* K. schw. 279/36. Act Betreffs Allianz mit Frankreich] (1629-1630). 1629, 25 April-26 Dezember. 1629, April 25, Gustaf Adolf to Electors, Stockholm. Asks that Stralsund may be placed under his protection. Gives his grounds of complaint against the Emperor, none of which are connected with Religion. Wishes his envoys admitted to the Peace Conference at Lübeck. April 23, Madrid, Father Philip Lagne to Father Alessandro. Olivares wishes to give Bavaria back the Lower Palatinate, but is uncertain as to Spinola's and Oñate's views. The conclusion of the Truce with the Dutch is expected at any moment, but it will be upon terms which will be the ruin of the Catholic Faith. Spinola leaves for Italy in a few days. Spain cannot come to terms with France about Mantua without the consent of others interested. May 20, Father Alessandro to Kutner, Rome. The loss of Bois-le-Duc might force the Infanta to abandon Brussels. October 5, Fontainebleau. Cardinal Bagni to Jocher. Sends a sketch of the terms drawn up by Louis XIII., Richelieu, and himself for an alliance between France and Bavaria. Louis XIII. has never discussed anything with

England to the prejudice of Bavaria. He advises the League to free Germany from the Imperial yoke whilst the Emperor's armies are occupied elsewhere. The Mantuan question must be settled by a legal process. *Lit. D.*, Maximilian's answer. Thinks the succession to the Empire should not be hereditary. Will not accept it himself. Will not assist France in a war in which she is the aggressor. Oct. 5, Fontainebleau, Unsigned (Cardinal Bagni). Gives the substance of his conversation with Card. Richelieu as to Maximilian's letter of July 4. [Evidently in answer to notes by Card. Richelieu of March 12 and March 30, 1629, in Munich. *Geh. St. Arch. K.S.* 279/36, cit.] and gives the Cardinal's observations on them. He is much struck by the restrictions which Maximilian imposes on the conditions for his joint action with France. Encloses a Draft Treaty. Oct. 13, Nuntio, "Responsio ad lit. C.D. ex Fontainebleau, q. erant 5 Octobris, 29 missa." From Dr. Jocher. [Cf. Nuntio to Jocher, Paris, 26 Dec., 1629.] Wishes the correspondence to be carried on in Latin, not Italian. Maximilian will sign nothing until he has in his hands a document signed by Louis XIII., and enter into no engagement contrary to the Catholic Religion or to the rights of the Empire. The Electoral dignity should only be guaranteed to himself and his descendants. Otherwise France might be guaranteeing the Protestant Palatine or the Spanish tool Neuburg. Oct. 29, To Card. Barberini. Anon. Bavaria has made an alliance with France by the Pope's advice through Card. Bagni. It is urgent that the Pope should get Louis XIII. to guarantee Bavaria the Electoral dignity and his territories, although the Elector disbelieves the rumours that Louis XIII. has sent his army to the German frontier to restore the Palatine. Dec. 26, Card. Bagni to Jocher. Had discussed his letter of Oct. 13 (Cf. *supra*) with Richelieu. Sends the Treaty which Richelieu has submitted to Louis XIII. for his signature. He does not want to keep Mantua himself. Dec. 26, Nuntii Literæ. Louis XIII. will make peace with Spain if she will give up Mantua. Trusts that Bavaria will secure the neutrality of the Catholic League, if France makes a diversion by attacking the Empire. In return, when the Italian troubles are settled, the Elector "would have gained the security of all his States." Louis XIII. engages that if this is infringed, "he will join his forces with those of the League," and he has the almost assured promise of Denmark and Sweden, "and also of others that they would support him if this took place, and (thus) the Duke of Bavaria would be secured in the possession of all the territories which he has inherited or acquired." Neither Louis XIII. nor Richelieu had drawn up any terms for a settlement with the Palatine, but, if the Duke thought it advisable, they would be glad to support fair and honourable terms to be offered to him. 1630, Jan. 3, Nuntio. The Italian war can only be settled by a Divine intervention. Brandenburg is very anxious to ally himself with France. He talks of visiting the Elector of Saxony and inducing him to join in inviting the Catholic Electors to settle the Civil War in Germany which is ruining the country even though Caesar may gain by it for the time. Richelieu urges Bavaria to cultivate the friendship of Brandenburg. The French have sent Charnacé to Sweden to urge Gustaf Adolf, who is said to be preparing for war with the Emperor and Wallenstein, not to support the Palatine or offend the Catholic League in any way, as the King would have to defend them out of considerations of policy. Gustaf Adolf had replied that he thought the request eminently reasonable and had promised to act in accordance with the wishes of the French. "These are the King's very words, and the news comes from Richelieu." *Marcheville's instructions*. [Cf. *Marcheville* to Elector of Treves *supra*.] The King wishes to free Germany and Italy from the tyranny of the Emperor. The Electors must

take up arms to force the Emperor to expel Friedland as a foreigner from the Empire, to withdraw his forces from Italy and the Grisons and settle the pending questions without reference to Spain, and, in accordance with Imperial Law, to expel Spain from the places she holds in Germany. *Maximilian's notes*. The King's assurances as to "Public Liberty" are too vague. As the League wishes to remain neutral as regards the Emperor and Empire, they cannot wish France to make a diversion against Germany. The object which the League had in view was the preservation of Religion not to put pressure on the Emperor by force of arms. The Catholic Electors, as they had said at their meeting at Mergentheim in December, 1629, could, he hoped, effect much through the Diet. [Cf. *Munich, Geheim Staats Archiv*. K.S. 279/36. Act Betreffs Allianz mit Frankreich, 1629-1630. 1630, "Quæstio if it is advisable for Bavaria to treat with France." Do. K.S. 29/25, 1629, Oct. 6, Madrid. Villeda to Khevenhüller, enclosing a letter from Rubens from London of Sept. 21, 1629.]

Do. 30 jährig Krieg, A. 246. 1630, Jan. 29, To Nuntio. Attaches no importance to the rumours that France is negotiating with England, and is convinced of Richelieu's friendship for Bavaria. May 17, Cardinal Bagui. "As soon as the Swede is ready to take up arms (disposto a mover li armi) which, it is thought, will be soon, the King will place the said guarantee (sicurtà) and promise of the Swede in good and authentic form in the hands of the Bavarian." [Cf. 1630, Jan. 3, Nuntio Supra.] July 4, Giulio Mazarini, Maurienne. Gives an account of his mission to Savoy, Collalto, and Spinola from Louis XIII.

Do., 30 jährig Krieg, A. 248. 1630, Jan. 4, Infanta to Tilly. Sends him an agent to request his help. Is sure he is too good a servant of his God and King to refuse to do what she asks. Feb. 26, Maximilian to Tilly (holograph). Thanks him for sending him (from Stade, Feb. 12) the Infanta's letter; is consulting his colleagues, the Electors of Cologne and Mainz, about it. March 3, Eugène de St. Esprit to Elector, Brussels. Truce with Dutch improbable, as it is opposed by the Gomarists and the French Ambassador. The King of Spain expects everything from Tilly's coming. Encloses copy of his letter to Tilly. March 13, Emperor to Elector of Bavaria. Urges that Tilly should be allowed to enter the Spanish service. April 4, Maximilian to Tilly. Refuses to allow him to leave the service of the League. If he did so it would be the ruin of the Army of the League and involve the Empire in trouble with the Dutch. April 4, do. to Infanta. As the troubles still continued in Germany, the League at its meeting at Mergentheim had decided that its army must still be kept on foot and that Tilly must remain in command of it. Asks her to excuse him, therefore, for refusing her request. March 3, Eugène de St. Esprit to Elector ut supra. It is said that the States mean to send an envoy to Friedland, the Elector of Mainz, and the Elector of Bavaria, to assure them of their goodwill to the Empire. "At the same time it is rumoured that they are preparing twenty thousand muskets for the King of Sweden, and would give him sufficient ships to transport the whole of his army, if he would invade the Empire by Emden, but it is not believed that he will accept the offer."

Do., 30 jährig Krieg, A. 249 (January 5, Nov. 5, 1630.) 1630, Sept. 21, Infanta to Nuncio, Brussels. Has heard the answer which the States General have given to the Duke of Neuburg's proposals, and is now authorised by Philip IV. to answer them. She will withdraw the Spanish troops from Juliers, Cleves, Berg, Mark, and Ravenstein, simultaneously with the Dutch, but as they are leaving garrisons in Rees, Emmerich, and Wesel, she will not pledge herself not to attack them. The Duke of Neuburg will procure the free exercise of the Catholic Religion in the places in which it was practiced in the late Duke's reign.

Munich, Geheim, Staats Archiv. K. Sch. 279/36. Act. Betreffs Allianz mit Frankreich, 1629-1630. 1630, "Quæstio, if it is advisable for Bavaria to treat with France. Cir. 1630." The Emperor knew that Bavaria was in treaty with France, whilst the Nuncio had written on 6 Feb., 1629, that the Pope had given him specific orders to bring about an alliance between France and Bavaria, and that he had told Card. Richelieu this. Jocher thinks on the whole the alliance should be entered into, as it will protect the Elector against such enemies as Friedland, and not involve him in any obligations to take the offensive on behalf of France. 1629, Notes by Card. Richelieu on the Terms of the Secret Articles offered to Bavaria at Susa, March 12, and the Elector's Reply. Maximilian refuses to engage himself not to attack France under all conditions, and would not enter into any offensive alliance with her, but would stand by her in case of need. March 27, Richelieu offers less stringent terms.

Do., Kast. Schw., 279/18. Treaty of 8 May, 1630, and additional Secret Articles of 3 Oct., 1630, between France and Bavaria.

Do., Kast. Schw., 377/48. "Spaniens Procedere gegen Bayern." Written before 5 Nov., 1630, when Spain made peace with England.

Turin: R. Archivio di State. Lettere Ministri. *Vienna* 8. Marquis de Wateville to Duke, Vienna. 1629, July 11, Count John of Nassau left on July 7 for Flanders. He is to command the troops the Emperor is sending to relieve Bois-le-Duc. Aug. 15, Count Trautmannsdorff says a Truce will soon be made between the Dutch and Spain. The siege of Bois-le-Duc is said to have been raised. Sept. 26, A Truce for ten years has been made between Sweden and Poland. The King of Sweden may now turn to Germany. Oct. 3, Now that Bois-le-Duc has fallen it is thought that the Dutch may attempt Antwerp or Dunkirk. Oct. 8, Aytona has just been summoned to Flanders, it is thought to take the place of Cardinal de la Cueva.

Do., Lettere Ministri *Inghilterra*, 4, Secretary Barozzi to Duke, London. 1629, July 2, The Fall of Bois-le-Duc is thought certain. Description of Count Henri de Berg's forces. July 13, There has been a "Te Deum" at Brussels because De Berg has taken a fort near Heusden which protects the Dutch communications. July 16, The Dutch Ambassador told Cottington the States would not refuse a Peace if they were styled "Free" in it, but did not want an Armistice. Count Henri de Berg has been defeated in an attempt to relieve Bois-le-Duc. Aug. 3, News had arrived that de Berg had entered the Veluwe. The Dutch had detached ten thousand men to meet him. The siege was costing Holland 40,000 Francs [£1,660] a day. Aug. 24, The news of the loss of Wesel, which had reached London a few days before, had made everyone see that the Fall of Bois-le-Duc was inevitable. Rubens had said a fortnight before that the place must fall if de Berg's diversion failed.

Do., Lettere Ministri, *Spagna*, 21 [Anni 1628 in 1629]. Bishop of Ventimiglia to Duke, Madrid. 1629, The Infanta urges peace with Holland and England. The Capture of the Flota has made this a pressing matter. Feb. 6, If the Emperor can hold France in check, a Truce with Holland can easily be arranged. Feb. 15, The sole reason why the Spaniards keep the Emperor to the front when dealing with the French about Italy is to get his aid against the Dutch, although they cannot fulfil his condition that they should enter France through Picardy, Navarre, or Catalonia. Feb. 22, The negotiations with Holland are progressing favourably. Spinola has full powers to conclude a Truce and is anxious to do so. Feb. 28, Fears the Dutch are too prosperous to wish for a Truce. March 3, People thought there would not be peace with Holland, as France was making Orange such

large offers. April 10, It was thought that Orange would give a hearing to the Spanish proposals. May 17, Bois-le-Duc will hold out some time. The Pope is very anxious that an attempt should be made upon Geneva, and this is bringing him over to the side of Spain. May 16, News arrived on May 13 that the enemy had appeared before Bois-le-Duc. June 26, Olivares would not declare war on France, before he had concluded peace with Holland.

Manua: R. Archivio di Stato, Arch. Patr. Gonzaga, Carteggio di Francia, E. xv. 3, Busta 676, cit. Priandi to Duke, Paris, 1629, Sept. 22, The Dutch after the Fall of Bois-le-Duc, where they had granted Freedom of Conscience and the full enjoyment of their property to all the inhabitants, including the Religious, had taken Eindhoven on the road to Liege. [But Cf. *Brussels E. et G.* 201. Philip IV. to Infanta, 13 Dec., 1629.] The Liegeois were asking the Dutch to help them to expel their Bishop and the Emperor's troops. The Spaniards will soon have been hounded out of the Low Countries. Sept. 30, Cardinal de la Cueva and Coloma have had to leave Brussels in disguise to escape the fury of the mob. Dec. 30, The Dutch, although the Spaniards are still making proposals for a Truce, have offered the French 40,000 men without any charge to them, if they will take the field in earnest against Spain.

Do., Carteggio di Francia, E. xv. 3, Busta 677 (1630-1633). Priandi to Duke, Paris, 1630. Oct. 19, The progress of the Swedes was playing havoc in Germany. The Electors and the Diet were urging the Emperor to make peace in Italy. Everything depended on the fate of Casale.

Do., Carteggio degli Invati. ed altri in Corte Cesarea, E. ii., 3, Busta 495 [1628-1629]. Di Vincenzo Agnelli, Vescovo di Mantua to Duke, Vienna, 1629. Sept. 1, Magdeburg had refused Wallenstein's request for a large sum of money. Bois-le-Duc is "sped." Count Henri de Berg is ravaging the Veluwe. The Palatine, the King of Denmark's son and a Prince of Wurtemberg are in the camp of the Prince of Orange. Sept. 8, "Though all the disasters which have befallen the Spaniards and the House of Austria are the work of Divine Providence, they do not soften their hearts." Oct. 6, Owing to the Fall of Bois-le-Duc, the Spaniards were most anxious to come to terms with the Duke of Mantua, but Eggenberg and Collalto, who dragged on the Emperor, were urging war, chiefly because the Spaniards did not want it.

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XVIII.—1625-1630. RUBENS' NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENGLAND.

Rooses. Rubens, op. cit. Vol. IV., pp. 47-49, Gerbier's account of the origin of his negotiations with Rubens, April, 1625; p. 52, 24 Feb., 1627, Spinola accredits Rubens to Gerbier; pp. 53-57, Rubens explains to Gerbier that the Infanta and Spinola wish the negotiations to be carried on solely between them; p. 61, Buckingham allows Gerbier to treat with Rubens. Vol. V., pp. 11-33, Dec. 2, 1628, to April 27, 1629, Rubens' visit to Spain; pp. 47-252, May 28, 1629, to April 8, 1630, His Mission to England; pp. 57-58, June, 1629, Explains to Charles I. the position of Spain; pp. 82-82, June 30, the three parties at the English Court; pp. 90-91, July 2, Barozzi the Savoy Minister's escape from drowning; pp. 108-109, England willing to make peace with Spain; pp. 115-117, July 22, the State of the English Court; p. 126, *Note*, Olivares' policy as to England; pp. 126-132, Charles I. and Richelieu; the King has much more confidence in Olivares; pp. 147-148, Rubens gives Pierre Dupuy a description of England; pp. 164-165, Spain and Bribery in England;

pp. 174-178, French offers to England; Holland and England; Ruben's views as to peace with England; England and Savoy; p. 205, the Duke of Savoy's change of policy; Charles I. distrusts him; pp. 206-214, grief at Court at the fall of Bois-le-Duc; Cottington's Mission; the Palatine places himself in the King's hands; Holland stronger than England at sea; jealousy of Dutch; pp. 225-226, Monson proposes that England should have the use of Villefranche for a Naval Base; pp. 235-236, Cottington's instructions for his Mission to Spain; pp. 243-244, Rubens leaves England.

Gachet. Rubens, op. cit. P. 174, note on Mantua and Monferrat; pp. 187-189, April 20, 1628, Rubens' views as to Spain and Casale; pp. 191-195, Montagu's arrest and release; pp. 220-228, Rubens at Madrid; pp. 228-241, his Mission to England. In Preface p. xxxv., Gachet summarizes the history of Rubens' negotiations with England.

Times Literary Supplement Thursday, October 20, 1910. "The Golden Age of Piracy" ["The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the seventeenth Century"] by C. H. Haring. [London, Methuen, 1907, 1. Vol.] The nature of the Spanish settlement of the West Indies. The Flota.

MANUSCRIPT.

XVIII.—1625-1630, RUBENS' NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENGLAND.

Brussels, E. et G.

No. 208, Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle concernant Rubens, 1628-1629.

1628, July 23, Count Duke of San Lucar to Infanta; Aug. 13, Infanta to Olivares; Oct. 20, Cottington to Coloma; Oct. 21, Cottington to Coloma; Nov. 6, Coloma to Cottington.

1628, April 27, Philip IV. to Infanta (two letters); May 5, Cottington to Coloma; May 17, Infanta to Philip IV.; May 22, Cottington to Coloma; June 3, Infanta to Philip IV.; June 3, Philip IV. to Infanta; June 3, Coloma to Lord Treasurer Weston; June 3, Coloma to Cottington; June 6, Philip IV. to Infanta; July 10, Infanta to Philip IV.; Aug. 6, Philip IV. to Infanta; Aug., Philip IV. to Marquis of Aytona; Aug. 22, Philip IV. to Infanta; Oct. 28, Infanta to Philip IV.; do. *E. et G.*, No. 203, Correspondence de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXVIII. (Juin-Décembre), 1630.

1630, Sept. 22, Philip IV. to Infanta. Rubens has not received payment for some pictures he painted for Philip IV. when at Madrid, nor for his salary and expenses in England. The Infanta is to see him paid, as Philip IV. is so pleased by his devotion to his service and great talents.

Munich, Geheim, Staats, Archiv. K.S. 292/5, Graf Khevenhüller, Berichte aus Madrid (1625-1629), cit. 1629. Oct. 6, Villela to Khevenhüller, Madrid, gives an account of Rubens' mission to England and conversations with Cottington and with Charles I. Enclosed in a Memorial from Khevenhüller to the Elector of Bavaria of 13 Nov., 1629.

Turin, Lettere Ministri, *Inghilterra* 4.

1629, June 2, Secretary Barozzi to Duke, London. Gerbier has been sent by the King to wait for Rubens at Argues [Margate] and tell him that if he is commissioned to arrange for a joint war with Spain against France, he must not say a word about it to any Minister, as the King wishes to keep the secret locked in his own breast. Rubens will have apparently to negotiate in one way in public and in another in secret. June 6, do. to do., gives an account of Rubens' interviews with the King, who had said that the arrangement with France was only an Armistice, and

that if he could come to a settlement with Spain, he would break with France at twelve hours notice. Rubens did not take this as ready money; June 10, do. to do., Rubens' second interview with the King; Barozzi was leaving England in a few days as he did not see that Rubens' negotiations would come to much; he thought the English would get Rubens to make some suggestion for an undertaking with Spain if the Emperor would promise to give back as much of the Palatinate as he could to the Palatine; Rubens had got the King to send Cottington instead of Carlisle to Spain, as he knew he would be "*persona gratissima*"; June 19, do. to do., Carlisle was pressing that Rubens should go back to Spain to negotiate an arrangement and treat with Soubise on the way, but this Rubens was unwilling to do; Rubens says Olivares will not give Soubise a farthing; July 6, do. to do., Rubens was much pleased at the frankness with which the King had spoken to him and Barozzi; Spain could please the King by restoring some places which she held on deposit in the Palatinate, although Rubens very much doubts if she will do so; the intervention of Savoy will have cleared the air by showing the English what they have really to expect from Spain in this business; July 16, do. to do., the French Ambassador is proposing an offensive and defensive League between France and England as to the affairs of Germany, and specially for the restoration of the Palatine, but the English will not listen to him as they do not want to prejudice their negotiations with Spain; Aug. 25, do. to do., Barozzi had taken leave that day of the King at Oatlands; Rubens was writing to Flanders and to Spain to express his gratitude for having been allowed to take such a prominent part in the negotiations.

Do. Lettere Ministri, *Spagna*, 21 [Anni 1628 in 1629.] Abbate Alessandro Scaglia to Duke, Madrid.

1629, Jan., Olivares had sent Rubens to him to ask him to arrange not only a peace with England but an alliance between England and Spain against France [Cf. *Turin*, Ing. 4, Barozzi to Duke, 2 June, 1629]; Rubens said that war with France was inevitable, and that Scaglia should try to get all he could for himself, as their chief reliance was upon him and Savoy; May 14, "As for the English business, Rubens has left for England with instructions to bring it to a settlement"; July 5, Rubens had made some suggestion for shortening the negotiations and this had delayed Cottington's departure from England; the delay had been the cause of a slight misunderstanding.

PRINTED.

XIX.—1625-1631, MARITIME PLANS OF THE HAPSBURG. DANISH-SWEDISH WAR. TREATIES OF LUBECK, 1630, AND BARWALDE, 1631.

Forster, "*Wallenstein's Briefe*," etc., 1627-1634, Herausgegeben von *Friedrich Forster* [Berlin, 1828, 2 Bde.]; Vol. I., pp. 291-295, Patent from Ferdinand II., Prague, 6 February, 1628, granting Mecklenburg to Wallenstein. 1627 [pp. 106-180], "First Series of Letters of Wallenstein and his Official documents." No. 40, arrangements for governing Mecklenburg; pp. 110-111, No. 56, to Arnim, 2 Nov., Negotiations with Sweden; Is to garrison Baltic Ports and burn Swedish Navy; pp. 124-126, No. 76, to Arnim, 21 Nov., Negotiations with Sweden; Imperial Claims to Prussia; pp. 143-144, No. 77, to Arnim, 22 Nov., Swedish ships must be burnt; pp. 149-151, No. 91, to Arnim, 2 Dec., hears Stralsund is fortifying itself; pp. 161-162, No. 115, Orders as to the behaviour of the officers and troops in the winter quarters in Pomerania, 26 Dec., pp. 177-178. 1628 [pp. 181-255], Wallenstein's Campaign in 1628; pp.

194-195, Negotiations between the Emperor and the Hanse Towns for a Commercial Treaty with Spain; p. 199, Wallenstein's reasons for occupying Stralsund; pp. 199-249, the Siege of Stralsund, Jan. 23, 1628, to August 4, 1628; pp. 249-255, Gustaf Adolf and the German War; No. 127, to Arnim; 6 January, Wallenstein desires an alliance with Sweden; pp. 263-264, No. 129, 7 Jan., Swedish ships must be burnt; pp. 265-266, No. 130, Jan. 11, Relations between Sweden and Denmark; pp. 267-268, No. 145, Jan. 23, as to peace with Denmark; p. 281, No. 176, March 20, Difficulties as to concluding it; No. 186, 6 Feb., (*sic.*), to Arnim; Hopes to arrange terms between the Dutch and Philip IV.; p. 328, No. 219, 7 July, Offers terms to Stralsund; pp. 361-364, No. 225, to Arnim, 28 July, Denmark will not let Stralsunders treat; p. 376, Nos. 227, 228, 229, 230, August 2, Orders Arnim to withdraw from Stralsund as Danish and Swedish ships are threatening Mecklenburg coast; pp. 381-383, No. 244, Sept. 9, Both Emperor and Wallenstein anxious to conclude peace, so as to undertake an expedition against the Turks; pp. 395-396, No. 267, Dec. 8, All Pomerania must be garrisoned or the contributions will not be paid, pp. 412-413.

Vol. I., 2nd Part, 1629, pp. 1-21, The Edict of Restitution, March 6, Reasons for making peace with Denmark, and effecting the conclusion of Peace between Sweden and Poland; Negotiations for the Peace of Lübeck, signed 12 May, 1629; Sweden excluded from the Conference, pp. 1-16; Sweden increases the garrison of Stralsund, but Christian IV. refuses to aid the Swedes at sea, p. 30; pp. 73-75, Wallenstein's Palace at Prague; his personal appearance; resigns his command, July, 1630, p. 71; the Treaty of Barwalde between France and Sweden, Jan. 13, 1631, p. 83; pp. 77-80, Gustaf Adolf lands at Rügen in Usedom, 21 June, 1630; his grounds for entering Germany.

Droysen, "Gustaf Adolf" von G. Droysen, 2 Bde. [Leipzig, G. Veit and Comp., 1869], Vol. I.; pp. 1-27, the Origin of the Baltic Question; History of Baltic Trade till 1560; pp. 27-49, Disputes between John III. and Sigismund of Sweden; Sigismund expelled from Sweden; Secures Throne of Poland; pp. 65-66, Spanish plans in Baltic, 1610; Spinola and Gustaf Adolf, p. 60; pp. 97-98, the Jesuits and Sweden, 1617; pp. 105-116, Danish Policy as to Germany; pp. 147-164, First signs of Danish intervention, 1620; pp. 177-184, Sweden until 1623; pp. 187-224, Gustaf Adolf's plans as to North Germany; pp. 237-254, the Hague Conference, 1625; pp. 255-369, the Brussels Convention; pp. 309-319, Swedish Policy in the Winter of 1627-8; pp. 319-331, the Hapsburg Baltic Plans; pp. 342-348, Hapsburg Plans shattered; pp. 354-369, the Peace of Lübeck. Vol. II., pp. 1-26, Gustaf Adolf settles his quarrels with Poland, and decides to attack Germany; pp. 70-88, his preparations for the war with Germany; State of Sweden; its Army and Navy; p. 86, Note 2, the cost of the Army worked out in detail; p. 666, Note 1, Oxenstjern explains to Bengt Oxenstjern the real objects of Gustaf Adolf's policy, viz., the foundation of a Scandinavian Empire.

Ranke "Geschichte Wallenstein's" von Leopold von Ranke [Leipzig, 1870 [1 Bd.] Chapter III., Conditions of the Empire; the subjugation, of Denmark; Chapter IV., Campaign of 1628; Stralsund; Chapter V., the Restitution Edict; Wallenstein and the Electors; Chapter VI., Meeting of the Electors in 1630; Wallenstein's Resignation.

Mares, Mittheilungen des Instituts für Oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung [pub. 1880-1881], Bde. I., II., Vol. I., p. 541, No. XIV., "The Maritime Policy of the Hapsburgs in the years 1625-8, by Fr. Mares." [London, British Museum Library, Press Mark Ac. 803.]

Many letters from Khevenhüller at Madrid in the State Archives

at Vienna for 1625-1628 are quoted, as well as some from the Kaiser and Menzel to Schwarzenberg at Brussels from the Schwarzenberg Family Archives. The failure of the Brussels Conference is attributed to the refusal of the Infanta to forge her claim to the Lower Palatinate, after the defeat of Christian IV. at Lutter had made the Emperor independent of Spanish help. Vol. II., p. 49, contains particulars of the failure of the negotiations between Spain and the Hansa, and of Wallenstein's quarrel with Schwarzenberg on account of his conduct as administrator of Hainburg. *Gindely*, Die Maritimen Plane der Habsburger und die Antheilnahme Kaisers Ferdinand II. am Polnisch-Schwedischen Kriege während der Jahre 1627-9. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges, von Dr. Anton Gindely.

Chapter I. Reasons why Spain aided Poland. Chapter II., Gustaf Adolf endeavours to prevent alliance between Spain and Poland, by offering Spain a Commercial Treaty. Spain refuses. Auchy's Mission to Poland. Spain wishes to obtain the Hanse Towns for military objects. Gabriel de Roy's mission to the Hansa. Chapter III., Wallenstein agrees to help Spain and exclude the Dutch from the Elbe. The Spanish-German Trading Company proposed. Chapters IV., V., the Spanish proposals to the Hansa. Chapter VI., Gustaf Adolf's Campaign in Poland. Chapters VII., VIII., Charnacé's mission. The Hansa rejects the Spanish proposals. *Hjärne*: "Gustaf Adolf, Protestantismens Forkämpe, Några Synpunkter." *Harald Hjärne*: [Stockholm, Wahlström och Widstrand]. 1 Vol. *Preface*: The origin of Lutheranism and Calvinism traced to the Mystical and Theocratical sections of the Pre-Reformation Catholic Church. Pp. 11-42, the Reformation in Sweden, John III. Sigismund; pp. 17-20, Charles IX., the Council of Upsala, 1593; pp. 21-29, the contest between Sigismund and Duke Charles, 1595; Spain and Polish affairs; a Baltic Port for Spain; pp. 29-36, Charles IX. as King [1604-1611]; pp. 36-42, the Policy of Sigismund III. of Poland (1587-1632); pp. 42-78, Gustaf Adolf becomes King, 1612; pp. 42-49, his training and character; pp. 65-66, his policy, as summarized by himself; pp. 66-70, his domestic policy; the Diet and Council of State; pp. 71-73, his own position; pp. 78-108, the Bohemian War; the Hague Conference; the Polish-Prussian War; the Maritime Plans of the Hapsburgs, 1619-1629; pp. 86-87, his Foreign Policy, 1622; pp. 87-91, really wishes to establish a Baltic Confederation; pp. 91-95, the Hague Conference; his policy as to Catholics; pp. 100-108, his views as to the interconnection of all the wars in Europe; their religious character, Jan., 1628; he informs the Estates that he intends to intervene to save the German Protestants; Feb., 1629; Christian IV. refuses to join him, pp. 108-140, Gustaf Adolf in Germany, 1629-1632; pp. 108-112, his attitude to the Empire quæ Empire; *Johan Skytte's Memorandum* on the nature of the Empire; the discussion in the Council of State; pp. 115-116, Gustaf Adolf takes leave of the Estates, May, 19, 1630; comes forward as the Protestant champion; pp. 116-123, the German War, 1630-1631; the negotiations with France, Venice, and Switzerland; the treaty of Barwalde, 13 Jan., 1631; pp. 124-128, his attitude to the German Catholics; the Pope admits that the Religious War had lost its bitterness; p. 144, Sweden as a member of the Empire; the *Corpus Evangelicorum*; pp. 128-140, his German policy; its results as to religion; his plans for the future; falls at Lutzen, 6 November, 1632 [p. 128.]

Royal Historical MSS. Commission Reports. Duke of Rulland. Vol. I.: p. 479, Battle of Lutter; p. 479, p. 483, relief of Nienburg; p. 481, Tilly enter Denmark; pp. 482-483, news from Denmark. *Drummond Moray*: pp. 89-91, pp. 99-123, letters of Queen of Bohemia to Duke of

Buckingham, 1625-7. *Defoe*: "The Memoirs of a Cavalier," a military journal of the wars in Germany and the wars in England, by *Daniel Defoe* [London, published by J. M. Dent and Co., Aldine House, 69, Great Eastern Street, E.C., 1895, 1 Vol.]; pp. 47-52, Tilly's troops described; the Swedish troops described; pp. 62-72, plundering when with the Swedish forces at the Battle of Leipzig, Sept. 7, 1631; pp. 89-90, raising a regiment of horse in England for Sweden, 1632. *Fryxell*: "Gustaf II., Adolf till Ungdomens tjänst utgifven af *And. Fryxell* [Stockholm, P. A. Norstedt och Söners Förlag, 1894, 1 Vol.]; this work is compiled from printed sources, the Riksbibliotek at Stockholm, and some private archives. It quotes *Daniel Defoe's* *Memoirs of a Cavalier* as "Newport, Memoirs of the Honourable Colonel A. Newport, who served as a Cavalier in the Army of Gustavus Adolphus" [London, 1791]; pp. 150-155, Gustaf Adolf's improvements in the art of war; pp. 155-160, his generals and soldiers; chapter 27, p. 103, Axel Oxenstjerna; chap. 33, the condition of trade and industry.

Swedish Intelligencer, op. cit., Part III.: pp. 80-81, the order the King of Sweden useth in drawing up a complete Battaglia; pp. 89-90, the figure for the fortification of a towne exposed; Part. I., pp. 75-77, the treaty of Barwalde, 1631.

Fuchsheim [Caspar von Grimmelshausen], "Der Abentuerliche Simplicissimus," von *Melchior Sternfels von Fuchsheim*, 7te Auflage [Leipzig, Verlag von Otto Wiegand 1 Bd.] Life in the Swedish Army. Written about 1660-1670.

Hosmer: "A Short History of German Literature," by *James K. Hosmer*. Revised Edition [London, Sampson Low, 1902, 1 Vol.]; pp. 203-208, portraits of Tilly and Gustaf Adolf at Coburg described [Cf. *Swedish Intelligencer*, op. cit. Part III., p. 188, Gustaf Adolf's personal appearance.]

Bering-Lüsberg: "Christian IV., Danmarks og Norges Konge, Populoert Skildret af *H. O. Bering-Lüsberg* (Assist v. de Danske Kongens Chronologiske Samling paa Rosenberg" [Ernest Bojesens Kunstforlag, Kjobenhavn 1890-1891, 1 Vol.] Section III., 1613-1629; pp. 305-318, attitude of Christian IV. and Gustaf Adolf to the events in Germany; pp. 319-323, the omens which preceded the war between Denmark and the Empire; pp. 323-363, the campaign of 1625; Hanover takes the Imperial side, Sept., 1625; out of hatred for Denmark, Sweden refuses to assist her; the campaign of 1626; p. 347, the battle of the Lutter, 17 August, 1626, [Cf. *Brussels*, *Papiers d'Etat et de l'Audience*; *Correspondance Historique*. No. VI., 1626; the Infanta Isabella to Tilly, Brussels, September 9, 1626.] The Invasion of Jutland (winter of 1626-1627). The campaign of 1628; the naval fight at Fehmarn; the Peace of Lübeck, 1630.

Appendix to the forty-seventh Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records [London, 1886.] op. cit. No. 5; Report on the Royal Archives of Denmark, iii.; pp. 48-49, letters of Charles I. to his uncle, Christian IV., 1627-1628; cannot supply money for Denmark, because Parliament refuses subsidies, but pledges jewels, 1627, 5 April, Westminster; asks for a licence for his Falconer to take falcons in certain eyries in Iceland.

SYLT AND THE LIISTER DEEP.

London, British Museum Map Room: *Johnson*, "Sailing Directions, etc.," by *William Johnson*, 1 vol. [Amsterdam, 1614.] "Map of the West Coast of Denmark."

Times "Atlas," Map 35 [London, Times Office, Printing House Square, E.C.]

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MANUSCRIPT.

XIX.—1625-1631.—MARITIME PLANS OF THE HAPSBURGS.—DANISH-SWEDISH WAR. TREATIES OF LUBECK, 1630. AND BARWALDE, 1631.

Genoa: Lettere Ministri. *Vienna*, 20 [Anni 1623 in 1627.]

Celio Levanto to Senate, *Vienna*.

1626, Dec. 12, Hamburg. Had reached Hamburg on Dec. 11. Had had his baggage seized by some soldiers at Wolmerstadt on his road from Leipzig, but it had been recovered for him by the Imperial Colonel Aldringer. Tilly was said to have summoned Stade. If he got that place into his hands, he could put great pressure on the forts held by the Danes between Hamburg and the mouth of the Elbe. Dec. 29, Christian IV. is at a Hanse Town, five leagues from Hamburg (which Levanto calls Itchad or Itemburg), and, it is thought, will seize the Treasure of Hamburg. 1627, Jan. 2, It is feared that Tilly will pass the Elbe, as there is a very hard frost. Describes the fortifications of Hamburg. He has, at the instance of the resident Catholics, pointed out to the Emperor how suitable a time it was for securing them the free Exercise of their religion. The mob attacked them when they were at mass in a private house. It is thought that H.I.M. means to claim the restitution of many benefices and churches in their City which belong by Right of Patronage to the German bishoprics which he has lately occupied. A Lutheran pastor has published a treatise against this. It is thought that the Prince of Holstein will declare the right of exercising the Catholic Religion free, and Spain made this a condition for granting him the right of navigation in the Spanish Seas, even if the sailors were Arminians, for the ships trading from his new port of Frederickstadt. Jan. 10, The Danish soldiers have plundered waggons belonging to Hamburg merchants. Jan. 16, Speaks of the quarrel between Christian IV. and the Prince of Holstein. Hamburg is full of Danish soldiers who might seize the place at any moment. Jan. 30, The Hamburgers are in terror lest Tilly should attack the city, whilst the ditches are frozen. The horses which the King of Poland was sending to the Infanta have been seized by the soldiers just outside the gates. Feb. 20, Christian IV's coach had fallen into a frozen river whilst he was on his way to Denmark, and he narrowly escaped drowning. Feb. 27, The Danish, Holstein, and Mecklenburg Ambassadors have come to Hamburg to call on the Senate to take sides with the Danes. On religious grounds they would gladly do so, but they are so afraid of the Emperor's lucky star that they will stay on the Imperialist side. March 5, Lübeck has declared on the Imperial side. Holstein wishes to remain neutral. March 12, The Infanta keeps writing to the Danish King as to an agreement, but he takes not the slightest notice of her letters. Christian William of Brandenburg, Bishop of Halle, who had been expelled from Halle by Tilly, had arrived with his troops in the Danish Camp. April 3, Large numbers of English troops in the Dutch service had arrived from Amsterdam for the Danish army, Money was coming from Scotland. [The scene of the arrival of the English forces at Glückstadt is vividly described by James Grant in his "Romance of War."]

For a description of Hamburg, and of a journey through North Germany in a hard winter, Cf., *London*, S.P.O. S.P. For., Germany (States), 20, f. 153, Conway's Journey from Hamburg to London. January, 1621, His residence in Hamburg. Description of the City and its Government. Monday, Jan. 29 to Monday, Feb. 5, His journey through, Bremen, Oldenburg, and Leere to Groningen.

London, S.P.O. S. P. Foreign, Poland, Bundle 4.

1627, June 6, *Francis Gordon, Agent with the King of Poland to Lord Conway, Dantric.* The Spaniards are trying to make Poland believe that England is stirring up Sweden to invade Prussia. The Senate of Dantzic wishes the English factory at Elbing to be transferred to Dantzic. May 29, Burghermaster and Council of Dantzic to Charles I. Cannot give an answer to his request that they should stop the export of munitions to Spain, as their Council cannot meet on account of the war. Their ports are shut up so that nothing can be carried in or out. July 16, The Austrian and Spanish Ministers are delighted that the Port of Dantzic is closed, as they had long wished to stop the export of munitions to Holland, but never could effect it. Aug. 20, The Dutch Ministers are trying to make peace between Sweden and Poland. The Spanish and Austrian Minister wish to prevent its conclusion as they want the trade between Poland and other nations stopped. The Polish nobility hate and fear the growth of Austrian influence. Do., "Overtures made by the Emperor and King of Spain to their loyal subjects, neighbours, and friends, touching the recovery and re-establishment of the liberty of commerce and trade." The Almirantazgo, etc. Oct. 8, The Spaniards had offered Dantzic the monopoly of trade between Spain and Poland if they will assist them against Holland and England. The Dantzigers are not attracted by these offers. Gordon had not had one word from Conway since he left England a year ago. Dec. 2, Poland had closed all their ports except Dantzic in order to provoke foreign interference against the Swedes. They would rather submit to Spanish and Austrian influence than to the Swedes, whom they despise. It would be a great blow if the Spanish faction became master of Poland, and the danger is a pressing one. Dec. 12, The Dantzigers complain that their goods have been seized by England and Scotland, although they left Dantzic six months before Charles I. asked them not to trade with Spain. They have sent no ships to Spain, although they have been offered large profits to do so. Dec. 18, "Extract of a letter from Hamburg." If the English and Dutch send any more ships to the Elbe "to offend them," the Emperor will banish both these nations out of the Empire. The Hanse Towns were being offered large sums by France, Spain, and the Empire to buy ships to join with them in making a great sea fleet. This will be the end of English trade with the Hanse Towns.

Turin: Lettere Ministri, *Vienna* 8. Marquis de Wateville to Duke, Vienna.

1628, Aug. 2, It was rumoured that Wallenstein had taken Stralsund. Nothing was to be seen at Vienna but crowds of Captains and Colonels. Nov. 7, Sweden and Poland were still negotiating. Gustaf Adolf had asked for a passage through Poland to enter Germany. His request had given the Austrian Court no little annoyance. Dec. 13, Stralsund had offered to submit and, if Glückstadt fell, the Emperor would be master of Germany to the Baltic. 1629, May 2, Denmark had proposed terms of peace. June 13, 20, Friedland had been invested with the Duchy of Mecklenburg. Sept. 26, A Truce for ten years had been concluded between Sweden and Poland, and many thought the Swedes might now turn to Germany. Oct. 3, Aytona told him Wallenstein was making every effort to stop the war in Italy, as he feared the Swedes might now try to turn him out of Mecklenburg. The King of Sweden declared he intended to do so. Dec. 12, Trautmannsdorff told him that Sweden had neither men nor money and would think twice before they went to war with the Emperor, who can now ride over his own states from Hungary to the Baltic. They are evidently in no fear of anything France may do. 1630, Jan. 30, The Dukes of Mecklenburg were trying to come to a friendly arrangement with the Emperor and were begging the King of Sweden not to make war on him on their account.

March 20, It is said Wallenstein will give back Mecklenburg to its Dukes at the General Peace. He is most anxious to secure Peace in Italy.

Mantua, Archivio Patrio Gonzaga. E. II. 3, Carteggio degli Inviati ed altri in *Corte Cesarea*, Busta 495 [1628-1629.] Di *Vincenzo Agnelli, Vescovo di Mantova*.

1628, April 8, to Marliani, Prague. Father Valerian said that Wallenstein meant to lead his army against the Turks, "if the Navigation of the Sea was not thought expedient." 1629, June 16, Now peace was made with Denmark, some of the Imperial Forces were being sent into Silesia for fear of the Swedes.

Munich, Allgem. Reichs-Archiv. *Relations of Sweden, France, and Bavaria*, 30 Jährig-Krieg, No. 238. 1629, April 25, Gustaf Adolf to Electors, Stockholm. His grievances against Germany. Dec. 26, Nuntii Literæ. France is almost certain that Denmark and Sweden will join her in supporting Bavaria. Do. 1630, Jan. 3, Do. Charnacé asks Sweden to leave Bavarian interests alone. Sweden consents.

Do. No. 248, 1630, March 3, M. de St. Esprit to Elector, Brussels. The Dutch are offering the Swedes ships to invade Germany by Emden.

Do. No. 246, 1630, May 17, Cardinal Bagni to Jocher, Paris. The Swedes will guarantee the safety of Bavaria.

Do., No. 195, 1626, Sept. 4, London. Reception of the news of the Battle of the Lutter in England. Sept. 12, Brussels. Rejoicings in Belgium over the victory of the Lutter.

Further particulars of the Manuscripts relating to the Maritime Policy of the Hapsburgs, etc., are in "Lists of Authorities, Manuscript," Belgium, 1627," "Belgium, 1629."

PRINTED.

XX.—1627-1631.—THE MANTUAN WAR. SIEGE OF CASALE. SPINOLA'S DEATH.

Nugent: "The Grand Tour," op. cit., Vol. III.; pp. 13-14, Oneglia, Monferrat; p. 28, The Cremonese; p. 29, Mantua; pp. 181-183, Genoa.

Khevenhüller: Op. cit., Part X., p. 1711; Part XI., p. 30, "The Succession to Mantua, 1627-1628. Part XI., p. 32, "The Position of Spain as regards Mantua and Monferrat, 1628; p. 58, Spain, Genoa, and Savoy, 1628.

Villa: "Ambrosio Spinola," op. cit., pp. 473-514.

Defoe: "Memoirs of a Cavalier," op. cit., pp. 6-7, His journey to Paris in 1630; pp. 10-11, A French Protestant ascribes the ruin of La Rochelle to the defeat of its fleet by the Royalists with English and Dutch help; pp. 17-28, The Campaign in Savoy, 1630; The Death of Charles Emmanuel I., Plague of 1630, Death of Spinola.

Raulich: "Carlo Emanuele I., Duca di Savoia," *Italo-Raulich* [Milan, Hoepli, 1896, 2 Tomi.], Vol. I., p. 85, Cardinal Borromeo compares Carlo Emanuele I. to Sebastian of Portugal.

"The Cambridge Modern History," planned by Lord Acton [Cambridge University Press, 1911], 14 Vols. Vol. XIII., p. 75, "The Genealogy of the Dukes of Mantua from 1478."

Giorcelli: "Rivista di Storia, Arte, Archeologia della Provincia di Alessandria" [Società Poligrafica, Alessandria, 1908], Anno XVII., Fascicolo XXXI. (Serie II.) Luglio-Settembre, 1903. Do. Fascicolo XXXII. (Serie II.) Ottobre-Dicembre, 1903.

"Cronaca Monferrina di *Gioanni Domenico Bremio*, Speciaro di Casale Monferrato (1613-1631.)" *Dott. Giuseppe Giorcelli*, pp. 436-451; pp.

569-603, War in Monferrat (1629-1631). The two sieges of Casale; p. 445. Prices during the First Siege of Casale.

Giorcelli: Documenti Storici del Monferrato XVII., Documenti Inediti o poco Noti della Cittadella di Casale (1509-1695) con la pianta della medesima. [Alessandria 1907 Stab. Cromo-Tipografico Ditta S. M. Piccone.] *Dott. Giuseppe Giorcelli* pp. 9-17 The Building of the Citadel.

Batiffol: "La Revue de Paris [Paris 85bis Faubourg Saint Honoré, 1903], 10e Anne, No. 14, 15 Juillet, 1903, pp. 292-326, *Louis Batiffol*, "Souvenirs d'un Siège (1630)," The Siege of Casale.

Times: Literary Supplement, Thursday, November 7, 1907, "The Planet King."

Saturday Review: Saturday, November 9, 1907, "Spain in Decadence."

Reviews of, "The Court of Philip IV., Spain in Decadence," by *Martin Hume* [London, Nash, 1907], 1 Vol.

Documentos Ineditos para la Historia de España Tomo LIV. [Madrid, Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1869.]

Correspondencia de *Don Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba* con Felipe IV., etc., sobre la guerra promovida en el Monferrato, 1628," 1 Vol., p. 370, 16 Dec., 1628, State of the Milanese; p. 375, 7 Jan., 1629, State of the Army in Milan; pp. 388-409, Savoy and France, 1629; pp. 409-412, The Treaty of Susa, 11 March; pp. 459-462, Cordoba's comments on the treaty; pp. 487-491, 9 April, Cordoba's instructions to Don Martin de Aragon, his envoy to Philip IV.; pp. 525-527, 27 May, Condition of the Army; p. 536, The Emperor and the Grisons; p. 571, French intentions as to Italy.

Bassompierre: op. cit. [Édition Cantenac], Vol. III., pp. 237-242, The Treaty of Monzon, March, 1626; Vol. IV., p. 2, Jan. 6, 1629, Accompanies Louis XIII. as his Lieutenant-General for the Relief of Casale; pp. 7-15, Surprise of Susa, March, 1629; p. 70, Renewal of the War in Italy, November, 1629. 1630, The Italian War, Bassompierre's Mission to Switzerland, Returns from Italy, November 9, 1630; p. 4, Attitude of the French when the Plague was at Roanne and Lyons, January, 1630.

Symonds, John Addington: "History of the Renaissance in Italy, The Catholic Reaction," Part I., p. 232, Note 1, The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Flanders and Naples in 1622." [Cf. *Mantua*, E. II., 3, Corte Cesarea, 495. Agnelli to Duke, Prague, March 18, 1628, Advising the Duke to keep in favour with the Jesuits, London, British Museum, MSS. Department, Add. 28,474, Marques de Aytona, Correspondencia Vienna, Aytona to Philip IV., Vienna, 23 August, 1628.]

Brinton: "Berühmte Kunststätten," No. 37, "Mantua" von *Selwyn Brinton* [Leipzig, E. Seemann, 1907, 1 Bd.], "Pedigree of the Gonzaga Family," "List of the Dukes of Mantua."

Rooses: "Rubens," op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 472-473, 1 October, 1626, Characters of the Infanta and Spinola; Vol. IV., pp. 346-347, Death of Vincenzo II., Duke of Mantua; Vol. V., pp. 28-30, The Treaty of Susa; pp. 339-341, The Plague in Italy, The Death of Spinola.

Gachet, E., "Rubens" op. cit., p. 235, Death of Spinola.

Hume: "The Court of Philip IV.," by *Martin Hume* [London Eveleigh Nash, 1907, 1 Vol.], as to the Relations between Philip IV. and Sor Maria de Agreda.

"THE MEMOIRS OF A CAVALIER," BY DANIEL DEFOE.

It would be interesting to inquire whether this work is a romance, or whether, as many believed in the Eighteenth Century, it is the genuine Memoirs of Col. Andrew Newport of High Ercall, Shropshire.

Wake to Dorchester, 27 July, 1630, describing the Duke of Savoy's death

might be compared with pp. 17-28 of the "Memoirs" on the same subject, as might the conversation with a Huguenot on p. 10 as to the fall of Rochelle with the Venetian Despatches.

Brilliana, Lady Harley, who was closely connected with Shropshire, was a sister of Lady Wake, and Newport may have been introduced to Wake by her.

MANUSCRIPT.

XX.—THE WAR OF THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION. SIEGE OF CASALE.

SPINOLA'S DEATH, 1627-1631.

London, British Museum, Manuscript Department, Additional MSS., No. 34,310. Letter Books of Sir Isaac Wake, Vol. I., 1624-1625.

1624, Wake to Conway, Turin, 21-31 July. Explains settlement of dispute between Mantua and Savoy as to dowries of Margaret of Savoy, Duchess Dowager of Mantua, etc. They are to be secured on the Canavese territory of Monferrat, which is to be held by Savoy till they are paid, but this arrangement requires a "placet" from the Emperor to Mantua before it is carried out. Explains difficulties which may arise as to the Mantuan Succession through Duke Ferdinand's morganatic marriage and as to D. Hyacinth.

Do., Add. MSS., 34,311. Sir Isaac Wake's Letter Book, Vol. II, 1626-1630.

1626, Wake to Conway, Venice, 4-14 Dec. Announces Vincenzo's succession. Trouble which may arise if he dies without issue, as Nevers is a Frenchman.

1627, Jan. 21-31. Venice will not intervene "visibly in Germany" or in Italy to support England against Spain or Denmark against the Emperor. Aug. 17-27: Wake explains to the Venetian Senate, which wishes to mediate, the reasons for the war between France and England. Oct. 25, Nov. 3, Rejoicings at Turin over the English defeat at Rhé. The Pope has forbidden any of his kinsmen to appear at the "Te Deum" for it at Rome.

THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION.

Dec. 17, Announces Vincenzo's death. Guastalla may claim Mantua against Nevers. Dec. 31, Gives details of Vincenzo's death and of marriage of Rethel with Princess Maria Gonzaga. Guastalla's attempt to seize the city of Mantua before Vincenzo's death foiled. Nevers had succeeded peaceably.

1628, Jan. 1, Savoy and Spain protest against Rethel's marriage. Emperor may claim that Mantua etc., have "devoluted" to Empire. Pope supports France and Nevers. March 10, Emperor has told Cesare Gonzaga that the Mantuan question must be decided by the Imperial Chambers. March 24, Nevers may agree with Spain and demolish the Citadel of Casale, the cause of all the trouble [Cf. *Turin, Vienna*, 8, Waterville, 12 Dec., 1629; 2 Jan., 1630, quoting his conversation with the Spanish Ambassador about Casale.] April 14, Savoy had entered Monferrat, and Cordoba was bombarding Casale. The reasons for the war. Nevers refuses to deposit Mantua and Casale in Emperor's hands until the question can be decided by law. Spain merely acting to support Emperor, who wishes to make himself as supreme in Italy as he is in Germany. France, etc., say Madrid formed the plan against the liberty of Italy. Wake says Emperor and Spain are "one thing," and Spain supports Emperor in Germany in return for his support in Italy. March 21, Pope keeps neutral but was at heart French. All the other Italian powers except Tuscany for Spain. June 9, Nevers was to be put in the Ban, but talked of appealing from the Emperor to the Electors and Princes of the

Empire. If he would submit the war would soon be over, as the Emperor was well disposed towards him [Cf. *Mantua, Corte Cesarea*, 495, Agnelli *passim*.] France had offered Geneva to Savoy, who would probably accept the offer [Cf. *Mantua*, E. xiv. 3, *Veneria*, Girolamo Parma, 8 Oct., 1628, *Turin*, Ing. 4, *Barozzi*, 27, 28 Feb., 1629.] May 19, June 23, Geneva would probably be attacked in the Emperor's name, and put in the Ban under the Edict for reforming the Imperial Towns. Nov. 10, Savoy annoyed by rumours that England was secretly treating with France through Montagu, and that Rochelle had fallen. Such negotiations would make the King distrusted by his allies, yet he holds the balance of power in Europe. Nov. 14, Emperor wants to occupy Casale, Venice to deposit it in the Pope's hands. Nevers has offered through a Franciscan friar to give it to Savoy for a compensation, but is now backing out. Nov. 19, Adventures of Charles Gibbons, a King's Messenger, in the Alps. News of the Fall of Rochelle has arrived. Dec. 6, Nevers refuses the Emperor's terms. Dec. 11, Charles Emmanuel's instructions to Scaglia. Spain must fulfil her engagements. Louis XIII. would desert Nevers as he had done the Grisons.

1629, Jan. 31, Mirabel had told the French that Spain would declare war and Nevers be put in the Ban if they interfered with the Imperial authority in Italy. Savoy had told Castro, the new Spanish Envoy to Vienna, that there would never be peace in Germany until the Palatine was restored and had refused, as an ally of Spain, to join France in attacking Milan and Genoa. March 6, 16, 17, Account of the Battle and Peace of Susa. Proofs Savoy had acted in good faith. France and Spain really joined together to crush out heresy. England could rely only on the Protestant powers. March 18, Probably Wake's belief as to Franco-Spanish aims was founded upon what Sancerre, a creature of Richelieu's, had said when at San Ambrogio with the Duke of Savoy on March 8.

THE GOVERNOR OF CALAIS.

1629, Feb. 10, Wake says Valencé, the Governor of Calais, may betray the place as he hates Richelieu [Cf. List of Authorities, Printed, Belgium, 1628.]

WAKE TO LORD DORCHESTER.

1629, March 18, 25, April 10, Negotiations between France and Savoy. Peace signed March 30. Casale siege raised March 25. June 3, It was unlikely that France would hand back Susa to Savoy. June 21, Huguenots treating in Languedoc. Clausel received as Rohan's Minister at Milan. Spain only held in check by her fears about Bois-le-Duc. July 18, Wake commissioned to treat for peace with Spinola, subject to Charles I.'s engagements to his allies and to the Palatine. French fortifying Susa. Aug. 16, Richelieu against war with Spain. Aug. 31, Spinola has full powers to treat with England. Emperor has ordered Savoy as Imperial Vicar in Italy to announce that he will maintain his sovereign powers there and not give Nevers investiture before all foreign forces are withdrawn. Sept. 24, Mazarin, as Pope's secret agent, proposes to Spinola and Collalto that Nevers should be invested with Mantua and Monferrat, but that Casale should be kept out of the hands of either the Imperialists or the Spaniards. Sept. 30, Had not the Imperialists surprised Ostiano, Mazarin might have persuaded Nevers to admit them into Mantua. French expect to be besieged in Casale. Oct. 24, Thoyras attacks Spaniards near Casale. Savoy and Créquy negotiating for peace. Nov. 3, Imperialists blockading Mantua, citizens for Guastalla and will surrender to

Emperor out of fear. All Italian Princes except Pope and Venetians will follow the conqueror. Bologna and Ferrara disaffected to Pope. Spinola for peace. French can seize Italy at any time so long as they hold Susa. Nevers refuses Collalto's offer to secure him the Investiture, if he will hand over Prima Porta, the key to Mantua, to him. Dec. 1, Duke of Savoy has quarrelled with Scaglia because none of his promises about Spain have been fulfilled. The Papal Envoy Pancirolo has persuaded Collalto to grant Nevers an armistice for a month. He refuses to exchange Casale for Sabionetta. Richelieu coming to Italy.

1630, Jan. 4, Large French forces on frontier of Savoy. Spinola strong, Collalto weak. Jan. 19, Spanish agent at Turin says Spain had kept faith with Savoy, but Spinola had not. Scaglia says that he approved of Spinola's appointment because Olivares proposed it as from Philip IV. Spinola and Collalto quarrelling, but Emperor had placed Collalto under Spinola's orders. Jan. 23, Feb. 13, 24, 28, March 6, Pancirolo tries to negotiate between Richelieu, Savoy, Spinola and Collalto, but fails because Richelieu will not allow Spinola and Collalto time to get authority from Madrid and Vienna to sign treaty. March 10, French enter Piedmont. March 18, Richelieu leaves Susa. March 22, French threaten Turin and Pinerolo. March 31, Cardinal Barberini negotiating with Richelieu. French wish to hold Pinerolo and the citadel of Casale until the Imperialists have carried out treaties of Monzon and Susa. April 20, Negotiations broken off because French will not restore Pinerolo. Spinola for peace. May 10, Spinola and Collalto visit Turin. Spinola shown *Sudario*. Fighting at Casale. [The *Sudario* now preserved at Turin, is the "Winding Sheet" in which Our Lord's Body was wrapped by St. Joseph of Arimathea; Cf. Matt. xxvii. 59, Mark xv. 46, Luke xxiii. 53]. May 14, Spain only anxious about Casale, merely defends Savoy for sake of Milan. May 25, Spinola had quarrelled with Collalto because Spinola and the League wished to make Duke of Neuburg Imperial Generalissimo and employ Wallenstein in Italy. June 22, Fearful dearth in Piedmont. Casale at last gasp. July 13, Mazarin's mission to Louis XIII., who will restore all his conquests in Italy, when his friends there are secured against oppression. Savoy will only make peace with the consent of Imperial and Spanish Ambassadors, Savoy expects peace soon [Cf. *Munich, Reichs Arch.*, 30 J.K. 246, Giulio Mazzarino, Moriana, a 4 di Luglio, 1630.] Spinola losing his reputation before Casale. July 27, Fall of Mantua on July 25. Death of Charles Emmanuel I. at Savigliano. Aug. 28, The new Duke, Vittorio Amadeo I., anxious for peace. Oct. 2, Truce concluded on Sept. 10. Savoy proposed it, French accepted it, but Spinola suggested allowing term for relief of Citadel of Casale. Spinola resigns his command, as he thought Santa Cruz had been appointed to replace him, and retires to Castel Nuovo di Scrivia, where he dies. Dec. 12, Wake describes his sufferings during his internment for the plague at La Porporata. Early in 1631 he was transferred as Ambassador to Paris and died there.

LORD DORCHESTER.

Lord Conway retired from the Secretaryship of State in January, 1629, and was succeeded by Sir Dudley Carleton, who was created Lord Dorchester. Wake received the news of his appointment on 25 Feb., 1629. *Do. Egerton MSS.* 2,053.

Ff. 232-239, 1628, Jan. 12, Olivares' "Voto" or written opinion in the Council of State on the question of the Succession to Mantua and Monferrat.

Nevers certainly the legitimate successor to Mantua and Monferrat, but he should have got the permission of Philip IV. as his Suzerain to

accept them, nor should Rethel's marriage with D. Maria Gonzaga have taken place without the consent of the Emperor, etc. Peace is most necessary in Italy, but the fact that Monferrat is too weak to defend itself allows any invader to enter the Peninsula through Savoy. Nevers has by his conduct given good grounds for annexing Monferrat without compensation to the Milanese, but he would do well for the sake of peace to exchange it with Spain for the Cremonese.

Do. Add. MSS. 28,474, Marques de Aytona, Vienna, Correspondencia. Aytona had succeeded Oñate as Spanish Ambassador at Vienna.

1628, March 23, Count John of Nassau appointed Imperial Commissary at Mantua, because he had been in the Spanish service in the Netherlands [Cf. *Mantua, Corte Cesarea* 495, Agnelli, 15 April, 1628.] Philip IV., whatever the sentence of the Imperial Courts might be, should keep all the states he had seized as Nevers and Rethel had forfeited them by their breach of their duties as vassals. Had told Eggenberg Spain wished the States to be sequestered until their ownership was established. The Empress was opposed, said Eggenberg, to this, but was now convinced that they ought to be in the Emperor's hands, and not in those of Spain or Savoy. France, the Nuncio, and Venice supported Nevers as a supporter of France in Italy. April 28, Mentions Bruneau's mission to Prague and Bavaria, "which is where all these matters are settled." April 28, Savoy thought Spain should help him to get Nevers expelled from Italy, but this was impossible, as they had asked Emperor to have the case settled by the Imperial Courts. The Emperor believed everything which the Empress and the Bishop of Mantua told him, and it was very difficult to undeceive him. Feb. 12, Philip IV. to Aytona. Letter embodying the contents of Olivares' "Voto" Cf. supra. [This "Voto" was based on Don Gonzalo de Cordoba's letter of 27 Dec., 1627, to the King to announce Duke Vincenzo II.'s death, in which he added that if Savoy would not withdraw from Monferrat he would enter the Marquisate himself under the commission from the Emperor held by the Duke of Guastalla, and hold it in the Emperor's name.] Jan. 16, Philip IV. to Cordoba. Approves of his suggestion as to Guastalla. Is to occupy Casale and its citadel. Jan. 16, Cordoba to Philip IV. His arguments as to Rethel's position were based upon a report of some authorities on Feudal Law at Milan. Guastalla was thought to have a better claim to the States, under the original grant of 1435 to Marchese Gio. Fran. Gonzaga [Cf. *Mantua, Spagna* 617, Striggi, Madrid, 1627, June 18.] and as the direct line of descent had ended with Duke Vincenzo II., Rethel could not enter them without the Emperor's consent. May 1, Philip IV. to Aytona. Glad Emperor has sequestered States. He must place them in Philip's hands or it would look as if Spain had taken up arms against the Emperor. If possible, the Tribunals should decide as to the "Right of Succession," and not as to that of "Possession." The decision should be sent to Madrid before it is published, as was done in the case of Piombino [Cf. *Genoa, Vienna*, 26, Celio Levanto to Senate, 1625, Feb. 11, 18, 26.] If the Emperor acts vigorously, he can settle everything by Law. July 6, *do.* to *do.*, Will not exchange Cremonese for Monferrat. He should be allowed to hold Casale etc., on deposit, and give compensation, when sentence is pronounced, for what falls to him in Monferrat. Proceedings must be spun out so as "to give time for the Casale undertaking." Oct. 11, *do.* to *do.*, Is to aid Duchess of Lorraine in putting forward her claim to Monferrat. Oct 30, *do.* to *do.* The Emperor's Confessor had written to the Rector of the Jesuits' College at Mantua to say that Nevers was not to trouble himself because he had been put in the Ban as he still retained the Emperor's favour. The King thought, however, that Nevers

might be ready for an arrangement, "supuesto que theologos y Jesuitas me han asegurado la consciencia en la parte de excluir a Nevers de esta succession por la dureza y obstinacion con que ha mostrado su Intencion" [Olivares had purposed in his "Voto" that a Junta of Theologians should be consulted on the subject.] Aug. 23, Aytona to Philip IV. Emperor so completely gained over to Nevers by those about him, that Aytona had told him plainly how grieved he was by his alienation from Spain. H.I.M. replied angrily this was not the case. If the French entered Italy he would send his forces to protect the Spanish States. Aytona defended Cordoba against the Emperor's charge that he had entered Monferrat in his name without his permission. The Emperor had given orders to the Aulic Council to report to him on the Mantuan question at once. The Empress and the Emperor's Confessor, although a born Spanish subject, were working for Nevers. The Confessor had told the Savoy Minister that the war was unjust. Eggenberg, by the Emperor's orders, had scolded him for this. "Esto dicen que naze de haver hecho el Duque de Nibers muchos Colegios de la Compania." Marginal note in Philip's hand, "ya me maravillaba yo mucho que no anduviesen por aqui estos Padres" [Cf. *Agnelli*, Prague, 18 March, 1628.] The Aulic Council had issued a declaration that if Nevers complied with the Emperor's orders, Spain and Savoy must do the same. Aytona to avoid delay had engaged that they would, on condition that Mantua and Casale should be deposited in Spanish hands, Eggenberg had acted well. Aytona's chief opponents were the Empress, the Confessor, and Trautmannsdorff. Sept. 6, Aytona to Philip IV. The Emperor had told him that he looked on Philip's interests as his own, but he had obviously had to force himself to say this, as he hated displeasing the Empress, with whom Aytona had had an angry conversation about Nevers the day before. He had told her Nevers should come to some arrangement with Cordoba and Savoy in Italy, as the Emperor could then intervene without acting independently of Spain. No diversion could be made in France without Friedland's consent with Imperial troops, as the Emperor was wholly in his hands. Oct. 25, *do. to do.* Nevers had written to the Emperor offering to submit. The Emperor asked Aytona to contrive a settlement. This could only be done if Nevers, Spain, and Savoy deposited what they held in the Emperor's hands until the case was settled. If Nevers did so, and the others refused, the Emperor would refuse to assist Spain elsewhere, and, perhaps, grant Nevers the investiture at once. Nevers might accept an exchange for Casale. If Count John of Nassau held Casale, it would be really in Spanish hands, but the Emperor would not admit a Spanish garrison independent of his authority into the place. The Empress had induced the Emperor to give Rethel such a reception at Vienna that the impartiality of the tribunal appointed to adjudicate in the Mantuan case might be suspected. Nov. 25, *do. to do.* After all, Nevers had not submitted to the Emperor but was marking time till Rochelle fell. Had urged the Emperor to depose Nevers, although the decree could only be carried out by the arms of Spain. Nov. 29, *do. to do.* The offer of Sylt to Spain [Cf. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 199, Infanta to Philip IV., 21 Dec., 1628.] The advantage of making Spain independent of Friedland's naval plans. The Emperor could not assist Spain against the Dutch, as the whole Empire hated the Spaniards so bitterly. Dec. 13, *do. to do.* Nevers had refused to come to terms with Cordoba, and the Emperor and his Confessor were making excuses for him. Eggenberg alone could secure the publication of the Ban against him. Most of the Imperial Ministers thought he was in the right. He would tell the Emperor, quoting Philip IV.'s orders, that the garrison of Casale must be Spanish, as nothing had come of his own representations.

1629, Jan. 1, Philip IV. to Aytona. Will agree to Cordoba's proposals [Cf. Aytona, Oct. 25, 1628.] Jan. 21, Will go to war with the French if they enter Italy to maintain the Emperor's authority. Has asked Mirabel to get the Citadel of Casale placed in the hands of Bavaria, as the French had suggested [Cf. *Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K.S.* 377/48; Spaniens *Procedere gegen Bayern, Agnelli*, 17 Jan., 1629, *Corr. de Cord.* p. 162, Savoy to Cordoba, 22 Feb., 1629.] April 4, do. to do. As Emperor, Bavaria and the Estates of the Empire propose a general peace and to force the Dutch to agree to it, they should ally themselves with him. April 5, Wishes Ban against Nevers issued at once, as French will certainly advance in Italy. April 6, As Aytona suggests, has asked Friedland through Sforza to join in an attack on Venice, where he would have a state given him. He should press the Dutch to sign a truce or peace, and the attack on Venice is conditional on this and on peace with Denmark. May 5, do. to do. Will not ratify treaty of Susa. Friedland should attack Metz. French have entered Monferrat. May 3, Philip IV. to Emperor. Will leave Nevers undisturbed in Mantua and Monferrat, if French will do so also and withdraw from Italy [Cf. do. Egerton 338, f. 214, *infra*.] June 9, Aytona to Philip IV. Thanks to Eggenberg and Collalto, the Emperor will send an army to Italy and issue the Ban against Nevers for felony. Collalto, not Friedland, should command the expedition. June 17, do. to do. Directly peace was signed with Denmark, Friedland sent a force to the Netherlands. Emperor delighted. Uncertain if Bavaria will also. July 15, do. to do. Thanks to Sforza's delays, Aytona only got Philip's powers to treat with Friedland on July 4. Two days later he received Philip's letter of June 11 asking Friedland should not go to Italy till the following March, and at the same time Friedland's express arrived to say that, at the Infanta's request, he was sending all his forces, except those which had gone to Bois-le-Duc, into West Friesland. The Emperor and his Ministers were furious because they thought Spain was deserting them in Italy. At Eggenberg's request Aytona had asked Cordoba to assist the Imperial forces who were occupying Mantua and Monferrat at once. "No one can believe that those who are working as zealously to relieve Bois-le-Duc as if it was Vienna, and are upholding Y.M. in the Lower Palatinate against the wishes of all Germany will do you any harm in Italy." If Spain and the Imperialists fell out, they might divert the forces intended to relieve Bois-le-Duc against the Turks, and this rupture might come about if Spain did not assist the Emperor in Italy. He was sending the Infanta and Cordoba copies of this. July 26, Philip IV. to Aytona. Copy of a memorial as to the complaints of the Princes of the Empire against Friedland. They still think the Empire will remedy their grievances. Spanish maladministration in the Lower Palatinate had done great harm. Treves and Strasburg, intriguing against Empire. [Cf. *Turin, Ing.* 4, Barozzi, London, 20 March, 1629, as to Strasburg.] The Election of a King of the Romans all-essential. Aug. 18, do. to do., Excuses Infanta for her dealings with Friedland about Friesland. Emperor should have sent the forces he is employing in Italy into Champagne against France or to force the Dutch to sign the Truce, as he knew that Philip could not help him in Italy till they had done so. Aug. 22, do. to Spinola. Must assist Friedland's troops in Italy and secure a peace favourable to the Emperor. A breach with the Emperor would ruin Spain. [Cf. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 201, Ph. IV. to Inf., Aug. 18, enclosing a copy of this letter.] Sept. 1, do. to do. Sends Aytona to Brussels to assist Infanta. Imperialists going to Italy must be sent to Friesland, as Bois-le-Duc is in such straits. Sept. 5, Aytona to Philip IV. Emperor, on learning of loss of Wesel, had ordered Friedland to

send the promised reinforcements. Sept. 9, do. to do. Emperor will not name Spinola his Commissary in Italy as Friedland and Collalto are going there with Imperial troops. All Germany is pressing the Emperor to ask Spain to deposit the Lower Palatinate in his hands or his representative's. The Emperor could do nothing to restrain Friedland's troops. Saxony furious at Edict of Restitution, and the French spirit which was blowing through Germany might produce great changes. "El Emperador esta advertido de todo lo referido, pero como hoye a todos y cree a muchos con su natural bondad no conoce la malignidad de los que le aconsejan mal y que con pretexto de piedad le hazen caer en Resoluciones peligrosas. Una dellas ha sido la del Decreto de la Restitucion de los Bienes ecclesiasticos a tiempo que las fuerças del Emper, havian de acudir a Flandes, Italia, y Polonia, y antes de asegurar el Impto, en su hijo. A los Jesuitas hazen autores deste parecer o por mejor decir al P. Lamormain su confesor [Note in Philip IV.'s hand. Yo lo creo. Los Principes tienen la culpa.], y a las Instancias deste Nuncio y del Papa. Dize se que esto se haze para meter al Empr. en tantos embarazos que dexé las cosas de Italia, pero parece que Dios ha querido hazer en esto milagro como en todo lo demas pues hasta aora no se han movido los Hereges que ocupan bienes ecclesiasticos y se va haciendo harto pacíficamente la Restitucion." Sept. 24, do. to do. Marcheville sent to Elector of Mainz to say French were coming to Germany to free the Princes, especially the Electors, from the tyranny of the Emperor. Mainz rebuffed him. Oct. 15, Philip IV. to Aytona. Begs that Emperor will not ask him through an envoy to evacuate the Lower Palatinate.

Do. Egerton, 338, f. 299. 1628, Oct. 19, Instructions to Count John of Nassau to occupy Mantua and hold it for the Emperor till the case is decided.

As Spaniards may object, he must know Nevers has offered to accept a compensation from Spain for the city and citadel of Casale, and what the Spaniards have occupied in Monferrat. f. 214, Philip IV.'s declaration (Cf. Philip IV. to Emperor, May 3, 1629 ante) that he will leave Nevers undisturbed in Mantua and Monferrat if France will engage to withdraw from Susa, Monferrat, Piedmont and Italy, 3 May, 1629.

London, State Paper Office.

S.P. For. Savoy and Sardinia 13.

[This series of State Papers corresponds in the main with London British Museum, MSS. Department. *Additional MSS.*, Nos. 34,310-34,311, "Letter Books of Sir Isaac Wake," Vols. I., II., quoted above.]

1627: f. 68, May 30; f. 89, June 13; f. 102, July 5; f. 104, July 13. *Montagu to Conway*, gives an account of his mission to Rohan. Rohan would rise with Soissons to effect a diversion when Buckingham attacked Rochelle. If Soissons rises in Dauphiny he will require hand of King of Bohemia's eldest daughter with a dowry from England. Savoy wishes Charles I. to arrange an accommodation between him and Geneva, which the King will do. This will recoup him for his losses at Genoa. Both Rohan and Soissons want subsidies from England. Savoy inclined to Spain rather than to Louis XIII., "whose affronts are so bitter." f. 118, Aug. 20, Louis XIII. angry at Montagu's mission to Lorraine. Richelieu has offered £10,000 to have him kidnapped and brought to France. Spain would support Lorraine, but will not act unless a general pacification is arranged at Brussels. Their answer to Lorraine shows what England can expect from Spain. Buckingham's successes have raised prestige of England. f. 137, Oct. 23, Savoy and Soissons will fulfil their promises. Too late this season for Rohan to move. f. 26, Dec. 31, *Extract from letter received by Hales from Turin.* Savoy angry at overtures made by

French to Nevers. Wishes England to make peace with Spain, as he had advised in previous year. [Cf. do. f. 3, 1627, Feb. 5. Hales to Conway. Turin.] Do. 14.

LORD CARLISLE'S MISSION TO SAVOY.

1628: f. 243, Aug. 7; f. 290, Aug. 17; *Carlisle, Turin*. "The Duke is a brave and generous spirit, vigilant and devout, notwithstanding that France and Spain for their own credit have cried him down as fraudulent and unquiet. The Prince is also industrious and courageous and an affectionate understanding exists between father and son." Scaglia sent satisfactory accounts of proceedings in English Parliament. f. 271, Aug. 16, France offers peace to England if they will give up Rochelle and the Huguenots. Hopes England will include Savoy in peace with France. f. 297, Aug. 19, *Conway to Carlisle*. Defence of England and Ireland against invasion by France and Spain will be seen to after fleet has sailed for Rochelle. f. 108, Nov. 11, *Carlisle, Turin*. Savoy furious that England is negotiating with France through Montagu without her knowledge. Such proceedings will ruin prestige of England which now holds balance of power in Europe. f. 167, Dec. 3, *Conway to Carlisle*. Denies Montagu's negotiations. Charles I. wishes good relations with Savoy. Is sending ship to bring Scaglia to England.

Do. 15.

1629: f. 49, Jan. 31, *Wake, Turin*. Spain rejects Botru's overtures. F. 175, March 7, *Dorchester to Wake*. Spain will consent to inclusion of H.M.'s friends and allies in Treaty. Vane sent to K. and Q. of Bohemia and Prince of Orange who are concerned.

Nearly all Wake's letters in this file are in *London Brit. Mus., MSS. Dept., Add. 34,311* supra.

Do. 16.

1629: f. 11, May 15-16, *Wake*. Savoy annoyed at peace between France and England. Probably, as a result, Susa will not be restored very quickly.

Do. 17.

1629: f. 20, Aug., Proposals to Charles I. from Barozzi. Aug. 30, Charles I.'s reply to these proposals. f. 124, Oct. 4, *Wake to Dorchester*. Mistrusts Scaglia, who makes as many difficulties as to meeting Spinola, "as if he were in Spain." f. 176, Oct. 24, Spinola, seeing that either the Low Countries or Italy must be abandoned, means to make peace in Italy, and retire to Flanders, as he thinks that the Dutch terms will prove too high to accept.

f. 240, 1630, Jan. 18, *Dorchester to Wake*. Peace concluded with Spain. Lord Conway spoke on Wake's behalf the day "he fell sick of a sharp fever, that carried him the third day after," which shows that Wake "was remembered by him up to the last." [Date really 1630-1631.]

Nearly all the despatches on this file are in Wake's Letter Books, Vol. II., as above.

Turin, R. Archivio di Stato.

Lettere Ministri, Vienna, 8, Marquis de Wateville to Duke of Savoy, Vienna.

1628, June 27, Nevers placed in Ban because he will not obey H.I.M. orders owing to offers of support from France. Aug. 23, Empress trying to prevent publication of Ban. Oct. 21, Emperor proposes Spain should compromise with Nevers. Savoy should hold in Emperor's name what he occupies in Monferrat. Nov. 22, Nevers refuses these offers, as he is promised French support.

1629, Jan. 17, Botru failed at Madrid because his proposals were against Emperor's authority. Jan. 31, Pope sends envoy to ask Bavaria to mediate with Emperor about Monferrat. Maximilian replied he would

stand by Emperor. March 21, Nevers defies Emperor and threatens to take Casale and invade Milan. Pope, France, and some Italian princes supporting him. Oct. 3, Aytona said Wallenstein was making every effort to stop war in Italy, as he feared Swedes would expel him from Mecklenburg now they had made truce with Poland. Spain wanted a sound, general settlement in Italy. Peace, Aytona said, might come when least expected. Dec. 12, Aytona said France and Venice would never let Nevers deposit Casale in Emperor's hands. Casale cause of whole trouble in Italy.

1630, Jan. 2, The deposit of Casale in the Emperor's hands "is the only remedy for all our woes." Nevers would do it but for France and Venice. As things stood only hope of arrangement was by forcing one of the parties to give way to the other. Jan. 23, Empress and Father Lammermann pressing for peace, but only the deposit of Casale and Mantua in the Emperor's hands could end the war. Jan. 30, Emperor so angry with Nevers that he has sent Werdenberg to press Wallenstein to march into Italy. Electors and Catholic League press him to maintain his prestige there. Feb. 27, Emperor now wants peace in Italy, for he thought he could now attack the Turks who are at war with Persia. March 13, H.I.M. trying to negotiate with Richelieu through Father Valerian a great friend of Father Joseph. April 3, Savoy neutral because Spinola would not help her against France after promising to do so. April 10, French plotting to attack Turin. Richelieu furious because he can do nothing in Italy without Savoy. April 15, When Wateville told Trautmannsdorff that the Emperor could not make a diversion in France without the consent of the Electors, Trautmannsdorff replied, "When a Prince of the Empire, such as Y.R.H., is to be defended, there is no question of requiring the Electors' consent."

Do. Spagna 19.

"Convenienze per stabilimento e Perpetuatione della Monarchia di Spagna. Al Sigr. Conte d'Olivares, Duca di San Lucar." [*Anon.*, written about 1622.] Gives an account of Charles V.'s policy in Italy, and a description of Monferrat, Savoy, and Genoa, the Italian territories most important to Spain. Most necessary to get direct access to the sea for the Milanese, and to secure the Valtelline for Spain. The Emperor's rights over Monferrat one of the chief reasons why Spain could not break with him about the Palatinate.

Do. Spagna, 20 [Anni 1628 in 1638.]

Gio. Fran. Gandolfo, Bishop of Ventimiglia to Duke of Savoy, Madrid.

1628, Dec., France through Botru urges deposit of Monferrat with some neutral chosen by Emperor and Spain. Pope, Tuscany, Bavaria suitable. Frankenburg presented memorial to Olivares showing Emperor only wishes (1) to do justice, (2) to preserve his Imperial jurisdiction, (3) to discredit French reports that he was coming to support some Spanish scheme.

Do. Spagna 21 [Anni 1628 in 1629.]

Abbate Alessandro Scaglia to Duke, Madrid.

1629, Jan. 3, Olivares and Scaglia agree to refuse Botru's proposals because they will not have Pope or any other prince meddle in the matter. It is enough if they accept the Emperor. Jan. 27, Spain inclined to refer Botru's proposals to Emperor and to inform France that H.I.M. alone decides in last resort. May 3, Must be war with France which has insulted Spain. Spaniards now see that if France remains in Monferrat, Milan will come to cost them as much as Flanders does. May 31, Spinola can do nothing unless Huguenot rising keeps France quiet. Emperor will do nothing till he sees what Spain does about French proposals to

place Mantua and Monferrat in the hands of a neutral. June 26, Olivares wants war with France, which might invade Italy again because Nevers has been refused the Investiture.

Scaglia left Madrid for England on 25 July, 1629.

Mantua, R. Archivio di Stato [Arch. Patrio Gonzaga.] E. XV. 3., Francia 675.

Girolamo Priandi to Duke, Paris.

1627, Jan. 2, D'Herbault thinks Duke should settle with Savoy as to Dow. Princess Margaret's claims. Jan. 31, Some French Ministers negotiating at Rome for dissolution of Duke Vincenzo's marriage. Savoy claims Princess Maria should not be married without consent of her mother and grandfather, the Duke of Savoy. Nov. 13, France will not allow Savoy to seize Monferrat or to force Mantua to marry Infanta Maria as they wish.

Do. E. xv., 3, Francia, 676.

1628, Jan. 7, Queen Mother grieved at Duke Vincenzo's death. Delighted at Nevers' installation and Rethel's marriage.

Rudolfo Hippolito, Count of Gazzoldo, to Duke, May 5. Queen Mother will protect Duke. May 25, Visit to camp before Rochelle. Louis XIII. and Richelieu will protect Duke. Créquy will reinforce Casale, etc. July 29, Had not gone to England as French had said his visit might prejudice Duke. Aug. 23, Créquy will not go to Mantua. France only talks. *Girolamo Priandi to Duke, Paris.*

1629, Aug. 24, Had told French Ministers that if Louis XIII. wished to avoid a breach with House of Austria, he must go in person with a strong army to the Italian frontier. Sept. 22, All France was in the Duke's favour. Dec. 30, Cardinal had left Paris for Lyons and Italy to show that H.M. will protect his friends and allies. Will fix headquarters at Casale. *Do. XV., 3, Francia, 677. [Anni 1630 in 1633.]*

1630, Jan. 4, Créquy instructed not to grant armistice as Louis XIII. wishes for "a good peace or a good war." Jan. 16, Louis XIII., on reaching Italy, will try to arrange a favourable peace. If he failed would continue war. March 9, Susa. Savoy had granted the French the passage. Cardinal annoyed because Papal Envoys against Duke. Regretted Duke's reported settlement with Guastalla. March 10, Cardinal told Nuncio, when he grumbled at French remaining in Italy, they would gladly leave it if Spain would evacuate Naples and Milan. Aug. 4, Loss of Mantua due to failure of France and Venice to send reinforcements in time. Mazarin said fall of Mantua and Duke of Savoy's death had prevented conclusion of peace, though Collato and Spinola were seeing the new Duke about it. Sept. 20, Rumours of Spinola's death. Santa Croce signing Truce in his place. Emperor would give Nevers Investiture if he would compensate Guastalla. French supported this arrangement. Eggenberg thought to wish to marry his daughter to Guastalla. Nov. 11, News of the relief of Casale arrives. Dec. 8, Peace not yet signed.

The war was ended by the Treaty of Chierasco. 6 April, 1631 [Cf. *Casale, Seminario, Foro, Vol. II., Documento 131, infra.*]

Do. E. xiv. 3, Spagna, 617 [1626-1628.]

Alessandro Striggi to Duke, Madrid.

1626, undated, Duke of Mantua thinking of exchanging Monferrat for Cremona. Emperor had asked Philip IV. to support dissolution of Duke Vincenzo's marriage at Rome. Feb. 13, *Striggi to Chancellor Striggi* (his uncle). Urges Chancellor to support exchange of Monferrat for some other territory. March 13, *Striggi to Duke.* Spain annoyed at Rethel's visit to Mantua. March 3, *Olivares to Marchese Giovanni Gonzaga.* Surprised that Duke has asked Rethel to Mantua possibly with a view to

the marriage Gonzaga hinted at. March 19, *Do. to do.* Many complications would be prevented by arranging an exchange for Monferrat.

1627, Feb. 10, *Striggi to Duke.* Cardinal Tresso had said that Duke Vincenzo's marriage to Donna Ardiatina was legal, and, therefore, D. Hyacinth was legitimate Duke, but Spain would never try this means to keep out Nevers. March 24, By employing Velasquez he had managed to get Olivares to write to Rome to support the dissolution of D. Vincenzo's marriage. June 18, Spaniards inquiring as to Guastalla's rights to succeed to Mantua, and it was said H.I.M. had issued a patent in his favour. Rambouillet had told him this. [Cf. *London Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept., Eg. 2,053*, 1628, Jan. 16, Cordoba to Philip IV., *supra.*] He could not find what the alleged proofs of D. Hyacinth's legitimacy were. Spain preferred the succession of Guastalla, who had a numerous issue, to the dissolution of D. Vincenzo's marriage, as the succession would then be assured for a long time. Spain was doing nothing for D. Vincenzo.

Do. Correspondenza di Mantova, Busta 2,777, 1627, April 8, *D. Martin Babin, a French resident at Mantua, to Duc de Nevers.* When Duke Vincenzo heard of the Spanish intrigues in support of Guastalla at Vienna, he had said he would give a wife to Rethel and declare him his heir.

Do. Spagna, 617 (contd.)

1627, Aug. 10, *Striggi to Duke, Madrid.* Spain was looking into D. Hyacinth's claims. Sept. 4, When Striggi asked Villela what Spain had been doing about D. Hyacinth and Guastalla, he replied there was nothing in the story. Both the Emperor and Philip IV. knew that Nevers' rights were better than Guastalla's, and had never dreamed of excluding him. Sept. 27, Spain recognised that D. Hyacinth, being illegitimate, could not succeed.

Do. E. II. 3., Corte Cesarea, 495 [1628-1629.]

Vincenzo Agnelli, Bishop of Mantua to Duke.

D. Vincenzo Agnelli had been tutor to Princess Leonora Gonzaga, the second wife of the Emperor Ferdinand II., and was her most intimate friend in Mantua. The Bishop left Mantua on Jan. 28, 1628, and reached Prague, where the Imperial Court was residing on Feb. 22.

1628, Feb. 26, *Agnelli to Duke Charles, Prague.* Emperor had given orders he was not to be received officially, as it had been all but decided to submit the Mantuan case to the Courts, but would willingly see him as a private gentleman at any time. Eggenberg said H.I.M. was well disposed to the Duke and advised him to try to conciliate Spain, which, Frankenburg wrote, was better inclined to him than he thought. Feb. 28, Had had a very friendly interview with the Emperor, who liked Duke Charles personally, and only regretted he had not informed him before concluding Rethel's marriage. He could not grant him the Investiture until the Civil Courts had decided the dispute as to the succession. March 4, Had seen the Empress, who said Agnelli must make friends with the Ministers. She believed Nevers to be the head of her house, but the claims of the Dow. Duchess of Lorraine must be considered, as they were founded on her father's will. She wished to reconcile D. Cesare Gonzaga and the Duke. Agnelli replied that this could easily be done before the suit but not afterwards. Eggenberg was angry that Duke Charles was levying troops, especially as they were to be paid by Venice. March 4, Large sums would have to be spent in influencing the Ministers. They must begin by giving five or six Ministers two hundred thalers [£30] each, with a promise of more. March 11, Eggenberg supported the Empress [Cf. *Turin, Ing. 4*, Barozzi to Duke, Brussels, 6 May, 1628. Cardinal de la Cueva said this was because Eggenberg had a claim on the Marquisate of Livorno.] The Duke should give H.I.M. a good sum for the Investiture.

Wallenstein had told some Imperial Councillors that he would never give them a man for a war against Nevers, "who had every right in the world." Philip IV. had given H.I.M. his word of honour that he would not begin hostilities against Nevers unless with his approval. March 18, Duke must keep on good terms with the Jesuits, who said that but for him they would have been expelled from France. The Duke's states had been sequestrated to avoid a general war. Aytona said the Citadel of Casale was the crux of the matter. Spain did not claim any of the Duke's states. April 15, Strahlendorf said Count John of Nassau was favourable to the Duke and was instructed to favour him as far as possible. This must be concealed from Cordoba. [Cf. *London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept., Add.* 28,474. Aytona to Philip IV., Prague, 23 March, 1628.] May 13, Eggenberg had informed Cordoba that Spain and Savoy could not divide Monferrat between them, as that state recognises no immediate master but the Emperor. May 28, Emperor hurt at the way in which the Duke had treated the Imperial Commissioners. He must accept some exchange for Monferrat but not Cremona. France could not help him before Rochelle settled. Olivares only wishes for peace in Italy if Spain is made safe in Milan. July 26, To please Spain, H.I.M. might send troops to Italy, though it was risky for him to do so whilst disaffection was rampant in his own states and in Germany. Aug. 16, Spain had made H.I.M. issue the monitorium against the Duke. Philip IV. determined to have Monferrat for his own security. The Duke's only hope was an appeal to France. Eggenberg said the sentence could not be remitted. Even his Confessor could not move the Emperor.

This despatch marks the moment when the Mantuan War became a certainty.

Sept. 13, Emperor said that he would gladly arrange a peace to please the Empress, but he was both a judge and under great obligations to Spain. Sept. 30, Had received Duke's letter of Sept. 10, offering to deposit Casale and the parts of Monferrat which he holds in the Emperor's hands, on condition Savoy did the same, and he was released from the obligation to exchange Monferrat. Oct. 21, Mantua was released from the sequestration, and the Duke was given hopes of the Investiture after the deposit of Casale. H.I.M. told Agnelli Monferrat might be placed in the hands of Spain, Savoy, and himself. Nov. 16, Their Majesties thought the Duke would not accept the terms proposed. The Empress said if he did not, she would do no more for him. If he does not come to Vienna he is lost. He could yield to Spain without disgrace. Nov. 22, News had arrived of the fall of Rochelle. The Spaniards said the Duke would now break off the negotiations. Dec. 16, Louis XIII. was sending Baron de Quincé to H.I.M. to ask him to act circumspectly about the Monitorium to Mantua.

1629, Jan. 3, H.I.M. asked Quincé to give him his proposals about the monitorium in writing, and referred them to a Council including Friedland, Eggenberg, and Collalto. Jan. 17, H.I.M. will abide by the report of the Commissioners, and would, Eggenberg said, take drastic measures against the Duke if he did not accept the capitulations as the other parties to the case had done. H.I.M. knew Duke had suggested the deposit of Casale in Bavarian hands, in order to make mischief between Maximilian and himself. [Cf. *Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K. S.*, 377/4. "Spaniens Procedere gegen Bayern," etc.] Agnelli thought Collalto had orders to march to Milan. March 17, H.I.M. disinclined to issue Ban, and, Agnelli hopes, cannot do it without the consent of the Electors. French would let them know their views about the Imperial Decree. March 26, H.I.M. and those who govern him furious that Duke did nothing without consulting France

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and Venice. Spain urging him to publish Ban and send forces into Italy. H.I.M. will publish the Edict of Restitution. He was delighted at the slaps Spain and Savoy had got by the Taking of Susa. The real ground of offence was that the Duke by invading the Cremonese had insulted Spain and Austria so that they would never forget it, and also by his conduct in driving out the Spanish forces, resisting the deposit, etc. May 19, Catholic League thought Spain was trying to get H.I.M. to make the Empire hereditary. June 9, The Spaniards are making a fool of H.I.M. so Wallenstein will not give him a man. [But Cf. *London, Aylona* cit., June 9, July 15, 1629.] July 11, Sabran's mission from France may lead to peace. July 14, Eggenberg and Collalto so hot against Pope, they call Wallenstein the Second Attila, and threaten Italy with the devastation of those times. Aug. 4, Sabran says the Duke must now trust only to "his own deeds." All Vienna eager for war. Aug. 8, "The Confessor who was once all powerful, can now not say one word which influences H.I.M.'s heart; the Empress is forbidden to speak: you may guess what my position is." Oct. 6, The Fall of Bois-le-Duc made the Spaniards anxious to come to terms with the Duke, but Eggenberg, Collalto, and H.I.M. eager for war, chiefly because Spain did not want it. Collalto wanted war to raise himself to greatness, H.I.M. was dragged on by Collalto, and Olivares in Spain, Collalto in Italy, and Eggenberg at Vienna were one mind in three bodies. Dec. 8, His confidant Father Domenico [Cf. *London, Brit. Mus., Wake*, cit to Dorchester, 3 Nov., 1629. He was the "Antesignano" of the Battle of the White Mountain.] found H.I.M. the King of Hungary, and Eggenberg far more for peace than they had been. Wallenstein against war in Italy, as he feared "some great commotion" might arise from it, but was opposed by Collalto.

REVENUES OF MANTUA IN 1628.

The Revenues of Mantua in 1628 were for the Mantovano, ducats 200,000 [£50,000], whilst the taxes on the City of Mantua were farmed for ducats 100,000 [£25,000] (Information from Cav. A. Luzio).

Do. E. xlix. 3, Milano, 1759 [1628-1630.]

Pietr, Antonio Marioni to Duke, Milan.

1629, Nov. 14, As report of plague in Milan had proved groundless, solemn thanksgivings had been celebrated.

1630, Jan. 9, 15, Mazarin was to treat for a settlement at Turin with Collalto and Card. Barberini. Spinola had refused Mazarin's request to withdraw the Spanish forces from Monferrat. Feb. 20, Richelieu and the French Army had reached Susa. Feb. 26, Piccolomini was bragging at Alessandria about what Wallenstein and the Germans would do in Italy, "but the fact is Wallenstein has refused to come here." March 12, Richelieu stands by his original proposals as to the evacuation of Susa, and the explanation of the Treaty of Monzon with regard to the Grisons and the Valtelline. Spinola and Collalto hoped Cardinal Barberini would secure them better terms. March 20, *Giorgi to Duke, Milan*. Spinola tried every means to effect a settlement even on terms somewhat discreditable to Spain, "ma che non volendo esser accettati, a chi toccherà a S. Pietro lo benedica, et chi havrà paura si nasconda. Ecco Sigre relata (sic.), rifero, esser sapienza dei Governatori il far maggior animo dove sta maggior pericolo." April 10, Spinola, owing to the surrender of the Castle of Pinerolo, had interrupted his march to save Carmagnola from the French, and hastened to Asti to relieve Savoy. June 26, In consequence of the courage and skill shown by the French defenders of Casale, Spinola had fortified the rear of his camp.

Milan, R. Archivio di Stato.

The so-called *Documenti Diplomatici* consist of letters directed to the Governor of Milan: (1) In connection with appeals in Criminal matters, chiefly in murder cases; (2) to assaults committed by soldiers or upon agents of the Holy Office.

There are few or no documents of any diplomatic importance amongst them for this period, probably because during the Rule of Spain the Governors were allowed to carry their papers away with them when they retired from office.

The files relating to 1629-1630, which, however, contain comparatively few mentions of Spinola, are classed as *Documenti Diplomatici di Filippo IV.*, *Registri* 435, 436, 437, 438.

A few are copies and drafts of letters dated from the camp before Casale in July and August, 1630.

These show that Spinola was making every effort to cope with the difficulties occasioned by the Plague and dearth in the supply of salt and grain to the troops. The City of Milan was running short of wheat which was selling at 50 lire a moggia [bushel, say £2 2s.], and no revenues were coming in. The magistrates, therefore, asked Spinola for a guarantee for payment, which he could not give. He, however, sacrificed everything to the object of taking Casale, and got the grain and salt for his army from Genoa. The plague is only mentioned incidentally. One of his Commissaries was not allowed to enter Milan on account of the contagion and stood at the edge of the ditch to shout his message to persons on the wall, and a Spanish Captain imprisoned there was expected to be released on account of the risk his health was running. There are a few mentions of "this terrible time."

The general impression given by these documents is very like that given in Manzoni's *I Promessi Sposi*, but the Director of the Archives says that Manzoni, almost certainly, never saw them.

There are curious notes as to the manner in which the Inquisition kept spies on private persons and had street hawkers who sold books of devotion without its license watched by its police. In 1629 they remonstrated as to the manner in which the highest nobles appeared in public with Rohan's agent Clausel. [Cf. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Wake cit., June 21, 1629, for Clausel's public reception at Milan, and Evelyn's diary for the details of John Evelyn's visit to Milan.]

*Casale-Monferrato.**Bibliotheca del Seminario Vescovile.*

"Memorie Storico-Critiche della Città di Casale, Monferrato, Manoscritto della Bibliotheca." This monograph was written by *Abbate Gio. Batt. Strambosio*, of Casale, after 1755.

p. 32, Description of Casale, its surroundings, and Monferrat; pp. 121-132, History of Marquisate of Monferrat, 937-1474, French occupy Casale, 1555-1559; pp. 168-169, Casale Cathedral; p. 169, Citadel of Casale.

"Raccolta di diverse carte interessanti l' Illma. Città di Casale messi per ordine di data con indici. D'Ordine dell' Illmo. Consiglio da me *Gio. Batt. Foro*, Catastrario, l'anno 1728." Tomi I., II.

Doc. 21, Doc. 24. The Investiture of the Marquisate of Monferrat given on 31 Dec., 1532, by Charles V. to Margaret, Duchess of Mantua, and his declaration of 7 May, 1534, that this grant was not intended to infringe the rights of Savoy. A decree of Charles IV. in 1354 had made Monferrat a female fief, of which no portion could be sold without the consent of the Emperor. Doc. 43, *Sept.*, 1539. Francis I. naturalises Frederick, Duke of Mantua, his wife, and children as "regnicoli" of France, so that they can inherit any estates and dignities which may come to

them in France. Doc. 25, May 23, 1534. Prince of Ascoli as Imperial Commissioner, decides against the claims of Savoy on the ground of Charles the Fourth's decree of 1354 [Cf. supra.]. John George Palæologus, who was a usurper, had no right, moreover, to sell Monferrat to Duke Charles III. of Savoy without the consent of the Emperor as his Over-Lord. Doc. 45, 1541. Savoy petitions Emperor to decide his claims against Mantua as to the district between the Po and the Tanaro. Doc. 111, November, 1569. Duke Emmanuel Philibert had sold certain rents which he held in Trenzano to Fabrizio Palæologus in Nov., 1559. This is the last occasion on which the claims of Savoy to any portion of Monferrat are mentioned, before they were revived by Charles Emmanuel I. Doc. 126, The Treaty of Susa, 11 March, 1629. Annexed is a letter of 12 June, 1629, in which Louis XIII. instructs M. de Thoyras as to what is to be done if the Germans enter Italy. Doc. 127, The Treaty of Boisselino between France and Savoy, 10 March, 1630. Doc. 128, Terms offered by Marquis Ambrogio Spinola to the Duke of Maine, 6 Sept., 1630. Doc. 130, 13 Oct., 1630. The Treaty of Ratisbon. Doc. 131, Treaty of Chierasco, 6 April, 1631, between Emperor and France, communicated to Savoy, and to Mgr. Pancirolo, Nuntio of His Holiness, and Giulio Mazzarini, Minister of His Holiness, the Mediators.

Casale-Monferrato.

Museo Patrio di Casale.

A book, compiled by one of the Army Surgeons, contains pictures showing the nature of the wounds which he had to treat during the Siege of Casale with the names and fate of the patients.

Most of the wounds were from musket shots or sword cuts. In musket wounds the shot seem usually to have passed through the body. The percentage of deaths was large.

The militia, who were mostly artisans from Casale, or labourers from the surrounding district, seem generally to have served as musketeers.

The Museum contains numerous engravings illustrating the Siege of Casale.

Munich, Allgemeines Reichs Archiv.

30 Jährig, Krieg, A. 238.

1629, 26 Dec., *Nuntii Literæ*. Richelieu's Instructions to Marcheville for his mission to Germany. France only wishes to free Germany and Italy from Imperial and Spanish tyranny. Will take the field for this object.

1630, July 4. Giulio Mazzarini's account of his mission to Spinola and Duke of Savoy. Spinola would not act without Collalto. Finally they wrote that peace could be made if everything were placed on its ante-bellum footing, Savoy got 18,000 scudi [£3,750] a year from Monferrat, and Guastalla and Duchess of Lorraine compensated. H.I.M. could then grant Investiture for Mantua and Monferrat to Nevers, and would, with Spain, guarantee to leave him undisturbed. France could then withdraw from Italy and Savoy. Emperor, France, and Spain should ask Swiss to guarantee the execution of the Treaty of Monzon. France, however, declined to treat with persons who had no proper powers for the purpose.

Munich, Geheim, Staats Archiv.

K.S.M., 322/3. "*Die Beylegung der Mantuanischen Successions-Streitigkeit zwischen dem Herzogen von Savoyen und der Krone Frankreichs, betr. fol. 1-132.*"

1630, Jan. 20, *Scaglia to Spinola*, Turin. Savoy anxious to keep on good terms with Spain. Will not make peace with France without informing Spinola. Asks for 4,000 men. Jan. 28, *Spinola to Bruneau*,

Milan. Collalto had agreed to armistice, but Créquy would not treat as Cardinal approaching. Eager for peace. If France will not make it, the Imperial troops in South Germany should enter France. Feb. 20, *Emperor to Elector of Bavaria*. Nevers has petitioned for pardon. *March, Richelieu's proposals for peace*. Nevers to be invested at once and Mantua guaranteed by Italian powers, and all foreign troops withdrawn from his territories. Imperialists to evacuate Valtelline and Grisons. Treaty of Monzon to be carried out. *March, Spinola's and Collalto's reply*. Nevers must apologise and French evacuate Italy and Savoy. March 6, *Pancirolo to Turin (sic)*. Collalto and Spinola cannot accept French terms. Mazarini's verbal report of his interview with Richelieu. Nevers must be allowed, as he asks, to keep French troops, paid and officered by himself, in Mantua and Casale. France can only evacuate Susa when Imperialists quit the Grisons. April 12, 17, *Father Valerian to Emperor*. Thinks war was brought about by Almighty because Catholic Princes approached the Turks and Heretics for political reasons. Had seen Richelieu, who said that Nevers must be guaranteed against an attack by the Emperor and Spain after the French have left Italy.

FATHER VALERIAN'S CHARACTER OF RICHELIEU.

"In tanto humilissimamente le pongo in consideratione che s'ha da fare con huomo destro di Cervello, pronto di mano, avvantaggioso al possibile, violento et che muove la Franza con quella facilità ch'io adopero la pena; ne io temo cosa veruna quanto il vedere le forze che s'hanno da opporre dipenderà (?) da piu capi, quali non veggo affatto uniti, dubitando che questo Sr. Cardinale preponga dalla mano ad inondar l'Italia.

"Tutto cio sia detto con quella moderatione che è necessaria per accautelare l'ignoranza humana, mentre che noi non possiamo che per congetture penetrar il cuore delli huomini, et è facil cosa che questo negotio muti faccia, et riesca facile quello che hora pare impossibile. Vero e che mi consolo infinitamente considerando che la continua serie di miracolose vittorie fu della Mtà Vra, applicata all'accrescimento della nostra Sta. Fede, la onde non conosco potenza in terra, la quale possa opporre alla divina dalla quale auguro et con tutt'il cuore desidero alla Mtà. Vra. vittoria contra tutti quelli che s'oppongono alla divina volontà." [*Father Valerian Magni to Emperor, Pinerolo, 12 April, 1630.*] April, 17, *Father Valerian to Father Basil*. The difficulty is that France wants to keep Pinerolo and will not evacuate Italy simultaneously with the Imperialists. The Legate says peace is hopeless. March 22, *Collalto to Emperor*. France has broken with Savoy. Nov. 13, *Emperor to Elector of Bavaria*. The French have evacuated Casale.

Do. K.S. 377/48.

"*Spaniens Procedere gegen Bayern*" cit. Spain's refusal to allow Bavaria to hold Casale on deposit.

Do. K.S. 292, 5, Khevenhüller, Berichte aus Madrid, 1625-1629.

1629, June 2, *Khevenhüller to Elector of Bavaria*. Spinola and Santa Cruz just leaving for Italy.

SPINOLA'S SUCCESS IN SPAIN.

"Spinola hat meines Erachtens grossere Thatten nie als Jetzt in Spanien begangen, wenn Er herkhant hat ihn Jeder Maun stainigen wollen, jetzt hat Er die gesammte Rath auf seiner Seite mit dem Conde Duque nolens volens thut Er was er will laszt ihn Zanken und veraignigt Patienz mit Bestande, und hat heutigen tags der Spanischen Monarchie valt und macht in Handen; ist gnal derer Kriegsher; also Nederlands, Pfalz, und Maylands gubernator regiert und der Ser Infantin Donna Isabella

Obrister Hofmaister, hat auch kein wort thun wollen über alle vom König in scharfer zugeschickter Decreta, habe dann das geld beisammen daz führt er selbst mit über." Sept. 14, Spinola had full powers in Italy and could decide as to peace or war, without referring to Madrid, in consultation with the Emperor and his ministers. H.M. with H.I.M.'s consent had given him these powers in writing. Nov. 13, Describes Prince of Guastalla's State Entry into Madrid.

KHEVENHÜLLER AND SPINOLA'S SUPPLIES OF MONEY.

Although Khevenhüller, 3 June, 1629, says Spinola had secured his supplies of money for Milan, Spinola himself says [Cf. *Brussels, E. et G.* 126, *Spinola to Infanta, Madrid, 1629, July, 26*] that, owing to the failure of the loan to be raised for the purpose, he was going without any.

PRINTED.

XXI.—THE THIRTY YEARS WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1648-1921,

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Lombard: "Un Volontaire de 1792" (Paris, 1903, 1 Tome) par *Jean Lombard*, pp. 1-3, 5-6, 12-13, quoting on p. 3.

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Strachey: "Queen Victoria" [London, Chatto and Windus, 1921, 1 Vol.], by *Captain Lytton Strachey*.

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AND NATIONALITY.

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Chamberlain: "Life of the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, M.P. [London, 1922, 2 Vols.] by *Rt. Hon. Austen Chamberlain, M.P.*, under dates 1889 and 1890-1.

THE BALKANS QUESTION.

Rankin: "The Inner History of the Balkans War." [London, Longmans, 1914, 1 Vol.] by *Lt. Colonel Sir Reginald Rankin, Bt.*, pp. 1-135 Account of Mr. J. D. Bouchier and the Formation of the Balkans League 1910-1913.

Buchanan: "My Mission to Russia, and other diplomatic memories" [London, Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1923, 2 Vols.], by *Rt. Hon. Sir George Buchanan, G.C.B.*, etc., Vol. I., pp. 119-150, The first Balkans War on 1912-1913, The Conference and Treaty of London, The Second Balkans War of 1913, The Treaty of Bucharest; pp. 128-135. The attitude of Russia during the first Balkans' War, and the Conference of London, 1913;

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p. 181, Tsar Nicholas II. on the attitude of Russia during the negotiations before the First Balkans War, 1911-1912, and as to Constantinople in 1912-1913.

THE EMPEROR FREDERICK'S ILLNESS AND BISMARCK.

Rodd: "Social and Diplomatic Memories, 1884-1893," by Sir J. R. Rodd, G.C.B. [London, Edward Arnold and Co., 1922, 1 Vol.], Cf., p. 50, for William II. in Nov., 1887; pp. 112-115, pp. 144-148, discusses Bismarck's attitude and his assertions in his "Reflections and Reminiscences," Vol. II., pp. 330-1. [London, Smith, Elder, 1888, 2 Vols.]

VOL. III

SIDELIGHTS ON THE THIRTY
YEARS WAR

CHAPTER LXXVIII

WHEN the year 1627 opened signs were everywhere visible that an era of new troubles was dawning for Europe.

Peace had not yet been restored between Savoy and Genoa, and the Valtelline question still remained unsettled, whilst the failing health of the Duke of Mantua showed that in the near future a dispute as to the succession to Mantua and Monferrat would not only bring France into collision with Spain but might open a breach between the two branches of the House of Hapsburg. Ferdinand II. had already given ample proofs that he wished to make the Holy Roman Empire a real and living power, and whenever he chose to assert its legal rights in Italy, it was certain that he must run counter to the interests of his kinsmen at Madrid, whilst, at the same time, by the assertion of his feudal claims in Metz and in Lorraine he was showing what a danger a revived Empire might be to France. With a Richelieu at the head of French affairs the experiment was not without its risks. Of these the Valtelline question must first claim attention.

Eager as both the French and Spaniards were to restore tranquillity in Italy, the Peace of Monzon had failed to restore tranquillity in the Eastern Alps. Wake had made every effort in Turin and Venice to induce those governments to get the Swiss and the Leagues to refuse to ratify that treaty, "for the more the negotiations could be spun out, the better it would be for His Majesty's interest, as the Spaniards would have to keep their forces in Milan, and could not send them against his friends in Germany this year."¹ The French still held the Valtelline, but the Spanish and the Papal forces in the Milanese might put

pressure upon the Swiss to allow it to be handed over to the Pope, whilst the Catholic Cantons would keep their Protestant confederates and the Grisons in check, and Venice would not take the offensive.¹ Wake, at a meeting of the Leagues at Chur, pointed out to them that England had helped them by sending her fleet to Spain and by supporting Holland, Denmark and Mansfeldt. By his advice they agreed to send a deputation to Paris, and to ask the Savoyards and Venetians to support them. If the French declined to throw over the Treaty, they would ask them to leave them alone in future. The Pope, "who is spending sixty thousand ducats [£15,000] a month on this affair," was so weary of it and anxious for the Spaniards to employ their army elsewhere, "that he is willing to give up receiving the Valtelline in deposit a second time, and will leave the demolition of the forts to any or all so long as the Treaty proceeds to execution."² Cœuvres, the French commander, however, wished affairs to be spun out, "as the Valtelline is a little kingdom to him, and he is making a good profit out of it."³

The Spaniards, in order to bring about a settlement, appointed Don Fernando Giron, "a peace-loving gentleman," who was well known and liked at Paris as Governor of Milan. Both the Swiss and Venetians protested, notwithstanding Giron's appointment, in refusing to acquiesce in an arrangement which left the Valtelliners independent in all but in name. At their instigation, thanks to Wake's support, the Leagues refused to ratify it, and upon this the Valtelliners, through the French ambassador at Rome, once more placed themselves in the hauds of the Pope, and thus induced the French to refrain from deciding to support the Grisons until their own deputies could be heard at Paris.⁴ Thus the Valtelline question was left open at the critical moment when the dispute as to the Mantuan Succession was once more to make the ownership of the Grisons Passages a matter of supreme importance.

For the time, however, France, hampered as she was by her internal troubles, was unable to play an active part either in the Valtelline or in the Netherlands, and so during the winter of 1626 Spinola was left free to devote himself to those naval plans which occupied his attention during the last year of his residence in the Low Countries.

Philip IV. and the Infanta were both equally anxious for peace. Despite the temporary relief which had been afforded

by the arrival of the Silver Fleet, the Treasury was exhausted. As the King wrote at the beginning of January, 1627, when enclosing a paper containing Olivares' views as to the line to be taken both in foreign and domestic policy during the ensuing year, "For this and for many other reasons the Council thinks that it would be best to arrange a good peace with England and Holland, and is likewise of opinion that to secure such a peace with due regard to prestige (a consideration which cannot be left out of sight on any account whatsoever), we must use our arms both by sea and land in such a fashion that our opponents may either find themselves forced to beg for peace or that by this means some way may be devised by which negotiations may be opened on lines becoming my position and agreeable to what your Highness knows to be my purpose." He, therefore, requested the Infanta to open negotiations in accordance with the Count Duke's suggestions with all possible secrecy, and left it to her to select from amongst her advisers at Brussels persons suited to carry them on in England, Holland and Germany. "I will only remind Your Highness that Gabriel de Roy seems to be the best agent whom you could employ in the Hanse Towns, and for England the Provincial of the Company of Jesus for those kingdoms, and as to the negotiation with England I must impress upon Your Highness that it must be carried on with the utmost discretion and that it must on no account be allowed to come out that it is our affair, for, if we conduct it as I propose, we shall have a fair chance of either securing our purpose or of lulling the English to sleep, and in that case we shall insure that their wish to secure an agreement with us will dispose them not to come to terms with France too readily." He asked her to keep him informed of the state of affairs in England and as to any opening which might present itself for making an attempt either there, in Scotland, or in Ireland. Her agents in all three countries were so well informed that the Council in Spain would be able to base their line of action upon their reports. "By placing the management of such an important business in Your Highness' hands, I shall remain with my mind at ease, as would not be the case if the matter had to be dealt with by other hands, for I know by experience what your prudence and foresight are." As it might be necessary to take active measures he would hurry forward the necessary preparations in Spain, and pay special attention to the equip-

ment of the fleet, which must afford the chief means for carrying them out.

The subsidies which he had promised her would be sent at an early date, but in order to ensure that they would be employed for the purposes for which he intended them, they would pass through the hands of some Treasury officials sent from Spain to administer them. Thus the ministers at Brussels would not incur any unpopularity for excessive strictness in dealing with them.¹

As the soldiers depended not only for their pay but for their daily bread upon advances from their captains, it is certain that when subsidies arrived from Spain, Belgian officials must have had many opportunities both for speculation and for the display of favouritism when repaying these advances. Public opinion, therefore, was likely to resent any display of unwonted justice, and the Spanish Government was beginning to see that it could not afford to incur the ill will of its Belgian subjects even in the interests of fair dealing.

The course of events in Germany had no doubt led both Philip and his favourite to believe that a peace on advantageous terms was their greatest interest. Friedland, it is true, had now become a thorough-going partisan of Spain and had made an offer to the Infanta through Aytona that he would build two forts upon the Elbe below Hamburg, and so close the most important of the German rivers to Dutch shipping. Wallenstein, however, was not in a position to make his offer good. As the Infanta remarked in her reply, she had every reason to be grateful to him for his goodwill, but added that some arrangement must be come to with Bethlen Gabor and the Turks, and the enemy must be expelled from Silesia before she could avail herself of it. When this had been done, he might march with all the forces he could collect to the lowest point he could reach upon the Elbe, and she would then send him a confidential agent who would give him further instructions as to what he was to do. Her object was to persuade the Duke to occupy some port or positions "upon the sea over them," or as she had at first written, "Baltic," a plan "of which I have several times represented the importance to Your Majesty." In a letter of the second of January she had also informed Aytona that he must use every means in his power to make a peace with Gabor and the Turks so as to leave Friedland free to come to the Elbe.² Three days

later she wrote that the King of Denmark was sending an envoy to treat for peace in Germany, and requested Philip to inform her whether the Emperor had given either herself or his Minister at Brussels powers to negotiate with him.¹

However willing Ferdinand may have been to support the cause of his Spanish kinsmen, it is certain that neither he nor his general were in a position to do so. Ferdinand was, as has already been explained, at the mercy of the Catholic League, whilst Wallenstein found it impossible to expel the Protestants from Silesia. At the very moment when the Infanta was forwarding Friedland's offer to Philip, the King was writing to inform her that the Emperor had explained that the Catholic League had refused either to enter into hostilities with the Dutch or to occupy a port on the Baltic in the interests of Spain. Aytona had then mentioned the Infanta's suggestion that the Emperor should ask either the Duke of Pomerania or the King of Poland to hand over to him some harbour in Pomerania or Prussia which could be held by a Spanish garrison, but his proposal met with strenuous opposition, more especially as the Prince of Poland would not guarantee that the Spaniards would restore the port on the conclusion of peace. Under these circumstances Philip thought that it would be unwise for him to assist the League in a long and costly contest in Germany. However, as it was impossible for him to conduct such negotiations from Spain, whilst the position of affairs might change at any moment, he left the Infanta a free hand to act as she pleased. All he desired was to see a general peace brought about in Germany, but in return for his efforts to effect this, the Princes of the League must cease to make difficulties as to his request for aid against the Dutch.² As to all intents and purposes the "Princes of the League" might have been more correctly defined as the "Elector of Bavaria," it was somewhat doubtful whether this condition, modest and reasonable as it undoubtedly was, would be carried into effect.

Despite Philip's warnings, the Infanta was loath to abandon her plans for a maritime campaign based upon a harbour between the United Provinces and the trading centres of Northern Europe. At the beginning of February she suggested that if peace could not be arranged between Denmark and the Empire, troops should be sent from Belgium to seize a port either on the Baltic or in East Friesland. As the latter lay so

much nearer the Netherlands, a position there could be far more easily held. If peace was made such a plan could be even more readily carried out unless indeed it was expressly prohibited by an article in the treaty. It would be necessary to rely upon the Obedient Provinces to supply the bulk of the troops for the expedition, as, even if twenty thousand men were sent from Spain, their effective strength would be reduced to fifteen thousand when they were brought into the field and it would be necessary to allow for a continuous wastage. There would be no need to purchase ships from the Hanse Towns as they had already more vessels than they could man.¹

For once the Spanish Council was hesitating between two courses of action, and were in doubt whether it would be best to carry on the war wholly by sea or whether it would be preferable to combine an active maritime offensive with a land campaign based upon the fleet. At one moment Philip proposed that if the privateers which had run the blockade from Dunkirk and Mardyke could not get back into port, they should make for the Guipuzcoan harbour of Passages, where they could be refitted and manned with crews who would thus gain an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the English seas to the great advantage of the Spanish service. A week or two later he wrote to Brussels that his name must not be engaged in any way in support of Wallenstein's proposals for blockading the Elbe against Dutch trade, for were he to take any share in such an undertaking he would greatly irritate the Dutch and render it still more difficult to negotiate with them. He was to a certain extent justified in his indecision. Attractive as Wallenstein's scheme might appear, it could not be carried out unless with the sanction of the Emperor, and the Infanta was forced to tell Schwarzenberg that Spain would not enter into any treaty with the Catholic League unless they agreed to aid the Emperor to maintain his authority and to assist in carrying out the sentences of Ban which he had proclaimed and in safeguarding the rights of the members of the Empire against all troublers of its internal peace, a condition which would imply that they would assist in the defence of such Spanish territories as formed part of the Imperial Circle of Lower Burgundy, and therefore depended on the Empire.²

But a few days later she learned that Wallenstein was unable to leave Silesia for the Elbe, and at the same time was informed

by Rubens that Buckingham and his agent Gerbier had written that Charles the First had approved of a separate negotiation between Spain and Denmark; he was anxious, however, that the Dutch as the old allies of England should be included in these negotiations, and that so far as Spain was in a position to do so she should urge that a settlement of the Palatine's affairs should be discussed. It was something to find that the King of England now recognised that Spain did not hold the Empire in the hollow of her hand. The Infanta wrote that it would be a great point if the Dutch would consent to the omission of any mention in the Truce of their international status as a Free and Independent nation and would consent to the opening of the Scheldt. It would be useless to negotiate for a Perpetual Peace with the United Provinces, if they were forced to declare their views as to the Religious Question and on the subject of their sovereignty, whilst, on the other hand, if the English found that they could not carry on war simultaneously with France and Spain, they would make peace with France if Spain proved obdurate. Once more she urged that if the war with Holland were prolonged, Belgium would be utterly ruined.¹

Philip stood at the parting of the ways. Three courses were open to him. He might either make peace with England and with Holland through the agency of Rubens, whose efforts to bring about peace had, as will be seen, already been attended with a certain measure of success, he might endeavour to subdue England by force of arms, or finally he might undertake an offensive against Holland and her trade both by land and sea with the help of Poland, and of an Emperor whose interests were by no means identical with his own and who was dependent almost wholly upon the support of princes, whom though they were in name his subjects, he was powerless either to influence or to coerce.

During the winter of 1627 Philip and Olivares had seemed to incline mainly to the second of these courses, and had been occupied chiefly with the consideration of schemes for an invasion of Ireland, if not of England, which no Spanish strategist would probably have entertained for a moment but for Wimbledon's failure before Cadiz fifteen months before.

The author of these plans was Brother Florence Conroy, a Franciscan Friar, who had been appointed Archbishop of Tuam, but who was then resident in Spain, where he was in close touch

with Olivares. As Metropolitan of Connaught he was well acquainted with the North West coast of Ireland and was aware that it was the region in which a quarter of a century before the last struggle for the independence of Ireland had been fought out. In Philip the Second's time it had been the constant object of Spanish strategy to acquire a foothold in the South of Munster whether in Kerry or in Cork, but these efforts had as constantly proved disastrous, and since that province had been devastated by the English during the last years of Elizabeth, and strongly reoccupied by English colonists, it was obvious that they could not be renewed with any hope of success. A descent, however, upon some remote part of Ulster, where the English had as yet got but a slight permanent foothold, might bring about more favourable results. Such appear to have been the grounds upon which Conroy based his proposals.

He pointed out that the Bay of Donegal in Tirconnell, which was twenty or twenty-five leagues long and ten or twelve broad, was the finest upon the Irish coast. "On the north side of its entrance is a promontory or headland named Cape Teelin, close under which six or seven leagues before one reaches Point Killybegs," the Saint John's Point of to-day, "is a small but very good harbour." Fifty miles by land from Killybegs is the well known port of Londonderry, also in Tirconnell. The city of Londonderry is small but well built and rich. It is inhabited by English only, and lies on an island in Lough Foyle, an arm of the sea which runs many miles up to the city and from thence extends miles further inland. The late Queen could never subdue the Province of Ulster nor crush the Earls' armies until she sent a fleet into this port and fortified it and founded this city on it; by doing this she brought the war to an end by slow degrees. Anyone who could possess himself of this harbour and of Killybegs would easily make himself master of all Ulster and Connaught, which are the strongest provinces of the whole Kingdom of Ireland. As the port of Londonderry lies very near the Hebrides Islands of Scotland, the Hebrideans would at once rise against the English. The town has very good walls but has only one piece of cannon to defend them, which has only just been sent there." In order to prevent any disputes arising between the Earls of Tyrone and Tirconnell, it would be desirable to give them both the rank of general, as neither of them would ever consent to serve under the other, and if one were named

general and the other admiral of the expedition, the latter would certainly think himself slighted. It would, therefore, be advisable to split up the Irish division in Flanders into two regiments, to appoint Lord Tirconnell to command the one to be enrolled, and to bring both up to strength with Walloons. It would be necessary to make some provision for Tirconnell's nephew, O'Rourke, who had lately fled from England, as he could bring a whole county over to the King. "As the Earls are scatterbrained young men, who in their excitement and joy at these proposals may well let the cat out of the bag to one of their led captains or hangers-on," Her Highness and Marquis Spinola must be warned that when they explain the matter to them, they must put them on their oaths not to say a word upon the subject till they are out at sea. "It is above all things indispensable that Lord Argyll should not hear a syllable about this design, for if he got to hear of it, we may regard it as foredoomed to failure, as he is in such close touch with England."¹ As in the following September Sir John Hippisley, Governor of Dover, was sending Sir John Coke "many letters that came from the Earl of Argyll by a man whose name is Colvill," this warning was not misplaced.² Strange memories must have risen up before Isabella's mind as she read these proposals, for it was upon the rocks of Donegal Bay that many a famous vessel of the Invincible Armada had perished but thirty-eight years before, and it was at Killybegs that the great "Rata," manned by the gallant de Leyva and the noblest youth of Spain, had for a moment sought a refuge from the angry waves.

When forwarding Tuam's letter to the Infanta Olivares said that he left Her Highness free to decide what should be done in the matter, as he felt himself quite safe in her hands.³

The Archbishop thought it most important that the proclamation which the Earls would have to issue upon their landing in Ireland "to the principal gentlemen in the other provinces," should be carefully drafted. They should point out to them that they had for many years lived under a tyranny which was far more severe than that endured by the Christians under the rule of the Turk, and which it was a disgrace that a nation so firm in the Faith and so courageous as the Irish should for one moment tolerate. They should point to the example of the Dutch, a people who were fighting in a bad cause and were rebels against their God and their King, to show them what

they might accomplish were they united amongst themselves. Yet the United Provinces were not as large as the fourth part of Ireland, and what was England when compared with Spain. If they took up arms for their religion they would certainly be supported by the Supreme Pontiff and the other Christian princes. Not a single English or Scotchman should be allowed to take part in the expedition and no Anglified Irishman from amongst those serving in Flanders should be given any position of importance, as this was the only means of keeping themselves "clear of spies." The expedition must take with them a quantity of ladders and of small pieces of artillery cast on Mansfeldt's model, and also a large number of artillerymen, designers of fortifications, engineers, petardeers and petards, "an engine which has never been heard of in those parts, so that there is not a single castle or city gate in the whole Kingdom which cannot be attacked with the utmost ease as they are not constructed to resist them." A proclamation would have to be issued forbidding the soldiers under the severest penalties to burn either the houses or the crops. The Marquis should tell the Earls that the moment they landed in Ireland they might assume the titles of Duke which had been conferred upon them by the King, as if they did so it would give them a better standing with the army and in that Kingdom. To avoid useless disputes and questions of precedence between them neither of them should be proclaimed General of the Province of Ulster, as the lands of both lay in that province and so neither of them would agree to serve under the other. It would, therefore, be best that they should be styled "Generals of the defenders of the liberty of the Fatherland," until the movement had been placed upon a firm footing. "Lord Tirconnell's sister has come from England, and has set so praiseworthy an example that Her Highness should receive her into her household, as owing to her age and rank she needs some guardian, whilst the Earl is away." It was all important that the best possible understanding should be maintained amongst the Irish and with this object "it would be as well that His Majesty should instruct the Infanta to arrange a marriage between Lord Tirconnell's sister and Lord Tyrone, and pay her dowry out of his Privy Purse as her brother is not in a position to give her one." It would be as well to give each of the Earls a large but equal grant for the expenses of their outfit before they embarked as they were both in great

straits. Four troops of Walloons from the cavalry in Flanders should also be sent with the expedition. They should leave their horses behind, but should take their carbines, pistols, side arms, bits, boots, and spurs, "so that the Earls may, on their first landing, dispose of a small body of trained cavalry, for plenty of stout galloways can be found everywhere, and in time they can get some good horses." Otherwise the enemy would be at a great advantage if they had horse and the Irish none. "Those four hundred Flemish cavalry would be worth more than a thousand of the enemy's horse and would train the Irish to fight on horseback not with lances as they now do, but with carbines and pistols." It would thus be possible within a short time to raise a strong force of cavalry, say fifteen troops, which could be equipped with arms and saddlery sent from Flanders with the expedition, or forwarded to Ireland after it was known that the Earls had landed there.¹

Such were the copious notes sent to Olivares by that militant ecclesiastic the Archbishop of Tuam; his suggestions made but little impression upon the sceptical Infanta. "I have received your letter of the 12th of March with the memorial on the Irish Expedition which the Archbishop of Tuam gave you. I have studied it carefully in case it may come in useful some time or other. For the moment we can do nothing in the business for the reasons which you will have seen explained in my letter to the King. I see he says that I ought to make up a marriage between Lord Tyrone and Tirconnell's sister so as to keep them better friends. As to this I can only tell you that I have mentioned the matter, but Tirconnell's sister swears she would not marry Tyrone on any terms whatsoever."²

The Infanta had, indeed, for a moment been in favour of an expedition to Ireland. Sergeant Major Eugene O'Neill, who had been sent to her from Spain by the King to explain a plan which he had drawn up for such an undertaking, had reached Brussels about the end of January, and she had thoroughly discussed the subject with him. O'Neill had suggested that the Irish Brigade which was serving in Flanders might be sent back to Ireland "without ensigns," and she considered that if Philip had definite information that the Irish would rise to assist them on their arrival, such a venture might well be undertaken. If they were sent under these conditions it would look as if they had merely been disbanded and were returning to their

homes. Thus his own prestige would not be at stake in an undertaking in which Spain would seem to be unconcerned. O'Neill, however, appears to have changed his mind and said that nothing could be done unless a force of two thousand Walloons accompanied the expedition. On this the Infanta at once drew back, for, were she to acquiesce, "all the world would look on the expedition as Your Majesty's, and if it did not succeed, you would lose much more than is usually lost in such an event, for everyone would think you extremely rash in venturing upon such an enterprise in a foreign country, which would be far more difficult to keep going than even to begin. I must also point out that it would necessarily have to be commanded by Lord Tyrone. Don Diego Mexia, who knows him, can tell Your Majesty about him. It would be worse still if we were even to think of sending Tirconnell as joint commander with him, for the two have never been able to get on together, and there is not the slightest chance of their doing so under such conditions, and so I must give it as my final opinion that we must have nothing whatsoever to do with the scheme as it stands. Although they themselves proposed at first that only the Irish Brigade should go to Ireland, it now seems that they do not think such a plan feasible. However, I will at all events fit out ten sail for sea, so that if Your Majesty, after all, decides upon the undertaking, notwithstanding what I say, I may be in a position to carry out your orders, whilst if Your Majesty comes into my views they will be able to go on a cruise and do the enemy all the harm they can."¹

In replying to this letter Philip said that as it was clear in view of the difficulties which she had pointed out, that the expedition could not sail before September or October, he would leave the arrangements for it in her hands on the condition that anything which she decided upon was to remain a secret between Spinola and herself. It would be well, however, if she could get Tyrone and Tirconnell to act together. Possibly they might be appointed as the nominal commanders on condition that a third person was sent with them, who would in reality control everything. She ought to continue her naval preparations, and if the expedition became unnecessary through the conclusion of an arrangement with the English, for which they had already made overtures, she could then employ the vessels either to harass the Dutch or on some other enterprise

in Northern waters.¹ This suggestion was entirely in accordance with the Infanta's views, for she had already decided that her ships in Mardyke and Dunkirk should put to sea with the first fair wind and, after doing what harm they could to the enemy, should make for Passages, should refit there and then sail about the twentieth or twenty-fifth of June, make for the Dutch whale fisheries in the Greenland waters, and thence proceed to attack the herring fleets off Shetland, to the great injury of the commercial interests of the United Provinces. She proposed Captain Michael Jacob as the commander of the squadron.² As Philip saw that nothing could be done as to Ireland before the month of September, he agreed that these suggestions should be carried out,³ and by the beginning of August it was known at Antwerp that "the Dunkirkers who were in Biscay are passed by Scotland to hinder the Hollanders' fishing of herrings and whales in the North Seas."⁴

The Infanta was delighted to find that the King had acquiesced in her suggestions as to Ireland. As she pointed out, it would be impossible for her to enter upon such an undertaking "with the small force which had been proposed at the outset, and which was all that could be sent from Flanders. If they did so they would only lose prestige. If the large forces which had been sent to Ireland during a war at a time when England and Scotland were not yet united had done nothing, what could a small one do now? Scotland lay so near Ireland that it would be easy to send reinforcements from there, "and the Scotch are even greater savages and tougher fighters than the Irish. I leave Your Majesty to reflect as to what the outcome of an expedition undertaken with such small forces would inevitably be. If, however, Your Majesty decides to risk this venture, I must see whether it would be best to make an attempt upon Ireland or upon England, where it would be far easier to send supplies and reinforcements. In any case the expedition must be thoroughly organised and in sufficient strength."⁵

Despite all precautions, the secret of the intended expedition had leaked out, and at the end of January a spy wrote from Brussels to London "that there were sixteen Irishe, religious men, gon for Ireland, which did land at the Margat, and it is secretly spoken amongst themselves here that ther will be an Interpryse against Ireland this next summer."⁶ There were many English and Scotch convents in the great Netherlands

cities, and not without reason the Infanta believed that information was sent by their inmates to Whitehall. A suspicious entry in Sir John Coke's papers signed "Agis" and dated in the following July is endorsed by Coke, "£280 sent to Brussels to Mrs. Katherine." Two lists of books of devotion and classical books with prices are enclosed.¹ The inference is obvious. By the middle of February Lord Totnes had submitted to Coke a scheme drawn up by Mr. Gowkin for maintaining an army in Ireland, and desired that it should be referred by His Majesty "to select reference." Although the plan suggested that the expenses of carrying it out should be charged upon the Irish revenues, Coke writing from Newmarket was forced to reply. "I dare not say anything to His Majesty of the business of Ireland, because I fear there is not so much done as should be." His Majesty was far too much engrossed with his usual "exercises" and with raising the forces which were to be sent to join His Danish Majesty at Stade to trouble about the interests of the defence of Ireland, but the preparations for fitting out the fleet filled the dock-yards with bustle, and Buckingham was busied in visits of inspection. At Chatham all was in order. "He seeth that the only defect is want of men," but though the navy was in tolerably good order the recruits pressed for service on land and with the Danes were everywhere deserting, and the justices were powerless to detain them. "The soldiers vow they will lie no longer on ship-board, and that they will lie this night in Harwich," writes its Mayor, "and that they will have the best beds, and many more mutinous speeches they give out. For the which except we be speedily aided by strong authority from Your Lordships we cannot secure ourselves nor anything that we have, and they will believe nothing except they see His Majesty's broad seal, and his hand." At Gravesend "the soldiers pressed for the King of Denmark were in mutiny for the want of cassocks and other necessities. I entreat that speedy course may be taken for the suppressing of this faction that they may fall down to their rendezvous." Nor were the officials beyond the reach of blame for the attitude of their subordinates. The greatest men in Dorsetshire were accused of receiving money for the discharge of pressed men, and of embezzling the coat and conduct money allowed for soldiers pressed for the Cadiz expedition. Lord Mountjoy was found to have drawn pay for his troop of 160 horse, but to have raised

only 134, whilst the *Vanguard*, one of the best ships in the Navy, "had neither surgeon nor surgeon's mate with her, the men of most consideration amongst men-of-war that mean to fight." Such was the condition of affairs at a moment when the outbreak of hostilities with France might be expected and when England was at war with Spain and engaged to support Denmark in Northern Germany.

At the end of April it was seen that some measures must be taken to guard Ireland against an invasion, but the management of them was placed in the hands of traitors. Amongst Sir John Coke's papers is a letter from his niece Susan Bates, whose husband but the year before had been a candidate for the Mastership of the Savoy, with its revenues of two hundred marks a year. As the Secretary of State who directed Naval affairs, the management of the Irish Garrisons appears to have been in Sir John Coke's hands and, therefore, the connection of the Bates family with Irish affairs must have been a close one. It is not clear whether Dr. John Bates was a nephew of Coke's by marriage or not, but Philip's letter to Brussels dated the first of June shows how rife corruption was amongst the courtiers of Whitehall. "Doctor John Bates, who is one of Inojosa's correspondents in England, where he has a post in the King's bedchamber, has written to the Marquis, through Jacques Bruneau, the former Belgian Minister in London, who was the director of the Spanish Intelligence Department in England, to give him an account of the design which the English have of sending a battalion of infantry and some cavalry to Ireland. Doctor John has been chosen to command these forces and offers to inform us of every occurrence of importance. He also asks the Marquis to take steps to insure that Mr. John Talbot, his intimate friend, may be elected to the Primacy of Ireland which is vacant, but although Talbot is Bates' friend and it was thought here that it would be a good thing to send him to Ireland to see Bates and find out the position of affairs there, speak with the leading people, and bring back something in writing from them as well as authentic information as to how the expedition there could be carried out, or a rising set going, I have decided to ask Your Highness to see Mr. Talbot and leave you free to send him over to Ireland or not. If you think he ought to go, he must on no account be allowed to get the slightest inkling of our intentions. As to the Primacy, I must

ask you to make inquiries with all secrecy in the proper quarters, as it is supposed here that this post should not be filled by any English Irishman, as this would cause great dissatisfaction amongst those of the other party, and that it would be much better to use it for them."¹ At the same time he informed Mirabel at Paris that he had instructed the Infanta to make inquiries as to the state of Ireland, and to endeavour to bring Tyrone and Tirconnell together. If she could not succeed in this, she was to send the latter to Spain, where he was to command the forces which were to embark in Galicia for Ireland,² a piece of information which was quickly forwarded to Coke from Calais by Antoine Miboyse, who offered to send him the list of English subjects who were in correspondence with Spain and Flanders and their letters in Latin and in cypher for a thousand crowns, and two hundred francs for the "personage" who brought them to him."³ Nothing remains to show if this proposal was accepted.

Despite the Infanta's objections Philip was unwilling to abandon the idea of the Irish expedition. It was true, he wrote on the fifteenth of June, that the force on which the Infanta based her estimates would be far too small for a regular expedition, but his own plans were utterly different. He must, therefore, point out to her that as he was now at war with England and as the English had attacked the Spanish coast, even if the negotiations with France had not reached their present point, there could be no doubt that his right course was to make some attempt which would have a fair prospect of success. "As you proposed this undertaking, and your proposals have been approved of here, the only difference between us is as to whether or no we should send sixteen or eighteen hundred men more. It is certain that we cannot let them go off at their own sweet wills, but must put someone over them to command them, and furnish them with some grounds for their undertaking which will leave me free of all responsibility for it. This would not have been the case had it been carried out on the lines which were suggested at first. I must tell Your Highness that I have a good mind to let them start on their own account, and if, as is the idea, they can get a foothold in Ireland, after the English fleet has been withdrawn, even if they only make a little headway, they will force that King's hand so that to recover it he will have to form a regular army and a powerful fleet, which will be no easy task for him when his own has got back to port,

the crews have been disbanded, and the season has grown unfavourable for such an undertaking. As Gallicia, where I intend to assemble the fleet which is to support the division, is far nearer Ireland than London is, I find no reason for changing my opinion, but many for instructing Your Highness as I do thereby to continue to make the most careful preparations for it, and I would ask you also to bear in mind that if matters could be so arranged with the Sergeant Major of the Irish Brigade and Lord Tyrone, that Tirconnell might give up his idea of heading the first invading force, whilst Tyrone comes to Gallicia to accompany the reinforcements, it would be possible to choose a better man to command the first attack whilst Tyrone with one of my good admirals could follow with the reinforcements, and it would be well that you should also consider what measures should be taken after the arrival of the reinforcements, supposing that they could not be induced to work together.

"You must also consider whether it would be best to send Lord Tyrone here without letting him know anything of the scheme, but on the pretext of business of importance for my service, but this I leave you to decide yourself. Those appointed to carry out the expedition should be instructed that they are to fortify themselves upon the coast, and not push inland, as this would offer them the best security for success, and, please God, the ships from Dunkirk would arrive in very good time and would have a good month and a half left to get ready and fit out, and as for the difficulty of Scotland, we think this is a small matter, for the Scotch are just as ripe for a rising as all Ireland is, and quite as discontented, as Your Highness will have seen by the last despatches, which say that Lord Hamilton has refused to come to court, and it is to be hoped that the troubles between France and England will not only serve our turn with the Scotch but possibly that all this discontent will produce even greater effects than it has done in Ireland. Lastly, when war has once broken out one must attempt everything even though one may risk something, and if one makes such attempts in many places at the same time, this will not be one of the least causes of fear amongst the enemy, whilst the form in which it is suggested that such a diversion should be carried out and the grounds for making it which have been adopted, inspire the greatest hopes in all that God will aid this cause as His own, and as being directed only to

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that object." He was sending Mexia to Paris as his ambassador extraordinary to give Louis XIII. and some of his ministers an account of the preparations which were being made in Spain, as it might be possible that the French might be able to arrange with them to make some attempt against England. From Paris Mexia was to go on to Belgium and consult with the Infanta as to what could be done there in the matter. Turning to his plans against the Dutch he added that Gabriel de Roy was being sent to the Hanse Towns to hire ships which might cruise in the Baltic from Polish ports.¹

The prospect of Mexia's arrival at Brussels afforded the Infanta a welcome loophole for delaying to take the Irish scheme in hand. "I am sending Your Majesty with this the best information we have had from England, and, in a word, all our correspondence goes to show that the English fleet has put to sea and is going to make an attempt on Your Majesty's coasts and harbours. I have not been able to ascertain either the strength of their forces or the number of sail, but have only heard a rumour that it is a hundred strong, half being men of war and the other half merchants' vessels with stores and other things." She ended by saying that no instructions had yet been received from him as to the person who was to command the squadron for the Baltic and added that if Walloons were to be sent with it, she would have to strip Belgium even of its German troops for the army on the Rhine.² A fortnight later Philip wrote that he had heard from Mirabel that the English fleet had attacked the Isle of Rhé. He had concluded a league with France against England, and had offered to send twenty-five or thirty vessels to join the French fleet. His own was at Corunna. The French Ambassador had suggested that the French and Spanish fleets should join at Brest, but the entrance of that harbour was difficult and any other port in those parts was exposed to an English attack in superior force. Don Fadrique de Toledo, the hero of the Bahia expedition, was to command the fleet. It would be well to send ships from Belgium to convoy the Flota and to cover the coasts of Spain as the English were so far the stronger at sea. The Dunkirkers might also harass the English communications in the Channel. He was anxious to know her opinion as to whether it would be well to throw fifteen hundred men from Flanders upon the English coast whilst their fleet was away, for none of the land forces in

England were in a fit state to resist them.¹ His secrets were, as usual, badly kept, and before the end of July Coke had been informed that "seven ships were at Dunkirk with above a thousand men to be landed at Grimsby or Holderness to burn and take prisoners," whilst Wake at Turin had, long before, been "alarmed by his Intelligencer at Rome" with "feare of an invasion in England" and remarked that "no intelligence of this nature is to be despised."² The French had, indeed, been pressing Philip to attack England or Ireland from Spain, but this he did not wish to do.³

Under these circumstances the King had for the time almost forgotten his proposals for naval operations in the Baltic, and it was not until the middle of October that he suggested to the Infanta that it was the duty of the Emperor to appoint a commander for that expedition, that his choice might well fall upon Count Mansfeldt, and that a base might be secured at either Danzig or Putzig which were Polish ports, if some harbour in Pomerania could not be obtained. Possibly he excused his tardiness in replying to her by remembering that he had left the Infanta a free hand to employ the ships she had at her disposal as she pleased.⁴

Spinola's naval plans had strategically speaking been more than justified by their results. The handful of ships which lay at Dunkirk, at Mardyke, and at Nieuport, figured like some stage army in every possible combination, and had played a part in determining the policy of Europe which was one of the first examples from which the modern world learnt the meaning of "Sea Power." Had not Wimbledon's fleet in 1625 been delayed in English waters out of fear of the Dunkirkers, Cadiz, if not Genoa and with Genoa the world power of the Hapsburgs, must have fallen at a blow. In 1626 the menace of the ships at Dunkirk had helped to delay the despatch of those reinforcements which might have enabled Christian the Fourth to expel the Imperialists from North Germany, and it is very questionable whether in 1627 Buckingham would ever have sailed for the Isle of Rhé, had not that squadron been despatched from Flemish waters to the coast of Biscay, whence they sailed to harass the Dutch herring and whaling fleets. They had intended to take Dunkirk on their way to the North, but "coming to the mouth of the Canal they did see a great fleet which they did take for Hollanders, but it being English they set their courses

to come about Ireland. They went on the north parts of Ireland on land and took 400 beasts and set some houses on fire and so came for Scotland." They landed in Shetland "putting the people to the sword," and then "came into the herring fleets where they sunk one ship and took two and sunk about 30 busses." On their way back they took a new Dutch man-of-war off the Scotch coast, and attacked a convoy bound for Livonia, finally reaching Dunkirk about the middle of September, "where they made great joy."

In the meantime Lord Tyrone had arrived in Spain, where, aided by Eugene O'Neill, who stood high in the royal favour, he besieged the King with proposals for the liberation of Ireland. His pertinacity was in so far successful that he induced Philip at the end of December to forward to Brussels a memorandum drawn up by O'Neill but signed by himself, in which he explained his views at great length.

Difficult as it must be to attack a country surrounded by sea from which it would be impossible to exclude reinforcements, were an attempt made to invade Ireland, the English would be forced to recall their fleet from Spain and would, probably, be attacked by all the Catholic powers, which were still neutral. They were still under the impression of their failure before Cadiz. If any place in Ireland could be occupied it would serve as a pledge during the peace negotiations to force England to grant concessions to the Catholics, who would otherwise be brought to their utter ruin. There would be great difficulties in carrying out the undertaking, in the name either of the King of Spain or of the two Earls, who were very jealous of one another. It should therefore be entered upon in the name of the Liberty of the Fatherland and of the Commonwealth and Kingdom of Ireland. The Earls should be given commissions as Captains General of the Irish Republic, and would summon a Parliament in its name. This republic should be organised as a sovereign and aristocratic state, and the Catholic Religion proclaimed as "Free and Absolute." To guide them in military affairs the Earls should take with them four or five Spanish or Walloon advisers, and as to political matters a councillor who should carry with him a commission as Spanish Minister to Ireland. His commission, however, should be kept secret until Spain had recognised that the insurrection was justified by religious oppression. The army should be composed of Irish exiles

who might be embarked quietly at Dunkirk under the command of half pay officers who would drill them at sea. It should number two thousand five hundred or three thousand men, who should seize and fortify some point on the coast and be given two or three frigates and a smack to keep open their communications with Spain. "When the fleet returned to Mardyke it might bring with it some Irish monks and exiles who should be employed for the diplomatic communications. One of them should be sent as Envoy to the Pope to ask him to make public his approval of the enterprise so that the support of other Christian princes might be secured, together with a sentence of excommunication against any Catholics who refused their assistance. His Holiness should also be asked to give them a grant of money, and envoys should be despatched to all the other Catholic powers." It was all important to secure the help of the French as their sincerity was suspected, and this could only be done by an astute agent. Scotland could be brought over to their side by the promise of liberty of conscience under the Palatine as King. The Hanseatic Towns might be reminded of the tyranny which England exercised over the rest of the world, for they had never forgotten the loss of their centuries old privileges there under Elizabeth. If a sufficient number of qualified Irish agents could not be found, Jesuits might be employed in their place. If it was made plain that the advancement of religion was the only object which Spain had in view in undertaking the expedition they would cause no jealousy amongst other nations.

In reply to this memorandum Philip wrote that he would not engage in an attack upon Ireland or upon any other state which did not belong to him for his own advantage. As he was at war with England he could not make diplomatic representations in favour of the Catholics, and so for the sake of Religion he would support the Earls with an armed force.¹

When announcing his intention of supporting Tyrone to the Infanta he urged her to hurry on the preparations for the expedition as fast as possible, for if the secret leaked out failure was inevitable, whilst if the landing in Ireland took place in the winter little progress could be made before reinforcements arrived from England, and it would take time to carry through the necessary negotiations at Rome. "It is absolutely necessary that the Earls of Tyrone and Tirconnell should be reconciled

with one another, so that no contretemps may arise which may hamper the undertaking. The heads of the departments of Ecclesiastical Affairs, War, and the Secretariat must be carefully chosen as it is of infinite importance that they should be both capable men and thoroughly united amongst themselves, as they are to be the bear leaders of these boys.

"The leaders in Ireland must be consulted upon all occasions, so that no jealousies may spring up between them and those coming from Flanders."

Of O'Neill himself the King speaks in high terms.

Finally, the Infanta is to draw up plans for organising the Irish Aristocracy as a Government which may carry on the administration during the conquest of the country.¹

Yet, notwithstanding all these elaborate preparations, the Spanish expedition to Ireland was not destined to take place, and with Philip's letter of the twenty seventh of December, 1627, in which he encloses O'Neill's memorandum to the Infanta, all mention of the subject disappears from the Brussels Archives.

Fate as ever had been against the Irish. But two days after the bells of San Felipe had called the faithful of Madrid to the Midnight Christmas Mass, Vincenzo the Second, Duke of Mantua, died after a long illness,² and the disputed succession to his inheritance raised questions which threatened the very existence of Spain as a world power, which once more placed her in deadly rivalry with France, and which alienated from her the good will of her kinsmen at Vienna. Henceforth her disputes with England sank into the background and her interests in Ireland had perforce to give place to her interests in Mantua and in Monferrat.

But the part which Philip the Fourth played in conjunction with the banished Earls is in itself by no means unworthy of study. Had any unprejudiced statesman of that day been able to read the King's letters and O'Neill's memorandum, he would have been forced to avow that the legend which depicted Spain as for ever aiming at a World Empire was now out of date. Philip expressly disclaimed all desire for territorial acquisitions in Ireland, as he had repeatedly done with regard to the acquisition of territory in the Palatinate and in Alsace. Moreover, though it is clear that the Earls, if successful, intended to banish Protestantism wholly from that island, he was quite willing to support the Palatine as King of Scotland if he granted

liberty of conscience. Such a concession, which was a far more liberal one than any which Charles I. could have carried through in England, is in itself enough to show that the days when the policy of states was conducted solely with a view to the interests of Religion had passed away. It is not uninteresting to find that he approved of the suggestion for organising Ireland as an aristocratic republic with a Parliament, for he himself was a constitutional monarch in Aragon, in Catalonia, to some extent even in the obedient Netherlands, and certainly understood the limitations imposed by a Parliamentary Government. But absolutism in its real sense was the work of Richelieu not of Olivares, and the petty princes who cried loudly for the "liberties" of Germany were far more tyrannical masters of their dominions than were the rulers of Spain.

The rumours of intended invasion had not passed unregarded in England. During the whole of the summer of 1626, the preparations at Cadiz and other Spanish ports had been watched with anxious attention. In July the Council had sent circular letters warning the towns upon the east coast to prepare in every possible way for defence against an invasion which might be expected at any moment, "and you as next the danger will be most concerned herein." If any considerable number of ships was discovered off the land the beacons were to be fired to warn the adjoining counties, and word was immediately to be sent to the Council.¹ It was imagined that the little Suffolk port of Aldeburgh, lying north of Orfordness, would be chosen as the landing place, for it lay within twelve hours' easy sail of Dunkirk, the coast was free from sandbanks, and as the water was deep in shore ten thousand men could be landed within the hour. "There is no bulwark or fortification," wrote the Deputy Lieutenants, "but only eight pieces of small iron ordinance all honey-combed and not fit for service," whilst it would be impossible to throw up breastworks to protect them against gunfire from the sea upon the loose shingly beach. In consequence of these representations the Council ordered cannon to be sent to Aldeburgh, but they did not reach the place until March, 1628. The state of the coast defences in Suffolk was a typical example of the outcome of the decentralised administration of that day.² The question of supplying ships was left to the several counties with the inevitable result that great delays occurred owing to the disputes between various localities as

to the provision of the necessary money. A quota of four ships was demanded from Kent and Sussex. The Justices of the Peace for Kent met the mayors of the Cinque Ports and some deputies from Sussex at Canterbury. "It was agreed on all parts to be contrary to any former precedents of that kind, that this county should join in any charge with another county or the ports. And therefore upon further conference at the assizes at Maidstone for the same considerations, we do humbly pray your Lordship not to require any such new charge from this county, which hath of late by several occasions been much charged. Further intimating to your Lordships that if the proportion were agreed on, we do not conceive that we are fully authorised to do what is required if the county should refuse." Similar remonstrances came from all those Western counties which in Elizabeth's day had been so forward in fitting out ships to cruise against the Spaniards, but which were now impoverished by the ravages of the plague, the interruption of their trade with France and Spain, and the burden of billeting the soldiers who were quartered in the neighbourhood of Plymouth. Save, however, in the letter from the Kentish Justices, not a hint is to be found that the local authorities considered it to be illegal to raise money for the King's service otherwise than by a vote of Parliament. King's Lynn and other Norfolk ports could point to the losses of their shipping through privateers as a reason for refusing their compliance, and Chester had no vessels of strength to carry ordnance, and as fifty sailors had been pressed out of the port no fitting mariners were to be had. Cumberland alone, after great pressure, granted a vote of four subsidies, and Cumberland was one of the poorest counties in the Kingdom. But for the aid of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London, the country must have been left defenceless at sea. "We found in the City the same spirit of interruption which misled us in Parliament. The impression that was made by the Lords of their unsatisfaction in the ill carriage of the trust reposed in the Mayor and Aldermen was a good and effectual means to draw them really to give example to the rest; which they have well performed to His Majesty's good satisfaction, twenty of them having lent a thousand pounds a man. The sum already raised will enable us to set out the fleet for the coast of Spain, His Majesty resolving to take no violent or extraordinary way to raise money, but in a common danger to rely upon a common

care and affection that all men must have that will not be guilty of abandoning their religion, prince, and country to the enemy's power." The natural consequences followed. A mutiny broke out in the fleet at Portsmouth. Very early on the morning of July the eighteenth "there came on shore into the dockyard the greatest part of all the ordinary seamen in the fleet, utterly refusing to receive any pay at all except they might have the full of their wages both old and new, otherwise they must take their course for London and petition His Majesty. They presently cried 'Away, away,' and so are gone on towards London to the number of about 500, neither could we possibly discover the leaders of that disorder, because they generally answered 'One and all, one and all.'" It was not until the seventh of August that Sir John Watts could write that "The insolent misdemeanours of the seamen is pacified, but we want power to punish or suppress daily disorders that falleth amongst them, some being of the better sort." Courts Martial were unknown to the English law, which drew scarcely any distinction between a seaman pressed for the Navy and an ordinary civilian, and the only authorities who could be called upon to stop the Portsmouth mutineers in their march to London were the High Sheriffs. At most, powers existed under ancient acts of Parliament to prevent pressed mariners from deserting. Under such conditions a Spanish invasion either in England or in Ireland might well have succeeded could it have been undertaken in 1626. As Lord Falkland, Lord Deputy of Ireland, wrote, "The danger is not one whit removed by any treaty of peace, for so in '88 a treaty was embraced and maintained until the Invincible Armada was under sail and then dissolved. I know it would ill become me being the least of a thousand sitting here remote in the darkness of ignorance to represent these things unto your Lordships' considerations. But that my charge is a Kingdom, and I cannot discharge my duty by my silence, your Lordships, utter abandoning all care of us, might make me confident you believe there is no danger near us else you would not make us depend altogether upon your directions and give us none, detain from us all possible means to do our duties and abridge our authorities, but would, if there were any peril, supply the one and restore the other. Our letters would not so hardly be gotten to be read and so utterly left unanswered as they are if such danger were believed. If this moves not your Lordships

as I suppose not it will, yet this must justify me another day."

Fortunately, at that time the Spaniards for want of money and seamen were in no position to undertake the offensive either in England or in Ireland, although it was reported amongst the Jesuits "that if the West India Fleet come safe home then it is thought they will provide the next year to fall upon the West of Ireland," a piece of intelligence which seems to have excited Falkland's liveliest apprehensions.¹

When, however, it was rumoured at Madrid early in January, 1627, that Spinola had seized the Isle of Wight, which since the days of the Armada had been looked upon as the Key of the English Channel, the news was received with something like dismay. "This action," wrote Tarantaise, "has not been approved of, and some people say that an express has been despatched to Flanders with all possible speed and secrecy with orders to him not to get himself entangled in that island, but to withdraw from it at once. They are anxious that he should not share the fate which has befallen others to the great cost of this Crown, has caused a fearful loss of life amongst the soldiers and nobility, and has done no small hurt to the prestige of this nation." The memory of Smerwick Bay, of the Invincible Armada, and of Kinsale was still fresh amongst the older generation. The Silver Fleet with a very rich cargo had duly arrived in the previous month, but by the following March money was all but lacking. "His Majesty has given great and lasting mortification to the Genoese merchants, for he not only will not let them touch a farthing of what has come by the Flota, but has forbidden them to take the funds which had been previously assigned to them, and is charging others which are to be earmarked for them, although upon such terms that they will lose five and twenty per cent. by the new arrangement." As a remedy for the evils which afflicted the Kingdom, Cardinal Tresso was made President of Castile, and "His Majesty, as a mark of special favour, has allowed the ex-president to retire to the Royal apartments at San Geronimo, with permission to retain his title and his salary of twelve thousand ducats [£3,000] and he has been admitted to the Council of State. Cardinal Tresso is the person who drew up the proclamation by which it is hoped to put some check to all the disorders and losses which have occurred in these realms.

"As the Navy suffers from the same defects, His Majesty has made a contract with a certain Captain Shirley, an Englishman, for fifty vessels, with which he offers to keep the sea free from pirates upon certain terms. People view this arrangement in very various lights. Some say that Shirley has not the means to keep up such a squadron; others again thoroughly approve of it, as they know him to be a very hard-working and experienced seaman who knows everything relating to maritime affairs. Shirley is the man who took part in the first expedition to Cadiz: subsequently entered the service of the Spanish crown, and, afterwards, in the time of Pope Clement the Eighth, came to Italy as Ambassador from Persia, accompanied by a colleague who was a born Persian." As Tarantaise had been resident at Rome during Clement's pontificate, he may well have had some previous acquaintance with Antony Shirley.¹

In the meantime Spinola was busily occupied in preparing for the summer campaign at sea, which we have already described.

It cannot be said that he was warmly supported by the Spanish authorities. Although he had from the first pointed out that his plans could not succeed unless he was supported by a fleet which was to be constructed in the ports of Biscay, the officials of the Basque Provinces showed him such ill-will that the Alcalde of San Sebastian refused to admit some English and Dutch prisoners whom the Dunkirkers had taken on their voyage to Passages into the town prison, unless their captors could pay for their support. This the Flemish captains were unable to do, so that they were forced to release prisoners whom they dared not keep on their ships.

On the seventeenth of April he informed the King "that he had now eighteen ships at sea in addition to five letters of marque. Three of them had already reached the north coast of Spain, but of these one had been lost already." He had twelve more building in the Flemish dockyards. These were to be armed with guns from Germany. As it was very difficult to recruit sailors he asked the King to have some sent him from Genoa, and also by the smacks which were coming to join him from Spain. Between the middle of November, 1626, and the twenty-second of March, 1627, his squadron had taken and destroyed fifty vessels, Dutch, Scotch, and English.

In answer to some inquiries from Madrid, he also sent a report as to the manner in which his ships were administered.

The captains were responsible for victualling their ships and received an allowance of eight placks, or about ninepence halfpenny a day, for every person on board. The masters had to fit out the vessels. The quartermaster and boatswain each drew an allowance for an assistant, but were not required to fill up the post. In answer to the King's suggestion that the victualling should be carried out by contractors, Spinola replied, "I must point out that it is an old custom in these states as well as in Holland, where they have some little acquaintance with nautical matters, that the crew should receive their rations from their captains though not on a fixed scale for either weight or measure, and that the captain should be allowed so many placks a day for every ordinary seaman, with something more for the officers who mess with him in the stern cabin. This arrangement is satisfactory to all concerned. If the victualling were undertaken by anyone else, Your Majesty's service would be in no way advantaged, the captains would be disgusted, and there would be never ending trouble, as the crews would always be grumbling about the provisions." The captain on his appointment to a ship took over by inventory all the rigging, stores, ammunition and fittings, as the master did in Spain, whilst in Flanders the master acted as the captain's lieutenant and took the command in his absence. The Quartermaster and his assistant looked after the rigging and repaired any breakages, their especial charge being the fore and mizzen masts. The boatswain and his assistant were in charge of the after deck, the after mast, and the steering gear, and the master gunner and his assistant of the guns.

In the Spanish Navy the masters were in charge of the rigging, sails, munitions and stores, whilst the actual work connected with the rigging was done by the quartermaster with the boatswain as his assistant.

At the same time he asked that the smacks sent from Spain to join him should be manned with twenty rowers and four able men to handle the sails although they usually carried a crew of eight or nine.

Nothing, however, could rouse the Spanish Government from its habitual lethargy. It was not until the tenth of July that Admiral Francisco de Ribera arrived in Flanders to take command of the vessels collected in the Flemish ports, and, by that time, England had declared war upon France, and the plans

for Spanish operations at sea were changed perhaps for the worse.¹

But before we enter upon the history of the war between France and England we must revert for a moment to that of the relations between Sweden and the House of Hapsburg which, once for all, decided the part which Gustaf Adolf was to play in the European conflict. Nor must we omit to glance at the Spanish campaign against Holland in 1627, the last year in which Spinola was to take part in the war against the Dutch.

It was not until the end of April, 1627, that Philip IV. answered the despatch of the twenty-second of December, 1626, in which the Infanta had informed him of Larsen's overtures. By that time the Infanta was in negotiation with Poland as to assisting Sigismund to seize some ports on the Sound in order to hamper the Dutch trade with the Baltic. She was, therefore, strongly in favour of Poland, particularly as the acquisition by Spain of either Elsinore or Elfsborg, the one port Sweden then possessed which was open to the North Sea, had been one of the chief objects which her father, Philip II. had set himself to secure, when in 1594 he had intrigued to restore Sigismund to the throne of Sweden, in the hope that these ports might enable him to ruin both Holland and England by cutting off their supply of naval stores. Consequently she accepted her nephew's directions to refuse Larsen's request without any remonstrance. "It would be most inconvenient," wrote the King, "to allow copper to enter Spain at a time when its importation was prohibited in order to prevent its price from being lowered. If copper was allowed to enter he would be besieged with requests to relax the prohibition against other merchandise, and thus the whole system of exclusion would be ruined." It would, moreover, be very prejudicial to their interests, if, whilst the Prince of Poland was so friendly to them, they were to treat with the enemies of the Polish Crown. He instructed her, therefore, not only to close the door against copper but against all other merchandise from Sweden as well as against any political move which might tend to turn away the Prince of Poland from his alliance with Spain. On the other hand, she was to do nothing to discourage the negotiations between the two kings but to keep them going, though without taking any direct part in them, so as to prevent the Swedish King from feeling himself slighted, and, possibly, from being forced into an alliance with England and Holland.

She should also inform the Polish King of the matter, so that he might act about it as he chose.

On the same day he wrote that he had decided to send twenty-four ships to the Baltic to be placed under the command of the Prince of Poland, and to send two thousand Walloons with the fleet. Arrangements were to be made by Gabriel de Roy whilst at Vienna for hiring and fitting out these vessels.¹

Philip's refusal to admit Swedish copper to Spain must have been a severe blow to Gustaf Adolf, as he derived a great portion of his revenue from the Crown copper and iron mines. On the other hand, the Spanish currency was at that moment chiefly composed of copper coins, which were being bought up in large quantities by the Genoese to maintain the rate of exchange, and the country would have been ruined by the unrestricted importation of the metal. In acknowledging the King's instructions the Infanta merely said that as there were so few Walloons left in Flanders it would be well to send Germans with the fleet to the Baltic, as it would be far easier to keep up a German force there. Of Eric Larsen and his mission she said not a word.² Gustaf Adolf was, however, by no means discouraged by this rebuff. In the following October and November he again through Colonel Götritz made overtures at Vienna as he had done in the previous year, and asked that Imperial troops might be sent into Prussia against the Elector of Brandenburg, a course which would have led to complications between Austria and Poland, and which Wallenstein declined to comply with. Wallenstein, was, however, of opinion that an alliance with the Swedes would be advantageous, as they could then assist him in his intended invasion of Denmark by attacking Scania and Norway, whilst the Emperor, as the head of Christendom, might arrange a peace between Sweden and Poland, in order to end a war in which "Turks, Tartars, Muscovites and such other disturbers of Christendom are taking part." It was not until January, 1628, that Wallenstein learnt through the Danish King's sister that Sweden was certain to come on to the Danish side, whilst Count Schwarzenberg thought that they were playing a double game. Wallenstein at once sent orders to Arnim to arrange to get the Swedish fleet burnt in harbour, so as to prevent them from attacking Wismar or his newly acquired Duchy of Mecklenburg, and hoped that when the Spanish vessels paid for by Spain had been fitted out, they

would "be able to block them up in their islands for my flesh don't creep at all at the thought of the Swedes."¹ Possibly Gustaf Adolf's double dealing was the reason why the Emperor refused to allow him to take part in the peace negotiations between the Empire and Denmark in the following year, and thus drove him once and for all into the Protestant camp. Ferdinand II. and Philip IV. were destined to pay dearly enough for their lack of foresight.

It was in 1627 that for the first time since the fall of Breda that the Dutch began to retrieve their position on land. On the other hand Spinola was hampered by want of money, and the resources of the Obedient Provinces seemed to be upon the point of exhaustion. Scaglia, who was on his way to London to arrange for the mediation of Savoy in the peace negotiations between England and Spain, wrote in May from Brussels: "These countries are in the greatest need if not of peace at least of a little breathing time, and even Spinola himself shares this wish for all that his great influence is founded upon his management of military affairs. This, indeed, is the clearest proof of the difficulties in which they find themselves as to covering the costs of the war and of their fears lest the provinces should rise upon them as they can stand no more, and things have come to that pitch that they curse the taking of Breda which has ruined them and now forces them to keep on foot an army to hold it. God forgive the French, for, if they had done the half of what they proposed when the Prince of Piedmont was at Paris and had let the English act, the whole thing would be over in six months, and the outlook for affairs here would be hopeless." The Infanta herself was most anxious for peace either on account of the difficulty which Spain experienced in finding the means to carry on the war, or because she saw the provinces "slipping from her grasp." The distress was very great. The necessities of life had doubled in price, all trade was cut off, and no way remained for them to find money.

"I must add to this that Marquis Spinola who is the only person who carries any weight with this princess is also in favour of peace possibly because he thinks that his fame is safe in port since the surrender of Breda, and therefore does not wish to run any further risks" in a task which he knew to be impossible both on account of his opponents' powers of defence and from the geographical position of their country. "It would, however, be possible to overcome their minds by cunning and through their interests,"

and both the Infanta and the Marquis were devoting their best thoughts to that end. "Their efforts have not been fruitless for they have gained the affections of many and so, as things stand, if the Infanta could be immortal, or have a successor who was not a Spaniard, there is nothing one might not hope for." Charles Emmanuel was always accessible to flattery and Scaglia was well aware that at one moment his son Prince Philibert had been pointed to as the Infanta's successor.

"The Dutch are wholly given over to their greed for gain through trade, which is, in fact, their only means of livelihood, and trade brought them such advantages during the years of the Truce with Spain, that they long to have one again, and were it not for their detestation of the arts and flatteries which some attribute to the Spaniards as being their policy until they have secured their ends and got their chum under their thumb, such a truce would not have been put aside by any and every means. However since Count Maurice's death the war party lacks a dashing leader, and for some little time the views of their opponents have been gaining ground everywhere.

"It looks as if the Marquis' chief rival in authority and credit is Cardinal de la Cueva, whose views are very different from those of the Infanta and the Marquis, who with the wisdom which one might expect from one who has known how to raise himself to such a position amongst a people who love no one but themselves," makes use of Her Highness to thwart His Eminence in every way, and his policy is seconded by the Belgians who esteem him to be a moderate man and a friend to peace and whom he has won over by constant acts of kindness. Pecquius, the hero of the unfortunate mission to the Hague which had enabled Maurice to bring about the rupture with Spain, was the third member of the ministry. "Like all those about the Infanta, who is a most infatigable and attentive woman of business, he is thoroughly in with the Marquis." Most of the court were in favour of Savoy, but D'Andelot the Master of the Household, and a creature of Spinola's was never tired of abusing the Duke. Scaglia never answered a word, for he knew what the Marquis, as a Genoese, really felt about his master.¹

After a fortnight's stay at Brussels, the Abbé went on to Holland on his way to England. On his road he visited Breda where he was cordially received by the governor, Baron Balanzon, the brother of the Archbishop of Cæsarea, a well-known soldier

from Spanish Burgundy, whose voluminous letters and coarse illegible handwriting are familiar to every student of the time. "It is, indeed, a miracle how the Spaniards ever took the place not only because it is so exquisitely fortified, but because it is so near two other most important fortresses, which are held by the States, one being Bergen-op-Zoom, and the other S. Gertruydenberg, the first being not more than four hours and the latter two hours march from it, so that the Marquis' trenches at the time of the siege were much nearer Gertruydenberg on their outer side than they were to Breda." It would have been easy therefore, for the Dutch to beat up his quarters at any time, and to have cut off his supplies without any risk to themselves, for all the roads by which he brought them up lay through marshes which ran right up to the trenches, whilst the Dutch had perfectly safe lines of retreat. As Scaglia took care to observe to Balanzon, who was showing him round the lines, escorted by two hundred horse, "Most certainly the Duke of Savoy would never have let the place be taken." Balanzon replied that he thought so too and added that they had accomplished more than they had ever expected.

"There is also Grave on the other side quite close to Breda, only an hour and a half off, and held by the States. The Dutch usually have five or six troops of cavalry lying there so that not one single person can enter or leave Breda without a large escort. The King has a force of five thousand infantry in Breda, at least this is their real strength, though they call them seven thousand, and five troops of horse, at a cost of three hundred thousand scudi [£75,000] a year to hold the place and he does not get twenty thousand [£5,000] out of it, for the lands in the Province of Brabant, which before it was taken used to contribute to the States, still do so. Not a hundred of the inhabitants have remained in Breda, so that except the garrison there is not a soul to be seen there. Most of them have gone to Gertruydenberg, where, besides the houses which are now building, the States are erecting three large stone bulwarks on the side of the river Maas, and on the other side they have built two fresh outworks, which join a third which was there before, so that this place will become the largest which the States possess. It is, as I have said, washed on one side by the river which surrounds a good part of it, and is really an arm of the sea which divides Brabant from Holland, and can only be entered by a single road which runs through the three forts I have mentioned on a dyke of earth carried through

a great lake which runs round the fortress on the land side for half a league.

"I have come on to Amsterdam where I now am, and find all the towns as full of people as those held by Spain are empty, and on my way from one to the other of these towns which lie two or three leagues apart, I met such throngs of people that there are not as many carriages in the streets of Rome as there are carts here crowded with passengers, whilst the canals which run through the country in every direction are covered with such numberless vessels that everyone must see that they are the masters of the sea. Before getting to any of these towns one has to pass through a great wood, such is the quantity of ship timber which they have." He found that, as he had already written, people in the United Provinces were anxious for peace on account of the profits they would derive from trading with Spain, whilst the Belgians desired it because they could not carry on any trade at all, "for the gates of these countries, that is the sea and the mouths of the rivers, have been left in the possession of the States. No wonder, too, that in Spain they are beginning to long for peace with the Dutch for their conquests prove to be but a source of difficulties and they are moreover handicapped far more than any one would believe by the expense of keeping such great forces at sea to secure their trade with the Indies, which is the mainspring of their power. Although the Dutch have lost their conquest of Bahia during the last two or three years, they say that by that expedition they have put Spain to incalculable expense in garrisoning and providing for all their settlements with men and vessels, so that now they lay out ten times as much as formerly to preserve their India trade. I really think that if the Dutch were to devote their whole attention to sea affairs they would weigh far more heavily in the balance against Spain than they have done yet, for though their strength upon the water is now perhaps greater than ever before, it is only now beginning to be considerable." Abbé Scaglia had had many opportunities for learning the maritime resources of Holland for he was engaged in navigations with Amsterdam to arrange for a trade between that city and Villefranche, the best harbour which Savoy possessed, and which Charles Emmanuel was most anxious to develope into a rival of Leghorn for commerce with the Indies and with the Levant. In his interest in "sea affairs" the Duke was a true descendant of the great Manuel of Portugal.

Anxious though the Dutch might be for peace upon commercial grounds, there were not wanting very weighty political arguments to incite them to continue the war. Don Diego Mexia, who was in Paris on his way to Flanders, was supposed to have powers to negotiate with them, and if he succeeded "it is certain that the Spaniards will have done much more to forward their designs than they will achieve by force in the state in which things are here in Holland, for the feeling in the Provinces as to Religion makes it very likely that Barneveldt's faction will be set on foot again, when they are no longer under the necessity of defending themselves against their greatest and common enemy. As, then, the most far-sighted people here foresee this danger, they do not set any great store upon the generous terms which they think that they could get from Spain in a treaty of peace, as they believe that it is much more to their advantage to continue a war which is against an enemy who is a foreigner, than to have a civil war at home, with the evident risk that the Spaniards might at any moment take advantage of it. But if the King of England, with whom they cannot break under any circumstances, inclines wholly to such a negotiation, and also interests himself in concluding this peace, they think that they will have to fall in with his wishes. They think themselves bound to England by their religion and that, as the strength both of these States and of the English lies on the sea, there must necessarily be a good understanding between them, for if there is one they have nothing to fear from any enemy, and, if there is not, they could not exist." Scaglia proved to be a true prophet. No peace was made between the States and Spain until time had cooled down the religious animosities which had originated forty years before in the disputes of University lecture rooms. Whilst the war with Spain lasted the jealousies which their commercial rivalry had aroused between England and the Dutch Republic were allowed to sleep. But when the Spanish danger was removed, these disputes kindled into war, and the rivalry of the English and Dutch Commonwealths gave room for France to become the conquering power which brought Holland to the brink of ruin and made the Stuarts the humble slaves of Versailles.

The resources of the Dutch were increasing every day. Four vessels from the East Indies had just arrived at Amsterdam with cargoes of spices worth two hundred thousand pounds, and the value of the trade with the Indies was now growing palpable to

every one "so that it is believed that they will now make even greater efforts to drive the Spaniards out of them, especially as since their late losses at sea they have greatly reduced their prices in those parts." The Province of Holland alone had but four days before of its own free will granted an extra contribution of eighty thousand pounds a year to the public to make up for the loss of the subsidies from France and Venice. "The fact is that their taxes here are very heavy, but their trade and their opportunities for making money in every kind of business are so good that they do not feel them, and this city is always increasing both in inhabitants and in riches, so that people here say that it is certain that the City of Amsterdam by itself pays as much to the revenue as the whole of these provinces could scrape together when the war began, and the King of Spain, therefore, may well bethink himself that in place of bringing them to ruin he has himself raised up the most powerful enemy he ever had."¹

Such was the condition of affairs when Frederick Henry took the field in the beginning of July for the campaign of 1627. As he had full control of the rivers he could transport his forces to any point he might choose and it was, therefore, necessary for the Spaniards to keep two armies on foot to oppose him, one of which lay in Flanders and Brabant, and the other on the Rhine. Early in May the Dutch had not only raided the country round Wesel, but had been constantly harassing the workmen on the Rhine-Meuse canal, although, in their fear lest Spinola should take the offensive, they had laid the lowlands round Bergen-op-Zoom and Grave under water.²

The Infanta herself had had some experience of the daring of Dutch raiders. Late in May she went, accompanied by Marquis Spinola, to be present at the consecration of the Church of Our Lady of Montaigu, the sanctuary which she had reared in the Campine to mark the site of an apparition which to her mind had set the seal of Divine approval upon the reign of the Archdukes. From Montaigu she made a short tour in Guelders to visit the works of the new canal, but she had but little reason to be pleased with her excursion. The Count of Limburg Stirum, General of the Dutch cavalry, made a foray into the district with a large force, and captured one of the Spanish forts and seven or eight redoubts. He then attacked the Infanta's escort of cavalry and handled it very severely. Meanwhile Antwerp was bleeding to death. The number of its inhabitants was daily diminishing, as

no outlets could be found for the products of its industry. "We must hope that some means will be found to stay this evil, which is the outcome of our own imprudence, if not of that maxim of tyrants, 'My friends may die if my enemies perish,' but even this plan is failing, for our own sufferings far exceed any harm we do the enemy."¹

For want of money Spinola was unable to move, so that Frederick Henry was left free to lay siege to Groll, the strongest fortress in Overijssel, which commanded the passage from Germany to Holland through Lingen and Coevorden. Here he entrenched himself so strongly that it was impossible for Count Henri de Berg to attempt to relieve the place for, as nothing could be raised to pay the troops, no reinforcements could be brought up. "I will only say," writes Antonio Martinez to the Marquis from de Berg's headquarters, "that the soldiers are in very good spirits, and are most eager to come to close quarters with the enemy, but they are suffering great privations and our captains are so impoverished that they have no means left to relieve them. I am putting reports about that the money is on its way and will arrive very soon." The garrison of Groll was only fifteen hundred strong and far too weak, therefore, to defend its extended lines. Frederick Henry himself expected to carry it by assault within less than fifteen days after he had commenced operations, as the ditch was half filled up. He was, however, faced by the flower of the Spanish army under de Berg, who had received large reinforcements of Tilly's veterans under Anhalt and Kratz, whilst his line of communications with his base at Zutphen six leagues off might be cut at any time. Antwerp wavered between hopes and fears, and every day "saw a fresh crop of false reports. It is lost, it is taken, it is relieved, and it is again lost daily." Meanwhile the besiegers kept up a furious bombardment. As Wimbledon, who was now, despite his failure before Cadiz, the General of the English forces in the Netherlands, wrote to Coke in reference to the siege of Fort Saint Martin which was withstanding Buckingham's utmost efforts, "In my judgment there is nothing so necessary to be used as great grenades of twenty or twenty-five lbs. of powder to be shot into a fort where they shall light they carry away houses or anything as if it were a mine. This effect we have found in the town of Groll which we have so lately taken." Prince Frederick Henry, however, pushed on with his works, and though his galleries for crossing the ditch

were broken down by the fire of the defenders, the place was forced to surrender on the twentieth of August. The garrison "ran out of cannon balls and so had to use all the iron, tin, and lead utensils to be found in the town. It is a great pity that the last or the last shot but one, with a bit of a tin spoon, killed the natural son of Prince Maurice who was named William of Nassau and was a gentleman of great promise." De Berg through a shortage of supplies fell back towards Westphalia, whilst the Dutch remained quiescent, although, for a moment it was thought that they would lay siege to Lingon, and by the end of October both armies were back in their quarters.¹

During the siege of Groll, Spinola had been at Antwerp sitting to Rubens for his portrait.² In his despatches to Madrid he attributed his failure to relieve the place to his lack of money which rendered it impossible for either himself or de Berg to bring up reinforcements. He added that but for the new levies of Germans which had reached him the enemy might well have attempted Wesel in place of Groll, or, had they chosen to bring all their forces together, might have attacked Antwerp or some other place of the first-class. They were supposed to be preparing for an incursion into Flanders as they had collected a large flotilla at Fort l'Estanque. As his own engineer had already reported that the forts on the Scheldt below Antwerp could not prevent vessels from running up to the city, and could also be turned at any moment, the Marquis must have known how dangerous such a threat might prove to be. He ordered the erection of a fresh fort at Sandvliet where the channel of the river was blocked by a shoal, but this, too, was said to be useless.³

Spinola had known full well that if he stayed on in the Netherlands he was risking the loss of the laurels which he had won at Breda. Apparently at his request, although this cannot be stated positively, the Infanta wrote with her own hand to Olivares a letter which is not to be found in the Archives of Brussels. In it she asked that Spinola might be given leave to come to Spain to explain the critical state of affairs in Flanders by word of mouth and to come to some decision as to the course which was to be taken there. Her letter was laid before the Council of State on November the sixth and they urged the King to comply with her request. On the eleventh Philip accordingly wrote to his Aunt to inform her that he had granted the Marquis three months leave of absence that he might visit Spain on condition that he was

back in Brussels by the end of February. The Infanta when replying to this letter took it for granted that his absence would be temporary and said he would make arrangements to carry on the administration until his return. It was given out at Madrid that His Majesty was anxious to discuss with him a plan for fitting out a large fleet against the Dutch, and that D. Carlos Coloma was taking his place in Flanders.¹

Scaglia who was no friend to Spinola² gave the Duke of Savoy what is probably a true explanation of the Marquis' motives in deciding on this journey.

"As Marchese Spinola saw what intrigues were at work against him in Spain on the pretext that he was doing no good in Flanders, and that the King's resources were being wasted more and more every year in carrying on the war, and, moreover, thought that these intrigues were working on the minds of many of the ministers, he determined to go to Spain, after having had a summary statement drawn up of the expenditure year by year to show an exact account of every thing. He will try to put forward some other excuse for his journey, so that he may not seem to be going upon this business. At the same time he will demonstrate to them how absolutely indispensable it is that they should either lay down a firm and sufficient foundation in Flanders on which to carry on the war against the Dutch," almost the very words indeed which Philip used in his reply to the Infanta, "or else remain solely upon the defensive. This is his object as it is that of the Infanta with whom he is in thorough agreement, whilst every one else at Brussels is opposed to him, as they don't wish to be domineered over by the Infanta and the Marquis, and they are for ever representing at Court that the King has already spent seventy millions in gold [£17,500,000], that Spinola is in Flanders to very little purpose, and that Belgium should pay for the war. It is thought, however, that the Marquis will not go to Spain except for the purpose of pushing one or other of the two policies which I have mentioned, and that he will succeed in carrying his point. This idea gains the more credence, because we hear that his son has been named Inspector General of the Cavalry in the State of Milan to the intense annoyance of all his rivals in Belgium, for they have been accusing the Marquis of having slighted the Spanish nation by not having put the Spaniards in the van on every occasion as the King had given him strict orders to do. The Marquis excuses himself by saying that on that occasion the

vanguard was not sufficiently strong to cover the main body of the army, and that in the interests of the King's service he had to take some account of the other nations. The Marquis, however, has the country as well as the Infanta on his side for he has always refused to draw the fifty thousand scudi, that is francs, which the provinces are bound to pay the Captain-General. As for the arrangement between England and Spain, Cardinal de la Cueva is not inclined to it, though everyone else wishes for it. People think that Spain, had she concluded this agreement, would have declared herself on the English side, but that she has refrained from doing so because she wishes to see France wasted away by the Rochelle war, and she is convinced that this would be quieted down at once were Spain and England to declare themselves allies." It was believed, however, in London that Richelieu was urging his master to leave Rochelle surrounded by a line of forts, and to turn his arms against Savoy, but that Louis XIII. was afraid that if he did so, Spain and England would come to terms forthwith.¹

The Council of State had not been altogether unanimous in its request to Philip IV. that he should summon Spinola to Spain. The Marquis of Montesclaros, who often took independent views, had reminded them that the Marquis was the senior member of their body, and that he might take the opportunity of putting forward some claims which it would be impossible for the King to accede to. Notwithstanding Montesclaros' objections the leave of absence was granted and arrived at Brussels before the middle of December, accompanied by instructions that on his way through France Spinola was to visit the French King's headquarters before Rochelle.²

Accordingly on the third of January, 1628, the Marquis set out from Brussels on his way to Paris. He was accompanied as far as Hal, the great shrine where forty years before the Prince of Parma had knelt besieging the Virgin with his supplications whilst Medina Sidonia was battling with the English heretics in the Channel, by a train of four hundred coaches filled with the great captains who had shared his triumphs in the field and with the lords and ladies who had shone around him at the Court. But unlike Parma his thoughts were occupied with peace and his final task at Brussels had been to consider the scheme for peace with England which Rubens had submitted to him a fortnight before. The Marquis imagined that his absence would be but a short one.

He little knew that he was looking on the Flemish fields for the last time and that with him Spain's hopes of victory over the rebels in the Netherlands were departing for ever. Not inappropriately the fort at Sandvliet which had been his last military work had just fallen in ruins into the Scheldt, for the soil on which it was built had proved to be but unstable sand. He had been warned by his engineer that it would be useless. The fall of Sandvliet, had he known of it, might well have seemed ominous of coming illa.¹

CHAPTER LXXIX

THE scene towards which Spinola was journeying must have reminded him strangely of many things which had taken place during the early years of his stay in Flanders, when by his exploits at the siege of Ostend he set a model before military engineers which they strove to imitate throughout the Seventeenth Century whenever naval and military skill were brought into opposition.

It perhaps may be interesting to give a sketch of the events which had led up to the siege of La Rochelle in the light of the evidence afforded us by neutral onlookers, for the victory of Louis XIII. and the failure of Buckingham were in some degree the outcome of Spinola's naval policy in Flanders.

War between France and England had been brewing even before the death of James the First. It was rendered inevitable by Buckingham's quarrel with the French Court and by their refusal to receive him at Paris in the spring of 1627. The grounds of that refusal, so at least the public believed, were to be found in his insolent audacity in daring to persecute Anne of Austria with his love proposals. In reality, however, the Duke hated the French because they had refused to recall the Duchess of Chevreuse, by birth a Rohan, whose first husband had been Louis XIII's favourite Luynes, from an exile which she had richly deserved for her intrigues against the peace of France.¹

Charles I. supported the policy of his favourite chiefly on private grounds. His feelings are well explained in a memorandum which Scaglia, about January, 1626, sent from London for the information of the Prince of Piedmont and Madame Christina, Queen Henrietta Maria's elder sister. "Your Royal Highness and Madame Serenissima may like to know how the Queen of England is getting on. I will, however, only write what I have seen myself. The King loves her absolutely as he is really a most kindly natured man. The Queen has from the first day shown an aversion for his person and for all English habits. The King, however, says he will see he overcomes his wife's mood, but that

if he finds gentle means do no good, he will play the master. It seems the Queen was induced to show this roughness to the King because the French women about her egged her on, as they say that they have not been treated as they thought they would be when they came here. It may be there is something in this, but it now continues at Blainville's instigation, so at least the King and his intimates believe, for His Excellency keeps telling her that as the King loves her she ought to be the mistress, keep him in hand, and force him to repay her her kindness. Your Highness may imagine how things stand as they live under this impression. Till now no allowance has been fixed for her household, but for the sake of their own credit they intend to fix one. The Queen treats all the English as absolute strangers and no Englishman ever comes near her except on the occasion of the public reception of an Ambassador. With the ladies of the Court it is just the same as at Mass she keeps with the French." As has been seen the Queen's conduct was not unreasonable in this instance, for from the first moment of her arrival, Buckingham's sister, Lady Denbigh, who held one of the highest offices in her household, had openly said that she would endeavour to convert Her Majesty to the Protestant faith. "I have worked through the Duke of Buckingham to sweeten matters a little, and to try to bring them together with the aid of Mme. St. Georges," a lady who had connections in Savoy and so was peculiarly open to suggestions from Scaglia, "and to induce the two nationalities not to continue to avoid one another, or to treat one another so harshly. If things go on as they are doing it will certainly be the worse for the Queen, as Parliament is absolutely opposed to the conditions granted in the Marriage Articles, and will agree to their being set aside, in which case the friars and the French might be sent back home. The King has a slight impediment in his speech though nothing much and you would not guess it from his accent when he is speaking French. The Queen has never consented to study English since she left France though she did so when she was there, and this has given very general offence. She has run herself into debt for the presents which she has given the French. People think they were nothing out of the way. In England they affect to know nothing about the French and do not show them the slightest civility. The King sleeps with her every night and complains that the Queen never says one word to him the whole night. This is all I can say upon this subject.

Your Royal Highness may count upon the esteem which the King has for you and rightly so, and upon Buckingham's wish to serve you, and may fully rely upon him in case of need. They want some one of greater experience to guide them in Foreign Affairs, for no one here has any real acquaintance with them. They are quite aware of this, and so will attach much more weight to anything which Your Royal Highness may be pleased to instruct me to say. Otherwise they will act on their own account overseas and spend a lot of money to no great good. The Duke of Buckingham has noble instincts and never makes a difficulty about anything for he is Ambition personified, but he has no experienced and practical adviser about him, and without good advice, power and courage often hurry one into undertakings of which, it would be well, in everyone's interests that one could forecast the results fully."¹

According to his Mantuan rivals, Scaglia was a born intriguer, who had nothing of the priest about him,² and who by his conduct in Paris had rendered himself impossible in the eyes of the French Government. Yet, to judge from his despatches, the "Abbot," as Englishmen called him, was one of the farthest sighted diplomats of his age, and history has confirmed the justice of his predictions.

Blainville quarrelled with Buckingham and was consequently recalled from England, to the great indignation of the French,³ who thoroughly sympathised with him, but for the time matters were smoothed over, and in May, 1626, Charles gratified his wife with the gift of Somerset House with its splendid gardens upon the Thames. When, on June the sixteenth, Parliament was dissolved in order to put an end to the impeachment of Buckingham, Henrietta Maria, in her terror at the prospect of a popular rising, sent her steward over to Paris in order to induce the King and Queen Mother to interpose their good offices to effect a settlement of difficulties which Spanish intriguers were thought to have brought about.⁴ But the ill-feeling between France and England remained and for want of money the English had been unable to carry out the engagements which they had contracted with the French under the Marriage Treaty. The "impertinency" of the Queen's French household continued to increase and it culminated when she was persuaded by her priests to make a "pilgrimage" with bare feet from Saint James' Palace to the gallows at Tyburn which had witnessed the execution of so many

Catholics. Their cup was full and on the thirty-first of July, all her foreign attendants, priests and laymen, men and women, were packed into coaches and hurried off on the road to Dover. The Queen Mother and Richelieu were furious at the news. Marie of Medicis said, indeed, in a fury that "they treated my daughter so roughly that when they were putting her into the coach they tore her hand," an assertion which Wake was solemnly instructed by Conway to deny at Venice and at Turin. The Queen herself wrote to the Princess of Piedmont. "You will have heard before this what hath befallen me of late and thereby imagine in what pain I am. I will, therefore, desire you to pray for me," a letter "which afflicted Madame here very much."

"The dismissing of the French out of England," wrote Wake, "did at the firste make a greate noise in this Court and City. Madame de St. George (whose pen is as nimble as her tounge), having represented it like herselfe, very fowely, and with as much disadvantage to His Matie. as her malicious witt could invent. When the alarme was most hot, especially on ye side of Madame and of the Princesse of Carignan," Mary of Bourbon-Soissons, "the Duke of Savoye was pleased to declare openly that the modesty of the English and the impertinency of the French was so well known to him that he could not give credit unto the relation of Madame St. George, but would constantly believe that they had donne something which had inforced his Matie. to take that resolution and being very tender of anything that doth concerne his Matie. he did immediately send unto mee to be informed of ye true course." Fortunately Wake had just received a letter with the full particulars from Mr. John Hawkins from France, and was able to give him an explanation which everyone found satisfactory. "I did amplifye one circumstance in their pilgrimage very farre to our advantage alleaging that Garnet and Oldcorne," who had been executed as accomplices in Gunpowder Treason, "were two of the principal Pseudo-martirs intended by them to be worshipped, whose abominable practises against ye King and State were so notoriously knowen unto all ye worlde, that no ingenuous person did account of them otherwise then as most wicked Traitors, and that the indiscretion of the Bishop of Mande was most inexcusable in this particular, because he would not be ignorant that the present Pope, Urban the Eighth, by a publique brevet commanded them to be expunged out of ye Martirologies of ye Jesuites, and has strictly

forbidden the inserting of any newe Martirs until their processe be first examined by the Congregatione de' riti."¹

Wake was never loathe to have a fling at the Catholics when he could do so without prejudice to other interests, and certainly displayed great ingenuity on this occasion in going beyond his official instructions in a manner which would have earned him the applause of every Puritan in England. Whatever Charles Emmanuel, who knew a great deal more than Wake did about the relations which had existed between James the First, his son, and the Roman Church, may have thought of these explanations, he was "most anxious to mediate between France and England" in these differences, "as they could only advantage the Spaniards and lead to the destruction of the Public Liberty." He had written on the subject to Lesdiguières to ask his good offices, and spoke very seriously to Wake about it. The latter, when taking his leave of the Duke on his departure for Zurich, said that His Master could not be blamed for "having purged his court and dominions of malicious" mischief makers. Madame he added had no one about her who had come with her from France, and in France and Spain "there were not at this present the compleat number of French and Spanish servants which at ye first did serve the two Queens." He found that the Duke was in great hopes of arranging the matter as Scaglia who was then his ambassador at Paris had been restored to Richelieu's good graces of which he had been deprived owing to the ill offices of M. de Bullion, the late Minister in Savoy. "His Highness asked to be recognised by England as King of Cyprus, if other princes did so; the French King had promised to lead the way, and the Pope to second him. It was, however, hard to say how the Venetians would take it."²

Wake had certainly put forward the English case in the most plausible fashion, but the French were in no humour to listen to arguments, and Lord Carlisle was recalled from Paris, to which he had been sent to explain matters, because his mission had proved an utter failure. "In his annoyance he said that the King his master would no longer put up with what he had stood from the French even if he were to gain another crown by it. I think, therefore," wrote Priandi, "that we shall see bad blood arise between the French and English, and the latter are putting it about that this will make an opening for a settlement with Spain, possibly only in order to make the French jealous."³ Buckingham, however, was anxious to keep in Henrietta Maria's

good graces, so despite Carlisle's failure, it was agreed that Bassompierre should be sent to London to endeavour to bring about a settlement. "In the meantime the Duke's mother, the Countess, is keeping a close watch upon the Queen" so as to prevent anyone from approaching her whom they cannot trust. His sister, Lady Denbigh, holds three offices, those of Lady of the Bedchamber, Keeper of the Privy Purse, and Mistress of the Robes. They are all convinced that they will be able to pacify the Queen so that she will not only have no complaints to make, but will act as their go-between and do her best to bring about an arrangement. Possibly this might carry some weight with Cardinal Richelieu and the Queen Mother, although other people think that the French believe their whole Kingdom is as much concerned in this business as the Queen of England is. It is said, too, that the Spanish Ambassador at Paris is doing his best to keep the displeasure which the French feel at these slights at boiling point, and is always reminding them of the contempt in which the English hold their nation."¹

Bassompierre set out upon the twenty-seventh of September, 1626, with instructions from Richelieu to break off relations with England and to return at once if he could not secure full satisfaction.² Sir Lewis Lewkenor, the Introducer of Ambassadors, met him at Gravesend with the royal barge, and on the seventh of October he was rowed up the river to the Tower Wharf where he was met by the King's coaches.

The same evening Buckingham and Montagu came to see him at his lodgings "without links," and entered his room by a secret door unexpectedly. A wrangle followed, in which both sides spoke their minds pretty freely, but at last the Duke agreed to support him on the condition that he would not mention his visit to Charles who did not know he was coming. The King, indeed, was in no mood to listen to reason. Even before he invited Bassompierre to an audience, he had through Sir Lewis Lewkenor requested him to send his confessor Father Sancy of the Oratory back to France, a request with which the ambassador curtly refused to comply.

Bassompierre was, however, summoned to Hampton Court, but, on his arrival there, was met at the coach door by Buckingham who urged him not to mention the business on which he had come over at the public audience. The King was in such a passion that he might well load him with abuse before the whole

court, and the Queen, who would also be present, was just as likely to burst into a flood of tears. Bassompierre, whose one wish was to gain Buckingham's good graces, talked the Duke into arranging that after a formal public audience, he should thresh out his real business in private. On these conditions he entered the Presence. "I found the King on a dais two steps high upon which he and the Queen were seated on two chairs. They rose when I bowed low as I entered. Their suite was brilliant and the ceremonial perfect."

Thanks to his own tact the Ambassador had passed through his first ordeal successfully. As a prelude to their private interview Charles sent Montagu to inform him that although Father Sancy had not been dismissed he would nevertheless accord him an audience. The Ambassador accordingly again went to Hampton Court, and found the King in the great gallery. "His Majesty at once fell into a furious rage, but, without any want of respect, I gave him as good as he gave me, and the interview ended by my yielding in some degree to him, whilst he did so a great more to me. On this occasion I saw the Duke of Buckingham act with an effrontery which might have been more truthfully termed insolence. When he saw that we had thoroughly worked ourselves up, he stepped from the King's side, placed himself between His Majesty and me and said: 'I'll halloo you two on.' I took off my hat and would not put it on again till he had left us although both King and Duke pressed me to. Once he was out of the room I put it on again without waiting for His Majesty to tell me to."

A few days afterwards he had an audience with the Queen, who took the opportunity of giving the King a sound scolding in his presence. "The King carried me into his closet, where he kept me some time and grumbled about his wife."

With some difficulty Lords Pembroke and Montgomery persuaded Bassompierre to see Buckingham with whom he went to the Queen. "and the Duke made his peace with her after I had taken a thousand pains to bring it about. Then the King came in and made it up with the Queen, loaded her with caresses, thanked me heartily for having reconciled the Duke with his wife, and again took me into his closet where he showed me his cabinet of precious stones which are very fine." "On the third of November the Duke, as a proof of his friendship, brought his little girl to see me."

On the sixth he was taken by Buckingham to Whitehall to receive his answer from the Council. The Duke left Bassompierre in the ante-room and went into the Council Chamber, but soon came out again saying that "their reply really amounted to just nothing at all, but that I must take no notice of this, and answer them at once in the firmest language, and he would then see that I was fully satisfied." The ambassador took his advice, and having been invited by the Council to seat himself in a chair at the upper end of the board spoke for over an hour in a most forcible way, "and better, I think, than I ever did in my life. After leaving them I went to see the Queen, showed her the fine answer I had had from them, and gave her an outline of my protest which pleased her hugely. That same evening the Duke sent to tell me that all the Councillors who spoke or understood French would wait upon me next morning, and that I might be confident that matters would be settled to my liking.

"About seven o'clock next morning Lord Dorset arrived at my house and told me that the Council would come to me in a few minutes and that it would be my fault if things did not go off well. He found me in a very poor plight for such an interview. Thanks either to the weather which was foggy or to my long and fiery reply of the day before, I was in such a state that I had no voice left, and despite all my efforts he could scarcely hear me. The Duke and Council soon arrived. Carleton acted as their spokesman, and after pointing out at length the evil consequences which would ensue if any breach took place between the two powers, ended by saying that if any settlement could be come to upon equitable terms the King would gladly sanction it." As both parties were anxious for an agreement, Bassompierre had little difficulty in arranging one, although they haggled a little as to allowing him to take the imprisoned priests back with him. "I then gave them a splendid dinner and after they had taken their leaves, I went to the Queen to tell her the good news." Next day the terms agreed upon were ratified by the King.

"On Monday the ninth when the Lord Mayor is chosen I went in the morning to Somerset House to meet the Queen who had gone there, and see him go to Westminster by the Thames, in a splendid procession of boats. The Queen then dined and afterwards got into her coach, and had me to sit in the same boot with her and we drove to a street called Shippside (Cheapside) to see the procession pass, which is the most brilliant there is at the

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installation of any dignitary in the world. Whilst we were waiting for it to go by, the Queen played *Primero* with the Duke, Lord Dorset, and myself. The Duke then took me to dine with the new Mayor, who that day entertained above eight hundred persons. He then with Lords Pembroke and Montgomery brought me back to my lodgings, and afterwards I went for a walk in Moorfields."

On the following Wednesday he was magnificently entertained by his old friend, Lord Wimbledon, at Wimbledon, where he had a very fine house, and afterwards the company went on to a Mr. Bell's, a merchant who had been Bassompierre's host when he was in England thirty-three years before, and who gave them a collation. "That day which by their Calendar is All Saint's Day, the English Carnival began."

Despite all these outward signs of goodwill the Ambassador seemed no nearer the attainment of the real objects of his mission, and after being present at a violent quarrel between the King and Queen which ended in both of them turning upon him, he was forced to tell Her Majesty that he should take his leave next day and that when he got back to Paris he should tell the King and her mother that she alone was to blame for his failure. Father Sancy did not mend matters by interfering on Her Majesty's behalf at her request.

Finally Carleton, Carlisle, and Conway patched up an arrangement, and to celebrate the occasion the King took him to the Duke's residence, York House, "where I was given the most magnificent entertainment I ever had in my life. The King supped at a table with the Queen and myself. Every course was brought in by a different troop of dancers, and all the sets, scenes, tables, and music were changed each time. At table the Duke waited upon the King, Lord Carlisle upon the Queen, and Lord Holland upon me.

"After we had supped the King and I were escorted into another hall, in which the company had assembled, and which we entered through a turning door, like those one sees in monasteries, without the least confusion. Here we saw a superb ballet in which the Duke danced. After it was over we began dancing country dances, and danced till four in the morning, when we were brought into some vaulted rooms in which five separate collations were laid out.

"On the eighteenth I took Secretary Conway the list of the

imprisoned priests, who were all released by the King as a compliment to me."

On the twenty-ninth he took leave of the King and Queen at a public audience in Whitehall, and next day set out for Dover in the Queen's coach, attended by almost four hundred persons, of whom seventy were priests who were to cross to France with him. He had generously consented to defray their expenses, but as his passage was delayed for fourteen days by a storm, his rash promise cost him fourteen thousand crowns [£3,500.] Hearing that he had been detained, Buckingham hastened to Canterbury to see him, but turned a deaf ear to Bassompierre's well meant advice to give up his idea of going to Paris.

"When I got back to Dover, I found that my suite had already sailed. Unluckily it took them five days to get to Calais, and they had to throw overboard my two coaches in which I had packed over forty thousand francs worth of linen which I had bought in England. I also lost twenty-nine horses who died of thirst, for as the crossing generally only takes three hours they had not taken any fresh water on board."

His own passage was equally unpleasant, and he had to pass the night at Calais to recover from his sea-sickness. Next day he set out for Paris by Montreuil and Amiens where he was splendidly received by M. de Chaulnes and banquetted with twenty ladies whilst the guns of the citadel fired salutes.

"I reached Paris on the twenty-second of December and found that they would not receive Buckingham's visit. The Queen ordered me to write to him that it would not be agreeable to her and that he must give up the idea."¹

The "favourite of England" was not the man to forget such an insult.

Priandi was informed "that some very sharp letters have passed between my Lord Cardinal Richelieu and Buckingham upon their refusal to receive him here and to restore Mme. de Chevreuse to her former position at Court as the English are pressing them to do. The latter now say that they hold themselves released from the promises which they had made to Bassompierre."² When a few months later England had been defeated at the Isle of Rhé and was trembling at the prospect of a French and Spanish invasion the same envoy remarked that she had been brought "to this pass because the King followed the counsels of a headstrong favourite, who has made the two greatest

Kings in Christendom his enemies and has done so not so much out of his zeal for the Rochellers and the Huguenots as he is always giving out, but from his lawless love for the Duchess of Chevreuse and his wish to help her to revenge herself. The Duchess who is the mortal enemy of the King, of the Queen Mother, and above all of the Cardinal, has been doing her utmost to stir up England, Lorraine, and Savoy to join in an invasion of France."¹ Buckingham was not a fortunate diplomatist.

From the moment when Richelieu and Marie of Medicis refused his visit, Buckingham became the warm partisan of the Rochellers. They had never cordially acquiesced in the settlement concluded in the spring of 1626, and were already complaining that Thoyras by fortifying the islands of Rhé and Oléron had infringed the provisions of the treaty of 1621.² The Duke hoped that by espousing the cause of the French Protestants, he would gain the good graces of the English Puritans, whilst the French, on the other hand, thought lightly of his ill-will as they believed that England would remain inactive owing to her own troubles at home. Both nations knew that their true interest lay in peace, but the French in their mistaken confidence in English inaction would not bring themselves to make any concessions.³ The course taken by the English in reference to the Spanish war was another cause which made it impossible for peace between England and France to be maintained. The naval preparations in Spain and Flanders had excited very real apprehension in Whitehall, and it was recognised that it would be essential to prevent naval stores from reaching the enemy's dockyards from the Baltic. Important as it was in the interests of Denmark to prevent the Hanseatic towns from being driven to side with the Imperialists, measures were contemplated for "staying the ships in the Elbe bound for Spain or Dunkirk," so that the goods had to be exported through Lubeck.⁴ It is evident that the fears of the English must have been great for envoys from Denmark, Holstein, and Mecklenburg had just been at Hamburg to press the Senate to take up arms upon their side. "Their own inclination would incline the Hamburgers to side with the Danes upon religious grounds, but as they are very much in fear of Cæsar's lucky star, it is more than probable that they will submit to him as it is rumoured that Lubeck has already frankly declared that it will do."⁵ In the middle of May, 1627, English cruisers off the coasts of Normandy and Britany took twenty-five French vessels laden with Spanish property to

the value of six hundred thousand crowns [£150,000] "besides the guns," and they threaten "even worse things, so bitter is the feud between Buckingham and the Cardinal. The French shipping dares not put to sea as they know they are not strong enough to make head against the English."¹ Naval preparations had been going on in France ever since the middle of March, and by that time Conway had written from Newmarket to Coke that "His Majesty hopeth it shall not be in the French King's power to chastise the Rochellers or their supporters. To-morrow we go hence, the next day we shall be at Theobald's and so be able to play our balls with quicker returns."² Montagu was despatched in April to Lorraine and to Savoy to bring about a closer union between England and those two princes, and "to negotiate with the Duke of Chevreuse and still more with his wife to whom he is taking letters, so that people at Paris are keeping a sharp look out upon these goings on."³ The Rochellers tried to add fuel to the flames, and when the French seized the goods of all the English merchants in their markets "upon most unjust and obsolete pretences," and laid an embargo upon their merchant shipping at Bordeaux, Pennington was ordered to sail straight with his squadron to the Gironde and to free them from arrest.⁴ The Dutch and Savoy tried in vain to interpose their good offices, but their efforts signally failed. Charles Emmanuel, indeed was for the moment most unpopular in France, because he was said to have acted very meanly in money matters to the Princess of Piedmont, whilst Scaglia had completely lost the favour of the Court, apparently upon personal grounds. On the twentieth of June it was rumoured at Paris that English vessels had raided the Norman coast and large forces were hurried into the province, whilst the French fleet despite the refusal of the Parliament to register any fresh taxes, was hurriedly fitted for sea.⁵ In their turn the English commenced negotiations with M. de Soubise and arranged to send their fleet to relieve La Rochelle, although as yet they had not come to any definite understanding with the burghers.

It was not indeed until July the thirteenth, the day on which the expedition sailed from Portsmouth, that Buckingham's envoy was received by Guitton, the Mayor of Rochelle, and the Town Council at the urgent request of Mme. de Rohan. The discussion was a stormy one and it was not until the envoy had disclaimed in his master's name any intention of occupying French territory or

of restricting the increase of the French navy that the Municipality decided to accept the English offers of assistance, whilst, on his side Buckingham declared that he was only in arms to protect the French Churches against the violation of the Edict of Nantes of which England was the guarantor. Possibly it was convenient for the Magistrates to forget that in the previous May they had sent envoys to call for the assistance of England upon that very ground.¹

It cannot be said that their attitude was unwelcome to Richelieu whose one wish it was to make France strong abroad by making her government strong and centralised at home. Rochelle, in fact, was one of the few French cities, which, in all but in name, occupied the same position as the Free Imperial Cities in the Holy Roman Empire. Although it lies close to the border of the former English possessions in South Western France, it had only been in English hands for a comparatively short time, and had, indeed, been during the dark days when Charles VII. was but "King of Bourges," almost the only harbour which France possessed upon her Atlantic seaboard. In 1472 when Louis the Eleventh was seeking to secure the goodwill of his burgher subjects, he had given the City a charter endowing it with very large powers of self-government, and under which the King only retained the right of appointing its Mayor. On the other hand he could neither appoint a governor over the place, nor levy excises or taxes, nor raise fortifications within its territories without the consent of the citizens. It was claimed that this charter had been forfeited under Francis I. in consequence of the rebellious conduct of the burghers, who in their turn alleged that it had been restored by that King on their humble petition. In any case the agreement as to the erection of fortifications had been confirmed in 1621 by the Treaty of Montpellier, only to be violated by Louis XIII. when four years later he erected Fort Saint Louis which commanded the approach from the inner harbour to the sea. The troubles, which had arisen owing to the construction of Fort Saint Louis had been settled for a moment by the intervention of the English, and as Stefani, his Jesuit correspondent in France, informed Maximilian of Bavaria, it was hoped that the Rochellers would be employed in the war which but for the conclusion of the Treaty of Monzon would have broken out between France and Spain. The settlement had not been a lasting one. Fort St. Louis had not been demolished, whilst taxes and excise were levied by

royal authority within the town, and M. de Thoyras was appointed as its governor. When, however, the municipality invoked English intervention, and received an English envoy, Richelieu seized the opportunity of putting them wholly in the wrong. He asserted that the Rochellers had themselves violated the Treaty of Montpellier by refusing to allow the public exercise of the Catholic Religion within the town, and that the Charter of 1472 which had been withdrawn by Francis I. had never been restored. Turning to the present time he pointed out that the Council had committed an unpardonable crime by receiving Buckingham's envoy and by summoning the English fleet to their assistance. On these grounds he instructed the Duke of Angoulême, who was governor of the neighbouring province of Saintonge, to advance against Rochelle without delay and ordered him to refuse to receive the delegates whom the Municipality had despatched to congratulate him upon his arrival in his government. War, from that moment, was inevitable.¹

The campaign which followed and which had such momentous consequences for both the French and English monarchies cannot well be understood without some description of the scenes amidst which it was fought.

Rochelle, the chief town of Aunis, stands at the head of an inlet of the Bay of Biscay which affords one of the best harbours between the Loire and the Gironde. It is closed in by two long low promontories whose yellow cliffs stand out against the blue waters like the gaping jaws of some monstrous reptile, that to the north being the Chef de Baye, and that to the south being the Point of Coreilles. Around the town brown, rolling, treeless plains stretch on all sides to the horizon save where the yellow sand-hills of Olonne rise to the north. Not a Church tower, not a hamlet, scarcely a brown roofed, white-walled farm is to be seen on these barren heaths swept by the fierce sea-winds and clothed only with a scanty growth of whins and of salt marsh loving plants. Rochelle with its lofty towers, its ring of gay villas and gardens marking out the site of the old siege works, and its belts of trees is an oasis in a desert. The town lies on the line where the North passes into the South. Houses, black and white like those of Chester, rise from arcades which would not seem out of place in some lesser city of the Lombard plain, and its markets with their wealth of fish and grapes have all the picturesqueness of some Italian square. Its inner harbour, crowded with the coasting

vessels of half Western Europe, runs far up into the town, and is guarded at its mouth by a lofty tower of yellow stone with the high pointed roof which marks the military architecture of the fifteenth century. It is well shown in the background of that portrait of Louis XIII. by Rubens, which is one of the glories of the Louvre. From the entrance of the inner harbour the outer harbour runs westwards to the sea. It is commanded by a rising ground to the north on which Fort St. Louis once stood, and is nowhere more than about a mile wide. A chain of islands lie along the coasts of Aunis and Saintonge, and forms roadsteads famous in history under the names of the Basque Roads and the Roads of Aix. Of these islands the principal are those of Rhé and Oléron which, though the claim was denied by the royal government, were said by the Rochellers to form part of the territory of their town, and it was one of their grievances that they had been placed under the government of M. de Thoyras and fortified by him without their consent. Of these islands that of Rhé lies to the northwards about three miles from the mainland with its port of La Pallice now one of the chief centres of trade with South America, and is separated from it by the Basque Roads. To the north of the island is the Breton Passage, to the south, separating it from Oléron, that of Antioche, and through one of these channels all the shipping going to or from Rochelle must necessarily pass.¹ The low, rolling, vine-clad hills of the Isle of Rhé, thickly studded with brown roofed villages, rise above a rocky coast, bordered throughout most of its length by a chain of reefs. On its north side this barrier is broken by two harbours, one that of Sablanceaux through which the traffic from the mainland passes, the other that of St. Martin so perfectly sheltered from the winds by a projecting headland that ships can lie in its roadstead throughout the winter. On this rocky headland, separated from the rest of the island by a shallow depression, stands the citadel of Saint Martin with ditches excavated in the rock, whilst to the west of the haven is the town of St. Martin with its white houses and lofty lighthouse rising above the Town Hall. The island terminates to the westward in two peninsulas, those of Loix and Ars, which are separated from one another by the wide tidal lagoon of Ars with its bordering salt pans, and are connected with the body of the island by narrow isthmuses. That leading to Ars is commanded by Fort du Martray. Fort du Grouin

stands at the extremity of Loix, whilst to the east of Fort St. Martin stand Forts de la Prée and Sablanceaux. The south coast of the island is inaccessible and desolate.

The fleet sent by England to the relief of Rochelle was a strong one. It consisted of thirty-seven ships of war, six pinnaces, and forty-eight transports, which were divided into five squadrons. It was commanded by the Duke of Buckingham as Lord General by sea and land. The Vice-Admiral was Lord Lindsey, the Rear-Admiral, Lord Harvie, whilst the other squadrons were commanded by Lord Denbigh and Captain Pennington. It was victualled for twenty-one days, and, if we may judge by the allowances made for M. de Soubise's ten ships, upon a fairly liberal scale. Every man was given daily one pound of beef, one of bread, a pint of pease and two pints of beer, with "a fish named ling" to every ten men, vinegar and brandy. The cost of provisions for the two hundred men on each ship was reckoned at £380 a month. Money, as usual, was hard to raise. Parliament had refused to grant supplies, and out of a total revenue of £539,000 estimated for the year 1626-7, £476,456 had already been disposed of by the beginning of January, and a deficit of at least £94,000 might be anticipated.¹ The pension payments were suspended and the expenses of the Court ruthlessly cut down, but little profit was to be expected from the sale of forests or the enfranchisement of Crown Lands. Rusdorf, who had earned the undying hatred of Buckingham by intriguing to secure his dismissal in order to reconcile the King with his Parliament, advised that applications for a loan should be made both to Russia and to Venice. In both cases, however, the rate of interest demanded was thought by the English financiers too high to be accepted, although such an importation of foreign currency would have done much to improve the condition of English trade which was seriously hampered by the bad condition of the coinage. The only outcome of Rusdorf's efforts was that early in 1627 Buckingham by threatening to withdraw the pension which Frederick was allowed by England forced his master to recall him to the Hague, and from that time until his death in 1640 he lived upon the Continent, chiefly occupied in fruitless missions to secure the restoration of the Palatinate. It is noteworthy that during the latter part of his stay in London he had with his master's consent drawn pensions from both Sweden and France. With Rusdorf a notable figure disappeared from English political life, in which he

had played no small part in thwarting Buckingham's ambitions. In the light of the fact that his correspondence is preserved at Munich it is difficult to decide whether he was an honest man.¹

Under such conditions as to finance the decision of the English Court to declare war against France, at a time when they fully anticipated an invasion from Spain and were on very doubtful terms with their Dutch allies owing to disputes about the East India Trade and to the outrages committed by them upon English subjects at Amboyna, can hardly be described as a wise one.

The pretexts for the war, as expounded by Wake to the Senate of Venice were for the most part flimsy in the extreme. Old grievances like the refusal of France to allow Mansfeldt's English troops to pass through French territory to the Netherlands, and the "diversion of Pennington's ships from Genoa to Rochelle from whence they could not be retired until all was lost here in Italy," as well as the abandonment of Savoy, Venice, and the Grisons by the conclusion by France of a peace with Spain, at a time when the English Ambassadors were actually negotiating a peace between Louis XIII. and the Huguenots on the understanding that when the King "had his hands free at home, he would push on the diversion in Italy," were solemnly recited, together with Richelieu's disavowal of the arrangements concluded with Bassompierre.

"Seventhly and lastly," added Wake, "His Majesty was well informed that the Cardinal de Richelieu had passed his word unto ye Cardinal Spada not only to extirpate ye Protestants in France but to procure ye French King to joyne with ye Pope, ye Emperor and ye King of Spayne in doing the like to all the Protestants in Europe, and that for the effecting thereof he had taken to himselfe ye government of all ye maritime townes in France and made provision of shipping in Holland, and that he was uppon ye point of attempting the usurpation of our jurisdiction in that Ocean if ye wisdom and courage of my Lord Duke of Buckingham had not prevented his malice." That a man who had been in constant communication with the best informed statesmen in Italy for so many years should have uttered such a farrago of nonsense about one who in religious matters was one of the most tolerant statesmen in Europe and whose sole object in putting down the Huguenots was political, affords a striking comment upon the condition of English diplomacy as depicted by Scaglia. It is even more

wonderful that a man who was capable of advancing such arguments before the Venetian Senate and the Diet of the Swiss Protestant Cantons should have died as English Ambassador at Paris.¹ Yet Wake expressed a mild surprise when Richelieu objected to receive him in that post.

The sole justification for Wake's statements may, perhaps, be found in the fact that erroneous reports had got abroad as to the nature of the agreement between France and Spain which had been concluded in the previous March, and which five months afterwards brought about the despatch of a Spanish squadron to assist the French against Buckingham. The history of the events which had led to its conclusion was a complicated one. Although the Infanta was warmly in favour of a settlement of the differences existing between Spain, England and the United Provinces she had never been willing to close the door against an understanding with France. At the very moment when Scaglia was impressing upon her that it was of the utmost importance that she should veil her negotiations with the English and Dutch in complete secrecy, she had written to her nephew that if he had made any arrangements with the French which precluded such negotiations, it was her opinion, although she did not think that they would hold to their bargain, that "Your Majesty should be the more faithful to it, and if you have done so, that you should send me orders to keep them informed of any communications which I may have with England." Before her letter which was dated the twenty-third of May had reached Madrid, the King had forwarded to her a copy of his agreement with France as to his relations with England, together with "the means which have been agreed upon for continuing the negotiations with the English, without infringing the good relations which it is fair we should keep up with the French." In order not to engage his own responsibility too much and out of consideration for France he must decline to send her the powers she had asked for. To avoid awakening the mistrust of the English he agreed, however, with her in thinking that their main object must be to prevent France from finding an opportunity for coming to terms with England and, at the same time, to spin out their own negotiations with England without coming to a settlement. He, therefore, enclosed to her powers dated the twenty-fourth of February, which would be sufficient for that purpose.

In a despatch to Mirabel the Spanish ambassador at Paris,

Philip entered into a more explicit explanation of his views. He informed him that if his discussions with the English did not produce any result he would be ready to join with the French in an attack upon England that very year. At the same time he believed that England would be ready to conclude a treaty with Spain in which any reference to the Palatine's affairs was omitted. The full powers which he had sent the Infanta authorised her, as he explained to her in a further despatch, to treat for a time for a suspension of hostilities with any King or Prince whomsoever with whom she was at war, and he had agreed in advance to ratify any agreement which she might conclude. At the request of the King of England he had empowered her to treat with the Dutch as well as with the English. The reason why he had refused to allow her to treat for a Peace was due to two causes. In the first place he would never consent to give up his claims to Suzerainty over the Dutch, in the second he would never accept any compromise upon the subject of Religion. Moreover it was certain that they would never abandon their claims to trade with the Indies. If, however, those best able to judge could assure the Infanta that there was any hope of inducing them to accept a compromise upon these points, he would be willing to negotiate with the United Provinces as an independant sovereign power for an armistice for one year, in the hope that they would make concessions in the definite peace. He fully recognised that to judge from the results of the Truce of 1609 his expectations would not be fulfilled. At the outset of the negotiations for that Truce the Dutch had, he wrote, offered to accept the Spanish terms, an assertion which was perhaps not wholly correct. They had, however, refused to do so, and all that Spain had gained by the Truce was the loss of the East and of part of the West Indies, whilst during the twelve years of its continuance, her expenditure had increased far more than it had done during the preceding years of war. If the Infanta asked him why he was giving her powers to treat for an armistice, he could only point to the cost of the war and to the impossibility of covering it. Had he, upon the other hand, given her full powers to treat with England, the English would have pressed her to include the Dutch in the negotiations, and in that case he must "have sent off another express." "What I want to do is to keep them amused until the events of this coming campaign show them the contrary." Spinola's failure to realise Philip's hopes of victory may explain

why the loss of Groll was so bitterly resented at Madrid as to lead to his recall from Flanders.¹

As a matter of fact Philip was in no position to negotiate freely with England. On the twentieth of March Olivares had signed a treaty with Rochepot the French ambassador at Madrid by which the two powers bound themselves to attack Great Britain and to divide the British dominions between them. Philip did not explain the provisions of this agreement to the Infanta, but merely said that circumstances had made it necessary for them to come to terms with France, although they were well aware that the French often failed to carry out their engagements, but that the settlement "will be greatly to the advantage of our Holy Religion, which is my chief aim," and its existence was no reason why the Infanta should refuse to give a hearing to any proposals from England. The Council at Madrid had been very unwilling to come to an arrangement with England for joint operations against France, as they thought that Buckingham's fall was imminent, and that Richelieu's hatred of the Duke was the chief cause of a war which as Gerbier put it to Rubens "was a frightful mask which could be taken off at any moment." Many Councillors however, thought that the Spanish fleet could do good work against England, and Spinola and Mexia were warmly in favour of taking the offensive against her in conjunction with France. Possibly Spinola knew that his rival, Cardinal de la Cueva was urging that a truce should be made with the Dutch if they would drop the style of "Free" and give up their trade with the Indies. It was said indeed that the Marquis had been in communication with Richelieu through the Nuncio at Paris. Yet to Rubens it seemed that if Spanish Pride would have listened to reason, means might easily have been found to bring back Europe "which seems all linked together" to a better frame of mind, "for all sides alike seem weary and exhausted."² The English were, perhaps, as much to be blamed as the Spaniards, for Carleton, the Ambassador at the Hague, through whom Scaglia, Rubens, and the other Spanish agents communicated with England, disbelieved in their desire for peace and informed Conway that the Dutch were equally incredulous, adding with the air of one who is announcing a pleasing novelty that the Emperor's ambassador, who had just returned from Spain, said that Philip would do nothing to bring about a settlement in Germany. It was clear that "the Spaniards, howsoever they

temporise more than formerly with those of our Religion in such places where they gett possession, yet theyr end and scope is to establish theyr conquests by their utter extirpation." As a proof of this, he quoted the assertion of two deputies from Frankenthal, who were then at Brussels, that the Spaniards, contrary to the agreement under which they held the town in deposit, were closing their schools and churches. Under these circumstances it was difficult to see how England and Spain could be brought to an agreement.¹

In the middle of June D. Diego Mexia was despatched to Paris to inform Louis XIII, and some of his Ministers, of the preparations which were being made in Spain to support France in any undertaking which they might wish to enter upon against England. From Paris Mexia was to go on to Brussels where he was to arrange with the Infanta as to the co-operation of Flanders, and Gabriel de Roy was despatched to the Hanse Towns to hire ships for an expedition to the Baltic which was to be based on the Polish ports. Mexia fell ill of a tertian fever at Paris, and although the Infanta and Spinola did their best to keep the negotiations with England going on by sending back Rubens to the Hague, they could do nothing, and by the end of July Cardinal Berulle had arranged that the Spanish fleet should co-operate with the French. Philip announced his league with France to the Infanta on the fifth of August, and, at the same time, added that whilst the English fleet was engaged in attacking the Isle of Rhé the Infanta might possibly throw a force of fifteen hundred men upon the coast of England, as none of the English land forces were fit to resist them. Two days later he wrote that he had offered to send twenty-five or thirty ships to join the French fleet, and that vessels should be sent from Belgium to cover the Spanish coast and to protect the Flota as the English were so superior at sea, but he left her a free hand to do as she pleased. The French had wished that the two fleets should unite at Brest but the entrance to the harbour was a difficult one, and the other ports on the coast were open to an English attack. Don Fadrique de Toledo was to command the expedition. The Spanish fleet was assembled at Corunna.²

For a moment it seemed as if Toledo would be detained in his own waters. News reached Madrid from Cadiz that sixty English vessels had been sighted off the coast, though they had not made any preparations for effecting a landing. The Isle of Leon was

hurriedly put in a state of defence, but the report proved false, and Toledo sailed for the coast of Morbihan, where he met the French fleet which, as he wrote to the Duke of Feria, was "a thing of no great account."¹

Had the Infanta's ships been in the Flemish harbours they might have done good service by raiding the English communications in the Channel, but, as has been seen, they were absent in the Northern seas and did not return home until the middle of September.

The English expedition arrived off Rhé on the twenty-third of July and Buckingham at once landed a large detachment of his troops at Point Sablanceaux. M. de Thoyras hurried to meet him but after a desperate fight was driven back to Fort St. Martin and the English did not venture to pursue him, although had they done so they might easily have taken the fort itself, which had no provisions. Buckingham lost five hundred men and entrenched himself at Sablanceaux, where he received large supplies of provisions from private traders at La Rochelle, whose Town Council had refused an offer from some contractors to smuggle in wine and wheat on condition that if peace was restored they might sell them elsewhere. The Town Councillors, however, had their own wine to sell, and allowed Rochelle to be stripped of its supplies, without taking any steps to replace them. A man of some note, Baron de Rabutin, the father of Mme. de Sévigné, fell on the French side in the skirmish at Sablanceaux after receiving twenty-seven wounds and having three horses killed under him. His monument is still to be seen in the village church. On the twenty-sixth Buckingham raised his batteries "within half a musket shot" of Fort St. Martin, which by that time had received supplies of provisions and ammunition from some courageous Dutchmen who brought their ships in shore despite the English fleet.² The excitement in France was at its height. Everyone believed that the English were anxious to gain possession of Rochelle as a base from which they might reconquer their former possessions in France, and in view of Buckingham's constant efforts to secure a foothold for England on the Continent or in the Mediterranean, the suspicions of the French cannot be deemed without foundation. It was not yet seventy years since Guise had recovered Calais and a few old men may well have remembered the flag of St. George floating on its towers. The Rochellers as has been seen, shared these suspicions, and conse-

quently, although the populace were heart and soul with the English the Council refused to admit English troops within their walls. On the other hand when Monsieur Vincent who had been named one of the deputies to go to England made a proposal that a Spanish jeweller who had been taken prisoner should be employed to negotiate for an understanding with the King of Spain, and argued in favour of its adoption because of his mistrust of both the English and Buckingham "his motion was not well liked."¹

The fears of the French as to Buckingham's intentions proved of service to the Royal cause. Every road in Western France was blocked with volunteers hastening to the front, and boats were every day arriving at Fort Saint Martin laden with young nobles bearing the greatest names in France. "The Dukes of Bouillon and de la Tremouille, Marshal de la Force and Chastellon, and all the Huguenots north of the Loire with those of Poitou and Guienne are at this moment as loyal and obedient as possible, indeed there are a great number of the Huguenot nobility in the Royal army and even in Fort St. Martin itself, for they are serving His Majesty out of their abhorrence and detestation of this unjust invasion and of the disloyalty and faithlessness of those who are supporting the English." Lower Languedoc, however, had risen in arms under the Duke of Rohan, who was advancing on Montauban and Castries, but both towns had suffered so severely during the previous war that they refused to admit the Protestant leader. Troubles were also brewing in Dauphiny.² It is noteworthy that Protestantism was far more deeply rooted in these old Albigenian and Waldensian regions than it was in Northern France, and it may well be doubted, indeed, if they had ever been really Catholic.

If the French Royalists were united amongst themselves, the same cannot be said of their Protestant opponents.

Whilst Buckingham was shelling Fort Saint Martin from floating batteries and was trying to bar the mouth of the harbour with a line of vessels fastened together with cables, Angoulême had advanced to Rochelle, and was marking out some forts within gunshot of the place. At the same time Monsieur threw up batteries at Coreilles, the point to the south of the outer harbour and commanding its entrance. Upon this the Rochellers recalled the troops which they had sent to Buckingham, who that same night failed in an attempt to take a half-moon of the

Citadel by storm, though he succeeded in poisoning the well which supplied the besieged with water. "Some ship-loads of provisions and ammunition have been thrown into Fort St. Martin, though with great difficulty, and it is thought that it will be able to hold out, for it is very strongly held, so we hope the English won't find it as easy to take it as they expect. Sickness is raging in their army and will get far worse now that the grapes, which they devour in enormous quantities, are ripening. People say, too, that Buckingham is quarrelling with Soubise, against whom and those who support the English the King has issued a proclamation." "It is very much feared that Rochelle will go over to the English body and soul, for the community are very much inclined that way: what happened in the past shows us what a fearful blow this would be to France, for it may be said to be the best fortress in the Kingdom." Possibly these rumours might have been justified by the event had the Duke been trusted by his allies, but, in the belief that Fort St. Martin would be driven by famine to surrender, he had commenced some negotiations with Thoyras which completely lost him their confidence.¹ Hostilities had opened at Rochelle on the tenth of August, when Angoulême bombarded the town with red-hot balls, and set fire to a magazine of hay and straw. On the seventeenth a messenger from the King to Angoulême was captured carrying a despatch in which a plan was explained for closing the harbour by a dyke at its mouth and for throwing up a line of circumvallation round the town. The plan for a dyke seems to have been suggested two years before by a Dutch engineer in Aerssens' suite, and could, it was thought, be carried out by a besieging force of ten thousand foot and a thousand horse. Early in September Thoyras with Buckingham's consent despatched an officer to Paris for instructions. The King ordered him to hold out: in his rage the Duke threw the envoy into prison. To gain time the Governor on October the first offered to surrender if he was not relieved at the spring tide of October the eighth. On that night forty barques and pinnaces laden with supplies sailed from Sables d' Olonne and succeeded in reaching the Fort under a heavy fire from the English. In his fury at this disaster Buckingham determined to raise the siege and had already embarked some of his people and artillery "and the goods of the poor islanders" when the entreaties of the Rochellers and the news that six thousand men under Lord Holland would shortly join him from England,

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decided him to renounce his design.¹ Charles' letter in which he announced Holland's approaching arrival was sufficiently deferential. "I am much grieved and ashamed that I must make an apologie for our slownes heer in giving you supplies, the cause whereof is the hardness of getting Mariners and the slow proceeding of the Commissioners of the Navie (which all Commissions are subject to), Monie being redelier furnished than I could have expected in thease necessitous tymes, but for this our beste answer is (as the School boye says) 'Pardon this and we shall doe so no more.' Holland within two or three dayes will attend you with supplyes, wherefore at this time I shall say littell more but concerning the instructions ye sent me for Ned Clarke," the bearer of his fateful letter from Segovia to Bristol, "and Will Hadon's place of the Ordinance, for the first King of Denmarke's ambassadours being heere for an accommodation between France and mee, I have sent them away well anufe satisfied, yet without discovering my intentions, or obliging myselfe to a treatie, so that I hope my Uncle will be content with my proceedings with France, Ned Clarke having likewise instructions correspondent to the answer that was given the Denmarke Ambassadours, so that I thinke it needless or rather hurtful to discover my maine intent in this business, because divulging of itt (which this may cause) in my mynde must needs hazard itt. Lastlie, for God's sake, be not disheartened with our bypast slowness for by the grace of God it is all past. This I say not that I fear that thy constant stoute heart can slake in an honnest cause, but that some rascall may cast doutes in the Armie as if I neglected you, which I imagen is lykelie anufe to fall out since some villains heere stille not to devulge it. And it is possible that those who were the cause of your consultation of leving the Sege and comming home (for the refusing of which I give thee a thousand thankss) may mutter such things." Such were Charles' views at the beginning of October.²

A fortnight later the King again wrote to the Duke in terms which show how anxious he was to cast the responsibility for coming to a decision upon Buckingham. After expressing his anxiety lest the supplies which had been sent with Lord Holland had arrived too late, "but I hope that God is more mercifull to mee than to inflicte so greate a punishment on mee," he entered into further details of his negotiations with the Danish ambassadors. He had refused their request that to save time, he should

send powers to Buckingham to treat with France, as he could not honourably do so until he had learnt "France's disposition to treat." He had not, however, been able to refuse their request that they might be permitted to keep Buckingham informed of their proceedings in France. "To give them some contentment at their farewell I told them that in case they made a peace between me and France, the Armie that you command should be readie to serve my Uncle if he desyred it. Now, honest rascall, though I refused being demanded to send the powers to treat, yet thou (knowing my well ground confidence of thee) must easilie juge the warrant dormant power thou hast in this, as in anie thing else where confidence may be placed in anie man; but for feare that thy modestie in this particular might hinder thee to remember thy power of trust which I have given thee I thought not amiss to write as I have written." As he announced in the same letter that Gerbier's negotiation with Rubens was at an end, it was certain that from an English point of view, the war with Spain was likely to prove far more important than the war with France. The English and with reason looked upon the French navy with contempt, but the experience of the past few years had filled them with a wholesome respect for the sea-power of Spain, especially when the sea-power of Spain itself was supplemented by the squadron in being in the ports of Flanders. But both the Spanish and the Flemish dockyards depended wholly upon their supplies of naval stores from the Baltic, and if Buckingham's army could be transferred from the Isle of Rhé to the mouth of the Elbe and to the Danish Islands, as it might be if a peace were patched up with France, the power of Spain to attempt an invasion of either England or Ireland would be greatly lessened and English commerce would be freed from the deadly menace of the Dunkirkers. At the same time by throwing the responsibility for concluding a peace with France upon Buckingham, the King would avoid any criticism from his Parliament as to his desertion of the French Huguenots, whilst the Duke could always defend himself on the plea of military necessity.¹

The attitude taken up by Charles towards the question of peace with France in October, 1627, was destined to prove of serious import to La Rochelle, unless, indeed, the Rochellers could offer him sufficient advantages to make it worth while for England to continue a war which might bring upon her an invasion from France and Spain.

Louis XIII. was lying upon a sick bed when he learnt that the English had landed at Rhé. His recovery was a slow one, and it was not until the end of September that he left Paris and journeyed by slow stages to join his army before La Rochelle. The two Queens remained at the Louvre, "possibly in order that he may have to go back there for the winter, though His Majesty will find it difficult to do so, if the siege of Rochelle is to be carried on as it has begun, for besiegers and besieged are already at close quarters." When he left Paris, it was thought that the relief of the Isle of Rhé was certain now that the French captains had proved that they could throw supplies into the forts "under the very noses of the English, who, overwhelmingly strong as they are at sea, will, may be, have to go home with their tails between their legs and acknowledge that God will not prosper rash and unjust ventures." On the twenty-third of September the King set out with the Cardinal for Rochelle "amid the tears of the Queens," but with a promise to return within two months. Meanwhile heavy fighting was going on between the Rochellers and the Royal troops, and many gentlemen who had gone too far "in the French fashion" had been killed or taken by the burghers. Monsieur was eager for the fray and, to the great anxiety of the Queen Mother, his gentlemen had a hard task to keep him back. The siege of Rochelle had been regularly formed by the end of September and despite constant attacks by the besieged the lines of circumvallation were being steadily pushed forward.

Although the King had told Thoyras "that he must die rather than surrender, many of the ministers and particularly the Cardinal himself who was by no means very partial to the Governor of Fort St. Martin" would not, perhaps, shed many tears if such an event did happen." Thoyras was worn out with overwork and anxiety, and it would be almost impossible to send him the reinforcements for which his brother the Bishop of Nîmes was clamouring as the English had blocked the approaches from the sea to the fort with a stockade. The army before Rochelle was very weak owing to lack of money and discipline and of a good understanding between the King's and Monsieur's officers. Guise and Angoulême sent envoys to inform the King of the real state of affairs, but they only got a sound scolding from the Cardinal as a reward for their plain speaking. The King established his headquarters at Netré, a village three miles south of Rochelle on the twelfth of October, and on the fourteenth, after great disputes,

Bassompierre was appointed to command Fort St. Louis and the forces on the north side of the place. On his arrival at Niort on the ninth of October, the feast of St. Denis, the apostle of France, Louis XIII. had received the news of the almost miraculous relief of St. Martin when it was at its last gasp, and learnt that the English had decided to endeavour to take it by force of arms. "The issue is indeed uncertain and doubtful, but we hope it will end in their disgrace for now that the bad weather is coming they will be forced to put out to sea," whilst the junction of the French and Spanish fleets would soon show some results. On the other hand Rochelle, Rohan, and the towns of Lower Languedoc had declared themselves in close alliance with the English and "now that they have such a good base of operations it will be hard to turn them out of the kingdom." If, however, Buckingham, who was loathed as the cause of all these troubles, were to come to grief, as might happen, people thought that a settlement might be arrived at with much less difficulty.¹

The presence of the King was a great encouragement to the army, fresh supplies for four months were thrown into St. Martin, and on the thirtieth of October M. de Canaple embarked a force of twelve hundred men at Plump and landed them at night at Fort de la Prée despite all the efforts of a squadron sent against him from Rochelle. On November the sixth Buckingham made a desperate attempt to storm St. Martin. His troops had carried the outworks and had reached the ditch, when it was found that the scaling ladders were too short and they were driven back with great loss. It was rumoured at Paris "that Buckingham, after Lord Holland's arrival had gone back to England having been recalled by his King, who on seeing that France and Spain had allied themselves, being fearful lest some disaster might befall him, had at once ordered a large fleet to be fitted out to relieve that at Rhé and to defend his own kingdom against an invasion which perhaps is looked for." On the seventh Schomberg and Marillac succeeded in crossing the Basque Roads and landed a large force at Point Sablanceaux. Next day Buckingham decided to raise the siege of Fort St. Martin and to withdraw his forces into the Isle of Loix by a bridge which he had thrown over a narrow arm of the sea called the Fosse de Loix which separates it from the town of St. Martin. Schomberg attacked him just as his troops had begun to cross the bridge, and they must all have perished, but for the bravery of his rearguard and of his cavalry

who were cut to pieces. Many of the English were drowned or taken prisoners, amongst the latter being Lord Mountjoy, Lord Gray and Colonel Montagu. Great were the rejoicings in the royal camp at the news, and so many salvoes were fired that the Rochellers, thinking that an assault was intended upon the town, remained all night under arms to resist it. The anxiety at Paris had been very great. For three days no couriers had arrived from headquarters, and it was feared that the attempt to relieve Fort St. Martin had failed, and that its commander and "more than five hundred of the flower of the nobility would be lost." The sufferings of the soldiers had been fearful, as although supplies were plentiful they had been lying in the open in mud and water up to their knees. Such a disaster would force them to make a disadvantageous peace. It was thought, indeed, that Richelieu had been treating privately with Buckingham in the Isle of Oléron. Notwithstanding all the efforts of the besiegers to throw up batteries even on the foreshore of Point Coreilles to close the harbour, the vessels of the Rochellers ran in and out without the slightest difficulty, and their deputies to England had sailed at the end of October. At the same time the rebel cavalry were scouring the country to the gates of Poitiers and had taken nearly all the despatch riders from the camp. On the twelfth of November, however, Beringhen, the King's Chief Valet, arrived at the Louvre post haste from Netré bringing letters to the two Queens with the news of Schomberg's victory and announcing that the Isle of Rhé had been completely cleared of the enemy, who had lost fifteen hundred prisoners and twenty ensigns. Great were the rejoicings "not only at the Louvre, but throughout the city. This morning the 'Te Deum' is to be sung, for this is really a miraculous stroke, and God, just as it was hoped that He would, has protected His Majesty's just cause and confounded his enemies. The Rochellers at this moment are in the utmost perplexity. If they are blind enough to put their city into the hands of the English, they will perhaps ere very long find out what the difference is between the rule of a foreigner and that of their natural prince, and will sooner or later receive their well deserved punishment." It was a good thing that this victory had been achieved without the help of the Spaniards "for whom they have no longer any use," as this would humble the pride of Rohan and the other rebels, and give others "who had not expected such a tragedy" something to think about. Bucking-

ham's fleet was said to have disappeared, but it was thought that in his desperation he might make some attempt elsewhere, or possibly attack the squadron in Britany which was still very weak "but they think precious little of any of his plans, be they what they may, now that he has had such a slap in the face from an army without the help of our navy." Notwithstanding his defeat Buckingham remained in Loix some days longer, and on the twelfth sent a letter to Rochelle by David and Vincent, advising the burghers to negotiate for peace, which he assured them would be granted to them upon their own terms. If they would not treat he offered either to throw himself into the town with two thousand men, or to return to England and bring back a fresh expedition to relieve them. On November the seventeenth, however, without waiting for their reply he sailed from Loix, on the twentieth he was caught up by the deputies from Rochelle off the Pointe du Raz, and on the twenty-third arrived at Plymouth where he found Lord Holland, who had sailed three times to join him but who had been driven back each time by contrary winds. Buckingham had from the first thrown the blame for his failure upon Holland and wrote to him at the beginning of October that though he had sent envoys on three separate vessels to England for supplies and reinforcements none had been despatched and he would be forced to raise the siege from sheer want. On his arrival in London the Duke had been met by most of the nobility, although he had not come by the road which it had been expected that he would take, and had been welcomed by Montgomery the Lord Chamberlain in His Majesty's name. The King, grieved as he was at the withdrawal from Rhé, kept telling everyone that it was not Buckingham's fault, and during his journey from Plymouth had sent him message after message, couched in the most affectionate terms.¹

At Turin the news of the French victory was, to Wake's indignation, received with the greatest joy. The cannon of the Citadel fired salutes, a "Te Deum" was sung at the Cathedral, and Cardinal Maurice of Savoy gave a display of fireworks at his vineyard. Charles Emmanuel had given a hundred ducats and Madame Christina four hundred to the courier who brought the news, although "he was not dispatcht to them nor had any letter for them, whereas the Pope to whom he was sent did not reward him with one penny." Urban VIII. had indeed forbidden all those "of his house, and of his brothers, and nephews," to be

present at the thanksgiving service at Rome, and the Ambassador of Savoy was the only one who attended it.¹

Charles Emmanuel was indeed "at his usual cabals," and was striving to fish up some profit for himself out of exceedingly troubled waters. Vincenzo II., who had in the previous year succeeded to the throne of Mantua was in exceedingly feeble health, and his death would at once open the whole question connected with the succession to his inheritance. The Duke of Savoy, therefore, was trying to come to terms with Spain and to marry his son, Cardinal Maurice to Princess Maria Gonzaga, who was the heiress of Mantua, and to divide Monferrat with the Spaniards whilst allowing them to keep the city of Mantua itself. As he knew that the great wish of Philip IV. was to secure a peace with England, his desire to effect this arrangement about Mantua was probably the reason which had led him to send Scaglia to London, although at the same time he had incurred the bitter hatred of the French who hoped to secure Mantua for their own claimant the Duke of Nevers. He had also other objects to gain by obtaining the goodwill of England. Of these the most avowable was the signature of a Treaty of Commerce, under which Villefranche would take the place of Leghorn as the English staple in Italy and as a half-way house to the Near East, an idea which was welcomed by the London traders, who, however, raised the very practical difficulty that they already had their correspondents in Leghorn and that they took up the ready money with which they traded in the Levant, at that port.² In the second place he was as eager as ever to recover possession of Geneva and with that object sought to secure the goodwill of Charles the First, who, like his father, was always ready to affect to exercise an authority in the affairs of the Swiss Confederates and their neighbours for which it is difficult to see what tangible grounds he can have had. As will be seen Charles had sent Walter Montagu, a younger son of Lord Manchester's, on a secret mission to Lorraine and Savoy in the previous summer and had commissioned him to say that if opportunity served he would be quite willing to assist the Duke about Geneva and that some means for doing this might be devised from the documents which had been sent from Turin.³ Scaglia would see that the agent sent to Savoy on the business was in favour of such an undertaking. Finally it was hoped that England would recognise the Duke as King of Cyprus in some public act. Scaglia himself had been in favour of delay-

ing a settlement between England and Spain until one had been concluded between England and France, as he feared that if Spain was relieved from the weight of the English war, Savoy would be left alone with all her enemies upon her hands. On his arrival at Brussels, however, early in May his views gradually changed. "It is absolutely necessary," he wrote, "that Y.R.H. should in the course of the negotiations which you have begun in France with Montagu and in England take measures to prevent the negotiations which have been begun here from being kept going, for, as I have already said, there is far too great a wish for a settlement here, just on the other hand the ingrained feeling between the French and English is hostile to the last degree. Here I think I have found that they are very friendly to the English, whilst, really when I was in England I was astonished to find such a liking for Spain. I could not name a single person who was opposed to her except the King himself, who feels that they have slighted him personally, and Buckingham. In order then to prevent a settlement being reached between England and Spain, Y.R.H. ought not only to push forward the negotiations in which you are engaged, but also make sure that those here do not go forward unless in such a way that you can ensure that an arrangement will not be come to here before one has been arrived at with France, and there can be no better way of effecting this than to keep England on more confidential terms with you and likewise Buckingham, as can be done. It is true that the way the French have dealt with Y.R.H. does not entitle them to this, but considering that the King is not to blame for it, and still less the whole community, it will be well to do him this kindness, and I cannot but hope that you will achieve this object either openly or by backstairs influences. The difficulty so far as I can see is that the English may forget you and also to find a method by which they may carry on the war to their own advantage and prevent the French from cloaking the interests of others, for I understand that when the English made that last capture of ships off the coast of Britany, the three of great value were Flemish property, although they don't give it out here. I heard it, however, from a very good source. The people too, who negotiated the Treaty of Commerce with Richelieu and who wished to treat for one with the Prince (of Piedmont) when he was in Paris last year, were also from here. I am trying to find out how the negotiations for peace with England stand that your Royal Highness may think of yourself.

I learn that so far no real foundation has been discovered for a negotiation, although there is a desire for it here." As Buckingham, as Lord High Admiral of England, took a large share of the profits on any prizes, the Savoyards could choose no better way of securing his confidence than by helping him to increase his gains. "Spinola, himself, shares the general wish for peace even though he owes his great influence to his control of military affairs, and this indeed is the clearest proof of the difficulty they are in as to meeting the expenses of the war, and of their dread lest the country should rise against them because it can stand no more. Things, indeed, have come to such a pitch that they curse the taking of Breda which has ruined the country and now forces them to keep on foot an army to hold it. God forgive the French for if they had done the half of what they proposed when the Prince was at Paris and had left the English a free hand the whole thing would be over in six months and there would be no hope for things here."¹ Rubens, however, saw that it might be possible to convince Scaglia that it would be more advantageous for him to forward an understanding between England and Spain than to delay it. Thanks, apparently to his representations, the Infanta and Spinola decided to trust the Ambassadors from Savoy with all the secrets of their negotiation through Rubens with England. Consequently, when writing to Buckingham's agent Gerbier on the nineteenth of May, Rubens was able to say "I have brought Scaglia and Spinola so close to one another that they are treating face to face; in any case when any doubtful point, ambiguity, or slight difficulty arises between them, they have always done me the honour of employing me as their go-between to clear it up. At this moment I don't think that there is any difficulty unsettled and that they understand one another very well, and trust one another thoroughly. In fact we find Scaglia more than equal to business of this transcendent importance, and I am glad to say that he has made up his mind to go to Holland, for as I have told him all along, the ticklish point is there, for the States will certainly claim to have the name *de jure* of what they have *de facto*." Scaglia, indeed, had been allowed to enter Holland with a passport which Spinola had secured for him through the Venetian Ambassador at the Hague, and left Brussels for Amsterdam on the first of June. "I have had the honour of having several conversations with him," wrote Rubens to his correspondent

Pierre Dupuy, "and agree with you in thinking that Abbé Scaglia is a man of a very acute intellect, and so far as I can see is quite up to his work, and, moreover, is in the service of a master who always keeps him to the mark and needs a servant with qualities like his. Our Marquis shares my opinion of him and he had to do with him several times. Matters, I think, went from Galeotto to Marinaro, that is to say, smoothly enough, but our man says little, is very reserved and listens to everything, but does not think the less for it." Rubens was indeed most anxious that Gerbier should accompany him to Holland, where they could discuss matters with Scaglia and Carleton, for he was on very good terms with some of the leading Dutch statesmen, and as he had had the negotiations with England in his hands from the first, might, he thought, be of very great use.¹ The Council of State in Madrid were, however, as has been seen, most unwilling to come to terms with England at the risk of being dragged into a war with France, whilst, on the other hand, they thought that as the Duke of Savoy had shown his hand so plainly by his proposals as to Mantua he ought not to be admitted into the negotiations with England and Holland. Carleton again, in his hatred of everything Spanish, mistrusted or affected to mistrust the proposals from Brussels, in which the Dutch openly professed their disbelief. The Duke of Savoy likewise, after receiving a visit from Montagu, wrote to Scaglia that he wished him to bring about an armistice between France and England. Montagu, who had arrived in the Hague on his way back to London about the middle of July, said that this would be a difficult matter, as both parties mistrusted one another so thoroughly, but that he would press for it, and Scaglia believed that he would have succeeded in his efforts if he could have seen Charles before the fleet had sailed for Rhé. Whilst at the Hague Montagu had visited the King and Queen of Bohemia, and had spoken with great pleasure of his reception at Turin.

"He showed them the presents which Y.R.H. has given him, and the chain was put round the neck of the queen's daughter the Princess," Elizabeth, afterwards Abbess of Hervorden. "She is only eight years old, but already shows that she has inherited her mother's quick wit and other admirable virtues. She is an extraordinarily big child for her age. He had to give the Prince the box with Y.R.H. portrait to satisfy him. The boy both by nature and by education promises great things," a

promise scarcely fulfilled by the shifty intriguer, Charles Louis, Elector Palatine. "Lord Montagu is for ever praising Madame Serenissima and says he wishes their Queen was like her. He has a portrait of her which he worships like a relic." From his conversations with Rubens and Gerbier Scaglia had been able to form some idea of the position of the negotiations between England and Spain.

"Rubens, a fairly well-known painter from Antwerp, has appeared in these states. He is a man capable of far greater things than of drawing and colouring a picture," a sentiment which no Italian of that age save a Piedmontese would probably have dared to entertain, "and has come on the pretence of treating privately with Gerbier, Buckingham's secretary, about a purchase of statues and pictures which Buckingham wishes to make from him to the amount of about two hundred thousand francs. He has really come however to continue the negotiations which I have already written about. The interests at stake are so great and so complicated that it might well take a long time to come to an agreement, yet as both sides are inclined to an understanding a settlement may be reached when it is least expected. However, so far things have gone no further than between Rubens and Gerbier though they are treating with the knowledge of all the parties interested. When Gerbier who is at Amsterdam with Rubens gets back to the Hague we shall see to what point matters have progressed. The French and Venetian Ambassadors are following the negotiations most carefully as they are rightly jealous of a business which may concern all. They have both questioned me several times about it, for they think that I must know of it as I am acquainted with both Rubens and Gerbier. I have convinced them that there is something in the wind so as to get them to tell me their real intentions, and, for my own part, have told them in so many words that I shall always make use of any confidences which I may receive in Y.R.H. service as you are so nearly interested in a business which concerns the safety and well-being of everyone, so they cannot say I have not done all I could for them about it. Really I don't believe that anything has yet been done except to discuss how the parties may be able to negotiate with the prospect of a settlement, for important as the questions at issue between Spain and England are to both of them, particularly as regards the Palatinate, yet their mutual mistrust is greater. It is true that I have sometimes feared that

England might put aside their desire for a thing which they can never hope to secure without such assistance from France as they have no prospect of receiving, but, when things have gone further I shall be able to say more. There is, however, some prospect of the negotiation being transferred to England as being the most interested party, and that it will turn upon the terms which may be expected from Spain for the King's sister."¹

Scaglia's account of the position which Rubens held with regard to the negotiations between Spain and England is not a very complete one. He had been from the first the mouthpiece of the Infanta and Spinola whose one wish had been to prevent any political consequences from arising out of the resentment caused in Charles' mind by his disappointment as to the Infanta Maria. They had thought that it would be well to interest the Duke of Buckingham in the preservation of peace, and had taken the opportunity of his visit to Paris in April, 1625, to induce Rubens to ascertain his views from his confidant the painter, Sir Bartholomew Gerbier. Gerbier, speaking apparently without consulting his master, had said that he believed that the Duke would favour such a policy, as once the King was married he would forget his useless projects at Madrid except so far as regarded the interests of the King and Queen of Bohemia. Rubens replied that the Infanta bitterly regretted that any causes of difference should exist between the two powers, but that if Charles really wished the Palatinate to be restored, it was for the Emperor to reply to him, and that the King of Spain could only answer for its restoration in so far as his power allowed him to do so. Rubens added that the Infanta hoped that England and Flanders would preserve a good understanding, as they had no causes of difference. Gerbier gave Buckingham an account of this conversation, and was instructed by him to correspond with Rubens, as provided that the King of Bohemia's interests were looked to, he would do all he could to preserve peace between England and Spain.² Sir Bartholomew Gerbier is our authority for the above statements, which, however, by no means clear up the question as to the reasons why the Infanta and Spinola should have chosen Rubens as their agent in such a delicate negotiation, a choice which, as will be seen, excited great surprise at Madrid. It is possible that if a letter from the Emperor Rudolph II. in which he recommends in very warm terms a young man named Peter Paul to Duke Vincenzo I. of Mantua really refers to the painter, we may have

the key to the enigma, and that the Infanta may have known or supposed that the blood of the Hapsburgs ran in his veins, although her nephew may not have been aware of the fact. But this conjecture must be only a surmise.¹ In the spring of 1626, when it was expected that the English fleet would attack the Flemish coast, Rubens was instructed to write to Gerbier to inquire if England would treat with the Infanta and Spinola as they were confident that they could procure the necessary powers from Madrid. Buckingham replied through Gerbier that he would endeavour to secure a general armistice for a term of years, during which a peace might be arranged, and instructed him to go to Antwerp nominally in order to buy pictures, but in reality to meet Rubens, and, accordingly, Spinola in February, 1627, wrote to Gerbier saying that he might safely discuss matters of State with him.² In consequence Rubens fully explained to Gerbier the position of affairs. After pointing out that peace might easily be secured through the Infanta and Spinola provided that no outside parties interfered in the negotiations, he entered into an explanation as to the question of the Palatinate. "It is most necessary that the English should entirely disabuse themselves of the belief that the King of Spain can settle German affairs absolutely as he pleases, for it is certain that the Emperor's army is paid with the money of the Catholic League, and that the King does not contribute the pay of a single company. Of this army the General is the Duke of Bavaria, who, as all the world knows, is not upon good terms with the King of Spain who through his Ambassador, Count Oñate, publicly opposed and protested against the transfer of the Electorate to the Duke. Moreover besides the jealousy which for centuries has existed and which exists to this day between the Austrian and Bavarian houses, the ill terms upon which they are at this moment can easily be gathered from what has appeared in print in France. The Duke of Bavaria is most indignant that the Lower Palatinate has not been handed over to him as well as the Upper. The Emperor, too, is not always at the beck and call of the King of Spain, and even if he were, he has his hands tied by the Electors and the other Princes of the Empire, for the Emperor, as such, has very little authority, and in reality it is the Empire which governs rather than the Emperor.

"Thus it is by no means certain that the Germans would be inclined to this settlement, nor do we know whether the King of

Spain would be willing to engage in such a tedious, disagreeable, and difficult negotiation, which, to say the least of it, might make our plan hopeless, either because of its length or because it would be impossible to secure the objects for which it was undertaken. If the King of Spain had concluded a peace, a truce, or an armistice with England and Holland, he would be in a position to intervene in Germany with more effect."

Rubens thought that an armistice with the Dutch would be arranged, and that the question of raising the point of their independence might thus be avoided. Despite Buckingham's assertion that the Treaty of 1604 between England and Spain was out of date, it would be better to renew it as it stood, particularly as the stipulations as to Trade were so clear and precise. As for Savoy "the Infanta is greatly inclined to facilitate an agreement between the Duke and the King (of Spain) on account of her affection for his children and for her only sister, and also on other grounds. The Ambassador of Savoy will, however, never be received or listened to, should he undertake to negotiate an arrangement for others before his master's own differences are settled for it is believed that ~~the~~ ^{these} will prove far more ticklish and difficult to deal with than the business between Spain and England." Neither Spinola nor the Infanta believed that any compact between France and England would prove to be lasting, but they knew that unless Savoy could come to terms with Genoa and settle its claims in Monferrat, the door for French interference in Italy would always remain open. Buckingham in answer to Gerbier's letter wrote that "the letters of attestation which Marquis Spinola has sent to you have given sufficient weight to every word contained in the notes and papers handed to you by Rubens. Without considering the honour of so royal a princess as the Infanta and of so famous a general as the Marquis, the reasons which they adduce to explain their intentions are regarded as sufficient to exclude any other mediators, although several persons and amongst them personages of the highest rank have offered their services and counsels."¹ A few days afterwards, Gerbier wrote to Rubens to explain that Carleton would be sent to the Hague in order to watch for an opening to negotiate an armistice with Spain, whilst Buckingham, when enclosing a memorandum signed by Charles himself in which he expressed his wish for peace in very general terms, said that his master was in honour bound to treat for the Dutch as well as for himself, but

that to avoid any question as to their status, he would treat for himself and his confederates, or simply renew the Truce of 1609. In return Spain might play her part in good earnest in settling the affairs of Germany. Ten days later, Buckingham forwarded to the Infanta a note drawn up for him by Sir John Coke in which he informed her that England could not negotiate with Spain apart from the United Provinces, and that she must, therefore, get full powers from Madrid to negotiate with them, although, in the meantime, England would do her best to induce them to agree to reasonable conditions. As Spain was at peace with Denmark, it would be unnecessary to discuss Danish affairs. Lastly Spain must authorise the Infanta to treat for the Restitution of the Palatine "at least so farre forth as that King's power and credit may extend unto." On April the seventeenth the Infanta had forwarded this letter to her nephew and had also informed him that Carleton had been sent to Holland.¹

Such was the position with regard to the negotiations between England and Spain, at the time when Scaglia had arrived at Brussels and when the Infanta and Spinola contrary to their first intentions had decided to trust him "fully and freely in the negotiations." The Infanta's letter of the twenty-third of May to Philip sufficiently explains her reasons for her change of purpose, "The Savoy Ambassador tells me that the question of an arrangement between France and England is in his hands, and that he can keep the negotiations dragging on for another two years, as he will do, for his master the Duke has instructed him to make it his first object to secure one between Spain and England, and this would be a difficult matter to accomplish if the other was arranged first. It would, therefore, be best for us to take advantage of this moment and of the very favourable opportunity which presents itself to us. It is true that the English mean to include the affairs of Germany or at least those of the Dutch in the negotiations, but as all this business cannot possibly be settled off hand, it is hoped that our differences with England can be settled first and that the other arrangements will be arrived at as the natural consequence."² The Infanta and Spinola must have both been sincerely desirous of peace, or they would scarcely have placed themselves so unreservedly in the hands of the Duke of Savoy, apparently in reliance merely upon the word of a minister, who did not think it advisable to explain the situation frankly to his own master. On the other hand although both

Buckingham and Charles may at first have been sincerely desirous of peace with Spain, it is evident that their wish for a settlement speedily cooled. Otherwise an open enemy of Spain like Carleton would never have been sent to negotiate with Rubens in Holland, nor would Montagu have been sent to Lorraine and Savoy to secure alliances which could have no other object than to realise the dreams of James the First as to the formation of a league of the smaller powers of Europe which might be thrown into the scales against either France or the Hapsburgs at the will of England. Possibly Buckingham wished to conciliate the Puritan opposition in Parliament by playing upon their preferences for the Dutch and for the Palatine; possibly he was merely a plaything in the hands of the Duchess of Chevreuse; lastly he may have been aware of Marcheville's failure to induce the Elector of Bavaria, cowed as he was by the successes of the Imperial arms, to conclude an alliance with France on behalf of himself and of the Catholic Electors against the House of Austria, and may have thought that Spain might be able to hand back Heidelberg and Mannheim to the Palatine when she saw herself opposed solely by the Catholic League, if England showed herself coy in seeking her friendship.

In any case after his conversation with Montagu, Scaglia, who evidently believed that his master had gone back to the French side, thought that it would be advisable to forward the negotiations between France and England, a task in which Montagu was his willing agent. The answer which he received was, however, discouraging. Charles replied, after some delay, that he had hitherto been unable to answer the suggestions of the Duke of Savoy as to a negotiation with France, because, on account of the bad weather, his forces had made so little progress in the Isle of Rhé. He feared people might say that he had acted upon them merely to excuse their withdrawal from the island. The Duke must consider that France might make use of a Truce in order to give herself time to make great preparations against England and her allies the Huguenots. He was, however, sending Montagu to Turin in order to ascertain what securities France would give that she would keep her engagements both about public affairs and the other matters which had forced him to go to war, and also to discuss the situation with the Duke.¹

Scaglia arrived in London in the middle of October nominally in order to carry on the negotiations about the foundation of an

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English Staple at Villefranche. He at once impressed upon the King the advantages which he might gain by concluding a Treaty with France which would enable Buckingham to withdraw from the Isle of Rhé without disgrace, and found him inclined to accept the mediation of Savoy for the purpose. He could not, however, make up his mind to separate his own interests from those of the Dutch and the Palatine, and so it was difficult to find a basis for discussion. A few weeks later the Duke of Savoy wrote through Montagu to the English Government asking them to send orders to Buckingham to withdraw his forces, and the King at first seemed inclined to favour the idea. When, however, letters arrived from Buckingham to say that he had hopes of holding his ground, he again changed his mind and decided to send large reinforcements to join him. The English in general were most anxious for peace and thought that once they got St. Martin off their shoulders they could use their fleet elsewhere to put pressure upon France to conclude it. At the same moment the Danes in order to induce England to send them reinforcements were pressing her to conclude peace with both France and Spain. England, however, declined their proposals on the ground that the war was as much in the interests of her allies as of herself, and that it was far more advantageous for her to keep her fleet upon the coasts of Spain and watch all the places from which they could send out naval forces than to despatch ships to the Baltic which could easily be guarded against any attack by Denmark, Sweden, and their German allies. Incidentally she was preventing Spain from sending her fleet against the Danish coasts. As regards France, England saw no need for treating in order to enable her to double her subsidies to Denmark. In their own interests the French must support every enemy of Spain as no great state separated them from the countries in which the Spaniards were for ever extending their influence at the cost of their allies. The French, indeed, had made peace with Spain after dragging all their allies into a war against her, and this proved that they had only used them as catspaws to get themselves out of the troubles which they had brought upon themselves in the Valtelline and by attacking the Huguenots. All they had gained by this was that they had strengthened Spain, their greatest enemy. Louis XIII. on the other hand, assured the Danish envoys that he would gladly conclude a peace with England through their mediation upon honourable terms.

Buckingham was on the whole not disinclined for peace. As he told a French agent the war with France could not have been avoided, for the French had broken their agreements with the Huguenots. If, however, they would observe the obligations which they had contracted towards them by treaty, an agreement could easily be arrived at. To this M. de la Ramé who had come over from France with letters to the Queen replied that France only wished England to leave her alone. The French King intended to reduce Rochelle to obedience once and for all, and when that had been done the grievances of the Huguenots would be handled very differently.¹

It cannot be said, on the other hand, that Philip had accepted Scaglia's offers with any enthusiasm. Writing to the Infanta on the fifteenth of June he said, "As regards Abbé Scaglia's proposals, I should I think tell your Highness that I have felt very much that a Painter should have been brought in as agent in these high matters, for everyone can see what a discreditable thing this is to this monarchy, as it casts a veritable slight upon us that a man of such low standing should be the minister at whose door ambassadors come and knock in order to make proposals of such great importance. It is true one cannot prevent the party which makes a proposition from choosing his instrument for in such cases one has to feel one's way in the first advances, and England cannot have any reason for objecting to our employing Rubens as such an instrument, yet for us there are a thousand reasons against such a course. It would be as well then that Your Highness should close the door to this plan of the Duke of Savoy's, and go on negotiating through Gerbier both as to the English and the Dutch affair under the conditions and in the manner in which Your Highness was instructed to treat in my previous despatch of the first inst. As to what the Abbé says about his master's wish to be restored to my favour, you may answer him with very fair words, but must not go beyond the limit of what was said here on previous occasions, namely that if he will come to an agreement about Italian affairs and particularly as to his differences with Genoa I shall be very glad to welcome him back amongst my friends with open arms." The Infanta was not inclined to give way as to her selection of her intermediary. In her reply of July the twenty-second she said that she could give no definite answer either as to the Expedition to Ireland or as to the negotiations with England until she had seen D. Diego Mexia and learnt what

his instructions were. "In the meantime I must tell Your Majesty as regards the conversations with England, that Gerbier is a painter like Rubens, and that the Duke of Buckingham sent him here with a letter to Rubens written in his own hand that he might make the proposal, so that we could not refuse to listen to him. Such negotiations as these may be set going through Tom, Dick, or Harry, but if they are to go any further, it is a self-evident thing that they have in that case to be conducted by persons of real weight; however, I will comply with Your Majesty's commands and try to keep the conversations going on as long as possible without coming to any definite conclusions."¹

Mexia left for Paris about the end of June and was detained there by illness for some time, although he was able to assist Mirabel in his negotiations for the league with France against England. At Brussels no one was aware of the real nature of his instructions, and he was expected "like another Messia," as it was thought that he was coming to arrange a general peace, and with full powers to do so. His mission was a very different one. He fully explained to the Infanta and Spinola the agreement which had been arrived at between Spain and France. The French and Spanish fleets were to land an army in England, which, after taking London, was to overrun the country. The expedition was to be commanded by Spinola. All the authorities at Brussels were disgusted at the news for both the Infanta and the Marquis had pinned their faith upon the success of Rubens' negotiations and put down their failure to the obstinacy of Olivares, "whose passion prevails over all reason and reflection," and by whom they had been affronted and insulted in every way. "These are plagues from God who doth his work by such means as these. Such strong remonstrances have been made to Don Diego that he is beginning to waver. They have made him touch with his own hand the bad faith of the French," who were at that moment helping the Dutch with money and would gladly have helped the Danes as well had they been able to do so. France was only using her alliance with Spain as a bugbear to scare England into a peace. Rubens put these arguments before Mexia by the Infanta's orders in the plainest words and produced some effect but "what has been done has been done, and he cannot alter his orders from Spain." As, however, the Infanta and the Marquis both thought that the negotiations between France and Spain would lead to nothing they decided to continue

their correspondence with England. "But so long as it has not been proved that they will fail, we cannot expect any change in the state of affairs, and we must allow time for matters to ripen. It is to be hoped that Olivares will then open his eyes and, perhaps, offer a better bargain." It was for Gerbier not to let the business drop, and to keep Buckingham in a good humour, as that could do no harm. "We on our part here have no intention to use this correspondence as an excuse for delaying or preventing any warlike operations, so that there is no trickery concealed behind it."¹

Much as Spinola mistrusted the French he at once set about his preparations for the invasion of England, although he knew that they might throw over Spain at the slightest pretext. "As for what is to be done next year in England," wrote Mexia to Olivares on September the eighteenth, "the Marquis is going thoroughly into the matter with me. He thinks this will be the best chance we shall ever have, for as the Emperor's affairs and those of Germany are in such a good state, we could press him to draw his forces to Friesland and Emden and thus divert the attention of the Dutch to that quarter, and employ a picked force from the army here for the naval expedition. Spinola seems to me so interested and so keen that some new decision should be come to as to this expedition that I think that if His Majesty ordered him to do so, he would take the command of it himself—and that with every hope of success, for he thoroughly understands the plan and how it must be carried out. Nothing would encourage the French more, for it is astonishing how devoted they are to him and how highly they esteem him. Cardinal Richelieu is for ever singing his praises."

Mexia added that the preparations for the naval expedition should be taken in hand at once and that the Friesland proposal should be put in the way of being carried into execution. "As for Rubens' business Your Excellency will see from the letters I send with this, what his correspondent sent him, and the answer which he sent back after consulting us. What they offer about England and Holland comes to a good deal. As Your Excellency thinks that we must listen to them and not let the negotiations drop out of one hand even though we grasp a sword in the other, we are keeping the discussion going with all due care and shall continue to do so but without committing ourselves to anything."

"As for the forces for the Baltic they are ready to start, and are

only waiting till they hear that there are vessels there for them to embark on. When this news comes they will march at once, for people here have long wished that this design should be carried out."¹

If Mexia regarded the future with confidence, the Dutch looked forward to it with dismay. To Reigersborch the danger which threatened the Provinces from the Baltic seemed grave in the extreme.² During the earlier part of 1627 the Danish army in Lower Saxony had been left in comparative tranquillity by Tilly, for whilst the Imperial forces were detained by Weimar in Silesia Wallenstein could not send him any reinforcements. Weimar, however, could only hold his own if he was supported by Bethlen Gabor from Transylvania and Bethlen, in his turn, would not move without the support of the Porte. As Christian IV. wrote to his Chancellor, Christian Friis, "I think that with God's help the Turk will be our Mediator; he means to make great preparations." The Sultan, however, was in no position to carry out his agreements. Murad IV. was only sixteen years of age, and rebellions were raging in every quarter of his Empire. Abaza was in arms in Asia Minor and the Persians were victorious upon his eastern frontier. Fleets of Cossack vessels were raiding the shores of the Bosphorus itself. The Turks were powerless to support their Danish allies, Weimar was defeated and killed and in August Wallenstein's troops were pouring northwards to join the Army of the League. Tilly crossed the Elbe and drove the Danes before him to the frontiers of Holstein. Christian IV. was at Glückstadt when he learnt of the disaster to his Silesian army, and at once resolved to concentrate all his forces in Holstein. He was engaged in carrying out this plan when the enemy invaded the duchy and soon overran the open country. In vain the King tried to make a stand at Kolding. His troops were in a panic, and he was forced to fall back towards Hadersleben, and thence on Flensburg where he was met by the remnants of his ten thousand men who had been lying near Berlin and whilst on their retreat had been cut to pieces near Oldenburg. The King at once took ship for the island of Fünen and left Jutland at the mercy of Tilly, whose army pitiless as it was, was less cruel than the Danish militia under Baudissin.³ The Dutch heard the news with terror. Without their help the King would "be too weak to hold even the Sound. We are too weak to take the load upon ourselves yet there is a question if it would not be wise for us to see that we get

the Sound handed over to us."¹ It was soon seen that the States of Denmark, who had been utterly alienated from the King by the conduct of his German cavalry, would not consent to hand over Elsinore or Copenhagen to the Dutch, and there was even a doubt whether they would permit him to fortify it. "If Norway is lost we shall not have a flank." It was rumoured that Tilly "has an eye upon Emdenland. Where shall we be with the Baltic and the North Sea? It looks as if the Kings have opened the door to the Monarchy to the Spaniard. I cannot see how his progress can be stayed. If they are masters up there and can therefore fall upon us from all sides both by sea and land, 'Not even a Saviour can save us,' and what will become of our neighbours then?" In the middle of November it was thought at Middelburg that the ships at Dunkirk had run out after losing their flagship in the basin. "It is feared they are for the Sound as they had so many soldiers perhaps three thousand, on board, with quantities of shovels and spades. But we doubt this because the winter is coming on. If they were all of a sudden to seize the King by the throat, they would easily get a footing there." "If our allies continue to look upon the Austrian successes with favouring eyes, they will find ere long that we cannot stay them." No help was to be expected from Sweden as the Poles would not consent to a Truce, and the Hanse Towns had gone over to the Emperor.²

Whilst Reigersborch was pouring his fears into the ears of Grotius in words which more than justified Spinola's plans, Gerbier on Rubens' authority was writing to Conway that Olivares was growing "more boiling" than ever. Thanks to Father Berulle he believed that Spain and France together could conquer England in six months, though everyone clerk and layman in Flanders was laughing at him for listening to that "Devil in a Cardinal's hat." Rubens, hoped, indeed that the two fleets would meet and that the Spaniards would get a good drubbing for "it might cool down the Count Duke a little." "Mexico was a Messiah turned apostate, and in place of a Messiah they now had 'the reverse of a medal forged by some hedge priests,' a sly hint at the Archbishop of Tuam's intrigues."³

"People thought that if conditions changed, Master Rodomont d'Olivares would see his mistake and that they would be very glad to do what they ought not to have put off till the morrow." This was clear from Rubens' own words in the letter in which he asked them to keep the road open for peace. Notwith-

standing all Gerbier's arguments Conway recalled him to England at the beginning of October. As Charles wrote to Buckingham, "Gerbier's treaty is at an end, wherein he hath showed both his honnestie and sufficincie, but mightillie abused by the King of Spaines ministers."¹

Probably Gerbier when he wrote was unaware how nearly conditions had been changing.

"The majority of the Council in Spain "had been" for siding with the Infanta and Spinola, "but their head had taken his own line," and Mexia had left Madrid for Brussels with a sword and not with an olive branch.² He had not yet crossed the Flemish frontier when Olivares seemed on the brink of ruin. At the end of August Philip the Fourth had fallen seriously ill. The Duke, who never left his master's side for a moment was forced to seclude himself from all comers. "To-day I can inform Your Highness not only that His Majesty's indisposition has become so severe that last Wednesday they thought his life was in the utmost danger, though I hear they think him a little better to-day, but that His Excellency has also fallen sick from excessive strain, and from the distress of mind which the King's illness occasions him. Were His Majesty to die the Count Duke would be civilly dead, even if nothing worse befell him, which Heaven forbid, for he is hated to the last degree both by the Infantes and by the whole Court. Such is the loathing which everyone feels for the man at whose door, though, perhaps, with but little justice, they lay the misgovernment of this kingdom, that there is not one living soul who gives the slightest sign that he would be grieved by the death of a King to whom alone it is due that his favourite has risen to his present greatness." A few days later the King was able to leave his bed and the all powerful minister could once more attend to business. Such were the shifting sands upon which the policy of Spain was raised.³

A month later Olivares submitted to the Council of State Mexia's despatch of the seventeenth of September from Brussels as to the invasion of England. At the same time he asked them to discuss the question whether it would be advisable for Spain to ally herself with France and to conclude a truce with Holland in order to have her hands free to carry out this design. The Count Duke himself was warmly in favour of such an arrangement, but the majority of the Council were strongly against coming to a hopeless breach with England, although they were anxious to

secure allies against her. Montesclaros pointed out that Spain had only entered into her alliance with France because she was a Catholic Power and on the condition that she would suspend her subsidies to the Dutch, a condition which she had at once violated. It would, however, be well to push forward the naval preparations in both Spain and Flanders in order to frighten the English into offering better terms.

Olivares argued that if they helped the French to recover the Isle of Rhé, Louis XIII. would hold to his engagements, and that out of their fear of such an alliance the English might persuade the Dutch to consent to a favourable truce and thus improve matters in Germany. They had every reason to hope that their plans against England for the coming year were so good that if they showed no signs of weakness or of slackness, they might well recover all their previous losses. There would be no excuse for their agreeing to an inconclusive truce or peace "at a moment when the arms of the Empire and Catholic League are so overwhelmingly strong," thanks to the help which Spain had given them both in the Empire and by assisting the King of Poland with a fleet "so that the Dutch cannot expect any assistance from Sweden, Denmark, England and France," whilst Gabor could not make any effective diversion and the Venetians had not a farthing to spare for anyone. Thus "a door seems to be opening for H.R.H. and the Marquis to conclude a most glorious peace upon terms which we never hoped to see or propose." Rubens ought, therefore, to have answered Gerbier in less precise terms than he had used, and he agreed with Montesclaros in thinking that it was a pity that negotiations had been broken off. Other means might, however, be found for setting them going again. Finally it was agreed upon the motion of Inojosa that the naval preparations in Spain and Flanders should be carried on with such publicity that the English would be convinced of their reality and that an alliance should be concluded with France. "The English must be most anxious for if they take the Isle of Rhé England is in such straits that they cannot hold it, whilst if they do not take it they must retreat in disgrace." For the moment, therefore, Rubens should be given no further encouragement. He then raised the question of the loss of Groll in terms most flattering to Spinola. "They should answer a private agent, who had told them how annoyed the Marquis was at the loss of Groll and at what people said about his failure

to relieve it, supposing this agent is a person upon whom they can rely, by saying that those who grumble because Spinola was not present at the attempt to relieve the place are, so far as his own person is concerned, praising him rather than blaming him. It shows that they must think that, had he been there, the attempt would have succeeded." Inojosa's words prove what a reputation Spinola enjoyed even amongst the most national of the Spaniards, but even with their support he could do little to counteract the effects of Olivares' ill-will, especially as he himself had laid such stress upon the military importance of Groll.¹

Olivares, indeed, proved to be a true prophet. Angry as the English were at their defeat at Rhé, and their anger was increased by the news that the French were "presuming" to fit out a fresh fleet, their second thoughts led them to treat with Spain. On December the seventeenth, Rubens received a letter from Gerbier, in which he expressed some willingness to treat. He said that Buckingham stood higher than ever in his master's favour, for it was known that his failure was solely due to the fact that he had been outnumbered by Schomberg because the reinforcements intended for him had been driven back by the bad weather. Preparations for a larger expedition were being pushed forward vigorously.

Rubens at once forwarded the letter to Spinola who was in the midst of his preparations for his departure for Spain. The Marquis replied that he would bring Gerbier's letter with an enclosure from Scaglia before His Majesty, and learn his pleasure, so that the negotiations might be continued, as Rubens knew how anxious both the Infanta and he himself were for a settlement. This, however, could only be arranged if the English would explain the manner in which such a settlement could be formulated, and would endeavour to meet in some degree the wishes of the Spaniards. If they would "propose a form of agreement such as would suit the King, our Lord, you may imagine that it would be far easier for me to persuade him to accept it, and then the negotiation would attain its object." But for the moment Buckingham was not likely to allow any such concession to be made. He had not lost his hopes of success at Rochelle, and a success at Rochelle might win him the favour of the English Parliament.²

CHAPTER LXXX

It is, perhaps, somewhat difficult for us to realise that during the earlier part of the Stuart period the political aspirations of England were still in some degree coloured by the memories of the Middle Ages. To ourselves the period of the Reformation seems as it were an impassible gulf fixed between the England of Richard the Third, of Henry the Seventh and of Cardinal Wolsey, and the England of Charles I. of Buckingham and of Archbishop Abbot. In reality the case was somewhat different. The memories of the Wars of the Roses were far from being forgotten and the peaceable accession of James the First was in no small measure due to the fact of the general terror at the prospect of a disputed succession to the throne, such as those which had drenched the England of the Fifteenth Century with blood. Nor had men yet forgotten the days when England was a Continental Power. It was only in 1558 that Calais had been taken by the French, and during the seventy years which had elapsed since its loss the English had never abandoned the hope of once more securing a foothold beyond the seas. In the first years of Elizabeth, Havre had been to all intents and purposes an outpost of England. During the latter years of her reign she had held the Cautionary Towns in Holland, and though James the First had under pressure from the Dutch allowed them to be redeemed by the United Provinces, it had been Buckingham's constant aim to secure their retrocession. We have seen the plans which he had formed as to Corsica and as to Cadiz, and when these failed, he not only eagerly embraced the opening which seemed afforded to him in France by his alliance with the Rochellers, but may have allowed himself to be drawn aside from his purpose in the South-West by a wild scheme for recovering Calais itself, which was destined to greatly hamper the English attempts to relieve Rochelle. It cannot be said that some of the Huguenots were in any degree loath to accept the aid of foreign powers even at the cost of forfeiting their allegiance to the French Crown. In August, 1628, the Duchess of Rohan sent a memorial to Sir John Coke as to what should be done after sup-

plies had been thrown into Rochelle. "I would impress upon the King that he ought to make a descent on France and fortify some position there. For if he goes home a second time without doing so, we are done for. The best province for such a descent would be Guienne, where he can rally a great force to his colours, and where he could construct an impregnable fortress at the Bec d' Ambés. The King can then carry on the War in France for as long as he likes, and get a peace on his own terms. After Guienne a landing in Normandy or Languedoc would be best. I only ask for four thousand men and four thousand rounds for my guns, and to be assured of a constant supply of munitions, and I will engage to put down the Rhone Valley and hold out a hand to Dauphiny and the Duke of Savoy." As the Bec d' Ambés is the point which commands the entrance to the Gironde it is clear that the Duchess of Rohan believed that the populations of Guienne and of Gascony still looked back with regret to the days when they were under the English flag.¹

The scheme was one which might well appeal to Buckingham who, in the previous year, had been forced only by want of means to reject Pennington's plan to make a diversion by attacking the Gironde whilst he was landing at the Isle of Rhé. He doubtless knew that the Rochellers had rejected Vincent's proposal that they should seek the help of Spain, yet the Protestants of Lower Languedoc were, when the Duchess of Rohan wrote, in close communication with Madrid, so he might have some right to believe that her proposals were feasible.

The envoys from Rochelle, David, Vincent, and Dehinsse caught up the retreating fleet off the Pointe du Raz and sailed in their company to Plymouth where they landed on November the twenty-third.²

Four days later Bassompierre at Fort Saint Louis was visited by Clement Métezeau, a famous architect and Jean Tiriot, a master mason of Paris, who submitted to him a plan originally brought forward some years before for closing the harbour with a dyke of loose stones. As the King and Cardinal had already sanctioned it the work was begun on Sunday, November the twenty-eighth.³

The dyke was a far more ambitious undertaking than those which had been attempted at Ostend, at Bergen-op-Zoom or at Breda. It ran from the Pointe des Minimes on the south of the outer harbour to Fort St. Louis on the North and was sixteen hun-

dred and forty yards in length. It was thus exposed to the full force of the tides, and of storms from the south-west, and the Rochellers laughed as they foretold its speedy destruction, for, as they said, one gale would bring down more of it in a night than could be built up in six months. Whilst the works were being begun from both ends, the lines of circumvallation were vigorously pushed forward, and were made especially strong on the side towards the sea. In the meantime factions were running high amongst the Rochellers. After they had heard of Buckingham's retreat, the loyalists had made a vigorous attempt to seize one of the gates, but their attempt had failed. After Buckingham's departure Marshal de Schomberg with his forces from the Isle of Rhé rejoined the King, and the Royal Fleet arrived at the entrance to the port on December the twenty-fifth, without, however, bringing Toledo's vessels with it.¹ The Queen Mother was in such delight that the island should have been relieved without Spanish help that she could not refrain from expressing her pleasure to Mirabel who was extremely annoyed. Forty-four English ensigns were brought to Paris, and were suspended in Notre Dame, "for the eternal glory of France over the English." As a news writer from Antwerp remarked: "If our nation had gloried so much in former ages against them they might have hanged ten ensigns for one in Paul's and Westminster, but he that cannot buy a capon must be glad of a chicken."²

In the meantime though the English were so far as words went very willing to help the Rochellers, their want of money threatened to render it impossible for them to do so. Soldiers could be levied and sent, but corn had to be paid for, and Charles was forced to announce that he could not send supplies unless he was repaid for them. Buckingham who had already advanced a hundred thousand pounds from his private purse, consented but with a very bad grace to advance twenty-five thousand more, and after long negotiations it was decided that a convoy should be sent off to Rochelle at the end of January.³

On the third of January, however, Lord Mountjoy, who had been made prisoner during the retreat to the Isle of Loix, arrived in London from Paris. He had been imprisoned in the Bastille and was released at the request of Marie de Medicis. Mountjoy at once set to work to induce the Council to accept the offer of mediation which had been made by Denmark. His visits to the Danish Legation were remarked by the Rochelle Deputies, and

when the Danish Minister suddenly resolved to leave for France, they scented out the plan.

They could not, however, make up their minds whether Charles was only using Mountjoy as a tool to enable him to escape from his engagement as to sending the supplies or whether the English were so disheartened by their defeat at Rhé that they had decided to treat without any regard for their confederates.

On the other hand Buckingham was still confident that he could strike a decisive blow at France even without the help of the Rochellers.

On the eleventh of January Buckingham gave David and Vincent his solemn assurance that England had no intention of treating with France, but when he came two days later to take them to the Council, he "spoke to us in a manner which filled us with apprehension. He warned us that we must not be astonished if some of the Lords were to ask us what we had to offer His Majesty, as a return for the help which we asked from him, and above all what security we could give the King that if he engaged himself still further in his attempt to relieve us, the Town would not allow itself to be drawn into a separate negotiation. As for himself he was far from entertaining any such thoughts and yet from his wish to be of even greater service to us he would be glad to learn from us what he ought to tell them, supposing that they continued to use such language, and above all what our opinion was as to the proposals which some of them were making that the Town should send here a certain number of deputies chosen from the most considerable families, who would be honourably entertained at the King's expense, and would serve as hostages that the Town would faithfully observe the engagements it had made."

Even before he left the Isle of Rhé he had been in communication with the King upon the subject, and in a letter which was intended to be delivered to the Duke upon his landing in England "in case you should come from Ré without perfecting your worke happilie begun, but I must confesse with greefe, ill seconded," Charles had given him power, "(in case ye should imageen that ye have not anufe alreadye) to put in execution anie of those designes ye mentioned to Jack Epslie or any other that ye shall like of; so that I leave it freely to your will, whether, after your landing in England, ye will sett forthe again to some designe before ye come hither," namely to Whitehall, "or else that ye will first come to aske my advyce before ye undertake a

newe worke ; asseuring you that with whatsomeever success ye shall come to mee ye shall be ever welcome, one of my greateste greefes being that I have not been with you in this time of suffering, for I know we would have much eased each other's greefs."

Accordingly at the beginning of December "Jack Epslie," otherwise known as Sir John Hippesley, the Governor of Dover Castle, through whose hands much of the correspondence relating to the English Secret Service in France and the Netherlands passed, was writing to him about a plan which the Duke was contemplating for attacking some fortified place belonging to the enemy, and was sending him John Daniel of that town "who knows well of the business which you are about." Daniel was an eye-witness when the place was taken by the Spaniard. At that time it was besieged in three different places, as this bearer can relate and is of opinion it is very probable to be done. He must be sure to have boats to land his men, "because the great ships cannot come in shore." Hippesley's one fear was lest while he was engaged with the French "the Spaniards may come and devour us up. It is such a time for them as they never had." Evidently Hippesley knew the views which were entertained at Brussels and Madrid.

It nowhere appears what "fortified place" the Duke thought of attacking, although subsequent events make it probable that it was Calais. His discourse greatly displeased the envoys who would only assure him in the most general terms of the goodwill of the Rochellers.

They were received by the King and Council in the "gilded chamber." The envoys entered and knelt down, but rose at the King's command. David then read a long memorial remonstrating against any negotiations with France, as they would delay the preparations to relieve Rochelle, would discourage the Huguenots who were ready to rise in the Spring and would give the Royalists time to strengthen the besieging forces. The town could in that case be forced to surrender at discretion. They begged, therefore, that the promised convoy should be at once despatched and that the expedition should follow it as soon as possible.

When they mentioned the word "negotiations," the King smiled, and they could see by his demeanour that he entertained no such idea. They handed the memorial to Conway, and were then dismissed by the King in a very friendly manner, "and

without a word being said to us of the matters which the Duke had mentioned to us."

Two days afterwards they again went to see the Duke, who told them that he and three others of the Council had been named as Commissioners to treat with them, but that he wished first to know what Rochelle would do for the King in return. The deputies replied with many compliments and pointed out "That great Kings are the image of God, in that they do good to those from whom they can receive none," and asked to be informed what was wanted from them. They engaged not to enter into a separate negotiation.

"On this the Duke speaking in a very hesitating manner and using confused language like a man who has to say something as to which he would rather not explain himself, mentioned two things, in the first place what he had already touched upon as to the young children of good families who ought to be sent here as hostages, in the second, that if the necessity should arise, we should bind ourselves to offer the King's forces, whether naval or military, a safe retreat. To this he added that he had wished to talk the matter over with us before our interview with the Commissioners so that there might be no need for discussing anything before them, as to do so might prejudice our case."

All the deputies could say was that they would sketch out some articles and the Duke promised to send his secretary de Vic for them the same afternoon.

When talking over the subject privately the whole of the deputies agreed that these proposals were only set as a trap to get Rochelle for the English by surprise, and thus make their town the theatre of an everlasting war as France would never agree to give it up. It would be insupportable to endure the English yoke, and, if the burghers were to lose their liberty it would be far better for them to submit to Louis XIII. As they could only do so in the last resort they must for the present spin out the negotiations in London as long as they could, and must agree to give hostages if Buckingham insisted upon it as a condition before sending supplies. As to his other demand they would, before answering, have to refer to the Town. They consequently sketched out a Treaty, as between equals, in which they stipulated that supplies should be sent at once, engaged to support England throughout the war, and required, on the other hand that Charles should guarantee the demolition of the forts on Rhé and that

Rochelle should be admitted to take part in the negotiations for peace between France and England.

The articles were handed to Buckingham who did not reply until the twenty-second of January, when it came out that he was most unwilling to engage in a fresh expedition against the Island of Rhé. As he thought it below his master's dignity to engage himself in a discussion with them upon that point, he induced Charles to consent to a modification of the articles by which he pledged himself in general terms to assist Rochelle, and this the deputies, though with great regret, consented to accept. The proposal as to hostages was tacitly dropped, as well as that relating to their reception of an English garrison. On January the twenty-eighth Dehinsse left for Plymouth and the same day Buckingham took his colleagues to the King who pledged himself that Lord Denbigh and the convoy should sail at once.

But the English were in no position to carry out their engagements. The merchants would only provide the wheat so urgently needed at Rochelle for ready money, and of ready money until Parliament should have voted supplies there was none in the Treasury, whilst even fire-ships which were supposed to be the best means for forcing the dyke were not to be procured. In the middle of February the deputies wrote to announce that Denbigh's departure must be delayed, but their despatches did not reach Rochelle until the end of March. Private merchants had offered to forward the wheat at their own risk, but the Dunkirkers were on the lookout and much of the corn was taken by them. To increase the confusion Buckingham changed the Commissioners for the Navy, and the new board were not only "above their places in their imaginations," but owing to their want of knowledge of their business could not carry out their duties. Buckingham in the end acknowledged his mistake in changing the Commissioners, a mistake which was to prove one of the chief causes of the delay in fitting out the fleet.¹

In the meantime Sir Charles Morgan, who when Christian IV. fell back into Holstein, had been left behind to defend Stade, was clamouring for ships and reinforcements, and his requests put a fresh strain upon the depleted dockyards.²

Buckingham, as Maximilian's correspondent Silsdonio had long before pointed out, was a creature of impulse and with him diplomacy was too much a matter of gratifying his caprice of the moment. It is certain that at heart he can have had but little sympathy

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with the French Protestants. When he had been asked to remonstrate with Charles Emmanuel for executing some Waldenses on very trivial grounds, he had merely replied that they had been rightly served. His wife and his mother were Roman Catholics, and his occasional flirtations with the Puritans were solely for political reasons. He had taken up the Huguenot cause because he was in need of a pretext to justify the declaration of war by England against France, and no pretext could be found which was better calculated to gain him the support of Parliament than the fact that the war was made in fulfilment of the duties imposed upon England as guarantor of the Edict of Nantes, a position which the French themselves had asked her to accept. The war, however, had turned out a far more serious matter than he had perhaps anticipated, and he found it necessary to offer the English people some material advantages from its continuance. Such advantages would be gained if Rochelle could be induced to accept an English protectorate and their refusal to do so must have come upon him as an unexpected shock. From that time forward it was his evident interest to secure peace with France at whatever cost, even if it were necessary to do so at the price of the abandonment of the cause of Rochelle. At the end of March, Zorzi, the Venetian Ambassador in Paris informed the Doge that he had heard rumours that a negotiation for peace was going on between France and England which was managed by "base and private persons." "It is said that the English promise to abandon La Rochelle and the party of the reformers. If that was arranged and the point settled, I do not think an arrangement would be difficult. I have some suspicion that the person may be Bourbonnais who took Montagu a few months back. Although a senator of the King he is really a Lorrainer and anxious to regain the favour of his natural prince. They declare he has gone to England not only to induce them to agree to the conditions upon which France will release Montagu, but to perform this greater service to the cause, and to prop himself by both sides in order to re-establish his threatened fortunes. But all this is mere talk in the air which wise men discount."¹ In any case after the interview between the deputies of Rochelle and Buckingham the despatch of the relieving fleet was postponed. On the fourth of February they wrote that it could not sail before March or at the latest in April. It would indeed have sailed at the end of January, but whilst M. Dehinsse was on his way to Plymouth, he had met a

Sieur Garribon who had seen a fleet of sixty French vessels at sea off the coast of Britany and Charles had consequently decided that the convoy must be strengthened. This news reached Rochelle on the twenty-ninth and probably strengthened the party in the town who were in favour of a surrender. When Richelieu on February the nineteenth sent proposals for peace which were rejected by the Town Council, some of its members had threatened to rouse the mob to force them to come to terms, and on March 14 the Cardinal ordered a night attack to be made upon Fort Turdon in the hope that it would be opened to him by friends within. One of his soldiers had gone in disguise to the garrison of Fort St. Nicholas and had asked them not to fire along the shore lest they should shoot their own troops who were making a sortie. One of their sentinels, however, seeing a black mass looming on the beach and hearing the pebbles rattling, fired his piece and by its flash saw the Forlorn Hope already in the trenches. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, and the Rochellers only beat off their assailants after some of them had got so close to the town drawbridges that they struck the posts with their axes. The wind was so high that not a shot was heard in the town.¹

Spinola meanwhile had visited the besiegers' camp. He had made but a short stay in Paris where he had received a very warm welcome from the two Queens, and visited the Queen Mother's picture gallery, more especially to see Rubens' paintings of Henry the Fourth. The painter's comments on the visit are singularly frank. "I never thought for a moment that he would go and see them for he cares and knows no more about Painting than a street porter, so I must set down his visit to the account of the Queen Mother. His son-in-law the Marquis of Leganes," Don Diego Mexia, "is one of the greatest lovers of the Art there is in the world." His remarks as to Spinola's character are similarly outspoken. "He is farther sighted and more prudent than any man I have ever known, but all his expressions of opinion are in covert terms, for he is by no means a ready speaker, though rather, perhaps, from a fear of saying too much than from a lack of language or wit. Of his high character I will not speak, for it is known to all the world, and I myself, contrary to my first expectations (for I suspected him as an Italian and a Genoese) have always found him a man of honour who stands by his word and whose good faith is unimpeachable." A great gentleman and a great courtier Spinola might well be welcome both at the Louvre

and at the Royal headquarters at Estrée where he arrived on the twenty-eighth of January. At Estrée he was received by one of the King's gentlemen who brought him an invitation to visit His Majesty at his headquarters to discuss the question of an alliance between France and Spain. His journey through France had been greatly delayed by the badness of the roads, and several of his baggage waggons had been overturned. A league from the camp the Marquis was met by Schomberg with a brilliant escort and was conducted to his tent where he was visited by several great lords from the Cardinal and King, one of whom is said to have handed him a general's bâton with the request that he would assume the command of the siege operations.

Next day he was granted an audience with the King who told him that his chief object was to expel the English from his kingdom, and that as he knew that they had come on account of Rochelle he was determined to punish the town severely. He wished in every way to follow Spinola's example at Breda for he was the inventor and author of his plan for taking fortresses. He then invited him to come and visit the lines of circumvallation and to give him his opinion about them.

The Marquis accordingly visited both the lines of circumvallation and the dyke, which had recently been seriously damaged by the south-west gales. He found that the lines were drawn too close to the place, so that the enemy were encouraged to make sorties as it was so easy for them to retreat. He was then taken to the dyke which he praised highly, saying that it offered the only means to take Rochelle, concluding his remarks with the pithy words, "You must close the port and open your hand," meaning that the entrance must be barred against supplies being brought in by sea, and that the soldiers must be regularly paid. The truth of his advice was proved by the events of the following summer. Spinola had long interviews with the King and Cardinal Richelieu, and was listened to by both as an oracle. He discussed diplomatic as well as military affairs and was told in plain words that France would support the claims of the Duke of Nevers in the question of the Mantuan Succession, but that they would postpone making any public declaration upon the subject until Rochelle had surrendered and peace had been arranged with England. He at once sent a report of these conversations to Madrid, and a few days later set off again on his journey thither after having received the greatest honours from the whole of the French Court.¹

It was now, therefore, certain that the restoration of internal peace in France would be the signal for the outbreak of fresh troubles in Italy. The news of the Duke of Mantua's death had reached Paris on the fifth of January, and had occasioned great grief to Marie de Medicis, who, however, was delighted that Nevers had been installed as his successor, and that his son the Duke of Rethel had been married to Maria Gonzaga beside Duke Vincenzo's dying bed. She at once assured Priandi that she would support Nevers and despatched him to the camp before Rochelle with letters to the King upon the subject from herself. The envoy's task was no light one. The winter was hard, and the roads mere tracks. "I had to take a good escort at Poitiers and at Niort so that I might get through safely without being taken and stripped by the foragers from Rochelle or others. Everything is in such disorder in the camp that I have the greatest trouble to find a place to lay my head in, and am lodged in a wretched hovel crowded, one may say, to the door with sick. The cold is getting very sharp, and wood and forage are not to be had for money. Anyone who wants to visit the Ministers must take horse and ride many a weary mile, so that one's life here is rather a purgatory than living. For all this I am carrying out the Prince's instructions to the letter, and doing my utmost for His Most Serene Highness' service. I can already see that I have influenced the minds of His Majesty and the ministers, and trust that I have set things going in such a way that it will be much to His Highness' advantage, and am only waiting for His Majesty's answer to post back to Paris as fast as I can for my stay here is ruinous to my health and purse."

Marie de Medicis was not one to fail in carrying out a promise when it was to her interest to do so. Like Richelieu she saw that France could do nothing abroad until peace was restored at home, and that the first step towards that peace must be made through England.¹

When writing at the end of March Zorzi had been inclined to treat the rumours of Bourbonnais' doings in England, as mere "talk in the air," but by the middle of April he had ascertained that the rumours had some solid foundation. "The truth of the matter is that among the princesses here and in the Louvre itself, there is a party friendly to the English and practically declared for them. They have worked hard for the recall of Mme. de Chevreuse, and for the release of Montagu. Whatever was de-

cided overnight in the Cabinet between the King and the Queen Mother and any of the Ministers, Montagu in the Bastille and the Duchess of Chevreuse in Lorraine knew all about it the next morning." The agent was discovered and imprisoned by Cardinal Berulle, and proved to be Elizabeth des Roches, wife of Jean de Pertuis, whose constant visits to Montagu had excited the suspicion of his gaolers. A few days later Montagu was released from his confinement, nominally at the request of the Duke of Lorraine, and to the astonishment of the world the Duchess of Chevreuse was recalled to Court. Montagu had felt his imprisonment severely "as he is somewhat of a mercurial disposition," but his spirits were soon restored and when he reached London, on April the twenty-eighth, he reported that the French were well disposed to peace owing to the events in Italy, a view which was shared by Rubens who thought that the Duchess of Chevreuse would serve as the go-between in the negotiations.¹

Nothing was more certain than that any such overtures would be welcomed in England, where it was believed on the authority of the Dutch Ambassadors in Paris that "France and Spain" had "an understanding together and designs on one of these kingdoms or on the Netherlands. It seems that Spinola recommended and urged this on his way to Spain as well as some other matters." "To tell the truth," wrote Alvisé Contarini, and his words are confirmed in the main, by Coke's most private papers, "they are ill provided for here for defence against a full flood, in case this strange conjunction of the French and Spaniards should be witnessed. The officials themselves tell me that in the whole Kingdom they have not weapons to arm ten thousand men, and they are scantily provided with powder.

"This is proved by a new proclamation forbidding salutes of honour either on board ship or at reviews. The yeomanry cavalry is very often exercised, but the native horses are not adapted to military service, and therefore all snaffles have been forbidden and they are told to accustom their mounts to curbs or ordinary bits to render them more manageable. As for the sea I will merely say that the Dunkirkers infest these coasts unmolested doing very great mischief without hindrance. They even captured two Dutch men-of-war lately which they sunk. The succour for Rochelle cannot set sail for want of three hundred sailors." The entrance to the port, however, though difficult was not impracticable, and the besieged were determined to hold out to the

death. Montagu's report was, therefore, warmly welcomed at Whitehall. It was rumoured at Paris at the end of April that France had left the peace negotiations in the hands of the Duke of Lorraine, of the Duchess of Chevreuse and of Montagu. Soranzo reported the story to the Doge on the authority of letters from the Dutch ambassadors there. "I blush as I write it and would gladly pass it over, were it not that the corruption of these days, forces me to pay attention to the most unlikely things. They add that the difficulties of the treaty will be removed, and they think some arrangement has been made between the French and English so that the latter shall confine themselves to a mere show of succouring La Rochelle and favouring the rest of that party. I am without light on such profound abysses." Dutch gossips asserted that Buckingham had been promised two hundred thousand crowns by the French, and the Queen of Bohemia questioned Soranzo on the subject in language which showed that she shared their belief. She now looked upon the Duke as the enemy alike of herself and of her family. On Change at Antwerp the attempted relief was looked upon as a farce.¹

"If Soranzo was without light on such profound abysses," others were more favoured in that respect.

English policy was, as usual, utterly unsettled. Scaglia believed, when he first learned that the King intended to summon a Parliament, that he did so in the belief that the general wish to relieve La Rochelle would facilitate matters as regarded the provision of money, although it would make it more difficult to conclude peace with France. He had been led to call a Parliament because he thought it right to make another attempt to secure the funds required for the war by legal means, and had received guarantees that no questions except those connected with their provision would be raised. The people, as a whole, were feeling the burden of the contest, but the nobility were supporting the King out of a regard for their own reputation, whilst for the sake of their trade the merchants were bringing money together to keep the seas clear. Scaglia could not see any immediate hope of peace. A month later he pointed out that the withdrawal of the Spanish squadron which had been assisting the French had been duly notified to England, with the comment that they had arrived late in the day and had retired at a time "which would give the English an opening for doing what they wish to do. Confidence between the two powers is increasing as

the negotiations grow closer, and the King of Spain might well make use of the English to close that cautery Holland which has been a seton for so many years and has consumed more than the Indies have supplied. As England has all along been the chief promoter of this contrivance for counterbalancing Spain, and is indeed the foundation on which it rests, it will be quite as well if the Spaniards make use of her as the instrument to free themselves from these tangles. If France gets La Rochelle, it is possible that the English will adopt this course to improve their position, for the loss will be a far greater one to them than most people imagine. The good fortune which has attended the Emperor's arms will greatly facilitate this business, for the Dutch are in terror lest every one should be going to fall upon them, at a moment when owing to the present state of affairs, neither the French nor the English could give them any help, and these are the things which Your Royal Highness should make use of to protect your own interests, for, as a matter of fact I think it much the most probable outcome of the situation that England will come to terms with Spain, and I see no hopes of peace with France. The outcome of this Parliament may, it is true, change their inclinations, but, as I must send this despatch off, I will only say that I trust this information will be of service to Your Royal Highness in the meantime."

The King had gone to Newmarket "to enjoy the country for a little before the meeting of Parliament," but had sent for Lord Carlisle who was to leave for Turin within the next ten days, "so it is said, but before he does so everything may have changed, and in that case I will let Your Royal Highness know in proper time what can be done about the Geneva matters, for they have always been dealt with on the basis that no one else can be sent as long as Carlisle is under orders to go" to Turin. Carlisle did not start until the end of March, but, as he was to go by Holland and Lorraine, Scaglia would have time to write to his master "in what frame of mind he is leaving and what instructions he has about the Geneva business."

Parliament was opened by the King in State on the twenty-eighth of March. "The ceremony is really a splendid and stately one from the magnificence of the robes and the good order of the riding from the Royal Palace to the Hall where the Parliament meets, and also from the number and quality of the great men of this Kingdom who are present for, except on these occasions, they

are never seen in such numbers at Court. I was paying my duty to the Queen and so had the opportunity of seeing everything in detail, and was also present when the King delivered his speech after arriving at the Hall, sitting on this throne in full state. He spoke in English for about a quarter of an hour, seated with the Crown on his head, whilst all those present were standing in their places bareheaded and ranged in accordance with the order of their precedence and rank." The readiness with which the necessary supplies were voted gave great pleasure to the Court, as they argued that this was a proof that the members would act agreeably to the King's wishes in other matters. Scaglia remarked, however, that the amount granted would only be sufficient to carry the King on until Michaelmas, and that the Commons would be able to make their own terms as to any further grant. He had told the King of the agreement which Savoy had concluded with Spain about Monferrat, and His Majesty had said that the Duke was quite right to make it. All the same he thought that it was impossible to say what the outcome of the session would be.¹

Just before the Houses met, twelve Jesuits had been arrested at Clerkenwell in a house where they had been living together for some months. "Their number and their assembling at the moment when Parliament is meeting will probably lead to some severe measures being taken in it against all Catholics," who till then had been living in greater liberty and peace than they had enjoyed for some time." The word 'Jesuit' awakens many memories and kindles hatred to the hurt of all the others, who are somewhat more readily tolerated just now than they used to be, although in contravention of the law of the land." When "memories of the past" were awakened with regard to the Catholic Religion, those memories were usually connected not with France, but with Spain, for the English in general were not aware of the fact that since Lerma had quarrelled with the Jesuits, the order ranked amongst the most bitter enemies of the House of Hapsburg. The natural consequences followed. In the middle of April, the Infanta reported to Madrid on the authority of an envoy from the Duke of Lorraine who had been in England, that Buckingham wished to make peace with Spain and to carry on the war with France, whilst the Council and the rest of England wished precisely the reverse. Buckingham had even told her informant that although the fleet which was being got together was strong enough

to fight both the French and Spaniards, it was not intended to act against Spain.¹

Such was the position of affairs at the moment when Montagu landed in England, bringing with him proposals which were likely to carry great weight in determining the Duke's unstable mind. From the Spaniards Buckingham could expect but little advantage for himself; by leaning towards the French he might not only gain the personal ends for which he had begun the war, but might win the support and favour of a Parliament which seemed likely to be more determined in its pressure upon the Crown than any of its predecessors. But to conciliate the French he must throw over the Rochellers and the French Huguenots, whose interests he had made the pretext for entering into the contest. At the same time, however, he did not wish to close the door against an understanding with Spain, especially as it seemed probable that the Spaniards would soon come to an understanding with the Dutch. Commissary Kessler, who was the Spanish Commissary for the exchange of prisoners, reported indeed to Brussels that the Dutch Deputies at Middleburg and at Rosendaal said in plain language that the Prince of Orange and the States were now willing to treat for a truce without raising the question as to the Sovereignty or the Independence of the United Provinces. Spinola, like Scaglia, thought that their attitude was the result of the successes won by Tilly and Wallenstein in Denmark and in Mecklenburg. Buckingham was still in communication with the Marquis through Gerbier and Rubens, and as the result of a letter from the latter to Spinola, in which he said that England was very anxious for an arrangement to be arrived at, Philip IV. on the first of May had written to the Infanta that he was favourably disposed to a negotiation. "I write this so that Rubens may put it about until I can send off another express with a detailed answer." He asked the Infanta, however, to send a courier to Rubens without delay "to ask him for the originals and the cyphered letters which they have written to him about this business as there may possibly be some things and phrases in them which deserve more careful consideration than Rubens may have given them, and he may also have added or omitted some particulars at his own pleasure, so it is only right we should see the foundations on which we are entering into this business, and who are taking hands in it." The Infanta, ever jealous for the reputation of her agents, replied

somewhat tartly that she was certain that Rubens had written honestly as to his negotiations with Gerbier, and that she was confirmed in her opinion by what she had heard as to the feeling in England from the Duke of Lorraine's agent and from other sources. She could not know that at that very moment Contarini was reporting that Buckingham was wholly in the hands of the Jesuits, and that the Jesuits were doing all in their power in the interests of France to sow discord between Charles the First and his Parliament. Under such conditions he was doubtless not unwilling to lend a ready ear to Montagu's proposals, which, however, are only known to us through the statements of Zorzi, writing after the withdrawal of Denbigh's fleet from before La Rochelle.¹

But whilst the diplomats were striving to secure a peace by intrigue, the soldiers were busied in endeavouring to secure one by force of arms. All through the winter the engineers were labouring at the dyke, which in the end of January was strengthened by a line of vessels, walled inside and filled with stones, which was anchored within half a cannon shot of the town, whilst a few days later a chain buoyed up on casks fastened together with beams was stretched from Point Coreilles to Port Neuf. About forty or fifty ships filled with stones were sunk in front of the Palisade. On the twenty fifth, however, a violent gale blew up from the South West, and drove the rising tide against the chain and line of vessels, some of which were carried to Rochelle. The mob came out on the cliff to carry off the floating wreckage but were received with deadly volleys from the enemy's batteries and driven back into the town. Meanwhile, as Spinola had foretold, the Rochellers were encouraged by the nearness of the besiegers' lines to make constant raids on them. Whilst Bassompierre and Thoyras were inspecting the redoubt of Lafous, Rivière, a bold skirmisher well known under his nickname of La Farine, rushed out and shot a young Swiss who was cutting sods dead under their eyes. The generals gave chase and followed him up to the bars outside the Coygues Gate when he threw himself into the counterscarp, whilst his pursuers got back unscathed as there was not a man to be seen on the ramparts. On Ash Wednesday Thoyras himself uncoupled his dogs to course a hare in the space between the lines and La Rochelle, under the very muzzles of the guns on its walls. "I went and brought him back and gave him a sound

scolding, but for all this he did not fail to turn up to sup with me."¹

But as March drew to its close scarcity began to be felt by the besieged who were stayed up only by their hopes of relief from England and by the news of Rohan's successes in Lower Languedoc. From a drummer who came to Bassompierre to arrange for the exchange of prisoners, he learnt that if the English failed to break the dyke the Rochellers would treat for a surrender. On the fifteenth of April Bassompierre stopped up the springs from which water was brought by pipes into the town. The besieged, however, who knew that although it would be difficult for the fleet to enter the channel, the undertaking was far from being an impossible one, were determined, thinned though their ranks were, to hold out to the death. On April the twenty-third, Louis XIII. who had been for a short time in Paris returned to the camp.²

About midday on Thursday, May the eleventh, a sentinel placed on the church tower of the village of Ars caught sight of the English fleet which was off les Baleines, the north-west point of the Isle of Rhé. Thoyras at once signalled its arrival to the mainland by firing three cannon shots and by raising a thick smoke on Fort de la Prée. Bassompierre who was at the battery of the Chef de Bois with the Archbishop of Bordeaux and some others saw the squadron at the same moment. The French vessels of war at once put to sea, whilst Richelieu and the King hurried to Coreilles. By two o'clock the enemy were off St. Martin. They numbered fifty-two sail, and were sailing in three squadrons, conspicuous amongst which were four large ramberts belonging to the King, long, narrow vessels, which by their form recalled the galleys of the ancient Vikings, and which were greatly valued on account of their speed and the ease with which they were managed. Unfortunately like all the large vessels they were too big to enter the outer harbour. The chief hopes of the expedition depended on their fireships.

The English attempted to anchor off Chef de Bois, but were driven off by the batteries, and stood out into the Antioche Passage, whilst the French vessels took up their station in the fairway between the headlands which closed in the outer harbour, two regiments were hurried to guard the dyke, and a flotilla of thirty-six galliots cruised in front of the inner harbour to prevent a sortie from the town.

Next day active operations were prevented by a violent gale, but the Cardinal in person inspected the palisade.

The decisive attack was expected on Sunday, the fourteenth of May, and Bassompierre manned his batteries and made every preparation for a desperate resistance. It was arranged that as the English vessels stood in every French vessel should grapple the ship nearest to it, and then run ashore where the soldiery would board the enemy and break them up with cannon fire. But this attack was not destined to be delivered. In vain Bragneau and Gobert the two deputies from La Rochelle who were on Denbigh's flagship, urged the Admiral to send his warships against the French, whilst the convoy made its way through the palisade, a feat which according to Zorzi, who examined it in detail a month later, would have been one of no great difficulty. Denbigh faltered and hesitated and finally declared on the Sunday morning that his orders were that he should not fight, but that he was only to escort the convoy to the place where it then was, in the hope that they would thus be enabled to make their own way into Rochelle. He added that he had heard that a Spanish fleet was on its way to attack them, and he was, therefore, determined to sail for England on the following Thursday afternoon, so as not to risk the King's ships. The envoys, thereupon, threw letters into the water near the palisade to warn their fellow-townsmen that the English were deserting them and advised them to treat for peace with the King unless Denbigh should after all decide to remain. Late in the evening one of their agents named Vidault made his way through the palisade, and on arriving in the town spread reports everywhere that the English would speedily follow him. Privately however he informed the Mayor of the real state of affairs, and thereupon Guitton assembled the Town Council who resolved to negotiate. Their selected envoy was Sieur de la Leu, and it was arranged that if the King would treat upon favourable terms, he was to send back a trumpet, a drummer if upon hard conditions, and no one if His Majesty refused to discuss any terms at all. It was also settled that la Leu should set out during sermon time on the sixteenth so that no one might see him leaving the town. The Councillors gave Vidault a gold chain so as to make the Royalists think that he had brought good news and then swore on the Bible, at the Mayor's suggestion, that so long as the English fleet was in the bay they would not buy any provisions lest the people should think that they were not strong

enough to force the dyke and were going to leave them to their fate. That very night, indeed, an English shallop forced its way into the inner harbour despite a violent fire from the batteries. The gale, however, continued and prevented the English from making an attack whilst the fireships which they sent against the French were easily turned aside by their rowing boats. Meanwhile the whole court was lodged at Bassompierre's headquarters which were so overcrowded that the King had to sleep in his coach. La Leu duly set out to visit him on the morning of the sixteenth, but a trumpet whom he sent back was stopped at Fort Turdon by a captain who had not received instructions to let him pass. When Guitton was on his way to inquire what had happened he was assaulted by a mob who forced him to give an explanation as to Gobert's letter, and nearly rose against him as they thought he was going to betray the town. On the night of the seventeenth the English sent off a whole squadron of fire-ships which burnt themselves out before they reached the Channel. The very next day the King from Fort Lafons saw the English fleet raise their anchors and sail away. Bassompierre hurried back to Chef de Bois, "and from there we looked on whilst the rambergs and large vessels drew up within gunshot of the batteries, fired their broadsides into our fleet, turned round and stood away. We followed them with our eyes as long as we could, and then went home and made good cheer without a thought of our enemy and with every hope that Rochelle would soon be ours." Denbigh had not made one serious attempt to save the city from her fate. On the nineteenth the King, "now that he had got the English fleet off his shoulders" went off to Surgeres, a castle near Rochefort, which belonged to the de la Rochefoucaulds.¹

Denbigh's conduct was difficult to explain away. A scape-goat was found in Ned Clarke, who as a reward for his services to Buckingham during the Parliament of 1625, in which he had sat as member for Hythe and had been imprisoned by the Commons for his defence of his patron, had been appointed Agent to Christian of Denmark, and subsequently to Rochelle, where he had acted as Buckingham's confidant. He was now returning thither with Denbigh and was accused of telling him that the real meaning of his instructions was that they were not to hazard a single ship either in fighting or in attempting to enter the port.

"They say that when the fleet sailed he was heard to remark that he was sure that they would never introduce succour into

La Rochelle and that the thing was a jest." The public did know that he had been employed in the negotiations for the Spanish marriage "so that every one feels that he did not act on his own responsibility," although it might not be known that in the previous summer Charles had sent him instructions dictated by Buckingham in regard to negotiations with France through Denmark. Clarke, however, was destined to serve as Buckingham's scapegoat for "his brother Denbigh." On his return to England the unfortunate agent was confined to his house, and despite his piteous appeals to Conway, was shunned by everyone at Court and was denied an audience by the Duke. The rest of his life was spent in poverty, and he died unpitied in 1630.¹

It is possible that Clarke paid the penalty for the indiscretions of his tongue. Zorzi's account of Denbigh's conduct is evidently derived from some inside source, and yet not from any definite official information. "I wrote some weeks ago that peace was in negotiation between France and England between unknown and mediocre persons. I think one may now argue that this is either arranged or on the point of being so owing to the recent ignoble expedition of the English fleet besides other things." As he truly wrote, the French could hardly be said to be making any serious attempt to attack La Rochelle from the sea. Certainly the English when they discovered that their large vessels could not enter the outer harbour had seen that their expedition was foredoomed to failure, and the fact that such ships were selected for the attempt might well be taken to show that its failure was premeditated. As Zorzi points out, with the acuteness of a Venetian dealing with maritime affairs, "It is clear that from the sea one who does not wish to cannot succour La Rochelle; the floating chain can never stop anyone determined upon going in, any more than spider's webs can stop eagles or nets enchain the winds," as Buckingham had seen for himself when the Dutch broke the chain of English vessels before his eyes at Fort St. Martin. "I have been all round the fortress three times. The present condition is that each side is secure from attack and they remain tranquilly waiting events. The deliverance of the town depends exclusively upon the sea. There, despite this labour and expense, the situation is the same as for many months past. The gap between the ends of the mole is 1,100 paces in which no more than ten large vessels, resembling the large frigates of Zara, stationed at equal distances and united by cables, form

the unbreakable chain which the English have not dared to attack. These have been stripped of sailors, they have not the number of soldiers arranged, the soldiers do not know which ship they are attached to and so they remain empty at the sport of fortune. Even supposing that fortune is always on their side, how can they supply the notorious lack of ordnance, for they have not a gun on all these ships. Apart from a foist which serves as vanguard for the ships within, there is not a vessel worthy of the name. They have indeed thirty or forty pinnaces or pataches, as they call them, though I should consider them small caiques. The Marquis of Tavannes showed me one of them, presumably among the best, yet it had only six oarsmen and the coxswain though all carried arms.

"This blind confidence and the obtuse negligence of the English fleet, with the negotiations constantly kept up on either side by nameless individuals, leads many to believe in a peace. However, I have not been able to discover anything definite although it is freely stated that the peace is not announced because the French would not consent to La Rochelle being named in it, while the English hoping to cover their shame do not want a declaration to be made before the fate of La Rochelle is decided one way or the other. Before it falls, for the sake of appearances only, they will send the fleet once more to attempt the impossible, and after its fall, as it is irreparable, they will announce the accommodation, which has already been signed some weeks since between the crowns, and has only been kept secret for these respects.

"They point to Montagu as the author of this work with little glory to him. No sooner was he released from the Bastille than they won him over by promising to allow the Duke of Buckingham to come on an embassy extraordinary to France next winter. They say this was all powerful.

"All the negotiations with the Rochellers are broken off. They wanted to send commissioners to England and to the churches of the realm, but the King would not listen to them." Such was Zorzi's explanation of Denbigh's failure as given in his despatch of the twelfth of June.¹

It is certain that the negotiations between England and France were not nearly so far advanced at that moment as the Venetian envoy supposed, yet it is not impossible that his statements are in the main correct. Buckingham, indeed, was not

without some justification for his conduct. During the whole of the campaign in the previous year, he had held powers from Charles to treat with France and had been left free to choose his own time for employing them. To the Rochellers he was only engaged by the treaty signed in January, 1628, under which the King bound himself in general terms to assist La Rochelle, a condition which was fulfilled in the letter by the despatch of the convoy under the escort of Denbigh's fleet. The King, on the other hand, had failed to secure the object for which he had undertaken to succour La Rochelle, for Parliament in place of confining itself to the provision of the necessary supplies, was engaged in framing that Petition of Right which struck at the very root of Charles' system of Government. The members, absorbed in their constitutional struggle, might well be thought to care little for the fate of the Huguenots, whilst the sufferings to trade occasioned by the war with France were keenly felt. The Duke may have imagined that all the disasters of the previous years might be forgotten when the first cargoes of wines from Bordeaux entered the Thames. He had, however, all but reckoned without his host for he had forgotten the feelings of the King, and Clarke had to pay the penalty of his forgetfulness.¹

Buckingham probably never was trusted with his master's inmost feelings. He had known nothing of Charles' intercourse with Fra Boverio, nor was he fully aware how often his thoughts had reverted with regret to the Infanta Maria after his departure from Spain. He never, perhaps, supposed that the King would be thrown into a fury when he heard that Denbigh had returned to England and left Rochelle besieged.

The news was not long in reaching London. Within a week after the fleet had left the Antioche Passage, a French vessel put into Plymouth with the tidings, and a few days later Coke hurried down to Portsmouth to arrange that it should return to Rochelle at once. Seamen were impressed in the Isle of Wight, all ships which passed Cowes Castles were stayed under a warrant from Lord Conway, and all the casks in Southampton were requisitioned for water-casks. Fireships were prepared to be despatched to the fleet forthwith. Buckingham, directly he had heard of the retreat, had sent off messengers to order Denbigh to return, but they failed to meet him until he was off the Cornish coast, when many of his vessels dispersed to their own harbours, whilst the rest were allowed to come on to Portsmouth. He had only five

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ships with him and lingered off the Isle of Wight as he was afraid to come to Court.¹ Gobert who had hastened after the English in Captain Guillot's sloop, had reached the Isle of Wight in four days and hurried to take the news to Buckingham who was furious at the tidings and at once went with him to the King. Charles was greatly moved, and asked what Denbigh's reason for retreating was. "Then he took M. Gobert by his arm and led him into a window, where leaning on his shoulder and weeping bitter tears he again repeated his question in these words, 'Whatever reason could my people have for retreating and leaving the poor town to its fate?'" Gobert answered that he knew of none except that they had gone off in a blind panic at a false report that a Spanish Fleet was on the point of arriving on the coast of France, and also that they were in deadly fear of losing their vessels. On this His Majesty was even more moved, stepped back three or more steps and said: "Heigh, what! Are my ships then built for scarecrows and not for fighting?" and that same moment ordered Buckingham to call a Council. Gobert gave the same explanation to the Council as he had done to His Majesty, and it was decided to send him off with a gentleman to meet Denbigh and order him to return and moor off Rochelle until reinforcements could meet him, but, as has been seen, he did not meet Denbigh until it was too late.² "It will be best," wrote Buckingham on the twenty-eighth of May " (since the fleet is so far advanced in the Sleeve, and that I have sent several messengers overland to advertise the town of Rochelle of His Majesty's resolution presently to send a greater force to open the passage for the relief thereof) that all the Fleet and preparations for reinforcements go away together." Strict orders were given that no one belonging to the Fleet should come ashore. The precaution was not an unnecessary one for very sinister rumours were afloat. One of Denbigh's captains, Sir Francis Carew, had died suddenly and it was supposed that he had been poisoned, because he had told the Admiral that La Rochelle could be relieved and when he was refused a hearing had demanded a written statement which he could show the King on his return.³ As Coke wrote to Denbigh from Portsmouth, "I heard an evil report raised in the Fleet and from thence spread abroad of His Majesty's resolution to send back this Fleet to an impossible work. Now whether it concerneth both your Lordship and all these worthy gentlemen in like manner to disavow and cry down these unworthy bruits and slanders cast upon your actions,

and the designs of the State your wisdoms may consider. . . . There is no way to redeem or make good your honour with His Majesty and the world, but by advancing the action, encouraging the mariners and making way through all fears by your wisdoms and courage, for in greatest dangers greatest captains get praise, and where no danger is every man can command. I know your Lordship needeth no such spur." Whether Denbigh needed such a spur or not Buckingham and the King were now both thoroughly determined that a third attempt should be made to relieve La Rochelle, or if La Rochelle could not be relieved at least to gain some foothold for England upon the coast of France.¹

At first the departure of the fleet had filled the Rochellers with fear, and they had not only made attempts to treat for peace, but they had removed the English flag from their towers and shipping. Their overtures for a settlement had been unsuccessful, and they had replaced the white flag which they had at first flown with a black one. "They did this for three days in succession, as if to say that they would either live freely in the modest liberty in which they were born or would all perish with their town. They afterwards set all their mills to work, as if to show those without that they had abundance of grain. But such things are not done in plenty, but in extreme misery." Upon the twenty-first of May, however, they despatched La Grossetière, a gentleman of Poitou to England with letters to the King in which they asked for help to be sent immediately and pledged themselves to hold out to the death.² Their request for help had already been anticipated and Charles' envoys were on their way to inform them that it would be sent. Buckingham, whatever his real views may have been, could not at this moment withdraw from the war. He thought that the Bill of Subsidies would be passed within a few days "for there is now likely to be a happy agreement between the King and his people." The happy agreement would be sealed if he complied with the wishes of the Puritans by helping their brethren in France. He knew that as affairs stood in Italy he would not by doing so be closing the door to peace with either France or Spain, for to both powers their disputes with England were an issue of minor importance as compared with their relations with one another.

CHAPTER LXXXI

THE news of Denbigh's retreat reached Paris late on the evening of Sunday the twenty-first of May. Such was the joy of Anne of Austria, that she had a solemn service of thanksgiving celebrated without delay, and the rest of the night was spent in lighting bonfires and firing salutes, whilst the streets were filled with shouting revellers and wine was flowing in every house.¹ The Queen Mother hailed the tidings with pleasure for she was pledged to protect Nevers in his possession of Mantua, where the Emperor had just appointed Count John of Nassau as his Commissary to sequestrate the disputed territories. A despatch from the Count of Gazzoldo, now the Mantuan envoy at Paris, who had hastened to Louis XIII. headquarters to take him the letter in which Count John announced his appointment to the Duke gives a vivid picture of life in the royal camp. "I arrived on the sixteenth of May and found him armed and surrounded by a throng of nobles who had hastened to him to resist the Rochellers and the English who for two days had been trying to run down with a fleet of sixty sail on the tide from Plomb to relieve Rochelle, in sight of which they were. I could only, therefore, let His Majesty know that we had arrived and that I was most anxious to pay my respects to him as soon as possible. Well on the night of the nineteenth all of a sudden the English sailed off for they did not choose to attack a king who was so well prepared by both land and sea to resist them, and thought they would most likely get the worst of it, as they certainly would have done. They made out that they were not under orders to fight, but to support the convoy of Rochelle vessels laden with supplies, so that they might make their way in more easily, but the Rochellers could not do so unless the English opened the passage. As they could not get in, although they fired more than five hundred shots, and as the high tides were over, they went off; the burghers in vain called them back by lighting great fires on their towers. They say the besieged look very disconsolate as they have no wine and very little bread left. Many are dying of scurvy which is caused, they say, by the

salt fish which forms the staple of their food. His Majesty was in the greatest delight and sent to me to say that he would be very glad to see me on Sunday, the twenty-first, and that he had appointed the Marquis de St. Chaumont to escort me and to take me to him, as he did this morning. He met me at more than a league from the camp with the royal carriage which is covered with crimson velvet, and was followed by another with four gentlemen of rank and by at least fifty others very well mounted," who took him to St. Chaumont's quarters. After lunch next day he was escorted by M. de St. Chaumont and M. de Rodes, a master of the ceremonies, to see the King. "I got into the usual royal carriage, in which, besides M. de St. Chaumont, M. de Rodes and some others took their seats, and soon got to a little farm not very far from my quarters, where we alighted and were met at the gate by M. Duhallier, the Captain of the King's Guards, who with many other gentlemen received me and made a number of the nobility who had gathered round us line up on both sides of the entrance. He then took me up a little stair into the King's bedchamber which was a very small room furnished with a bed and state canopy of crimson velvet with gold fringes. The King was standing between the bed and the wall two paces in front of an armchair covered with brocade behind which M. de St. Simon, first gentleman of the bedchamber, and a great favourite of His Majesty's, stood during the whole audience. At my first bow the King took off his hat and remained uncovered until I had come close up to him when he embraced me and put it on again, and made me do the same. The interview was a purely formal one, as the King said that he would leave Cardinal Richelieu to deal with the envoy about the business of his mission, but then went on to say : "That he hoped he would soon have La Rochelle in his hands now that the English had gone off. The place, they knew on the best authority, was in the greatest straits. I congratulated His Majesty most heartily ; his face was beaming with joy the whole time he was talking to me. He took his hat off every time I uncovered, and did so when I took my leave." Such was etiquette in the camp of Louis XIII.¹

The state of affairs in Italy made both the King and Cardinal even more eager than before to bring the siege of La Rochelle to a close. The Rochellers were known to have been greatly disheartened by the departure of the English, and on May the thirty-first sent an offer to treat for peace. On the following day

Bassompierre sent the Sieur de Grançay, Colonel of a Company of Light Horse, to visit the Mayor and to open a negotiation. Guitton, however, replied that he could do nothing without consulting the French Churches and the deputies in England and asked for the necessary passes for his envoys. The King's answer was that they must submit unconditionally. The burghers answered that they would hold out to the last. "On the second of June a letter was brought in from Charles I. In it he said that he would hazard his three kingdoms to save them, and that within a few days he would send such a fleet that they would be relieved without fail. On this the fanatics made the people swear to die rather than to yield, and sent me a message to say so, with a copy of the King's letter by Grançay."¹

Charles was never loath to make a promise, even if he did not know how or when he could fulfil it. He might talk of sending off a fleet within a few days, but to get one in readiness to sail was a task which took several months.

Money was wanting and without money neither fireships could be purchased nor victuals procured. Sir Allan Apsley, the Governor of the Tower, reported that the victualling by petty warrant would come to seven hundred pounds a week. He and his deputies had pledged their credit so far and their creditors were so disheartened and disabled that they would do nothing upon trust. So far as words went, Buckingham was not the man to be kept back by any such trifling obstacles. The dispute with France might have easily been arranged in the previous summer had not the money from the sale of the French prizes "relieved the King's necessities and so kept the Duke from ruin." Yet but a month later he had sailed at the head of a powerful fleet for the Isle of Rhé. Whilst the London victuallers were holding back their stores and captains at Southampton despite his agents' bullyings were refusing to part with their ships, Buckingham was writing in imperious terms to Coke that the whole fleet was to go together to La Rochelle. More fireships and transports were to be prepared, all the ships at Portsmouth, Southampton and other places were to be taken in hand and supplied with fresh water and provisions, whilst gunners and boatswain's stores were to come from London by land. The sick men were to be refreshed on shore. As the King would be at Portsmouth very shortly "to set all things forward," he prayed Coke "to continue the diligence and care" he had hitherto shown. Three "able commanders" were

sent "to be at the disposal of my brother Denbigh." Coke's reply was not encouraging. "The fireships cannot be had unless £350 be paid in hand and as much more assured. The Lords have written unto me that they have given order of £500 to be paid to the Treasurer of the Navy to be returned hither, but of the money I hear no more, and their Lordships' order there will do no work here, where no credit can be procured, and the fleet stay for fireships and the fireships for money and monies be sent in paper only, I assure Your Grace that the time which is given to send the Fleet together will consume the provisions and disable it to proceed. I have been forced to procure from Southampton a hundred tons of new cask to be there filled with water which, when it comes to the Fleet if they do not empty it and fill it again at the Cowes, (as I fear they will not, having denied to do it twice), it will presently turn black and putrified and be of no use." Portsmouth was so overcrowded with sick sailors that it was no place for His Majesty to come to, "and to send them further from the ships were to discharge them." "There will be the greatest want of fireships of all other provisions for opening the passage into Rochelle, but, methinks, they are very dear," replied Buckingham, who added in his own writing, "I have read your last letter to His Majesty before the Lords, whereupon he hath resolved to come in person himself so soon as Parliament will be ended. In my opinion cost may be saved by putting in the fireships such a proportion of men out of the King's ships as may serve for the management of their sails till they come before Rochelle."¹ The fireships, in which the Duke placed such confidence were vessels in which a stone chamber had been built which was filled with powder and fireworks fired by a fuse and timed to explode when they reached the palisades. They were recommended to Buckingham by a Swiss engineer named Peblitz who had seen service with Mansfeldt and in whom he placed implicit confidence.² But for all Buckingham's exertions the naval preparations were inevitably slow. Ships ready to sail were kept in the Thames because their crews deserted, the new Commissioners of the Navy might send orders to refit ships but provided neither materials nor money for repairing the graving place, and at the end of June Coke was forced to write, "I have continued here almost six whole weeks, and have spent already all the King's money in his service and my own, in an inn where I have lodged not only with a continual oppression of seamen, victuallers, and workmen, but as if in an

hospital with a confluence of sick men. Give me now leave to say freely that not only my abode here will be of no use, but that every day while the Fleet stayeth in this harbour it will be less ready and worse provided to set to sea. The only means to amend evil effects is by discovery of the causes, to which neither my commission doth extend, nor my disposition which is rather inclined to mend than to find faults." Buckingham had his own explanation to offer of these causes. His secretary, Edward Nicholas, proved to the Council Board in the King's presence on the second of July that the remissness and ignorance of the officers of the Navy had been the chief hindrances in delaying the preparation of the fleet, and the Duke himself admitted that he had made a mistake when he changed the Commissioners for the Navy as the new ones thought themselves too good for their business and yet were too ignorant of it to carry it out. Possibly he forgot that his quarrel with the Trinity House had been the chief reason why in the previous year officers had been appointed who were so completely unfit for their places, but he had the wisdom to endeavour to make amends for his fault by making up his dispute with Sir Robert Mansel, one of the few English commanders who had been successful when on active service at sea, and by consulting him in private interviews as to current affairs.¹

Moreover the prospects of an English offensive were greatly darkened by the want of money, which, even if Parliament would have voted it, could only have been collected with difficulty from taxpayers impoverished by years of pestilence and by the cessation of their trade with France and Spain. The constitutional conflict which had led to the suspension of supplies was embittered by the suspicions which hung about Buckingham's attitude towards Religion. He had said that he had broken off the Spanish Match because he would not agree to Articles which by sanctioning the toleration of the Catholic Religion would have rendered it a danger to the Anglican Church, yet, in order to effect the French Marriage, he was accused, though erroneously, of having entered into yet more dangerous agreements to which he strictly adhered. His mother and his nearest relations, as well as some of his closest confidants were Catholics, and to their influence was attributed the appointments to important offices of persons suspected on religious grounds, and the illegal toleration which the Recusants had lately enjoyed. Our failures on the Continent were another ground for mistrust and men hesitated whether to attribute them to inefficiency or to treason.²

It was muttered that Gondomar had kept back the supplies which would have made Sir Horace Vere the master of the Palatinate, and that when Count Mansfeldt "had a royal supply of forces to recover it," his efforts were rendered vain by stupidity or treachery in high places. At sea Mansel's expedition to Algiers had done nothing except guard the Spanish coasts, whilst with more justice they blamed the folly which, "against the advice of the Parliament" had squandered money like water at Cadiz only to weaken England by rousing the King of Spain to his danger. That so many "fruitless voyages" had been undertaken which had emptied the English arsenals and scattered the bones of English soldiers on every shore between the Elbe and the Guadalquivir was another cause of the peril in which the country stood, and the ruin of Denmark and of the Protestant interest in North Germany was the direct outcome of the policy which had diverted the monies voted by Parliament for the war with Spain to support an attack upon France, which as our elder statesmen had rightly judged, was our natural ally in any contest with the House of Austria. These were cogent reasons why Parliament refused to vote new supplies.¹

Nor was the feeling as to the position of affairs at home any more satisfactory. The King's profusion, wrote pamphleteers, had made it impossible for him to cover his expenditure with the revenue from the Crown lands, the ancient patrimony of the crown, and it was feared that his necessities would drive him to follow the example set him by so many of his predecessors and not only to resume the grants on which the fortunes of so many of the landowners depended, but to "command" his subjects' goods, without the consent of Parliament and to enforce his mandates by "confining their persons without especial cause declared" as some late decisions in the law courts empowered him to do. Such were the grounds on which the Petition of Right was drawn up, which as it was defined by Glanvill in a conference between the two Houses, "consisteth of four parts, the first touching loans, aydes, and taxes, the second the imprisonment of men's persons, the third touching billeting of soldiers, the fourth touching Commissions issued for Martial Law and put in execution upon several persons."² Buckingham had been urged to win the name of a Zealous Patriot by inducing the King to call a Parliament which might reconcile him with his people, but that Parliament had turned into an instrument of discord.³ Bacon had prophesied that Spain would

be beaten by the defection of her allies, and that the war would be paid for by the captures of her plate fleets at sea, but France and Spain seemed to the outside world the closest of friends, and the plans of our privateers men had been foiled by the genius of Spinola whose Dunkirkers rendered it impossible for the fishermen of the Isle of Wight to put to sea, whilst Algerine pirates were lying off the Lizard and were raiding the Irish coasts.¹ Thanks indeed to Spinola's genius, the English preparations were paralysed in a great degree by the spectral menace of an invasion. The junction of a Franco-Spanish fleet with cruisers from Flanders had in the previous autumn filled the whole island with alarm, and it was thought that at any moment the beacons blazing on the South Downs might show that his veterans had landed on the shores of the British Channel. The state of the defences of the country was, as we have seen, by no means such as to inspire confidence that the levies of Hampshire ploughmen and London prentices could long resist the onset of the Walloons and of the Brigade of Sardinia. Yet the Government was content to leave the task of organising the national defence on shore to Deputy Lieutenants and Mayors of seaside corporations. Everywhere, it is true, the militia were mustered and the houses of the Catholics searched for arms, whilst rural magistrates quarrelled as to whether or no the "hoblers" who carried charcoal from the New Forest should be exempted from the duty of watching at its beacons. Lord Conway's preparations for the defence of the Isle of Wight of which he was Governor are even now of interest as they show the details of the national system of defence, and, in some degree, bear marks of the experiences which he had had of Dutch methods at Briel. That they were regarded with approval by the inhabitants, who had shown their independence of political pressure by their attitude in the preceding elections, may be gathered from the fact that although the island was represented by six members in Parliament, no complaint as to the regulations seems to have been made in the Commons.

Compulsory and universal service was vigorously enforced, under orders originally issued by Queen Elizabeth "which cannot be bettered, for every officer and almost every private soldier knew what he was to do upon the firing of the beacons." The Captain-General was to visit the island twice every year, in order "by the authority of his office and by consent of the freeholders and inhabitants thereof" to remedy any deficiencies which he

might find in its defences. As to those he was to consult the Centoners or Hundredmen, who were chosen from amongst the leading gentlemen of the island, and who were not only to muster and inspect the inhabitants of their districts when the Captain arrived, but to bring them to consult with him as to the improvement of the fortifications.

The island was so far as might be to be self supplying, and everything possible was to be done to increase its population. No one was to be allowed to rent two farms, and non-resident landowners were to be reported to the Privy Council. All soldiers were to reside in their garrisons and not in private houses, and no person exercising a mechanical trade was to practise husbandry. Sheep walks on common land were forbidden, and only cattle, for the "maintenance of tillage" were to be grazed in the forests or on the common lands. The Captain-General was to see that all arable land was properly tilled and that no wood or timber was exported. All ecclesiastics holding preferment were to be resident and the jurisdiction of the local courts was extended so that the inhabitants might have no pretexts for resorting on law business to London. Finally no one in the island was to be chosen Sheriff of Southampton lest at a critical moment he, with the train of followers who in those days attended a Sheriff in his progresses, might be absent from his post, a provision which within the last few years furnished matter for a legal though adverse decision on a claim for exemption from the duty. Everyone holding land of the yearly value of twenty marks was to find one arquebusier, "to remain within the isle" in time of war, and the forty shilling freeholders were grouped together for the same purpose. In short for military purposes the Isle of Wight formed a little commonwealth in itself, and its inhabitants cheerfully submitted to restrictions which would have been looked upon with loathing in the inland shires. Possibly their willingness was due to the danger at their doors. Late in May it was reported that the enemy came so near Dunnose that the mackerel men dared not go forth, and it was rumoured that a fleet of thirty sail had been sighted from the hills. A few weeks later the Dunkirkers burnt Swansea. Early in June London "had been in the greatest fear and despair," but on the arrival of some false rumours of a success beyond the seas, great fires were blazing at every door, and cans of drink were passing from hand to hand.¹

The tidings were without foundation so far at least as La

Rochelle was concerned. News reached London on the second of July that the inhabitants were in great extremity, and His Majesty therefore determined to send off the fleet as soon as possible, waiting only until some money could be raised on the credit of the new subsidies. That done he left for Portsmouth on the tenth of July, Parliament having risen on the twenty-sixth of June, but Buckingham remained behind him in London until the beginning of August.

Rochelle was, indeed, in desperate straits, although if Zorzi may be believed, the plight of the royal army was but little better. Louis XIII had not followed Spinola's advice to keep his hand open. His soldiers had deserted and the lines of circumvallation were held by only seven or eight thousand half starved men. The dyke was, however, being finished in stone work and only a narrow passage had remained open for the passage of the tides, whilst lines of armed vessels fastened together with cables and iron chains and well furnished with mines and *chevaux-de-frise* were drawn up between it and the open sea. Such is the tale which is told by Mervault, the chronicler of the siege, but Zorzi only saw some starlings of floating casks, like those used to protect the groynes and seawalls on the Lido, and the Dutch in the previous summer had found it an easy task to break through a similar chain of vessels at Fort St. Martin. Provisions were still fairly plentiful in the town and a soldier was fined for salting horse flesh and selling it as beef to private persons. In the course of June two letters purporting to be from Charles, and promising speedy relief, reached Rochelle. The genuineness of the first was doubted. It was confirmed when the burghers recognised the signature of their Deputies on the second.¹

Despite Charles' assurances it was, however, still uncertain what the destination of the expedition, when it should sail, would prove to be. Buckingham was still cherishing the hope of surprising some port on the French coast which he could seize and hold for England. At Paris it was feared that he would make an attempt upon Normandy, especially after it had been discovered that Breville "the governor of Vire, an important port in the Carentan province," probably a mistake for Isigny, at the mouth of the Vire, or Trevire, was conspiring with the English. His designs were betrayed by a Huguenot who carried the letters to and fro.² The Duke, however, entertained and on better grounds the hope of taking Calais by an understanding with traitors in the place. He

had been meditating the design since the previous October, and had won over a young man named du Parc, son of the Captain of the Port, who had been for some time an exile in Holland on account of an assault which he had committed on a noble lady, and who on his return home had at the request of his father been imprisoned in the Citadel to save him from the vengeance of her parents. During his confinement he had surveyed the weak places in the fortifications, and at once determined to sell his secret to the enemy. With this view he wrote to his brother who was in the Dutch service and through him secured the services of a Dutch sergeant major who negotiated an arrangement with the English authorities. It was agreed that an English fleet should cruise in the Straits and that the English should be admitted into the town on the night of Saturday the twenty second of July. Unfortunately for du Parc he had made a confidant of a fellow prisoner, a certain mysterious stranger the Vicomte de Fruze, who had at his mother's request been confined there by the Governor, the Lord of Valençay, to prevent him from entering a Capuchin monastery in Holland. This man at first entered into the design, but afterwards betrayed it to Valençay, who immediately sent a warning to Marie de Medicis. She at once ordered the Governor of Picardy to the spot and he arrived at Calais on the nineteenth of July just in time to frustrate the attempt. It had been agreed that the Sergeant-Major should at daybreak on the twenty-second introduce three hundred men into the old castle, which lay to the north west of the Citadel, by going along the beach and entering the port at low tide. It was through this castle that François de Guise had entered the town in January, 1558. An old soldier who was a friend of Du Parc's was to admit the company. That same day two boats arrived from England and were at once boarded. Their pilots had proved that the English fleet was on the point of sailing, that all the troops were on board, and that everyone was saying that it was to go either to Rochelle, to the Isle of Rhé, or to Calais. The expedition was said to consist of fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, who were mostly Frisians and Scotch. Du Parc was at once arrested and sentenced to be broken alive on the wheel. The English, who were to have landed three thousand men after the castle had been seized and forced their way into the town, suspected that their plans had been betrayed, and, therefore decided not to delay any longer in the Straits, but to make the best

of their way to Rochelle, which was in the utmost straits, and which was perhaps lost owing to their delay.

Such is the story of Buckingham's design for seizing Calais, which was published in Paris at the time, and which, if true, would in some degree account for his delay in sending the fleet for the third time to Rochelle. There can be little doubt that a belief in Buckingham's designs on Calais was widely spread in England for Zouch the Oxford lampoonist asks in his burlesque epitaph upon the Duke what Calais and Rhé have to say of him, and Contarini believed that Dalbier's German cavalry, who were the subject of serious apprehension amongst English patriots, had in reality been hired for the purposes of the expedition. The plot was a common subject of gossip at Turin, and when Valençay, as French General of the forces sent to aid the Duke of Nevers, arrived there in the following December it was noted that Wake seemed strangely pleased at his coming, whilst a few months later the same envoy in his letters to Conway said that "Valencé, the Governor of Calais, as I am informed, is very much discontented with the Cardinal de Richelieu, and it is thought that if he were tempted, he would easily be induced to betray that place: So I do intend to write to the Infanta to bargain with him, and I do refer it to the wisdom of Your Lordship to make what use you shall think fit of this advertisement," a suggestion of which Conway was little likely to make use in the honeymoon of the reconciliation between England and France.

At Rome it was said that a very large English fleet had been sighted off the coast of France about the beginning of August, and that it had cavalry on board, "indicating that they meant to attempt a landing. Accordingly the Queen ordered prayers to be offered in the churches and all the people were raised for defence. But the Pope has learnt by a very recent letter from the camp at La Rochelle that this is all a trick of Cardinal Richelieu, who sent the news to Paris in order by this false alarm to induce the nobles to come to the camp and the common people to go to the coast from which they had withdrawn, in order to be ready when the fleet really did appear, as they expect it will about the full moon" in September. As our independent knowledge of the events at Calais depends mainly upon a report published in the *Mercure Francais* of the Seventh of August, and as the English State papers seem to throw no definite light upon the subject, it is impossible on what basis of fact the story rests. It

is only certain that Buckingham had entertained thoughts of a descent on Calais even before he left the Isle of Rhé in the previous Autumn.¹

But whilst Buckingham was dallying with his dreams of restoring Calais to the English Crown, the Rochellers saw famine knocking at their doors. By the beginning of July the butchers' stalls were filled with the flesh of horses, dogs, mules, and cats which was sold at the rate of ten to twelve sous the pound. Flour was disappearing and the dearth was increased by the malpractices of hoarders. In place of bread the rich ate porridge and gruel made of Flanders glue and a little pounded tallow which was flavoured with raw sugar or aromatic drugs from the apothecaries. In the previous May when it was expected that the English fleet might at any moment force its way into the harbour, the Council, to prevent the outbreak of contagious diseases, had ordered two hundred barrels of sardines which had become slightly tainted, to be thrown into the harbour. Their loss was now the subject of the keenest regret. The eels, small fry and shell fish which were collected on the marshes and seashore and the wild herbs which grew on the salterns were sought as delicacies. As the distress grew greater leather of all sorts was soaked, and boiled, and was then sent to the tripe shops to be sold as "White of Beef," and fried or eaten with sugar as jelly.²

On the tenth of July Zorzi reported that "Everyone is talking about some parley with the Rochellese. I do not know if that is the general desire or because the guns have not been heard for some hours, so I do not know what grounds there were for this rumour, nor do I know whence the King derives his hopes that the English may not come after all, unless they are agreed as has been stated. I am absolutely certain that this is his opinion, as he imparted it to one of his confidential servants who informed me." Two days before letters had passed between Richelieu and Guitton with the result that the Rochellers had absolutely refused to surrender on the ground that they expected to be relieved by the English within a fortnight, although the high tides which fell about the middle of the month would then be past.³ It was only on the tenth indeed that the soldiers and sailors for the expedition mustered at Portsmouth, where it was thought that the fleet could not set out before the twenty-fourth at earliest. The hope proved delusive. Money was as usual wanting and it was only with difficulty that one thousand pounds was furnished to pay six

months full wages to the men at Portsmouth who had received their last pay on the previous first of October. The claims of Morgan at Glückstadt could not be disregarded, and the billeters in Hampshire and Sussex had received nothing. Another cause of delay may have been the intended attempt upon Calais which, as has been seen, was fixed for the twenty-second of July. Seamen were still being pressed in the districts around Portsmouth and for fear of desertion the crews were left penned up on ship-board. Buckingham did not leave London until the fourth of August, and was by no means confident that his presence at Portsmouth would produce any great results. He ordered that four or five ships should be sent to take in stores at Plymouth but added "If the mariners make difficulty to go until they are paid some of their arrears I pray cause the Treasurer of the Navy to pay what is needful." In Dorsetshire his orders were treated with contempt. When Sir Nathaniel Napper mustered the able men of his district at Weymouth, where there were five hundred "as able as any in England," those who appeared "were the poorest and unblest men more fitting for an hospital than for His Majesty's service. The Constable warned to appear before the justice and the Mayor seventy-eight able seamen and not one of them gave his appearance." Next day the Mayor "out of his simplicity" sent "the drum to beat about the town with proclamation that, whereas they were warned to appear the present day, it was put off till this day se-night." The state of Portsmouth itself was even worse, Buckingham was at Southwick Manor near the town with the King when Coke wrote to inform him that "The sailors who are gathered at Gosport in great numbers have given notice to Captains Pell and Longworth who have only twenty musketeers each, that this night they will force their passage and will not be restrained in using their liberty in going whither they please. I have advised them to keep careful guard this night with assurance of sending more strength tomorrow into them. The ships riding so thick together among the fireships may give opportunity to any malicious and discontented person to do more mischief than can be prevented."¹

The Duke was no coward. In the previous summer he had exposed himself to the heaviest fire of the enemy in the trenches at St. Martin's, and had been the last to leave the shore during the disastrous retreat from the Isle of Loix. He at once sent for his coach and drove to Portsmouth where he found the High

Street crowded with mutinous seamen who were endeavouring to rescue one of their comrades who was being led to prison. Buckingham summoned the guard who beat off the rioters and had the prisoner hanged forthwith before their eyes. He then took up his quarters in the house of Captain Mason, the Treasurer of the Navy, a low, mean-looking building which is still to be seen in the High Street, but which was then probably one of the best in the town, and which contained a large hall with a gallery running round it at the level of the first storey. Here he proposed to remain until he embarked for La Rochelle.¹

He had not been idle during his stay at Southwick, and his diplomacy was, as was usually the case when his interests were not at stake, inspired by a desire for peace. He was probably no great believer in the professions of the Rochellers as to their zeal for the Protestant Religion and was not unaware that Richelieu's motives for wishing to bring Rochelle under the complete control of the Crown were purely political, and that the Cardinal had not the slightest intention of persecuting subjects who were obedient to their King, even if they happened to profess opinions opposed to those of his Church. He had written on the fourteenth of July through Vincent and David giving his word to the Rochellers that he would soon be off their coast, and, before his arrival in Hampshire, Vincent had delivered a fiery harangue to the King and Council urging them to succour the Protestant Zoar.² The Duke was determined to carry out his promise to the letter, but, even before he left London, Carleton, after an interview with Contarini, whose one object was to restore peace, had suggested to him that it would be well that the Rochellers and the Huguenots generally should be informed that it would be agreeable to the King of England if they would make peace with the King of France. On this hint Buckingham sent word to the Venetian Ambassador that he held powers from his master to employ his forces according to circumstances, and that he should be greatly pleased if on his arrival before Rochelle, he should learn that the Rochellers requested him to refrain from hostilities because they had received satisfaction from their sovereign. Contarini sounded Vincent, who was the coolest headed diplomatist amongst the envoys, and, induced him, despite the opposition of his colleagues David and Dehinse, and of Soubise, who was now at Portsmouth, to write to Rochelle to advise the burghers to consider any proposals for an accomodation which Contarini should bring before them. It was

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agreed also that the Venetian Secretary Agostini should go to France so as to get the negotiations started before there was any further bloodshed. As the Rochelle envoys were perfectly aware that ever since Buckingham first sailed for the Isle of Rhé he had held a warrant dormant giving him powers to treat with France whenever he pleased, they had no reason to complain if he now thought fit to act upon it in such a way as to leave them free to obtain the best terms they could for themselves.¹ The only other persons whose interests were really affected by the negotiations were the King and Queen of Bohemia, and in the previous January Elizabeth, with Frederick's concurrence, had expressed her desire that peace might be brought about by the Danish Ambassadors "if it be for the King my dear brother's good." Both of them probably recognised that the best hope of their restoration lay in an understanding between England and France, which would leave Louis XIII. free to devote his attention to the affairs of Italy and Germany, with results which would almost certainly make Bavaria a mere satellite of the French.² For the feelings of the English Puritans Buckingham cared but little, to the Dutch he might well believe that the fall of Rochelle could only bring satisfaction. The Duke's advice was sound and it would have been well for the burghers, had they listened to it, but the mob had been driven desperate by the malicious ravings of a detected spy who at the gallows' foot had told them that whatever promises were made to them, they would not be kept. Their blind belief in his words cost many their lives.³

Buckingham was accompanied to Portsmouth by his wife, by his sister-in-law, Lady Anglesea, and by the deputies from La Rochelle who with Soubise came to him before breakfast on the morning of August the twenty-third. As usual a throng of nobles and of military men were in waiting to attend his levée, whilst outside the door knots of scowling sailors were talking over the tumultuous scenes of the preceding days. Whilst the party were at breakfast, news was brought in that Rochelle had been relieved. By the English the tidings were received with shouts of joy, by the French with incredulity, and with vehement gestures and in excited tones they professed their belief that the rumour was an idle tale. In reality some provisions had been thrown into the town. Buckingham rose and walked towards the hall door speaking on his way to some of those who were waiting near it. Just as he was passing under the tapestry which hung before it

he was stabbed to the heart by John Felton, a lieutenant who had taken part in the expedition to Rhé, but who had not received the pay to which he was entitled, and who through long broodings over his wrongs and over the grievances of his religion and of the nation had been brought to believe that it was his duty to strike down the oppressor. The deed was hailed with fanatical delight by the mob outside, but struck terror into the hearts of the ladies who lodged in the rooms above the hall. The cries and screams of Buckingham's wife and sister-in-law and the vision of the Duchess running out into the gallery in her white night-dress with her hair streaming over her shoulders were long remembered by the beholders. Felton was soon hurried off under arrest to meet his doom in London, and the crowd of courtiers stole away from the house one by one, leaving the duchess in a dead faint. Soon an express was galloping to Southwick Manor to bring to the King the news of a disaster which he, like his favourite, may have half foreseen. It was the Vigil of Saint Bartholomew, and Charles was kneeling at prayer in his private chapel when the messenger entered stealthily and whispered the tidings in his ear. He remained motionless in his place, without asking a single question, but those around him saw the blood welling up into his cheeks till they grew nigh as black as the plumed hat which lay beside him. All marvelled at his composure which showed how his reverence for Divine things forbade him to disturb the solemn ceremony. Then as now the psalms for the day were the hundred and tenth to the hundred and fourteenth, and it must have been with mingled feelings that the King listened to the solemn words in which the psalmist tells of the promises of the Almighty to the righteous that "He will not be afraid of any evil tidings, for his heart standeth fast and believeth in the Lord." When the prayers were over, the King at last learnt the sad details from the messenger, sent off words of comfort to the widow, with the promise that her son should succeed to the offices held by his father, a request which Buckingham had pressed on him through Laud, on the fateful day, when, as if prescient of his coming death, he said farewell to the Bishop of London on his departure from Southwick, and also despatched a gentleman to the Rochellose deputies to give them his pledge that this disaster would in no wise change his goodwill to their town.

Meanwhile one of these deputies, Vincent, the hard, shrewd minister, who might well have found his place in the Roman

Conclave, had made his way back to Mason's house. "When I got there again two hours later I found the body lying on a wretched mat in the corner of the hall watched only by a single footman. What a contrast to the glory in which we had seen him that morning with the flower of the nobles of the land, and the greatest captains of the army thronging round him, and what a melancholy proof of the vanity, instability and transitoriness of all things human."

"That very same evening, between seven and eight o'clock all the guns of the fleet, the army, and the batteries were thundering forth salutes to the sound of pealing musketry, the skies were ablaze with fireworks, and cheers for the King were ringing through the air; and all this went on for an hour and a half in honour of the King's birthday which was being kept that day." As both Charles and his Queen were born in November, it is not easy to see why the official celebration should have been held in August. On the tenth of September, Buckingham was buried almost privately in Henry the Seventh's Chapel in Westminster Abbey, where he rests under a tasteless monument erected by his widow, who subsequently married Randall McDonell, the Earl, afterwards Marquis, of Antrim.¹

Such was the end of the man who for so many years and under two kings had been the real master of England, in so far as the King himself was such. It cannot be said that upon the whole Buckingham was a bad or an unskilful statesman. If he tried unduly to extend the rights of royalty at the expense of the English constitution, he cannot be blamed for supporting a policy which had been that of James the First ever since he ascended the English throne, and which Charles the First pushed to even further lengths when he had himself undertaken the direct management of his affairs. Buckingham always remembered that Parliament was possessed of very real power, whilst his own position was that of a favourite who was entirely dependent upon his master's changing whims. The fear of being outrivalled in the royal affections was ever before his eyes. He himself had risen upon the ruin of Somerset, and he never forgot how nearly the efforts of those who aimed at supplanting him by Brett or Monson had been crowned with success. Even in his night watchings on the Isle of Rhé he would pour into the ears of his secretary, Doctor Mason, his apprehensions lest some of those who had remained at home about His Majesty "were now content to

forget him," and the impatience of his attitude at Madrid which did so much to frustrate the success of the negotiations for the Match was in great part due to his fears that another would slip into his place whilst he was absent from Whitehall. Under these circumstances it was all essential for him to keep on tolerable terms with Parliament if he was to avoid the fate of Mompesson, of Bacon, and of Middlesex. Hence his policy was at all times that of an opportunist, and many of those swift changes which onlookers like Silsdonio took to be the outcome of levity were, in reality, nicely timed to meet the changing moods of the House of Commons. Because Buckingham governed as the King's favourite, the only manner in which he could possibly have governed under the conditions of that day, his shifty policy is looked upon as a crime. In our own day it would be regarded as the only course naturally open to a Minister who was dependent for retaining power on a small and uncertain majority. As regards domestic politics, especially when connected with the constitutional relations between the sovereign and his Parliament, Buckingham was, doubtless, in the wrong, but as regards his policy in foreign affairs he was on the whole in the right. In his heart he knew that the old system under which England had been for centuries the ally on the one hand of the power which held Flanders, and on the other of the power or powers which ruled the Spanish peninsula was the right one to pursue. It had been an unfortunate day for England when James the First in part to gain the favour of the Puritans, in part out of a wish to take up the mantle which had fallen from the shoulders of Henri IV., had plunged into the welter of German and Italian politics, in order to combat by the combination of the smaller states of Central Europe into an alliance the phantom of that Universal Monarchy of Spain, which, if it still, perhaps, at moments gibbered under Philip III. was laid to rest for ever in his tomb. James the First's attempt to carry out an international policy with resources too scanty to support it was the real cause of his struggles with his Parliament, and it is difficult to see what benefit England could gain from a policy which only served to strengthen her commercial rivals, the Dutch, and to leave her old enemies, the French, a fair field for rising to greatness on the downfall of Spain. Moreover Buckingham knew that the day was over in which international politics were governed by religious considerations. As Gage, when at Rome in the autumn of 1622, had pointed out to Pope Gregory the Fif-

teenth, who complained that the French King had not pushed home his successes over the Huguenots, Louis XIII. was perfectly justified in negotiating with them. "He knew well enough that the Spaniards who made such a show of their zeal for Catholicism were for their own ends encouraging the French heretics and were doing their best to keep his Kingdom in confusion." On the other hand the French themselves were in alliance with the Protestant Dutch, whilst the exiled Arminians found a refuge at Antwerp, and in Germany most of the Lutheran princes and cities were at any moment ready to support the Emperor in putting down the Calvinists. In England, however, religion still remained the pretext, if not the real motive, for political faction. Buckingham saw clearly that if the Prince of Wales became a convert to Romanism and if toleration was granted to the Catholic religion, he himself would be looked upon as their irreconcilable enemy by the Puritans who controlled Parliament, and was, therefore, forced against his better judgment to take the side of the opponents of Catholicism. He sought to make his own profit by doing so, but he grew cold in the cause when the Palatine refused to marry his heir to Lady Mary Villiers, and when La Rochelle refused to admit an English garrison. But he had gained one great advantage by his journey to Madrid. It had won him the confidence of the Prince of Wales, so that, "he got, as it were, two lives in his own fortune and greatness, whereas, otherwise, the state of a favourite is, at best, but a tenant at will, and rarely transmitted." His quarrel with France was the outcome of his wish to secure the goodwill of Parliament, at a moment when he saw that he was an object of detestation to Henrietta Maria. Amongst English statesmen he was one of the first to recognise the true value of Sea Power and to see that England might play a part in the Mediterranean, in the Baltic and in the Indian Ocean, as well as in the narrow seas, and that her naval activities beyond them need not be confined to isolated raids upon the Spanish Main. His efforts to secure a foothold upon the Continent which might serve as a base for the English fleet were frustrated by men who looked upon a war with Spain as a means of capturing her Plate fleets. In his choice of ministers he was not unsuccessful, Dorchester, Cottington, even Porter and Conway, compare not unfavourably as diplomatists with the eloquent speakers who dilated at Westminster upon the wrongs of the Palatine. He was affable and courteous to his servants and those around him but his

pride made him hateful to his opponents and to the outside world. Latterly Buckingham seemed to have grown very dear to Charles, who, before the journey to Madrid, had probably in secret disliked him. The King was no gainer by his loss. So long as Buckingham lived the Duke bore the blame of all his political failures yet, at the same time, was always able to regain the goodwill of a Parliament, which had not yet made up its mind to break wholly with the traditions of the past. After Buckingham's death, the effects of the King's personal rule proved that he himself was the origin of the evils which his people had hitherto attributed to other influences. Wentworth was his minister and his master, but not his favourite, and Wentworth's "thorough" policy was in strong contrast to the adroit opportunism of George Villiers. Charles allowed his minister to be offered up as an expiation to his injured people, but, as Cotton had foretold even before Buckingham's death, all the history of England proved that such sacrifices "are in vain, and are no less fatal to the master than to the minister in the end." "But with this," as Wotton ends his comparison between Buckingham and Essex "let us commit this noble peere to his eternall rest with his memorable abilities remaining in few, and his compassionate infirmities common to all."¹

To the Palatine and his wife the news was not unwelcome. To Frederick nothing in the world was of importance save his own affairs and he was only too willing to do all in his power to prolong the miseries of Germany, if by so doing he could secure his restoration to the Palatinate. When Soranzo in the middle of August had sought to excite him to use his influence to destroy "these pernicious proceedings," in other words the negotiations in progress between the United Provinces and Spain for a truce, he replied, "If there is any faith in the world, and if one may believe the word of a King and brother I am bound to believe that the King of England will not abandon me, because his last letters to my wife are most explicit without a trace of equivocation." He added "But I know that the favourite may destroy everything." "The first news of the Duke's death," writes Soranzo in a despatch of the eleventh of September, "was brought to the Queen of Bohemia by one who says he left Dover when it arrived. No letters have come but as the wind is favourable some confirmation may arrive before I send these presents. The Queen of Bohemia spoke to me about it yesterday with passion, fearing that it might not be confirmed; as although I

believe that she does not desire these unbecoming things, it is nevertheless certain that if the registers of his fate cannot be changed in any other way she will not object to them."¹

It is one of the enigmas of history that Charles should have been willing to sacrifice everything for a sister, who, in reality, was from first to last, only inspired by a wish to promote her own interests and who, later on, when her brother was fighting to the death for his crown, was in friendly relations with the most violent of his opponents. It is not too much to say that the cold-blooded Elizabeth of Bohemia was a far worse woman than her grandmother, Mary Stuart. Mary sinned out of passion and out of a desire to serve the interests of her religion. Elizabeth sinned out of self-interest, and, as her policy about her daughter Sophia's education was to show, cared nothing for the religion of which she posed as the persecuted defender. She had only refused to regain the Palatinate at the cost of marrying the Electoral Prince to a Catholic princess because she did not trust to the promises of Maximilian of Bavaria, and, possibly, because she did not wish to forfeit her chance of gaining the Crown of England with the support of the Puritans, should her brother die without direct heirs, whilst, if M. de Gourville's testimony is to be believed, she deliberately allowed her youngest daughter to be brought up without any definite religious beliefs, until it was seen whether she would marry a Catholic or a Protestant. Such was the Queen of Bohemia of whom English enthusiasm had made a heroine of the Faith.

The importance of the event was fully realised on the Continent where Buckingham's desire for peace was generally known. To the Infanta it came as an unexpected blow. The tidings reached her just as she had finished a despatch to Philip in which she had communicated to him the progress of the negotiations with England. "The face of things has since changed completely, for we have sure tidings that the Duke of Buckingham was stabbed to the heart by a Scotch lieutenant just as he was about to embark with the fleet for La Rochelle." It was impossible to say what the effects of this event would be. The Rochellers were already treating for terms. At Madrid the blow was even more keenly felt. Antony Porter had arrived there from Brussels but a few days before with powers from Buckingham to negotiate for peace. Pallavicino the Genoese envoy came to the Palace "just as it was on a boil with the news. The Count Duke has felt it very much.

It is doubtful whether the negotiations, which were in a fair way to succeed, will be continued." Self-controlled as Olivares was he openly displayed his grief. He was a man of deep feeling and he may well have been moved by the fate of one with whom he had so often crossed swords, a fate which might at any moment be his own. He knew also that the negotiations with England, on the success of which his whole policy was grounded, had with Buckingham lost their principal support. To Monthoux, the lawyer, who since Tarantaise's death, had been placed in charge of the legation of Savoy, he spoke without reserve as to their expected failure and said that he would condole "with the poor Englishman." Monthoux, however, believed that they would not fall through, "for Lord Bristol, who was Ambassador here, is very friendly to Spain, and is a friend of the Count Duke's. He was an enemy of Buckingham's, but will take up the business. But said the Count Duke, the King will not admit to his intimacy any save those who were friends of Buckingham, and has already taken up a certain lord. I told him this was all very well for His Majesty's private satisfaction, but that the affairs of the State had been placed in Lord Bristol's hands, and that before the new favourite had got into the way of such business they could close the bargain, and, perhaps, even gain him over." Monthoux was, perhaps, over sanguine for Lord Holland, the new favourite, was not only an experienced diplomatist but for years had been at the head of the French party in the Council. A fortnight later, indeed, Philip was writing to the Infanta to inform her that Mirabel reported that Holland had made the same offers of good will to "Mehroussa" as Buckingham had done and that Scaglia, who had come to Paris with an offer to mediate between France and England said it would be as easy for Charles to find safe channels in France for doing so as it would have been in Buckingham's time. The effect of Holland's dalliance with "Mehroussa" was soon to be seen at La Rochelle.¹

If Girolamo Parma, the Mantuan envoy at Venice, is to be trusted, Scaglia had originally gone to England in the interests of Spain rather than of France. Writing from Venice on the sixth of October, Parma says, "Our advices from Flanders confirm the news of Buckingham's death, and say that the fleet would not sail until the 14th ult. This accident which has befallen as it were the primum mobile of that English heaven, has changed the courses of all the others, and the King has been

left, so to speak, a blank sheet as to foreign affairs. We can see this is so because we learn from an express to their ambassador Wake, that His Majesty has sent to invite Abbé Scaglia back to England, to the delight of those at Brussels, and this is a sure proof that what was all along suspected is perfectly true, namely, that the Abbé was negotiating to bring about a reconciliation between Spain and England, and that whilst Buckingham was alive some points had been postponed as to which the King of England wished Scaglia to inform him in detail by word of mouth, possibly in order to put the negotiations on a firmer basis, although it may have been to break them off. This is thought to have been the doing of the Puritans, who had already begun to give signs of displeasure at these negotiations, chiefly because they were being carried on through the ministers of a Prince of whom like His Highness of Savoy, they entertain the deepest suspicion, for these gentry have seen through his plans for giving their brethren in Switzerland some trouble." As Charles Emanuel's plans against Geneva had necessarily come under the notice of the extreme Puritan Wake, it was probable that the unusual knowledge of foreign intrigues displayed by his co-religionists in England may easily be accounted for. "This is the reason why the Spaniards have some shadow of suspicion that peace between France and England will be patched up by the afore-said Puritans, whether La Rochelle is relieved or no, and that the English fleet will then be diverted either to attack Flanders or to harass the coasts of Spain."¹

For a time the departure of the fleet was delayed by the want of money, but as the King was bound to listen to the advice of his Council, the majority of whom were Puritans, Contarini believed that the preparations would be completed as fast as possible. Lord Lindsey, a soldier rather than a diplomatist, was appointed to replace Buckingham as its commander. His instructions were framed upon the lines which Contarini had suggested to his predecessor, and to which the King had determined to give his consent at the Council which was to be held at Southwick Manor upon the very morning of the catastrophe. By Charles' orders they were communicated to the Venetian Ambassador. If the French King would give up the siege of La Rochelle, Lindsey was authorised to begin a negotiation for peace, and on no account "to do hurt" by entering "that place or any other in France." In return France must allow the expedition to bring into the town

the provisions which had been brought by the fleet, "not as part of the relief from England, but as victuals bought by the Rochellers in the way of trade. The fleet will then return without doing anything further." These terms were varied from those originally suggested by Vincent and apparently sanctioned by the Duke. Under those conditions a truce would have been agreed to during which the French would have every day sent a supply of provisions into the place on payment by the burghers. It had been also stipulated that Rohan and all the other Huguenots should be included in the peace which was to be arranged by the English authorities on the fleet at the prayer of deputies who were to be sent on board it from Rochelle. If Rohan and his confederates refused to agree to its terms, the Rochellers were left free to promise obedience on their own account. In the instructions given to Lindsey it was only stated that "if the Rochellers are freed by the Most Christian's desire to give peace to his subjects and to attend to foreign affairs, His Majesty will assist him in the work for the sake of the common cause to which he is much attached." In any case, however, it was stipulated that provisions must be introduced into the town, probably in order to place the besieged in a position to treat with the besiegers on more equal terms, and, in Lindsey's instructions, no possible loop-hole was left for an evasion upon this point. To forward the preliminary negotiations it was arranged that Contarini should be allowed to send an agent to France without delay, as Buckingham had in the first instance proposed although he would have preferred to send a gentleman of his own to Zorzi, with whom Contarini suggested that he should confer when he arrived off the coast, "before they proceed to the last extremity."¹

The position as to the peace negotiations was a sufficiently delicate one. Zorzi was warned "that the peace with those of the religion must go in unison with the one between the two crowns, as for good reasons of State they do not want the one without the other here, and it will also be a great advantage that they should add the third point," namely "that if the peace is made, the English fleet will be employed for the public cause, and so the French also should assist Italy or Germany." Such was the tenor of the letter to Zorzi drawn up by Contarini and Buckingham. Its meaning is obvious enough for it would evidently be a great disadvantage to England, if she remained at war with France, after Louis XIII. had made peace with the Rochellers,

whilst if the English naval forces were employed to assist the King of Denmark, the French might well be asked, especially if Bethlen Gabor could be induced to attack the Emperor, to send their forces into Germany.¹ Contarini, however, was doubtless not aware that Buckingham was in the closest relations with Olivares and that he was even willing to go secretly to Spain to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.² The prospects of peace with Spain would not be improved if he concluded a peace with France, though it would be utterly useless if the Huguenot troubles still remained unsettled. Holland, on the other hand, who was the chief author of the French marriage cared little or nothing about the goodwill of Spain, but set great store upon the restoration of friendly relations with France. Hence he was only too willing to take up the threads of Buckingham's negotiations with Chevreuse.

On the sixth of September Lindsey set sail from Portsmouth with a fair wind. He was accompanied by Walter Montagu, who had been the channel of communication between Marie de Medicis and Buckingham, and whose presence on board was of evil omen to the cause of Rochelle.

The English people, as a whole, were determined never to desert the Huguenots. They had imbibed a sense of their fellowship with the French Protestants from their earliest childhood, and this maxim had grown stronger as time went by. Buckingham even had at one moment made it a point of honour to enter Rochelle in triumph as its redeemer, for he had believed that he could thus force Richelieu to come to terms. The Council now ruled, but though they were apparently eager to support the Huguenots, they, like the King, were secretly eager for peace with France so that they might have their hands free to carry the war against the Austrian House into Germany.³ If the Huguenot difficulty were out of the way, the arrangement with France would be a mere trifle, and Montagu was not the man to allow the Huguenots to form an insuperable obstacle to a lasting settlement.

Whilst the fleet was running towards the Bay of Biscay, matters in Rochelle were going from bad to worse. La Grossetière had been taken prisoner on his way back from England and Richelieu had prepared to try him for High Treason, on which the burghers threatened to hang de Fequièrre, who was a prisoner in their hands. The Cardinal sent an officer named Arnault to treat for his release, but in reality to open negotiations which on the four-

teenth of September were placed in the hands of Fequièrre himself. He returned to the town the same evening with good hopes of effecting an arrangement, but that very night a letter dated July the twenty-fourth arrived from David in which he said that the English fleet would shortly be off the coast, and that Buckingham would himself accompany it. Two days before a mounted messenger had made his way along the beach into the town with the news that the fleet was on the point of sailing. All thoughts of negotiating were laid aside, and the resolution of the populace was strengthened by reports that at midnight a fleet of fire had been seen in the heavens forcing its way through the dyke.¹ If Zorzi is to be believed the task of forcing the dyke, or even of raising the siege, did not need the intervention of any celestial portents for its success. When he inspected it in the middle of September the damage done by the gale in the previous July had been superficially repaired, the lines of circumvallation were crumbling, the batteries were strewn with dismounted guns, and the lines were held but by a few thousand ragged troops. It was said, however, that seven or eight thousand gentlemen were scattered over the neighbouring country, and that they could be got together to repel an attack within a few hours. Under such circumstances it seems astonishing that the Rochellers did not take the field against their besiegers, especially if Gascony and Guienne were willing to rise in insurrection on the first appearance of help from abroad.²

On September the eighteenth the Rochellers learnt the news of Buckingham's death. His fate had not been regretted by Soubise and by their deputies who doubted his goodwill to relieve them.³

At the moment of Lindsey's departure Charles, who, as he told Contarini, had not the same confidence in him as in the Duke, had made a change in his instructions, perhaps under pressure from the Puritans, which was to prove of fatal consequence to the Rochellers. By his original instructions the Admiral was bound to insist that, even if a truce was arranged, the French were to allow the town to be reprovisioned during its continuance, and that this condition was on no account to be waived. "In proof of his goodwill for peace" the King, however, "had added that 'the admiral' if able to relieve La Rochelle, was to do so without damaging any other place in France, and, if unable, was to return with the same regards, provided he was not provoked; indeed, if the French propose any treaty to him, he is not to reject it, but is

to send it here immediately. He is also to return, if able to relieve the fortress without bloodshed not as succour from England but as provisions purchased by the Rochellese." In other words, as Zorzi had foretold in the previous June, the third attempt to relieve Rochelle was nothing but a farce intended to throw dust in the eyes of the English public, although, in Contarini's opinion, if Buckingham had lived, it would have been absolutely necessary for him to force his way into the place, or to perish in the attempt. The ambassador even thought that Charles would have stayed the fleet from sailing, had he been able to do so, after he had learnt from Zorzi's letter that Richelieu had expressed his willingness to treat. But when the courier arrived from France the Admiral was already well on his way to the Bay of Biscay, and it was impossible to call him back.¹

On the twenty-eighth of September signals from the Isle of Rhé announced to the watchers on the mainland that the long expected invaders were in the offing, and by the evening the topsails of the English vessels could be seen off the Isle of Loix. Next day the English made sail and tried to draw in to the coast near Le Plomb ; all the troops were called under arms to repel an attempt at landing but as the wind fell they were set to work again on the dyke. Bassompierre had been to visit the Cardinal who was bringing him back to La Leu in his carriage when a shot from the town struck the ground near the coach and filled it with earth. The King transferred his headquarters to La Leu and to the astonishment of the whole court the Marshal was able to lodge and entertain more than two thousand persons in that small village, but at a cost to himself of eight hundred crowns (£200) a day.

The nearness of the enemy kept everyone on the alert, and Bassompierre spent his night in going the rounds of the sentinels.

Next day the King inspected the batteries and the dyke, which he now found to be in such good order that it would repel any hostile force. In the afternoon the English were reinforced by sixteen large ships of war, and about two o'clock made sail and tried to pass through the strait between Chef de Bois and Sablanceaux. The fire from the batteries on the coast, which was lined by the bulk of the French was so hot that they were forced to draw in as close as they could to the Isle of Rhé, and after firing several broadsides without effect, fell back through the Antioche passage to the anchorage where Denbigh had lain in May. More vessels joined the English on the first of October, but the wind

fell just as they were preparing to attack the Chef de Bois. Meanwhile the whole country was rising in arms and crowds of the nobility came in to serve as volunteers. On the second, ten of Peblitz' fireships were sent in and exploded without doing any damage.

The night of the second of October passed quietly but when the breeze rose at dawn, on Tuesday the third, the English vessels slipped their cables and stood in between the two headlands of the outer harbour. Bassompierre, who had been going his rounds all night, had seen the lights on the boats moving about amongst the ships, and had guessed that an attempt at a landing would be made. He at once sent to summon the King and Cardinal who hastened down to the coast attended by a brilliant throng of nobles. The shore was lined with troops under arms and the batteries were packed with eager gunners. Zorzi hurried to join the King and arrived just as the English were getting under weigh. Their ships were arranged in three divisions and came on under full sail, with their canvas swelling with the light breeze. In the eyes of the Venetian who, like all his countrymen, loved the sea, the sight was one which he thought could never be equalled. The attack was conducted, in the main, in accordance with the Fighting Instructions which had been given by Lord Wimbledon to his second in command, Lord Essex, when three years before he had sailed from Plymouth on the expedition to Cadiz.

The van, led by Lindsey himself, after making several tacks to get the wind, came on about half-past seven to within cannon shot of the French fleet, which, at Bassompierre's request, had fallen back a little towards the palisades, so that they might not be fired into by their own guns. Then they put about, and delivered their broadsides, tacked and delivered the others, and every vessel, after doing so, showed her stern, stayed and trimmed her sails. After the van had delivered their broadsides, the centre, and the rear did the same, then all tacked again and gave their sides, thus keeping the enemy under perpetual volleys. This manœuvre as if it were the figure of "some stately morrice," they repeated three times. The French for their part "did not go to sleep," the cannon thundered without ceasing from their ships and coast batteries, and gave the English some music for their dancing, and that well performed too." The "ball lasted" for two hours and a half, during which about five thousand shots were fired. The King was in the battery of the Chef de Bois, and

above three hundred balls passed over his head to bury themselves in the ground three hundred feet behind. When the tide fell at ten o'clock the English fell back with it, and the French were left with the consoling thought that their fleet and army would be unscathed by an enemy who were powerless to harm them. The English had discharged a number of floating mines, but they had not been of the slightest use, whilst the hopes which they had set upon a fireship packed with rockets had been bitterly disappointed, for it burnt itself out before it could drift down upon the French vessels. They by their own showing lost two hundred men during the engagement, the French only twenty or thirty. Of these, three or four were killed at Coreilles by a shot from the town, the first and last time during the siege, that their guns carried so far. During the whole attack the burghers were cannonading the lines of circumvallation, but with slight results. On the fourth the attack was renewed, but the tide was so low that the large ships were forced to remain with the transports, and those who came in seemed, so Bassompierre thought, almost afraid to close with the batteries. The French fleet drew out to meet them, and was met by a squadron of nine fireships, which, however, were grappled by the French boats and towed under the cliffs of the Chef de Bois where they burnt away harmlessly.¹

Bassompierre was for once not in the inner secrets of the Court. He did not know that all this bloodshed might well have been spared. At the urgent request both of Charles and Contarini it had been arranged that only Louis XIII. and Richelieu should be admitted into Zorzi's confidence, as it was feared that if his proposals became known, the Spanish party and the nobles who were "thirsting for glory" would do their best to frustrate the negotiations. Had Charles himself not been so eager for Rochelle to be relieved, perhaps mainly because he thought that he could get better terms from France as to the Queen's Household, the one matter which really interested him, if peace was signed after such a victory, it is possible that Lindsey would never have fired a shot. Scarcely had Zorzi witnessed the arrival of the English fleet, when he had decided to see the Cardinal and ask him to allow the Venetian secretary to be sent on board in order to arrange for a conference between the ministers before they came to blows. He accordingly went to His Eminence's headquarters late at night, roused him from his slumbers, and made his request. The Cardinal, who was half asleep, said Zorzi might send a messenger

on his own account, as, if anyone were to learn that he himself had done so, he would be loaded with abuse by all France. Next morning, however, Richelieu possibly "because he had recovered from his fright" at the arrival of the English, changed his mind, and, after communicating with the King, refused to permit anyone to be sent to Lindsey, as "now that Buckingham was dead, the new Admiral might not allow any vessel to approach the fleet," even if it had a Venetian messenger on board. "The King thanked me for my goodwill and was greatly obliged to me. In the meantime I must consider irrevocable what he had frequently said to me, that he could never object to peace with England, provided that monarch decided to give up protecting La Rochelle and the Huguenots. As soon as the place surrendered he would go to relieve Casale and help the Duke of Mantua.

"With these words the matter dissolved in smoke. It is not unlikely that Your Serenity will soon hear of the surrender of La Rochelle especially, as one may judge by appearances, if the English leave it destitute without doing anything, but I am very doubtful about the royal standards passing into Italy. In short the French will let Casale fall by the same acts that the English have used for the ruin of La Rochelle." For a moment it looked as if the Rochellers would settle their fate for themselves. After the failure of the attack on the fourth of October, their deputies on board the fleet, Friquelet and Lestreille, sent to Bassompierre to ask for a conference. He brought them on shore and took them to Richelieu in his own coach, but the Cardinal refused to allow them to go to the town, so that they might report its condition to the English, and they, therefore, returned on board. On the seventh the burghers themselves refused an offer from the King to negotiate with them, if they would treat independently of the English.¹

Within a few days, however, the English were in negotiation with the French, independently of the Rochellers, a course which in view of the particulars which Charles had added to Lindsey's institutions, the Admiral now that he had twice failed in his attempts to force the dyke, might conceivably think himself authorised to take. Montagu was sent on shore on the fifteenth, with permission to visit his friend the Duke of Chevreuse, apparently without any communication with Zorzi who only heard of his landing from a gentleman of the Princess of Conti on the following day. By Chevreuse he was taken to Richelieu, whom

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he assured that his master was most anxious for peace so that he might have his hands free to make war upon the House of Austria in Germany. The Cardinal replied that the only means of reconciling the two crowns was for them to think no more about La Rochelle, which was already taken, or of the Huguenots who were already lost, if they did not keep within bounds. He added that the punishment of the town was not for religion but for rebellion. He went on to assure him that out of special regard for the King of England, no other place, or person of that party should suffer in person, goods or privileges, provided they did not abuse the royal favour and "continue in their errors," an expression which evidently had a political and not a religious signification. To this Montagu could reply nothing so he took his leave of the Cardinal, with the request that he would allow him to make his way to England by St. Malo, to report the real state of affairs to his King, and promising to be back in a fortnight "with some not unfavourable solution, unless the sea hindered his passage. Accordingly the Cardinal assigned la Ramé, or Meos as they call him, for his guard, to take him to Britany." On the very day Montagu landed, a deserter had reported to the Rochellers that he was with the King, and added "that a cannon shot fired from the Belfry of St. Bartholomew had struck the rampart of Fort St. Louis close by where the King was standing talking to Montagu, and covered them both with dirt. On this the Rochellers thought themselves bound to redouble those prayers to God to preserve His Majesty from all harm which they daily offered up at Sermon."¹

But despite the oraisons of the Rochellers, and Montagu's gentle cooings, hostilities still continued, at least in show, in the waters of the harbour, whilst within the town famine was a grim reality. As the best of the flood tides had passed and for lack of wind the English had done nothing, the burghers took stock of their remaining resources. It was found that only one hundred and fifty bushels of wheat were left. For months bread had not been seen on many tables. All the horses, asses, mules, dogs, cats, rats and mice had long ago been devoured. The very streets were bared of grass, and the snails had vanished. Men cheated their hunger with boiled leather or crushed wood, or, as Mervault saw with his own eyes, greedily swallowed horse dung, whilst the very bones which the dogs had gnawed clean were sought as delicacies. The streets and houses were full of rotting corpses. Many lay down in the cemetery to die. Yet the mob

suffered without complaining and no rioters crowded to the Town Hall clamouring for surrender. The soldiers were too weak to move the cannon, and it was a common thing for those who went the rounds to find that the sentinels had fallen dead at their posts. On some nights there was not a living soul in many of the guard rooms, and when the reliefs arrived the half of those who had answered to the roll call a few hours before had perished. Yet great charity was shown: many distributed their whole stores amongst the poor, and a widow, who had sacrificed her all for others and to whom her sister had denied bread, found a sack of wheat thrown down by a stranger at her door and lived on it until the siege was over. Such were the horrors which men suffered in their fear of an imaginary danger to their religion and what they wrongly deemed the rights of their city.¹

On the twenty-first the French in their turn sent down fireships, against the English fleet, and forced several vessels to cut their cables, whilst two days later the English again advanced against the palisade, but effected nothing to the disgust of even the cynical Zorzi. "I blush that to make a second letter I must write of the third pretty Morrish dance of the English. This morning with a great clamour of drums and trumpets at the usual hour, with wind and tide, they acted as usual, without doing any more than before. They fired quite 3,000 or 4,000 shots without doing any harm. The six fireships sent forward were made useless by the shalloops, much to the delight of the spectators. I was unable to arrive in time myself despite every effort. I am told that the small barques behaved admirably and that it was a marvel that all came off safe, as after they had rendered those machines innocuous, they all formed in battle array, and went within musket shot of the English fleet, and although in a tempest of shot they would not retire until the English had done the same." Much to the annoyance of the French the English had landed at night and had burnt some magazines of forage. "The French think it the more strange because it is the English who have asked for peace through Montagu, and therefore they ought to be the more careful." They professed that they were by no means astonished that the English fleet should have again attacked the palisades, as they believed that it had made a feint of doing so in order to encourage the Rochellers, who suspected that negotiations were going on, and to show them that they would not conclude anything without them, although they could settle nothing

before Montagu had returned with instructions from Whitehall.

On the evening of the third attack the deputies from Rochelle who were on board the English fleet, sent a message to Bassompierre to ask him if he would procure their pardon from the King. He at once agreed to undertake the mission, and had them brought on shore in his own boat and escorted to La Saussaye, where Richelieu's quarters were, whilst he himself went to Fort Lafons to speak with some persons from the town who wished to treat. By the Cardinal's orders they were brought on to La Saussaye, where the two deputations were conducted to separate rooms. The Cardinal first received those who had come from the fleet, who begged him to allow them to speak with the envoys from the town, and pledged their words that after they had done so they would return to their obedience. He dismissed them and then received the representatives of Rochelle, who also begged to be allowed to communicate with the fleet, and promised that they would then surrender if they could do so on tolerable terms. The Cardinal replied that, if they would promise not to speak to them, they might see their colleagues at once, and to their intense astonishment took them into his gallery where he had left Friquelet and Lestreille. On this the Rochellers offered to put themselves in the King's hands without delay, but the Cardinal replied that His Majesty had gone away for a week and that he would speak to him when he came back. "In a week, Monseigneur," cried one of them, "we have not enough in Rochelle to keep us for three days." Thereupon His Eminence spoke to them very seriously and pointed out to them to what a state they were reduced, but said that he would nevertheless induce the King to treat them leniently. He then drafted some articles which they said would certainly be accepted, and allowed the two parties to confer together for some time, after which those from the Fleet asked that they might be included in the treaty, to which the Cardinal assented subject to the King's pleasure. The two deputations then returned to their respective quarters. On the twenty-sixth a gentleman from the fleet arrived in Rochelle, bringing letters from Vincent in which he said that Montagu had gone to England with proposals from Richelieu, and others from Lindsey advising the Rochellers to treat with the Cardinal when Montagu returned. On this the Mayor assembled the Council and it was at length decided to ask for the King's mercy, as the English for want of a

wind had remained for a month with their arms folded and had done nothing. That same day the deputies from Rochelle and from the fleet went to thank the Cardinal for the terms which he had secured for them from the King, and joyfully accepted them. Three days afterwards Bassompierre presented the deputies to His Majesty; "they knelt down before him and made their humble submission, after which he addressed them in a few words, whilst the Keeper of the Seals, who spoke at some length, formally pronounced their forgiveness." On All Saints' Day, Wednesday, November the first, Louis XIII. entered the town in state by the Porte de Cuygues. The Cardinal met him at the gate, and presented him with the Keys of the City, whilst the burghers thronged around him to implore his mercy. The royal procession then marched to the Church of Ste. Marguerite which had been hastily stripped of its Calvinistic trappings, to be present at vespers and to listen to a sermon from Father Suffren. On the morrow, All Souls' Day, the Holy Sacrament was solemnly carried through the streets, now purged from heresy, followed by the King who walked with bared head under a canopy supported by d'Angoulême, Schomberg, d'Alais and Bassompierre. Two days later the Cardinal offered Bassompierre the command of the army which was to be sent into Italy to relieve Casale. The siege of Rochelle was over, and Richelieu had at last laid the corner stone on which the fabric of the French domination over Europe was in the not far distant future to be reared.¹ So long as the Huguenots retained the political power which had been granted to them by the Edict of Nantes so long was it impossible for France to take her natural place abroad, for, at any moment, ambitious intriguers at home, hiding their designs under the pretext of religion, might reduce the kingdom to a chaos of warring provinces, and thus undo that work of centralising the executive power which had been the task of every French Monarch since the expulsion of the English. To the French Monarchy the conquest of Rochelle was what the interdiction of the marriage of priests had been to the Papacy, for had the Rochellers succeeded in their designs, the age of Louis XIV might have witnessed a repetition of the disasters which had followed on the death of Louis the Pious. Had Louis XIV been content to continue the wise policy of Richelieu and to render the Huguenots the obedient subjects of the civil power whilst leaving them free to obey the dictates of their consciences as to religion undisturbed, the defeat of the designs of

Soubise and of Rohan would have been nothing but a blessing to their country. But from the day when a King of France gave an ear to those who shrunk from no measures which might secure the outward appearance of a unity in religion, for which the Popes themselves cared but little, the powerlessness of the Huguenots became a national disaster of which the effects were only seen in the French Revolution.

Both Charles the First and England were destined to pay dearly for the opportunist policy which had shaped his course during the first years of his reign. So far as can be seen England should not have undertaken, at the request of France, to become the guarantor of the Edict of Nantes, for by this guarantee she necessarily became involved in all the entanglements of the internal troubles of France. With France, indeed, England had no real concern whatsoever, for so far as her relations with foreign powers were concerned, her all important interests were in no way, or, at least only indirectly, connected with France. If, in order to please the Puritans and to secure their support against the Catholics, Charles chose to champion the cause of the King and Queen of Bohemia, and by so doing so to become the enemy of the House of Austria in Germany if not of the Spanish Hapsburgs, he was only playing the part which every French statesman would have desired him to play, and at the same time might hope to secure his ends through the influence of the French with the members of the German Empire. It is true that the interests of the King and Queen of Bohemia were of no importance to England, and that in pursuing them she not only weakened herself, but strengthened the position of the Dutch, who were fast becoming her most dangerous commercial rivals, but such arguments had little weight with those who clung to the traditional belief in a chimera like the Universal Monarchy of Spain. The alternative course open to him was to seek the support of the Catholics and to maintain that policy which had as a rule been held to be the guiding star of English statesmen until after the accession of Elizabeth, namely, that England, whilst leaving the affairs of Germany and of the German branch of the Hapsburgs severely alone, should maintain a close alliance with the Spanish Hapsburgs, the successors of the House of Burgundy, who had been her natural allies on the Continent before the Reformation. Nor need her friendship with Spain necessarily have occasioned the ill-will of France, as it was not until after the fall of

La Rochelle that the Spanish Government sought to secure the active support of England against her opponent in Italy. The dispute between England and Spain was a gratuitous one and due in the first place to the ignorance of those statesmen who failed to understand the limitations which hampered Spain in her relations with the Empire, and, in the second, to the short-sighted policy which led Charles and Buckingham to undertake a war against the traditional enemy of the Protestant Religion in order to regain the goodwill of Parliament. If they intended the war to be a serious one, and if they wished to bring Spain to her knees, it was unwise in the extreme that, in place of joining France in an attack on Genoa, they should enter into a contest with her under conditions which forced them to divert their forces to support La Rochelle, which for military or naval purposes was devoid of importance. The war with France was due, indeed, it was said, to Buckingham's desire to revenge himself on the French Court for their refusal to receive him as Ambassador, and also to his wish to pose before the Puritans as the champion of their injured brethren abroad. A much more serious motive was, however, to be found in the fact that so long as French vessels continued to carry naval stores to Spanish ports, so long would Spain be able to continue her preparations for an invasion of England, which, in the weak condition of the English fleet might possibly prove successful.¹

As Alvisé Contarini pointed out, whilst Lindsey was executing naval morrice dances before the palisades at Rochelle, rich Indiamen, freighted for London, were lying in Irish ports, fearful of crossing the Channel, lest they should be captured by the Dunkirkers. "For the coast defence of these realms which are quite helpless, the Dutch have been asked to make their ships cruise off them, and to bring Morgan's troops towards Glückstadt; the States have also been asked to help the English with their naval forces."² Such was the only tangible justification for a war between England and France, the results of which were felt well into the Nineteenth Century, for the age of Louis XIV. dates from the English abandonment of Rochelle.

On the other hand the contests against France and Spain bore their fruits in the after history of the House of Stuart. The intrigues of Mazarin played their part in stirring up that Civil War, in which the fall of Charles I. was brought about by the defection of a Navy which had become estranged from the Crown by the

experiences of Cadiz and of the Isle of Rhé, nor was his son's restoration accomplished until both the Navy and the Army joined in bringing it to pass. The Revolution again was owing to the relations between England and France, a power with which England, when James the First ascended the throne, had but little or no concern, although the French ambassador would gladly have prevented the union of England and Scotland under one crown.

Such was the outcome of Buckingham's policy towards France and Spain, but it must not be forgotten that his failure to take Cadiz and to relieve La Rochelle was in a great measure due to his fears that Spinola would invade England with the forces which he had collected upon the Flemish coast, and which, for a while, seemed to have assured to Spain the mastery of the seas. Spinola's success was destined to be a disastrous one for Spain, for had the Huguenots held out in France, Richelieu must have held his hand in Italy, and the war of the Mantuan Succession would never have been fought. The fall of Rochelle was a turning point in History.

CHAPTER LXXXII

To Spain the death of Duke Vincenzo the Second of Mantua, which took place on the night of the twenty-sixth of December, 1627, was an event of momentous import. As Bacon had pointed out, when to win Buckingham's good graces, he was urging his countrymen to enter into the war with Philip the Fourth, the greatness of Spain was a very fragile thing. Spain was only very thinly populated, her soil was poor, and her native citizens were barely sufficient in number to supply the needs of the employments open to them in her vast and scattered Empire. It was rare indeed to find ten or twelve thousand Spaniards in one of her armies, and the resources of the country were in themselves wholly insufficient to supply the wastage of a single battle. But for the huge forces from all nations which her wealth enabled Spain to gather round her standards, to be welded together by her own veterans, Spain could never have carried on a campaign beyond the bounds of her peninsula. It was true that Spain alone amongst the European States was a "money breeder," but her hold over the Indies with their emeralds and spices their mines of gold and silver depended upon her sea-power for the moment when she lost the control of the ocean ways the Indies would fall an easy prey to her conqueror, "so as this axle-tree whereupon their greatness resteth is soon cut in two by any that shall be stronger than they by sea."¹ And what was true of the wealth of Spain was true also of her man-power, for unless she had been the mistress of the seas through which her galleys passed from Barcelona and Carthagená to the ports of Italy, and unless she could keep open the roads which led from Genoa to the Valley of the Rhine and to the Danubian lands, it would be impossible for her to bring together her Flemish and Italian levies, and the recruits furnished to her by the Holy Roman Empire and even from distant Poland. If she lost her mastery over those roads, she might well abandon all hope of retaining her dominion over Flanders, for the seaway from the Gallician ports to Antwerp was at the

mercy of the English and of the Dutch, whilst if communication with Milan were interrupted by an untoward event not only would she speedily lose the Milanese, but, possibly, in the long run even Naples itself. But scarcely had the great North Road from Genoa crossed the Apennines, when it emerged into the open basin of the Po, and could at any moment be barred by those who held the great fortresses in that valley. Of these the most important were Mantua and Casale which lay to the east and west respectively of the highway from Genoa to Milan, and were the capitals of the Duchy of Mantua, and the Marquisate of Monferrat. They had been fortified by their possessors the Gonzaghi, Dukes of Mantua, with such skill that they were ranked with justice amongst the strongest places in Europe. The Gonzaghi had for over two centuries been the principal agents who had hired in the Welsh Marches and in the fastnesses of Germany the archers and the lansquenets by whom the quarrels of the mediæval despots in Italy were fought out, and had amassed vast wealth not only from this traffic, but from their trade in arms with Northern Africa under a license from Pope Leo X., from the sale of their famous horses, and from the returns from silk factories which in the city of Mantua alone amounted in 1627 to nearly one hundred thousand crowns (£25,000.) They had employed these resources to consolidate their power, to maintain a luxurious court, and to form matrimonial alliances through which they had become connected by ties of blood with the greatest potentates of Europe. Ferdinand the Second, indeed, had to the annoyance of his Spanish kinsmen married as his second wife Leonora of Mantua, the daughter of Duke Vincenzo the First.

Both Mantua and Monferrat, like almost every other state in Northern Italy, were members of the Holy Roman Empire and were held by their rulers as vassals of the Emperor by feudal tenure and under Imperial grants. As the Emperor's vassals every Duke, on his accession had to receive investiture from him as his suzerain before he could legally take possession of his dominions. In cases in which the succession was disputed, the claimants appealed to the Imperial tribunals which adjudicated upon the case according to the laws of the Empire, and the Emperor accorded the investiture to the successful litigant. Such was the procedure which applied to all the fiefs of the Empire wheresoever situated, and which in 1625 had been followed in deciding the claims of the Appiani to the state of Piombino.

Ferdinand II. was the champion of Law, and fresh from his victories over the Danes, was not the man to permit the rights of that Empire which, in his eyes, was by no means a mere "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" to be treated with contempt either in Germany or in Italy. The question of the Mantuan Succession at the death of Duke Vincenzo the Second was one which opened up the vista of a long series of disputes, and these disputes were of a nature not only to interest the Princes of Germany and of Italy, but to bring Spain and France into the keenest opposition and also to bring about a conflict of interests between the Spanish and the Austrian Hapsburgs, at a time when the Court of Vienna was far from being controlled by influences favourable to Spain.

The positions of Mantua and of Monferrat were from a legal point of view distinct. The Gonzaga family had originally obtained Mantua as a lordship by an Imperial grant in the year 1334, but when the lordship had been raised successively to a marquisate and to a duchy, the terms of that grant had been varied in such a manner as to render the question as to the nature of the succession one of some doubt. It could not be denied on the other hand that Monferrat was a fief the descent of which passed through the female line. The fief which had been first established in 967 by Imperial diploma as a marquisate had passed by marriage into the hands of the family of Palæologhi, and when under Charles the Fifth that family had become extinct in the male line, had passed to Margaret, daughter of Marquis William I., who had married Duke Frederick of Mantua, to whom jointly with his wife the investiture was granted by the Emperor on December 31st, 1532. Duke Charles III. of Savoy, however, raised a claim to possess it on the ground that he had purchased the reversion from the Marquis John George Palæologus. To this claim Duke Frederick opposed the objection that Marquis John George was a usurper, and that, in any case, he could not grant a transfer of the fief without the consent of the Emperor as his overlord. On this Charles V. issued a declaration on May 7, 1534, that his charter of 1532 to Duke Frederick was not intended to prejudice the rights which the Dukes of Savoy might have over certain portions of Monferrat, and subsequently ordered the case to be heard by the Prince of Ascoli as his commissary. Ascoli, however, never pronounced any definite decision, and though in 1541 the Duke of Savoy petitioned the Emperor to adjudicate

upon his claim to the districts between the Po and the Tanaro, the matter was not then dealt with, so that, though since 1532 Monferrat had been annexed to the Duchy of Mantua, yet, under the grant of 1534, the Dukes of Savoy still retained the right of petitioning the Imperial authorities to decide as to their claims. It was thus open to Charles Emmanuel to reopen the question of Monferrat at any time. In 1555 the French had taken Casale by treachery, but, in 1559, had been forced to restore it to William I. of Mantua under the Treaty of Cateau Cambresis. In 1590 Vincenzo I. had, by the advice of Count Germanico Savorgnano, converted it into one of the strongest fortresses in Europe at the expense of a million gold ducats [£250,000]. Its citadel, castle, and ramparts, flanked by six large hornworks, required a garrison of six thousand men whose upkeep cost the State of Monferrat six thousand gold crowns a year.

The city which is one of no great antiquity stands on the right bank of the Po, at the foot of the vine clad hills which stretch westwards to the neighbourhood of Turin and thus part the Piedmontese plain into a northern and a southern half. Around it on all sides, save to the south-west, stretch the fertile plains of Lombardy richly clothed with the verdure of vines, of poplars, and of mulberries, and with the fields of wheat, of rice, and of maize which made Casale one of the granaries of Northern Italy. Beyond them to the northward rises the great wall of the Pennine Alps, above which tower the glittering glaciers of Monte Rosa and the sharp pyramid of the Matterhorn. Although Casale had never produced any great artist, it possessed a fine Lombard Cathedral whose walls had been incised by sculptors of the seventh century with representations of the battles of Abraham and Chedorlaomer portrayed in inlaid marbles, whilst its citizens, who boasted that they ranked with the noblest houses in Italy, had expended the wealth which they had derived from their grains and silks on palaces which still vie even with those of Genoa. Its territory was healthful and was so thickly populated that in places the farms and villas in the hills when seen from a distance looked like one continuous village. Casale lay between the Po and the Tanaro and thus formed part of the district which was claimed by Savoy.¹

As early as the death of Duke Vincenzo I. in 1610 it was foreseen that the question of the Mantuan Succession might soon become a burning one. He left three sons, Francis, who succeeded him as

Francis II., Ferdinand and Vincenzo, and two daughters, Margaret married to Henri, Duke of Lorraine, and Leonora wife of the Emperor Ferdinand II. None of his sons had any male issue, but Francis II. had by his wife Margaret, daughter of Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, a daughter named Maria, on whom the succession to Monferrat if not to Mantua would rightly devolve if the senior branch of the Gonzaghi died out. Francis II. died young in 1612 and was followed in both states by his brother Ferdinand, who, much to the chagrin of Olivares, on his death in 1626 did not leave behind him any issue whose legitimacy could not be impugned. On Ferdinand's death his only surviving brother succeeded him as Vincenzo II. Two junior branches of the Gonzaghi thus saw a prospect opened to them of succeeding to the rich inheritance. Of these the first were the descendants of Ludovico Gonzaga, a younger son of that Federigo II., who had received the title of Duke of Mantua from Charles V. and with his wife Margaret and his children Francis, William, and Isabella had also received the rights of denizens from Francis the First in order that they might be able to hold titles and properties in France. Ludovico had entered the French service and under Henri II. had seen much service against the Imperial Armies. He had in consequence been put under the Ban of the Empire as a traitor and had thus, as the feudal lawyers alleged, forfeited the right of possessing any Imperial fief both in his own person and in those of his descendants. This sentence had never been reversed and therefore, though the descendants of Ludovico Gonzaga retained the right of succeeding to Mantua they were not, so it was asserted, entitled to enter upon its possession. In 1627 Ludovico's representative was his son Charles, who in virtue of his mother Henriette, the heiress of the House of Nevers and Rethel, held the duchies of Nevers and Rethel in France, and had a son also named Charles who was known by the title of Duke of Rethel. Both Nevers and his son were French subjects, and all their interests were exclusively French. The other candidates to the succession to Mantua were the Dukes of Guastalla, who were the descendants of Ferrante, the younger brother of Duke Federigo II., and who held territories which had been erected into a duchy in 1621. The reigning Duke of Guastalla was Imperial Commissary in Italy, and with his son, Don Cæsar, was heartily devoted to the interests of Spain. Although the Guastallas were the junior of the two lines, it was claimed

that under the charter granted to Gian Francesco, first Marquis of Mantua, by the Emperor Sigismund, in 1435, they were entitled to the possession of Mantua in virtue of the sentence pronounced against Ludovico Gonzaga and his descendants seventy years before. Thus the candidates to the Mantuan succession brought the interests of France and Spain into direct antagonism, for it could not well be doubted that if Nevers succeeded in establishing his claims, Mantua and Casale would become French fortresses in all but in name, and the Duke of Savoy would then be too weak to close the gates of Italy against the French.¹

The Duke of Nevers had always been a great traveller; he had served in Hungary with the Imperial Forces, was well known at the Court of Brussels, and had kept in touch with his kinsmen at Mantua by frequent visits to Italy. When in 1626 the French Government had been left free to take its own line abroad by coming to terms with the Huguenots, he had succeeded in inducing Duke Ferdinand to take his eldest son, the Duke of Rethel, into his household. The news came as a shock to Olivares, who, busy as he was with the negotiations which culminated in the Peace of Monzon, found time to ask his confidant, the Marquis Giovanni Gonzaga, to give him full particulars as to the Duke of Mantua's intentions in doing so, as from a hint of Gonzaga's, he suspected that Ferdinand wished to bring about a marriage between his cousin and his niece Princess Maria. In his memorandum Gonzaga seems to have pointed out that as a measure of precaution it would be prudent to begin negotiations with Mantua for the exchange of Monferrat for the Cremonese, the rich and valuable district which lay around Cremona, and which was separated from the Mantovano only by the Duchy of Sabionetta, a fief claimed by the Dukes of Mantua in virtue of certain rights reserved to them by the Emperor Rudolph the Second. Olivares eagerly adopted this idea, but, owing apparently to Giovanni Gonzaga's death on the first of April, 1626, the plan was not carried out.² Duke Ferdinand died in the following autumn, and his successor, his youngest brother Vincenzo, was known to be in very weak health. Ferdinand had gone through some kind of a marriage ceremony with a certain Donna Ardizzana, by whom he had had a son named Hyacinth. For a moment it was thought possible that this marriage might be proved valid, but much as the Spaniards dreaded the prospect of Nevers' succession, they did not dare to put forward such a claim, and thus Vincenzo

the Second ascended the throne without opposition. The new Duke's own matrimonial affairs were no less complicated. As a young man he had taken Holy Orders and had received a Cardinal's hat, but he had laid them aside when he saw the prospect of succeeding to Mantua opening to him. Before, however, he had left the priesthood, he had, during a visit to Bozzolo, a principality near the Mantovano which was held by a junior branch of his family, become acquainted with the mother of the reigning Prince, Donna Isabella Gonzaga, had fallen in love with her and had married her, although, as a Cardinal, he could not contract such a marriage without a dispensation from the Pope. Subsequently, tiring of his wife, he had done his best to get rid of her, and had denounced her to the Holy Office for having forced him to marry her by her spells. "How," writes the reluctant, if not very penitent husband, "could I, Cardinal as I was, have committed such a fearful sin as to marry a woman and to enter her bed, unless she had bewitched me?" The complaisant Inquisitors at Mantua promptly found her guilty, and the equally subservient Tribunal pronounced the marriage null and void. The Princess of Bozzolo, however, fled to Rome, and appealed to Pope Urban the Eighth, who, as he knew that Vincenzo had only moved in the matter because he was anxious to rid himself of his wife, refused to annul the marriage. As the Spaniards looked upon the Pope as wholly in the French interest, the Duke might well have looked for support from Madrid, but thanks to the efforts of Donna Isabella's agent at the Spanish Court, Colonel Appiani, Philip the Fourth could not be persuaded to take his side, whilst at Rome, her son, the Prince of Bozzolo, and her brother-in-law, were her zealous advocates. Thus the cause came to be delayed, and no settlement had been reached at the time of Vincenzo's death. As the Duke left a son by Donna Isabella, the war of the Mantuan succession, which was destined to bring such sorrows upon his country, might have been avoided, had he had but the good sense to refrain from disputing the legitimacy of his marriage.¹

The question of Vincenzo's marriage became one of international importance as soon as he had ascended the throne, as if he died without heirs the succession would be open to the Frenchman Nevers, although, as has been seen, in the eyes of some jurists a good case might be made out for the claims of the Princes of Guastalla, whose ancestor Ferrante was the second younger

brother of Frederick the Second, first Duke of Mantua, whilst Nevers was the representative of that Duke's third son Ludovico. Olivares was greatly perplexed as to the course which he ought to take. Not only had he to face Philip's scruples of conscience with regard to interfering in the matrimonial case before the Rota, but he knew that his every step would be watched with eagle eyes by the Princes of Germany as well as by those of Italy, whose status would be gravely prejudiced were the Emperor to sanction any illegality in a case which affected the succession to an Imperial fief. Such a precedent might well lead to complications which would concern the most vital interests of the most powerful members of the Empire. These issues the Count-Duke could not fail to foresee.

For the moment Olivares contented himself with ordering a secret investigation into the claims of Don Hyacinth, whilst he resolutely refused to receive Striggi, who wished to urge him to support D. Vincenzo's suit, and turned a deaf ear to those who warned him that France was already making very suspicious inquiries as to his intentions on the subject. He was doubtless aware that Vincenzo hated and distrusted Striggi's uncle, Chancellor Striggi, who was wholly in the French interest. The worthy Chancellor's conduct in regard to the sale of the Mantuan Gallery of Pictures to Charles I., at a price less than that which Duke Vincenzo I. had paid for Raphael's "Madonna of the Pearl," now one of the greatest ornaments of the collection at Madrid, in 1590, showed that he was quite willing to betray his master in every way.¹

No sooner, indeed, had Louis XIII learnt of Duke Ferdinand's death, than he promised to send an agent to Rome to press for a verdict in favour of Duke Vincenzo, on the ground that he was anxious that the Duke should give an heir to the Gonzaghi. At Rome, however, it was seen that no legitimate grounds existed for invalidating the marriage, and, consequently, it would be best to defer a decision as long as possible.²

In the meantime the Imperial Court, much to Vincenzo's annoyance, was treating the question of the Mantuan succession as already open. Striggi had informed him on the authority of Rambouillet, who had been sent from France to Madrid on the pretext of negotiating about the Valtelline, that the Spaniards were making the most careful inquiries as to Guastalla's claims, and that, at their request, the Emperor had issued a patent by

which Nevers and his family were declared incapable of succeeding to the states. Villela, indeed, denied the story, but on the other hand, Nevers was warned by a French agent at Mantua that the Guastallas had bribed one of the Imperial Ministers with sixty thousand ducatoons [£14,000] to secure the proclamation of the Prince of Guastalla as the reigning Duke's successor. When the story was repeated to Vincenzo, he was deeply moved, and said, "That, then, is how I am being treated by the Duke of Guastalla and his son. I will show them what I think of them, and when I see my affairs are hopeless, I will give the Duke of Rethel a wife, and will declare him Hereditary Prince and the heir of all my states." It was said, indeed, at Mantua that but for Guastalla's underhand intrigues at Rome, the Duke's suit might possibly have succeeded, but no one dared to tell him so out of fear of Count Striggi, the Chancellor who, though he posed as a friend of Nevers, was believed to be in his opponents' interest. In reality the Chancellor was hostile to Spain, but at the same time dreaded Guastalla's vengeance. These court intrigues were destined to bear fruit in the near future, and Duke Vincenzo was to prove a man of his word.¹

Striggi had to resort to an interesting expedient to secure his much-desired interview with the Count-Duke. He commissioned "the most famous painter in these parts," possibly Eugenio Caxesi or, Velasquez' most dangerous rival, Carducci, "to paint two portraits of the King and the Count-Duke on horseback for him to send to Mantua," and then went to thank Olivares for a letter to Oñate which he had given the Duke. "In the course of conversation I said that the portraits had not been very good likenesses, and asked him if he would lend me the two best in his collection that I might have them copied, and at the same time showed him mine. I begged him to forgive me for my presumption in making any such request. His Excellency was very pleased with the two portraits and was much more so at Y.H. having shown him such a mark of your esteem, and after looking at them with great attention, said that although he could not truthfully say that they are not good, in any case, Velasquez, the King's painter, would have done them much better, and advised me that as I was getting them for Y.H. I should not fail to employ him. I at once agreed to do so, for he would otherwise have ordered them from him for me himself so that they might be the better done, and he

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forthwith gave orders to the said painter, who was in his studio painting the Queen, that he should lay aside all his other work, including Her Majesty's portrait, and do me two small ones of them which I will send to Y.H. directly he has finished them. His Excellency could never stop expressing his thanks to you for the great honour you were doing him." Striggi took advantage of his good humour to begin upon the question of the Duke's matrimonial troubles, and after half-an-hour's talk got Olivares to order Secretary Villela to write to Rome in the King's name to support Vincenzo's application. A few days later he writes that "the two portraits which I am sending Y.H. are excellent, and I can swear that after I had had them done and before I showed them the Count-Duke, I repented of my bargain, as I had not settled their price beforehand with the painter, who asked a hundred Spanish Crowns, which came to fifty doubloons in our money" [£25] "and I have not been able to get them for less than one hundred and ten Mantuan crowns," [£16 10s. 0d.] "for a hundred and ten saints in Paradise."

Striggi greatly regretted that he had been obliged to order these portraits from the "King's Painter," as he was afraid that Velasquez would refuse to accept payment for them, and Olivares would know of it. "I think H.H. might for many reasons have the two portraits enlarged and thus conceal my trick at the same time."

Unfortunately the latest catalogue extant of the ducal collection at Mantua, was compiled in January, 1627, and as the two pictures were not despatched from Spain until the following April, we do not know whether they were amongst those sold in that year by Duke Vincenzo II. to Charles I. for the Gallery at Whitehall, through an expert named Laurier, and Daniel Nys, merchant at Venice, but for which neither the Duke nor his heirs were ever paid. On the fourteenth of April the transaction with Velasquez was duly completed. "I am sending Y.H. herewith two little portraits, which I think you will judge to be most excellent, and I may tell you that the King used to go every day to see how his was getting on, as the painter lives in the Palace, and when he learnt that it was for Y.H. he was very pleased and was so good as to stand for it for some little time so that it might be the better done and finished. The other, also, that of Count Olivares, is very fine. He, too, is delighted with his portrait, and I think this in itself will recommend it to Y.H. and assure you that the likeness is perfect. I

have sent by my steward as a present to the painter who did them a chain worth twenty-seven doubloons," [£13 10s. 0d.] "with which he seemed fairly well satisfied."¹

To the envoy, however, the marriages of Mantuan princesses were doubtless matters of more immediate interest than the merits of any portraits. The Duke of Savoy was most anxious to marry Princess Maria to his third son, Cardinal Maurice, probably in order to give more weight to his claims in Monferrat, but Spain, therefore, was unlikely to support his suit. If Rambouillet was to be believed it was equally unlikely that the Spaniards would support Duke Vincenzo's own suit at Rome. His application on the subject to Louis XIII. had brought him into ill odour at Madrid, where it was a maxim of state that those who were dependant on Spain should not turn their eyes to other quarters, as it looked "as if they were trying to put their feet into two boots." They were making careful inquiries into Don Hyacinth's claims, but, on the other hand, it was thought that the Emperor's ministers were inclined to support those of Guastalla ostensibly because that branch was so numerous that, if they inherited Mantua, the question would be settled for a very long time to come, and Spain would thus have no reason to dread similar complications in the near future.

As a matter of fact Striggi believed, or professed to do so, that the Guastallas were going hand in hand with Spain to secure the succession of D. Hyacinth for their own ends. According to Father Tamudio, who was Secretary Villela's great confidant, they were the people who were really opposing the dissolution of Duke Vincenzo's marriage.¹

In the same despatch he wrote that there was now no one to represent Savoy at Madrid as the Archbishop of Tarantaise had died upon the fifth of August.

The Archbishop was about seventy years of age, and had ever since the previous January been suffering from fever and dysentery. He was still able, however, to keep his master posted in the latest court gossip, and did not fail to take every opportunity of explaining to him his pecuniary troubles.

"Your Royal Highness gives the war as the reason why I am not paid my salary. I can only reply that my claim to be paid is far better than that of any officer or soldier. They live in luxury on the country and on the townspeople and are generally off duty. I have no parish to keep me going, and I am always at

my post defending Your Royal Highness with sword and dagger.

"Neither I nor mine are anchovies, which, as the saying goes, live on air, but we have to eat, drink, dress, give alms, and do other things which an ambassador must do perforce. We have, for instance, every year, perhaps sometimes twice a year, to buy liveries for two coachmen, four running footmen, and six pages, and to pay the rent of this house, towards which the King only allows four hundred ducats," [£100] "and so I have to put down as much again for it comes to eight hundred ducats," [£200] "in all."

When announcing that the Royal Council of State had given sentence in a suit which had lasted one hundred and eighteen years, and that this would cost someone at least seven hundred ducats [£175] in pensions, he went on to enlarge on his text. For the last eight years he had been living upon loans, which, before the war, he used to obtain from some Genoese merchants, "who had shown themselves most loving to him," but who had advanced the money "at their own rates of interest." After Savoy had gone to war with Genoa he had obtained credit from a Bergamasque, but for whose help he must upon several occasions have thrown up his post. In his last despatch of the first of August he said with some bitterness that Phillip was allowing Rambouillet four hundred and fifty ducats [£112 10s. 0d.] a day for his expenses.

Four days later he was dead, for his illness had been accelerated by a fall, and, as his successor grumbled, he did not leave enough money behind him, after his debts had been settled, to pay his funeral expenses.

Yet to judge from the inventory of his goods and chattels which his confessor, D. Bartolommeo Saputi, sent to Charles Emmanuel, the legation must have been a museum of art treasures.

Saputi dwells lovingly upon "a little writing desk of Portuguese tortoiseshell with hinges and a lock with large silver flowers," which, "would make a very good present for Madama Serenissima," the Princess of Piedmont. Amongst the silver was a brazier, which, with its grate or fire-pan, weighed between seven and eight hundred ducats [£175—£200], and which, as it was very well wrought, might be valued at six hundred ducatoons more, [£180] for its workmanship. Four large vases with others, ornamented with flowers and figures "of varied but exquisite

work," intended to be displayed on a sideboard, had been given "by a King of England to a Spanish Ambassador," and thus may have been one of the gifts presented by James I. to Constable Velasco in 1604, when he bestowed upon him the "Cup of St. Agnes," which is now one of the treasures of the British Museum. Salvers and goblets of silver gilt embossed with the figures of the evangelists, cups of Indian work and of mother-of-pearl set in silver, and "fit for a king," shell-shaped sweetmeat boxes and Portugal pepper castors, which were "a present for princes," do not speak of poverty, and crosses of emeralds, red topazes, and white amethysts "set to look like diamonds," had shone on the Prelate's breast, whilst a "very venerated image of the Blessed Athanasius, "whom we read of at the Council of Nice," and a silver gilt crucifix with a figure half life size and "of fairly good workmanship" adorned his chapel.

Tarantaise was evidently fond of birds, for in his aviary were two Parrots, a Lory, and a Parroquet, "which last is a great rarity," whilst four Canaries "placed in different rooms, made a most sweet song."

"But the most beautiful and valuable of his possessions are his "Diaries" or "Commentaries," in which in a historical and concise style he records his life and a number of the notable occurrences of his times. Amongst them I would more especially point to a whole work upon the journey of the Most Serene King of England and his negotiation at Madrid for his marriage," a manuscript which may yet be found in some old library in Piedmont or at Moutiers, his archiepiscopal see.

The Count Duke sincerely mourned the old Ambassador, whom he may have known when a lad in Italy. Thus ended the career of Anastasio Germonio, Archbishop of Tarantaise and Minister of Savoy at the Spanish Court. Tarantaise is unknown to fame but under more favourable circumstances his reputation as a letter writer might well have vied with that of Horace Walpole. A Churchman by profession and reared in an Italy which still bore the imprint of a Pius the Fifth and of a Sixtus the Fifth, he yet viewed religion with a tolerance which was far in advance of his time, and looked upon heretics with the eyes of those abbés who crowded round the toilette tables of Mme. de Pompadour and Mme. du Barry. Credulous and weak he may have been, but his outlook upon European affairs was clearer because less biassed than was that of any of his English

contemporaries, although at times, perhaps, he was unable to keep pace with the shifts and turnings of the devious policy of Spain. But despite his limitations, Tarantaise was an honest man and, despite his poverty, we never find him accepting bribes from foreign courts.

For the moment Saputi took charge of the interests of Savoy at Madrid, as Tarantaise's successor was not appointed for many weeks.¹

Early in September, during Phillip's illness, in accordance with Olivares' suggestion, Striggi asked Secretary Villela whether there was any truth in the rumours as to what Spain was doing about the Duke of Guastalla and D. Hyacinth. The Secretary blushed scarlet, but said that there was nothing in the reports, which had been put about by some ambassadors in order to ascertain Striggi's views. The Spaniards, he declared, knew very well that Nevers had far better rights than Guastalla; the Emperor, therefore, could never for a moment have thought of excluding him from the succession, and the King could not possibly have asked for such a patent, as Rambouillet talked of, to be issued. Their one hope was that D. Vincenzo would leave legitimate descendants behind him, and for this reason they were doing their best to secure the dissolution of his marriage. Striggi at once pressed him to write to the Rota upon the subject and to endeavour to induce Donna Isabella and the Prince of Bozzolo to withdraw their opposition, and at last got him to admit that there would be no injustice in doing so, a fact from which Striggi argued that Oñate must have written that the cause would be determined in the Duke's favour. When he had spoken to Rambouillet before this conversation the French ambassador replied that he had warned Secretary Cisneros that if anything were done to the prejudice of the Duke of Nevers he would at once renew the protest which he had already made. Cisneros told Striggi that they heard that the Duke of Mantua's health was failing fast, and his own belief was that this was the reason why they were so slow in pushing forward the suit for the divorce, and added that when Feria had been talking to him about Princess Maria he had remarked, "If your Lordship only knew how many there are after her. I said the Cardinal of Savoy had already come forward, but he answered, 'There are others, but here it is hoped she will marry the Duke,'" or in other words, her uncle D. Vincenzo, a marriage which,

however, was not destined to take place. Scarcely was Philip IV. convalescent, when Villela remarked that he seemed willing to forward the divorce proceedings, and rumours reached the French Embassy that he was endeavouring to induce Mantua to accept some things in exchange for Monferrat, although every prince in Christendom would cry out against the Duke if he agreed to such a proposal. At the same time Villela was forced to admit to Striggi that D. Hyacinth could not possibly be brought forward as a candidate for the succession, as illegitimacy was a fatal bar to inheritance, and all the Gonzagas knew that he was a natural child. In fact, he added, Spain had never moved in the matter at all, and never raised the question of the succession in any shape or form.¹

But Duke Vincenzo's hours were numbered. His health was breaking, and Striggi was once more ransacking the apothecaries' stores for rare and infallible drugs from the Indies East and West. "Natural cinnabar, from the silver mines in the East, which is the embryo of gold, and from which gold is made by the action of the sun," was highly recommended by one authority, but the remedy proved of no avail.² The Duke grew steadily worse, and the Spaniards and Venice did their best to effect an arrangement between Savoy and Mantua, the Venetians indeed going so far as to ask the Empress Leonora who had always been partial to them to do her duty as an Italian by inducing the Emperor to intervene. All was in vain, and by the middle of December, 1622, Vincenzo II., Duke of Mantua, and the last male of the elder branch of the House of Gonzaga, knew that he was dying. He had been infuriated when he learnt of the intrigues which were going on as to the succession to his States, and thanks to the stories which had been so skillfully put about by Rambouillet and other French agents, had grown every day more hostile to Guastalla and more inclined to look upon Nevers as his heir. He determined to carry out the resolution which he had formed in the preceding April, and to make Nevers' rights to Mantua and to Monferrat doubly secure by giving his niece Princess Maria Gonzaga as wife to Nevers' son and heir Charles, Duke of Rethel. His Confessor, his Chancellor Count Striggi, and other councillors had been urging him to make a will leaving her his estates, and when he sent to Rome to ask the Pope to grant a dispensation for her marriage, as the suitor was within the prohibited degrees of

affinity, the courier was sent back again with the brief within a very few hours. As the Spaniards muttered, Urban VIII. was a Frenchman and an enemy of Spain. When Cordoba, now Governor of Milan, learnt this news, he warned the Resident of Mantua that the Emperor was the only authority who was competent to decide the question of the succession to those States.¹

When the dispensation reached him Vincenzo the Second was lying upon his death bed, for he had had a second stroke of apoplexy. "The dispensation arrived from Rome upon Sunday, at two hours in the night; at four hours the Princess was taken out of the Monastery and brought into the chamber of Don Vincentio, where by his bedside she was married by his chaplain unto the Duke of Rethrelois. The two young married parties immediately were put into a bed to consummate the marriage, and as soon as the Duke Don Vincentio understood that it was finished he himself died at eight hours of the night." It was Sunday, December the twenty-sixth, 1627. The question of the Mantuan Succession was now open.²

CHAPTER LXXXIII

DUKE VINCENZO had had sufficient cause for hurrying on his niece's marriage. The Marquis Ferrante Gonzaga, the second son of the Duke of Guastalla, had desired to seize Mantua before Nevers could take possession of it. With this object he had won over Federigo Gonzaga, Governor of the City, who had admitted a large number of his soldiers into the town, but during Vincenzo's illness the Marquis' designs had been discovered and he had been thrown into prison. On the day after the Duke's death, Count Serbellione had approached Mantua with a train of a hundred coaches on the pretext that he had come as Ambassador from the Governor of Milan. He found the gates shut against him and was told, "There are too many of you for ambassadors and too few to attack us." "Now couriers do fly up and down, as if the 'Fortunes of Greece' did consist in the settling of the State of Mantua, and the Venetians (who are afraid of their shadow), have sent those miserable troops that they have towards their confines, as if there were Hannibal at their gates, but really there is no great fear of innovation, for if the Spaniards have no secret intelligence in Casale, they may well show their teeth, but they will not be able to bite." The Duke of Nevers, added Wake, had been most fortunate, for until a fortnight before his death Vincenzo had not thought himself seriously ill and had been pushing forward his suit for a divorce at Rome in order that he might be free to marry his niece. As things stood, Rethel's marriage with Donna Maria had not only reunited the two lines of Federigo and Ludovico Gonzaga, but would tend to the settlement of the differences with Savoy about Monferrat, for Donna Maria was not only heiress of Monferrat but grand-daughter of the Duke of Savoy, and it was not impossible that Nevers himself might marry her mother, the Infanta Margaret.¹

Had Duke Vincenzo been less precipitate as to the celebration of the marriage, it is possible that Wake's prediction that Nevers would succeed without opposition might have been fulfilled.

But though the Duke had been so prompt in securing the dispensation required to make the marriage valid under ecclesiastical law, he had not fulfilled the obligations which the Civil and Feudal Law imposed upon him with regard to it. He had failed to obtain the consent either of the Emperor as his feudal superior, or of the bride's nearest relations, whether her mother, her grandfather and the other members of the House of Savoy, or the King of Spain who was not only her kinsman but who was in some sense her "Supreme Guardian," for, through her mother, who was an Infanta of Savoy, and her grandmother, who was an Infanta of Spain, she stood in the line of succession to the thrones of Castile and of Aragon, and as such belonged to a House of which Philip IV. was the head. Want of time may have accounted for the Duke's omission to comply with his duties, but, on the other hand, he may well have apprehended that his request for their sanction would be met with a refusal. The two Striggis, in their zeal to secure the interests of Nevers, had ever since his accession, plied him with stories, generally traceable to Rambouillet and other French intriguers, as to the sinister projects both of the Emperor and of Spain. He believed that Ferdinand II. had already issued a patent in favour of Guastalla by which Nevers was wholly excluded from the succession; he knew that Savoy had been pressing the claims of Cardinal Maurice as a candidate for Donna Maria's hand, and he may have heard rumours that the Spaniards desired her as a wife for the Infante Don Carlos. It cannot be wondered, therefore, that when he unexpectedly learnt that he was dying, the Duke should have thought only of securing the sanction of the Church to the marriage and should have shrunk from the long delays which would have been involved in securing that of the Civil Powers. His failure to do so provided the opening which was so anxiously desired by those who wished to defeat the claims of Nevers.

They were not slow to avail themselves of it, and the Duke of Rethel unconsciously did his best to forward the aims of his opponents. Scarcely had Duke Vincenzo expired when he put himself at the head of the Government in Mantua and sent orders to the Mantuan Resident at Milan to inform Cordoba of his marriage. The Governor could only reply by pointing out that Rethel might well have waited for Philip the Fourth's consent before marrying, and that he could not see by what right he

could take possession of the two States without the Emperor's sanction. He would communicate with Madrid and until he received his instructions, would take any steps he might deem necessary for his master's service. In writing to the King he said that speaking for himself, he would rather not take up arms on this occasion, as he was quite unprepared to do so, "but what troubles me most is that if I do not, we may lose the opportunity of occupying all we can of Monferrat and the Mantovano with your Majesty's troops in the Emperor's name." Father Gaetano, a Theatine friar, had arrived at Milan on a mission from the Duke of Savoy, on Christmas Eve. He said that Charles Emmanuel would never come to terms with Nevers unless with Philip's approval, and proposed a plan for carrying off Donna Maria from Mantua, which it was now too late to carry out. "What is certain is that the Duke of Savoy is ready to seize what he can of Monferrat and I have no orders to prevent him from doing so on the Duke of Rethel's account." An agreement between Savoy and Nevers would be fatal to their interests, against which Striggi and other Mantuan Councillors had been working for years. They had made a great mistake in not treating with Duke Vincenzo, who had only come to an understanding with Rethel because it was the easiest way in which he could secure a provision for his bastard sons and all his servants had been bought over by him. They could not remain inactive because all Italy was waiting to see what line Spain would take in this momentous business. He had written to the Duke of Savoy, "and if H.R.H. does not back out of the offer he has sent me I am thinking of entering Monferrat with Y.M.'s forces and of sending a detachment into the Mantovano, so that they may occupy all they can of both States in the Emperor's name, for no inconvenience can arise from their doing so, as the Duke of Rethel's forces are very weak, and it will be most difficult for Nevers to send him any reinforcements if Savoy opposes him. Should, however, Y.M. decide on any other course, it would be far easier for us to hand back to the Duke of Nevers what we might have occupied than to effect an occupation after he had come to terms with Savoy. He would owe to Y.M. anything which might be given back to him under such conditions. Our justification for such an action is a valid one, as by law the Duke of Nevers cannot enter upon the possession of those States before the Emperor has declared his pleasure, and we should lose

our chance of acting in the Emperor's name if we gave the Duke of Guastalla time to do so in virtue of his commission." He had sent an express to Aytona, the Spanish Ambassador at Vienna, begging him to induce the Emperor to issue fresh orders and "to show his intention of enforcing his authority."

If this plan were carried out, and if the Duke of Savoy remained constant to his present policy, the peace of Italy would be insured for many years. Savoy might be attached permanently to the interests of Spain by arranging a marriage between Cardinal Maurice and the Emperor's daughter, whilst a Spanish occupation of part of Monferrat would relieve Milan from the fear of being attacked by the Savoyards, and if the Mantovano were also occupied, Nevers might in the long run be induced to content himself with that Duchy.¹

Such was the despatch which Cordoba indited on the twenty-seventh of December, 1627, and which, from its date, is clearly the outcome of prolonged reflections. Neither the Duke of Savoy nor the Governor of Milan were slow to take action. Their residents at Mantua had already refused to recognise Rethel's marriage until their masters' pleasure could be known, and protested against the inhabitants of Mantua swearing allegiance to his father. By the middle of January Savoy was moving upon Vercelli, and Spanish troops were advancing towards Mantua and Monferrat. At Venice it was believed that the Emperor "will be against Nevers, and that he will pretend that dutchy to be devoluted to the Empire. If he do bend his forces this way to repossess himself of such Feudas as the Italian Princes do withhold from him, it will mend the game of the King of Denmark very well, and, perhaps, establish a good peace in Germany." Wake was a truer prophet than he knew, but his prediction was destined to be fulfilled in favour not of Christian IV. but of Gustaf Adolf. Cordoba, indeed, by his action with regard to the Mantuan succession proved to be one of the chief authors of the ruin of Spain. The Pope, with keener foresight, was warmly in favour of the French candidate. Moreover, the Governor of Milan had put himself in the wrong with the Constitutions of the Empire, for he had no right to act in the Emperor's name without the Emperor's authority at a moment when the Duke of Guastalla was the Emperor's Commissary for Italy.

Cordoba's despatch can hardly have been welcome to the Spanish Council of State. The news of Duke Vincenzo's death

had reached Madrid early in January and had at once been the subject of grave discussions. In the sitting of January the twelfth Olivares had delivered his opinion at great length. "There cannot be a shadow of doubt," he began, "that the Duke of Nevers is by law and right the legitimate successor to the States of Mantua and Monferrat." He ought, however, to have procured the sanction of Philip the Fourth as his suzerain to his succession, whilst Duke Vincenzo had been equally at fault in permitting Donna Maria to marry Rethel without the permission of his suzerain and without informing her mother, grandfather, and uncles.

Their conduct was a grave infringement of His Majesty's suzerain rights in Italy, for not only had his predecessors given back Monferrat to the Dukes of Mantua after they had been deprived of it, but they had since held it solely with the help of Spain, and, moreover, the marriage was a direct infringement of the rights of the bride's relations. In short, the violence with which the Dukes of Nevers and Rethel had acted in Italy was a grievous wrong to the Emperor, Spain, and Savoy. The greatest interest of the Italian Commonwealth was peace, and the greatest boon to Italy was any measure which would insure it. "Savoy is the gate by which war can enter Italy; not on account of its geographical position in itself, but because of its situation as regards Monferrat, where the largest conceivable army can find safe quarters." If Monferrat was not held by a sovereign who was strong enough to defend it with his own forces, the door would always remain open for trouble to enter Italy through Piedmont, for Savoy was not strong enough to keep it closed, whilst, at the same time, the province was the bulwark of the Milanese. Therefore, for the sake of the Princes of Italy, Monferrat must be held by Spain.

If it could be annexed to the Milanese by diplomatic measures this would be the best course to take in the interests of peace, but such measures had hitherto been tried in vain, although the late Duke had all but agreed to exchange the province for the Cremonese, an arrangement which would have been sanctioned by the Emperor. The Spaniards, however, had hesitated, as such a convention might have proved the signal for a war in Italy. On the other hand, the Duke of Nevers must be made to understand that his slight to his suzerain had fully justified Philip in annexing Monferrat. Olivares ended, however, by saying that

as such a step would render it necessary for Spain to carry on a war in Italy for two and a half years, which he knew her to be unable to do, he would give no definite opinion as to the wisdom of taking such a step. A middle course was the only one which it would be safe to follow. The question as to the line which should be followed by Spain might well be submitted to a Council of Theologians, and might be decided in accordance with their decision founded on their examination of all the materials bearing on the conduct of Nevers and Rethel, which His Majesty might submit to them.

Olivares was on considerably firmer ground when he entered upon the question of the position in which the two Dukes had placed themselves by taking possession of the States without any regard to the rights of the Emperor and Philip IV. or to the claims of Savoy. It might, indeed, well be questioned in how far Spain could be held to be the suzerain either of Mantua or of Monferrat. As regards the former it is impossible to see that the Spaniards had the slightest shadow of a justification for advancing any such claim, unless, indeed, it was argued that the investitures granted to the Gonzaghi as its lords during three centuries by various Emperors did not invalidate the suzerain rights which the Dukes of Milan, now represented by Philip IV., might have held over the province before 1334, an argument which, if admitted, would have gone far to legitimate the claims advanced by the Bishops of Chur to the possession of the Valtelline. As to Monferrat, Charles V. had conferred the province upon the Dukes of Mantua in his quality of Roman Emperor and not of King of Spain, and it cannot, moreover, be seen how Philip II., when he restored the marquisate to them after its occupation by the French, could have acquired any rights of suzerainty over it by doing so, especially as it was never contended that he had been invested with them by the Emperor. It was true, indeed, that by the Charter of 1534 the rights of Savoy to lay its claims to portions of Monferrat before the Imperial Courts, had been expressly reserved, but on the other hand the Gonzaghi declared that the Dukes of Savoy had purchased these claims from a usurper, and if, therefore, the tribunals gave their verdict in favour of Charles Emmanuel, it would be very difficult for Spain to refuse its recognition to the rights of the Grisons to the Valtelline, Bormio, and Chiavenna. In any case, if the question of the succession to Mantua and Monferrat was to be decided by law,

Olivares was taking a course which might involve Spain in very great risks, and which could not fail to arouse great apprehensions, not only in Italy, but in Germany, where many of the temporal princes held but dubious titles to their dominions.

The Count-Duke, however, was fully entitled to say that considering the manner in which Nevers had seized upon the States, "Y.M. has resisted such violent measures so as to give time to the Emperor to pronounce as to the rights of the case in accordance with law, which Y.M. will at all times be ready to assist him in maintaining." Under the laws of the Empire, indeed, as every Spanish diplomatist in Germany was for ever arguing, it was the bounden duty of the neighbouring Princes to assist the Emperor in putting down rebellion and in carrying out the Imperial Ban, and it could not well be denied that Nevers was a rebel, even if he did not fall under the sentence of Ban which had been pronounced against his father. If Spain could occupy Monferrat in the same manner as that in which Maximilian of Bavaria had occupied the Upper Palatinate, namely as the Emperor's mandatory to suppress a rebellion against the Empire, she could be fully justified in asking the assistance of the Empire in putting down her rebellious provinces in the Netherlands.

Olivares, upon the whole, advised a temporising policy. Cordoba should be informed that His Majesty approved of what he had already done, but instructed him to respect everyone's rights and to come if he could to a peaceful settlement with Rethel, whilst refraining at any cost from losing the goodwill of Savoy. He was to let Charles Emmanuel engage himself in the undertaking against Monferrat, but only so far as he could do so "without allowing him to fortify himself in the country so strongly as to prevent us later on from getting out of his clutches what we may want of it for ourselves." Due condolences must be sent to the heartbroken grandfather for the shock which Rethel's conduct must have inflicted upon his feelings, and at the same time he must be assured that "Your Majesty will not take up arms until the rights and wrongs of the matter have been decided, but that at the same time you will not side with Nevers until the merits of his claims have been adjudicated upon." The picture of Charles Emmanuel as a heartbroken grandfather, as drawn by Olivares, is sufficiently ridiculous, but the Duke of Savoy was always careful to remember his ties of kinsmanship with the Spanish Court, and when anxious to marry his mistress

but a few months before, had taken pains to secure indirect assurances through Tarantaise that his cousins would see no objection "to Y.R.H. marrying that prudent, pious, and chaste lady, who has been your mistress for so many years, and by whom you have had so many children." As one of these children was Governor of Nice, it is possible that the Council of State saw the advantages of being upon good terms with the master of such an important port and fortress, whilst the Duke of Savoy did not forget that under the Law of Succession in Brabant, it was possible that, in right of their mother, his legitimate children might on the death of their aunt, the Infanta Isabella, claim large portions of the Netherlands.

Whatever the justification for Khevenhüller's gibes may have been, Olivares now fully understood the affairs of Germany. "We must without fail or delay send someone to the Duke of Bavaria, to the Saxon, to the Ecclesiastical Electors, and to the Duke of Lorraine, not only to treat with them for their aid against the Dutch, but to explain to them our policy in Italy. It is my firm belief that it will make them so suspicious of us, both on their own account and on that of all the world, that it is very doubtful whether it will be as easy as we think to drag out of them the assistance we expect.

"We shall have to put all the pressure we can upon the Pope, but I fear we can scarcely hope to achieve any success unless we send someone to replace Oñate."

The Infanta was to be warned to keep a sharp look-out upon the French, and if they assumed a threatening attitude to stir up Lorraine against them, so as to keep them occupied at home, whilst the Archduke Leopold was to be asked "to prod up France a little through Alsace and Burgundy.

"I will end my memorandum by saying that there is only one thing more important than Monferrat to Your Majesty, and that is that you should have full justification for your actions.

"You are absolutely justified in mortifying the Duke of Nevers and Rethel. If the outcome of such a mortification is that Nevers consents to carry out some exchange of territories with Your Majesty, it would be a just and righteous deed to inflict it on him.

"You would not be guilty of any act of violence or injustice if you did not strike him a deadly blow, but if you only mortify him and leave the rest to time, I think that what now looks a long way round will prove a very short cut.

"Yet though my greatest wish in the world is to see Y.M. the master of Monferrat, I cannot find any way to justify you in dividing it with the Duke of Savoy with any show of right on either side, whilst you would be acting in direct opposition to that of the Duke of Nevers, which is beyond all possible dispute or challenge.

"And I must further submit to Your Majesty that from this day forward it will be impossible for any of your ministers to use the freedom in dealing with this subject to which we have been accustomed during the last years, for up till now Y.M.'s one aim has been to remove all causes of jealousy or suspicion, and this affair is one which, whatever we might do, is certain to arouse both the one and the other in every quarter.

"It may be that things may shape themselves so that we may see no outward manifestation of these feelings, but Y.M. may be well assured that there is not a Prince in Europe, small or great, who will not conceive the greatest suspicion of Y.M. and your policy, and I believe most sincerely that if Y.M. does not seek for a justification for doing what is to your own interest but for your interest in doing what is right by seeking first your duty and then your own gain, all these things will be added unto you, and our Lord Himself will place them in your hands. If we choose this path I know not how greatly we shall oblige Him or what outcome or success His Divine Majesty will grant to our exertions.

"If Your Majesty wishes to be greater than anyone else, there is much left for you to achieve; there is yet far more if you would stand alone and high above all. If this is your aim it is inevitable that all will join themselves together against him who seeks to be more powerful than them all.

"I think also that instructions should be sent to H.R.H. the Infanta to put pressure upon her agents in England so that that Kingdom may be occupied with the party disputes which they could keep going.

"It is, however, for Your Majesty alone to decide what steps we are to take as to these matters."

Such were the grounds upon which the Count-Duke, though evidently with the greatest hesitation, advised his master to resist the claims of the Duke of Nevers to succeed to the inheritance of Mantua and of Monferrat, and to engage in that war which in Philip's later years weighed so heavily upon his conscience,

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and which formed the constant burden of his letters in which he unburdened his soul to the saintly Maria de Agreda. But it is only fair to say that Olivares was convinced that the existence of the Spanish Empire in Italy, if not in Flanders, would be in jeopardy if Casale passed under the control of a vassal of the French, and that if the door into the Peninsula were in the keeping of a power which had never abandoned its claims to Milan and to Naples, the Italian Peninsula would, like Germany, be torn by never-ending wars.¹

By the middle of January Nevers himself had arrived at Mantua, and the Duke of Guastalla had lodged a formal protest against his claims to the rich inheritance because the Duke was not born in Italy, and because his mother "descended from heretical parents."

"His desire is that these two points may be decided by the Imperial Council or Chamber, and that till the case be heard, that State may rest deposited either in his hands as being the Imperial Commissary in Italy, or in the hands of the King of Spain. What will be the issue thereof time will show us."

On the sixteenth of January Philip the Fourth wrote to inform Cordoba of his intentions as to Mantua. He fully approved of the line which the Governor had taken, and of the agreement which he had entered into with the Duke of Savoy as to the division of Monferrat, and instructed him to get it sanctioned by the Emperor. It must on all accounts be kept secret. Cordoba was to enter Monferrat in the Emperor's name, and to give out that he was only holding it until such time as the Emperor had given his decision as to the rightful owner. He was to take steps to occupy without delay any part of the territory which he did not hold already, particularly Casale with its citadel and Nizza della Paglia, with Spanish troops, whilst Savoy held the district between the Sesia and the Dora. "As I have already said you must be careful that the Emperor's voice is heard speaking through him and through yourself, and, remember secondly, that the Emperor has still to decide as to Savoy's claims." Lastly, he was to bear in mind that if any Spanish forces had already entered the Mantovano to support the Duke of Guastalla as Imperial Commissary he was to adopt the same attitude, and to occupy all that he could in the province in the Emperor's name. Philip IV. promised to contribute fifty thousand ducats (£12,500) a month towards the expenses of the occupation, and ended by saying

that his first object was to keep the war from extending into Italy.

As has been already seen, the news of Duke Vincenzo's death reached Priandi at Paris on the seventh of January, 1628. Despite the position of affairs at La Rochelle, the French Ministers were already determined not to allow Mantua to sink into a mere dependency of Spain. They had stated in the plainest language that they would protect the interests of Nevers and would prevent Savoy from seizing Monferrat or from interfering with any marriage which Duke Vincenzo might wish to arrange for his niece, Marie de Medicis, as sister of Eleanora, wife of Duke Vincenzo I., was greatly interested in her relations at Mantua, and Cardinal Richelieu had readily given Priandi every assurance of his support when he visited him after Nevers' accession. But France, hampered as she was by her war with England and by the rebels within her own dominions, could do little but wait until she had settled her difficulties at home, and had the Court of Vienna been in reality as subservient to Spain as English politicians believed it to be, there can be but little doubt that Guastalla would speedily have been placed in possession of the two States.

The position of affairs at the Austrian Court was, however, very peculiar. Ferdinand II. was far from being a free agent. His whole policy was based upon the continuation of the Imperial authority in his own family, and for this he was absolutely dependant upon the goodwill of the Electors and of the Diet, that is to say upon that of persons to whom the very name of Spain was hateful, and who were by no means inclined to allow him to strain the power of the Empire in a manner which might be most prejudicial to their own interests merely for the purpose of securing Spain in her Italian possessions. Moreover, the Emperor was in a peculiar fashion the champion of Law and Order. It was upon legal grounds that he had secured himself the Crown of Bohemia: in Poland he was assisting Sigismund as the legitimate sovereign of Sweden: but for his wish to secure the recognition of the Constitutions of the Empire, the troubles in Germany might long since have been settled. It was, therefore, impossible for him to act illegally in the case of Mantua and of Monferrat, and by the law of the Empire he was forced to hear the various claimants to those states before he could decide as to their lawful possessor. Many persons too, in his own home circle were far from being bound to the chariot wheels of

Philip IV. His wife, to whom he seems to have been devoted, was a Princess of Mantua, and was therefore the aunt of Princess Maria, but, though she was a kinsman of the Emperor, she was not a descendant of Charles the Fifth. Father Lammerman, Ferdinand's confessor, who was a Jesuit and as a Luxemburger was a born subject of Philip IV., was somewhat to the King's surprise, a leading opponent of Guastalla, and was known never to say a good word for Spain. The Society had, indeed, quarrelled with Lerma, and was now upon the worst of terms with Olivares who had secured their expulsion from Naples in 1622 and from the Indies in the year following, and, by doing so, had made them his bitter enemies.¹ The Pope, also, was most anxious to assist Nevers in every way, as his one object was to prevent the outbreak of war in Italy. In reality, His Holiness was, above all things, anxious to devote himself to the task of extending the territories of the Church. The assertion of the Imperial authority in Italy in regard to questions of Feudal Law, was peculiarly unwelcome to him, at a moment when the Duchy of Urbino might at any moment devolve to the Holy See as a vacant fief by the extinction of the House of Montefeltro, whose last representative in the male line had abdicated in the previous year. Questions might indeed be raised with regard to the succession to Urbino which, if the succession to Mantua were determined by the Imperial Courts, might once more reopen the old disputes between the Guelfs and the Ghibellines, a situation which would be one well calculated to alienate the sympathies of every temporal prince from the Holy See. It is not wonderful, therefore, that Urban the Eighth threw his whole weight into the scale of Nevers, and it is possible that this fact had much to do in deciding Cardinal Richelieu to deal so leniently with the Huguenots as regarded their religion. For once the Pope and the Jesuits were acting on the same side, and few of the Popes of the Seventeenth Century were bigots. To oppose these hostile influences at Vienna and at Rome, the Spaniards could rely solely upon the Prince of Eggenberg, Ferdinand's favourite and Prime Minister, upon Pappenheim, the one faithful supporter of the Imperial authority in the army which was the Emperor's but in name, upon the Aulic Councillor, Ottavio Villani, and upon the claims which they had upon the Emperor for the support to which he in so great a measure owed his crown.² At Rome there was, as always, a Spanish

party amongst the Cardinals but, as the Pope was a comparatively young and vigorous man, he might well disregard their representations. It was thought indeed that he only refrained from declaring himself the open enemy of Spain, because he feared to leave his nephews, to whom he was devoted with a devotion unusual even amongst Popes, exposed after his death to Spanish and Austrian vengeance. Under these circumstances Nevers might well expect that he would be allowed to retain undisturbed possession of his states, but Cordoba's refusal to receive his envoy seems to have awakened his apprehensions, and he decided to send the Bishop of Mantua as his representative to the Imperial Court.

His choice was a wise one. Mgr. Vincenzo Agnelli, a Mantuan of noble birth, had been long attached to the Ducal household, and since her childhood had been the much loved friend of the Empress Leonora. A man of courtly manners and of high attainments he would be a welcome visitor to the Emperor who would willingly give him his fullest confidence. Accordingly, a few days after Guastalla had appealed to the Imperial Tribunals, Agnelli, on the twenty-eighth of January, 1628, set out for Prague, where the Emperor was then residing, and reached his destination on February the twenty-second.¹

In the meantime Aytona had been busied in carrying out the orders which had been sent to him from Madrid by the courier who had carried instructions to Cordoba to occupy Casale. To Philip's intense surprise, however, his ambassador's requests were met with a very unfavourable response. The Emperor flatly refused to allow Cordoba to enter either Mantua or Monferrat with Spanish forces, as he said that he did not wish any occupation of the kind to be carried out for the moment. On the other hand, with the cordial assent of both the Empress and Prince Eggenberg, he gave orders that Agnelli was not to be received officially, as when the Spaniards learnt that H.I.M. had forbidden them to take up arms or to begin any effective action against Nevers, they had used this prohibition as an argument to persuade him to hear the claims of both parties and to administer justice accordingly. This he readily agreed to do, and would not therefore consent to receive an ambassador from Nevers, as by doing so he would seem to be carrying out a sentence which had already been given. In other words, whilst he was protecting the French

claimant in the actual possession of the disputed territories, he was willing to admit that his rights had yet to be legally established. When Agnelli reached Prague on the twenty-second of February he was informed by Senator Morbioli, a Mantuan resident in the city, how the case really stood, and two days later he had a conversation with Prince Eggenberg, which might well have afforded an opening for avoiding a war. The Prince told him that the Emperor was well disposed towards his master, and would willingly do all he could to support him without any reference to any private feelings or political considerations. The Duke ought to endeavour to stand well with the Spaniards, and might be certain that the Emperor wished to avoid a war in Italy. He added that they did not believe the Duke of Guastalla's denial of the report that he had tried to smuggle mortars into Mantua whilst Duke Vincenzo was dying, in order to make an attempt to seize the city. In short, the Imperial Government was entirely opposed to the extension of Spanish influence in Italy, unless it was forced to recognise the rights of the Duke of Guastalla on legal grounds, and the unity of thought and purpose which foreign statesmen professed to believe existed between the two branches of the Hapsburgs was, not for the first time, proved to be a myth.

Ferdinand the Second had good reason to hesitate in announcing his intentions. Even Cordoba had been forced to admit that hitherto everyone had thought that the Duke of Nevers was the natural successor of Duke Vincenzo as being "the next male heir to the last possessor," although it was fully recognised that his connection with France would give rise to difficulties. The claims of the Duke of Guastalla had, however, been talked about at the Spanish Court for some years, and Councillor Ferrer had been commissioned to investigate them, but had not yet presented his report.

Cordoba was a soldier, and Aytona, though a diplomatist, confessed himself unable to deal with legal questions without professional assistance. These two men, therefore, knowing as they did the supreme importance of Monferrat to Spain, were, perhaps, too much inclined to lend an ear to the counsels of lawyers who were more or less biassed by their own interests.

Early in January Cordoba had consulted some Milanese experts on Feudal Law who, on the grounds which have been already stated, had advised him that Nevers and Rethel had acted

illegally in taking possession of the two states without the consent of their suzerain the Emperor. Moreover, as the Salic Law did not exist in Monferrat, they added that the Empress was the natural heir as the sister of its last holder, unless the Emperor should decide in favour of Nevers' claims, and in that case the question would arise as to whether he had the right to take actual possession of either Mantua or Monferrat. "It was a good thing for the interests of Spain that both the Emperor and the Empress can show such good claims to succeed to both these states," as they were united with Philip by such strong ties of gratitude and blood.

Cordoba's counsels were too conformable to Philip's interests, if not to his wishes, for him to disregard them, especially as he could cloak his actions under the appearance of his duty to the Emperor.¹

A few days before Agnelli reached Prague the King sent fresh instructions to Aytona, which at once placed him in the sharpest antagonism with the Imperial policy. He wrote that he had decided to support the claims of Savoy to Monferrat, not only that he might follow in the footsteps of Charles the Fifth, but because the rival claimant was a dependant of France, and also because he could only obtain those districts of Monferrat which it was so necessary to annex to the Milanese, in virtue of the Duke of Savoy's rights, as he would cede them to him in return for his efforts to procure the recognition of those rights by the Emperor. If Nevers and his son had already made any approaches to Ferdinand, Aytona must remind him of his obligations to Spain, and point out that Philip was only taking action in order to force them to recognise their duties to the Empire. The business, he added, was a new and ticklish one, and they were groping their way in the dark about it. It was certain that it would arouse the suspicions of all the Italian powers particularly of the Holy See and of the Venetians.

It was absolutely necessary that the Emperor should write to them at once to explain that he was only holding the Imperial Fiefs until the suit between the claimants had been decided. It was very important, therefore, that the proceedings in the case should be spun out as far as possible, so that the decision should not be given, until the armies, which had been raised in his name, had occupied all they possibly could before they received powers from the Emperor "which will entitle them to

continue to hold all they have occupied without disturbance." Bavaria, Saxony, and the German Princes must be informed that Spain was only acting at the request of the Imperial Commissary. By the following day Philip IV. had learnt from Aytona that the Emperor had refused to sanction Cordoba's proceedings. He was now, however, in no mood to be diverted from his purpose. He forthwith sent fresh instructions to D. Gonzalez, expressing the hope that he had already entered Monferrat, but ordering him to refrain from occupying the Mantovano until H.I.M. gave his permission for its occupation, "so as to show all the world that all that I have at heart is to secure the peace and quiet of Italy." Cordoba was to report his proceedings to the Emperor and to justify them by the orders which he had received from his master. Negotiations were going on with the Emperor to secure the assistance of the Empire against the Dutch, and if he could take action in Italy, without hampering himself for action in the North, "it would be of the greatest advantage to us if we could hamper the King of France with another war in addition to those he has on his hands already, and we should also ensure our hold on the Duke of Savoy so as to prevent him from putting himself at the head of our enemies or stirring up trouble amongst ourselves." Doubtless Philip was well aware of the intrigues in progress at Genoa. It would be as well to induce the Emperor to occupy all the territories in dispute which were not already occupied by Spain or Savoy until the case was decided. At the same time Cordoba must make private inquiries as to Nevers' own views, so that the Government might see how the land lay and shape its policy accordingly. He might also hint to Charles Emmanuel that Philip would be glad to see a marriage between Cardinal Maurice and the Emperor's daughter. To Aytona Philip wrote that he must point out to both Ferdinand II. and Eggenberg that Nevers was a friend to those whom neither Spain nor Austria could ever trust, and that once he was in the saddle at Mantua it would be easy for him with the support of Louis XIII. to gain over Savoy and carry on a war in Italy in the interests of France. He was to tell them that the King was hurt by their condonation of Nevers' conduct. Once more Philip expressed his determination to follow the example of Charles the Fifth. It is clear that those who drafted this despatch were but ill-informed as to the views of those who swayed the policy of the Austrian Court.¹

As a matter of fact, the most influential courtiers at the Hradschin vied with one another in their expression of their devotion to Nevers and his house.

From morning to night Agnelli was receiving assurances of their support. Count Furstemberg, the President of the Aulic Council, before which the case about the Mantuan succession was to be tried, expressed himself in very favourable terms as to Duke Charles, but hoped that, once the matter was settled, he would be reconciled to Guastalla. There were three claimants in the field, the Duke of Savoy "with his musty old pretexts," the Duchess Dowager of Lorraine, who wished to secure the "increments" in the revenues, and Guastalla. A Secretary of the Duke of Lorraine had been with the Emperor, and when asked if he really thought that the Dowager's claims were valid, had replied, "The Duchess' rights are as clear as the sun in heaven," on which Ferdinand had burst out laughing. "We must, however," wrote the Bishop, "be upon our guard." Count Terzi, the Councillor in charge of the Italian department, and Cardinal Harrach seemed well disposed to Nevers, whilst the Nuncio said that the Pope and the Cardinal Secretary would do their best for him in order to prevent a war in Italy, and that the Emperor's real wish was to satisfy Spain by doing strict justice. The Spaniards, indeed, were far better disposed towards Duke Charles than was believed at Mantua, an assertion which the Nuncio evidently made in good faith. Agnelli had not seen the French envoy, as they were sure of France, but at Prague "we must take care to make it clear that we do not depend upon anyone except the House of Austria." He had received an invitation through Morbioli to visit the Emperor privately, as it would be to Nevers' disadvantage if he received him publicly as his ambassador.

On February the twenty-eighth Agnelli wrote that he had seen the Emperor. To his great surprise Ferdinand spoke first and said, "Excuse me, Monsignore, if I have kept you waiting, but I was playing at Primero with my wife, and had to finish the game to please her." This looked well, so the Bishop explained that Duke Charles' first thought on his arrival at Mantua had been to do homage to the Emperor and to ask him for the investiture as had been the constant usage of his predecessors. Out of his devotion to the Empire and to the House of Austria, he had refused to accept a commission as General in the French Service, which might have forced him to serve against them.

The Emperor replied that he knew Duke Charles very well as, in Emperor Matthias' time he had served with him for four months before Buda, and he retained very pleasant recollections of his courage and courtesy. "But, Monsignore, what I regret is that he should have entered those states and that the Prince should have concluded such a marriage without letting me know beforehand."

Agnelli said the Dukes of Mantua had always appointed their sons or their brothers as their successors by will, although they held their states by investiture, and that D. Vincenzo had only made his people swear fealty to Rethel to insure their peace and quiet, as every one at Mantua and all of the Gonzaghi except Guastalla believed in Nevers' rights. The marriage had been hurried on and Princess Maria herself had only been informed of her uncle's intentions a few hours before the ceremony. Want of time had prevented them from communicating with the Emperor but he himself could bear witness to the pleasure which its conclusion had given to D. Vincenzo on his deathbed, and to his heartfelt thanks to the God who had been with him to the last.

"His Imperial Majesty listened attentively and seemed pleased," and then asked after Duke Charles and his family. "We had a most pleasant and affable conversation, after which I once more took up my theme," and begged that the investiture might be granted to Duke Charles at once so as to prevent the other claimants, particularly D. Cæsar, from making trouble. The Emperor said that Guastalla had brought forward the most trivial objections but that Agnelli must present him a memorial as to the investiture with the necessary proofs. The Bishop then asked that the Duke might be placed under the protection of the the Empire. Ferdinand II. said that all the necessary steps had already been taken to do so, "but that, as for the Civil case, the Duke must submit himself to the Courts and I pledge my word that I will then do him justice without regard to any human considerations." Such was the only result of Agnelli's visit, although the good Bishop was delighted with the ceremonial reception which was given him. Ferdinand II. was by no means eager to enter into a dispute about Mantua, and undoubtedly took the right course by adhering to the letter of the law. A few days later the Bishop went to visit his old pupil, the Empress Leonora. The moment he entered her presence, she burst into a flood of tears, and to prevent herself from being seen crying by

her attendants, asked him to stand close in front of her. "God's will be done," she sobbed, "it was six years ago on the Epiphany that I heard that I had been made Empress, and on the same day this year I heard of my brother's death. The princess's marriage filled me with apprehension, for I felt Spain would take it very ill, and there was the Emperor, too, almost at death's door. I know, and with good cause, when my mind foresees troubles are drawing near. The night before I could not get to sleep and I lay crying the whole night long without knowing why." "I tried to comfort her as best I could by telling her of his saintly death, and as to the Princess' marriage I explained things to her as I had done to the Emperor and his ministers. This seemed to please her. I said that I had seen with my own eyes D. Vincenzo sign the letter which he had written to H.I.M., and so freed her mind of the suspicion that it had been forged." He begged Her Majesty to support his request to the Emperor for the investiture, but she said she must refuse as the Duchess Dowager of Lorraine had asked that nothing should be done in the matter, until they had seen one of her gentlemen whom she was sending to Prague. "She added—I am giving it you word for word—'Monsignore, to get the business settled, you must make friends with the ministers. . . . Treat them well and tell them the Duke will be bound to them for ever. As for my protection, I assure Your Lordship that up to this moment I have believed and believe Duke Charles to be the legitimate sovereign and now head of my house, but the claims of Lorraine about the state are also to be taken into account as they are based upon the will of the Duke my father, although Duke Vincenzo, my brother, could not make one like it,' " and other things to the same effect. "After asking to see the will and codicils which Agnelli gave her, she continued, 'For this reason I will always help Duke Charles and as you would be less honoured if you came as ambassador from the Duke of Nevers and not from the Duke of Mantua, and as were the Prince himself to come here, whilst things are in such a dubious state, he would be refused the privileges which he claims, I have arranged that you should come privately. It is not well that the Prince should come here at present, as I could not endure seeing my own blood less than honoured.' " The Bishop said that Mantua was now a greater state than it had ever been before, but that the Duke's one wish was to obey the Emperor, who, he knew, would treat him with justice, and begged

that they would write to Spain to ask that Savoy should be kept from attacking Monferrat, and for orders to D. Gonzalez de Cordoba to remain quiet as he hated the Duke and wished to make trouble. "To this H.I.M. replied, 'Let the Duke stand well with Spain! How do the Court dress?' 'In the Spanish fashion, there is not a trace of anything French in Mantua. The Duke has not brought a single Frenchman with him, and even as to his body-guard he wants to get some Germans for his own personal security so as not to have to depend entirely upon Italians.'" Her Majesty could say nothing but went on to question the Bishop as to a certain M. de St. Chamond, who, it was rumoured at Prague, had Nevers entirely under his control, at which she expressed some annoyance. Agnelli could only reply that M. de St. Chamond and Sig. Martinelli had come with a commission to try to effect an arrangement between Savoy and Mantua, but that the settlement had been delayed by Duke Vincenzo's illness and death, so that their business was not yet concluded. He had not heard anything about Donna Maria's marriage until it had been celebrated and did not interfere in state affairs.

The Empress then asked about D. Vincenzo's natural children. "I hear Luigino is a very fine boy. I have his portrait in a priest's dress, and I want him here with me when the time comes. I will send him to Ingolstadt, the great Jesuit university, and will try to push him on through the Church. I know that here they make but little account of natural children. We have several of Rudolf's sons and daughters at Prague and Vienna, who are not well treated and are in a very low condition. But I will help him. I want to see this will and codicils for a minute. I want to make up matters between D. Caesar and the Duke.' I said this would be an easy matter if it were arranged before the suit, but not afterwards, when all parties were embittered.

"Your Highness will see from this that H.I.M. is wholly on your side, and I can do nothing without her. Your Highness must try by every means to get reconciled with Spain, for once that power is appeased, we shall not have such difficulties to face."

On the following day he saw Eulenberg, one of the ministers with whom H.I.M. had recommended him to make friends, and handed him the memorial as to the investiture. Eulenberg, however, criticised Nevers' conduct in levying troops, "and the worst of it is they are paid by Venice. Your Highness must walk warily. D. Caesar had been with His Excellency the day before,

and when the Minister said that the Duke was very devout and a hanger-on of the Jesuits, replied that if he had been at Duke Vincenzo's deathbed things would have gone very differently." Agnelli denied the assertion that the Duke was arriving and said that he had no need to take money from Venice as he had plenty of his own.

As a matter of fact, the Emperor's advisers, the Eulenburgs, the Strahlendorfs, the Nostitz and other "High-born" members of the Imperial Government, their favourites and their toadeaters, were simply up for sale. Agnelli, after describing his interview with Eulenberg, says that large presents would have to be given and that he must have the money ready to pay over directly the business has been settled. He would advise that two hundred thalers [£30] should be given to five or six Ministers as a retaining fee when the case was begun and that they should be promised more. Marchese di Grana, who knew the Court well, was strongly of this opinion. Such a paltry bribe might have been scorned by Olivares' hall porter.

It would be well also that Donna Maria should write frequently to the Empress expressing her reliance on her protection as Her Majesty was very fond of her and delighted in her letters.

Such was the position of the Mantuan question when Spinola arrived at Madrid from La Rochelle on February the twenty-fourth, fresh from his conferences with Louis XIII and with Richelieu, and bringing with him the knowledge that once France was quit of her difficulties at home she would forthwith take action in Italy to support Duke Charles.¹

CHAPTER LXXXIV

DESPITE the mutterings of those Councillors who could not forget that Groll had been lost by a Genoese, the Marquis de los Balbases was welcomed with all the honours which were the due of the conqueror of Breda and of the senior member of the Council of State. He was met at half a league from the Gate of Guadalajara by the Count Duke and all the grandees of Spain, and when he neared the town got into a coach alone with Olivares and drove through the Campo to the Palace to pay his duty to the King, "a thing which was never done in this way before," to the great disgust of his attendants, who would gladly have seen their master greeted by His Majesty in public. "On the last day of February the marriage of D. Diego Mexia, Marquis of Leganes with Donna Polyxena Spinola was consummated. Next day there was a fête and ball at the Palace. I have a letter," adds Rubens, "by My Lord Marquis' express of the third of March, from which it is easy to see that these feasts and balls have not made him less attentive to business than usual, and that all the honours showered upon him have not altered his natural frame of mind." On the morrow of Donna Polyxena's nuptials, Spinola's chief enemy, the Marquis of San Germano, President of the Council of the Indies, died, and the vacant office was at once granted to Leganes, "who, in good truth, is riding post to the summit of every distinction which can fall to a man like him." The loungers in the Calle Mayor marvelled when they heard that Philip himself had appeared uninvited at a banquet at which Spinola was present, and that with unheard of condescension he had seated himself at the table and dined with his grandees. But, despite all these outward honours, Spinola had a hard task to carry through for he had now fallen into disfavour with Olivares.

The Marquis was, above all things, anxious that the war in Flanders should be carried on vigorously both by land and sea, and for this a force of at least ninety thousand men would have to be kept up, who would have to be paid regularly and in full,

although under existing arrangements there were only 68,271 on the pay rolls with a service strength of 47,554. They received a half pay of four escudos [£1] a month at intervals of from forty to sixty days, with commissariat bread and their cloths. If these proposals could not be carried out, Spinola wished that a Truce for the term of thirty years at the least should be concluded with the Dutch, under which they should be recognised as "Free" and allowed to trade with Spain though not with the Indies, on the condition, however, that they should allow the public exercise of the Catholic religion. He believed that if hostilities were suspended Holland would be rendered powerless by religious dissensions, as Frederick Henry had not the same personal authority as Maurice. Olivares, on the other hand, whose thoughts were now turning towards Italy, if not to the Baltic, rather than to the Netherlands, proposed that the war in Flanders should be carried on upon the same lines as it had hitherto been. He believed that a force of thirty-five thousand men for the garrisons, and twenty-two thousand for the field forces in Flanders with a pay of four escudos [£1] a month a man would be amply sufficient, and that the necessary expenses would only come to one million, nine hundred and eighty-four thousand escudos of fifty-seven placks [£595,200], as against the Marquis' estimate of four million, one hundred and fifty-one thousand, eight hundred escudos [£1,037,950] a year for the upkeep of a force of fifty-seven thousand foot and four thousand horse, with a fleet of forty galleons.

Olivares, in justifying his estimates, expresses the utmost horror at the thought of paying an army regularly. "I assert and will make my assertion good that this is the first time that twelve pays of four escudos in each pay have been given to the forces in any one year, as I am now estimating for. I will also prove beyond contradiction that during the whole history of the world four millions [£1,000,000] a year have never been spent to keep up any army whether large or small. I will establish, likewise, that no one would ever seriously propose to keep up a force of fifty-seven thousand foot and four thousand horse on three million seven hundred thousand escudos [£902,500], and run the risk of doing so, whilst at the same time saving a good sum for other expenses."

The Count Duke, however, also accused Spinola of gross extravagance, more particularly with regard to the expenditure

of the Secret Service money, and his outrageous grants to individuals, a charge which the Marquis might have easily brushed aside, as before leaving Brussels he had put all his papers and accounts in good order to refute it. Rubens, however, believed that he "had been snubbed by the King and his Ministers, because he made them put their fingers upon the outrageous cost of this war and the difficulties which it presents, and yet if they wish to produce any effects in the end they should send more supplies." He well knew, indeed, "that this war in the Low Countries is one against fish and water. As for land, the Dutch have none, for castles they have nothing but ships, and the harvests they garner in are at the expense of the King of Spain. This people is so wholly given up to gain that they think of nothing but the substance, and take no account of the outward show; those who find themselves in the best places are like the monks and judges who never expose themselves to fire or steel save that of the bottles and the plates; the rabble always give way to the ready wits, who govern them as the bridle does the horse, the mixture of religions has bred a real indifference, so that anyone who offered them a good settlement, before success has made them intractable, would be sure of succeeding beyond his utmost wish." "Since then on your side," wrote Gerbier to Rubens, "they are all perfectly ready to build a golden bridge for their enemies, reason must make them see what advantages may accrue to them through their pious purpose. As miracles are so common amongst you, you ought to work them." Spain had every reason to believe in the anxious desire of Charles I. and Buckingham to come to a settlement with her, and if Spinola could only be sent back to Flanders with ample powers to treat, "you will shortly be living in peace, otherwise it is but words and wind," much as they had been disappointed by Mexia's failure to bring some acceptable proposals with him. Gerbier believed, indeed, that if the negotiations were carried on in England for a peace between Spain and "the King of England and his allies," not only could a peace be concluded with England, but also a truce with Holland, if a settlement could be come to without the knowledge of the States General. For such a course Prince Frederick and many leading Dutch statesmen were said to be prepared. This advice was laid to heart by both Olivares and the Infanta, although at the same time the Count-Duke was fully persuaded that the Emperor and the Empire

would shortly put the Dutch under the Ban, and that Tilly would force them into submission by invading the Provinces from East Friesland. Rubens could not but take note of the awe which was expressed by the common people when a rumour spread that an apparition clothed in the robes of a bishop had been seen walking in broad daylight across the Lake of Haarlem "as a sign to foretell that that State through some strange revolution will once more return to the Catholic Faith; but I think that Cæsar's army which is now very near there, will both accredit and explain the miracle." But for the complications in Mantua it is possible that a settlement, whether through the help of the Imperial Armies or by peaceful negotiations, might have been arrived at in the Netherlands, before the French had been set free by the fall of La Rochelle for undertakings abroad.¹

The real sentiments of the Emperor and his advisers were widely different from those which they were supposed at Madrid to entertain. According to Eggenberg's right hand man, "Blanco Verda," the Knight of Werdenberg, the Prince could decide the question as to the Investiture as he pleased, whilst Spain, on account of the Queen of Hungary, would have to do the Emperor's bidding. Ferdinand II. himself would expect seventy thousand thalers [£10,500] as a present from Nevers, Eggenberg would accept twenty thousand, [£3,000], whilst the other ministers and Werdenberg himself would be satisfied with five or six thousand [£750 to £900.] The Emperor, however, to please the Spanish Court, was anxious that the Duke of Guastalla and his son should receive some compensation.

Wallenstein roundly told both the Imperial Councillors and Aytona that he had no mind to allow his army to be broken up, and that they need not expect to get a soldier from him if they meant to make war against Nevers, "for it is an unjust war, and he would say the same if the Emperor asked him for them." Agnelli begged Duke Charles to think well over everything that he wrote to Austria, so that he might get himself firmly seated in the saddle, well though his prospects looked. The King of Spain had notified the Emperor that he had sent orders to Cordoba to advance towards Monferrat. "For this, however, he asks the sanction of His Imperial Majesty, and gives his word of honour that he will not begin hostilities without it." The Emperor had decided to refuse his approval, but Agnelli's informant had urged him to send an express to Mantua with the

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news. He also tried to induce Duke Charles to enlist other supporters. "It will be of great advantage to H.H. to cultivate the Jesuit fathers who are for ever crying you up here, and who have stated publicly that they have to thank you for preventing their society from being expelled from France. If you did so, it would please the Emperor, who has formed a very high opinion of them, and is so devoted to them, that out of his over great wish to support them, if it can be done agreeably to that sense of justice which he always professes, H.I.M. has secretly given orders for prayers to be offered up in four places of religious, that God may inspire him with a right decision, and, at the same time, show him how to content the Spaniards, who are for ever goading him on to the opposite course." If indeed he could see how to satisfy Spain, there would be little further trouble.¹

Aytóna had remained quiet until he had learnt that Savoy and Cordoba had occupied Monferrat. He then spoke to Eggenberg, who advised him to present a note to the Emperor, by whom it was referred to a Committee of the Aulic Council, and Councillors of State. They decided unanimously that the Emperor must sequester the disputed states. Ferdinand II. instructed Eggenberg to inform the Empress of their decision. "Her Majesty listened to him with great agitation at first, but grew calmer when he told her that as to the main point Princess Maria would receive ample compensation, and that although H.I.M. would have to sequester the states, he would allow H.H. to live in Mantua and would give her an allowance." Count John of Nassau, with two Aulic Councillors, had been appointed, Imperial Commissioner. "They would not, as I asked, name D. Gonzalez de Cordoba, but yet wished to give the commission to someone who depended on Your Majesty." The Emperor had pressed Aytóna to write to Cordoba to suspend his advance into Monferrat, but he had refused to do so. "I thought it as well to let the Emperor and his Ministers know that Your Majesty's armies would not suspend their operations even though they had not received H.I.M.'s sanction and assistance. This was the reason why they were so quick in making up their minds to undertake the sequestration, and they have told the Empress that they are doing her a service by doing so as it would be better that those states should be in the Emperor's hands rather than in those of Savoy and of Your Majesty." Werdenberg urged Agnelli to secure the exchange of Monferrat for the Cre-

monese, but to this Philip IV. was now unwilling to agree, although Aytona told Agnelli in so many words that the Citadel of Casale was the crux of the whole difficulty, and that they cared little about Mantua. The sequestration was inevitable in order to avoid a general war, but it was a good sign for Nevers' prospects that it had been extended to embrace all the claimants. Wallenstein's attitude was more determined than ever. As he told the Bishop, "he had told Werdenberg and Collalto plainly that he will not give a man for this war and would sooner agree to an arrangement with the Dutch, whatever its terms, so as to give the Spaniards their deserts. He added that Y.M. should nevertheless deal frankly with Nassau, and that he himself would make very plain representations to Spain about the whole business and would tell them what he thought in black and white. I believe he did so, for when after lunch I went to the Spanish Ambassador, I found him there and he was very civil to me." Aytona said that Spain did not claim any of the Mantuan States, and it would therefore be well, wrote Agnelli, that the Commissaries, when they reached Mantua, should be asked who the claimants really were. In Aytona's eyes the question was far more complex, for if Nevers obeyed the Emperor, it was certain Spain and Savoy must give up the idea of acting as sequestrators in the Emperor's name, and he suspected that the Imperial Ministers wished to undertake the occupation themselves. On the other hand, he could not believe that either the French, the Pope or the Venetians will give the Duke a chance of doing so, even though the Empress were to make him a secret offer of a large compensation and some sort of guarantee that his case would be decided in his favour. Thus there would necessarily be a war in which the Emperor would have to stand by Spain. As things stood in Germany, all he could do would be to make a diversion in Friuli, if the Venetians sided with Nevers, for it was certain that all the German troops would refuse to exchange the service of the Emperor for that of Spain, whilst though the Passage of the Valtelline was open for the moment, it might be closed at any time by France and Venice, and they would have to pay a high price to Archduke Leopold for one through the Tyrol. Every enemy of Spain and Austria and, worst of all, the Pope, was working for Nevers, and his assurances that if the case were decided in the Duke's favour, Spain would at once hand over those territories which she had

occupied, carried but little weight. As Aytona was urging Cordoba by every post to press forward with the occupation on the ground that Nevers would thus be brought to be His Catholic Majesty's most humble servant "when he sees what has been occupied and trembles lest the remainder should be," their scepticism was, perhaps, justified. The Emperor was for the moment at least resolutely determined "not to let either Spain or Savoy take one inch of land from Your Highness," as he assured Agnelli through Eggenberg, "but as the wickedness of the world may possibly, though not probably, make things turn out otherwise," the Duke at Mantua and he himself at Prague would have to keep their eyes open.¹

They had no easy task. The Spaniards were for the moment determined to keep what they had occupied even if the Imperial Courts decided in Nevers' favour, on the ground that the Duke and his son had forfeited them by their disobedience to their suzerain. On the other hand, the Empress was more decided than ever in her support of her kinsmen, and Agnelli was informed that Count John of Nassau had orders to protect Duke Charles in every way. The French also were zealous in his favour, and were negotiating at every court from Madrid to Rome. According to Gueffier, their former resident in the Grisons, Cordoba's only ground for his hatred of Nevers was that he had in 1622 prevented him from concluding an armistice with Halberstadt and Mansfeldt, which he hoped would have secured to him the fruits of his victories. In the German Empire itself Lorraine and Bavaria were trying to get the upper hand of the Emperor and to insist that their representatives should take part in all diplomatic negotiations, whilst Wallenstein, who was only anxious to lead his armies against the Turks if his naval plans were judged to be inadvisable, would be allowed to control their forces. It would be well, wrote Agnelli, that a contingent from Mantua should join them. Under these circumstances the Emperor had good reason to be annoyed when in the middle of April he learnt that the Spaniards and Savoyards had attacked the Mantuan states. Although it was Palm Sunday, and the whole Court was at the Church of the Capuchins he had at once summoned Agnelli, and, moved by the tears of the Empress, had written to Philip IV. Aytona shared his annoyance, and with some reason, for he was now greatly disinclined to follow a policy of violence in Italy. He had, indeed,

learnt from Cordoba that the Duke of Savoy was in such a fury when he learnt that the Emperor had sent the Commissaries to Mantua, that he had told D. Alvaro de Losada that he looked upon the measure as a grave slight to himself, and there was reason to fear that he might break with Spain. Under these circumstances Aytona had tried to come to terms with Agnelli and had assured him that D. Gonzalez had advanced upon Casale without any orders from Spain. "The Bishop of Mantua has all along told me as his leading proposition, that his master wishes to be in entire dependence upon Y.M., and to obey Y.M.'s orders, but he also told some one, who informed me, that the Duke of Nevers had written that he is not to engage himself by any agreement.

"The Empress is backing up her niece in every way she can, and as for the Emperor it is a very hard job to open his eyes and undeceive him when the Bishop and some Mantuans about him get the Empress to talk him round, so that the whole business would be a most difficult one even if Nevers had less right on his side than he has."

Her Imperial Majesty herself had, however, no very easy task to carry through. When she told Agnelli that he should send an express to Mantua to say that she swore that she could get everything arranged at once if the Duke would only obey the Emperor, the Bishop replied, "I will not send off a courier for this, My Lord Duke is being badly treated by everyone, and it will be a miracle if he consents to give Y.M. this satisfaction, when he has so many causes for dissatisfaction. H.I.M. ought to order Savoy as his vassal, and D. Gonzalez as the same, to lay down their arms. It will be much easier for the Duke to comply with Y.M. wishes if this is done. As the saying runs, with a stick in your hand you can make your slave do your bidding, but that is not the way to handle great princes." She told me to speak to Eggenberg, who was most offhand and handed me a note, but I did not give him one, and said that, "The armed forces must be withdrawn before negotiations can be begun." The French Resident had told him that his master would never abandon His Highness, who was not only his beloved subject but his near kinsman. The Emperor also had told Don Caesar that neither he nor his nephew, the King of Spain, had given orders for the attack on Mantua, but that it was a freak on D. Gonzalez' part for which he would have to

pay dearly. D. Cæsar would have replied, but H.I.M. spurred on his horse and would not listen to him.

Whatever the Spaniards might say, neither Philip IV. nor Duke Charles could disregard the attitude of Savoy. Charles Emmanuel claimed that Nevers should be expelled from Italy and said with some show of truth that Spain had agreed to this. Such an agreement might well breed a serious dispute between Philip IV. and the Emperor when it transpired that he had at one and the same time been asking Ferdinand II. to sequester the States until the case should have been decided in the courts, and had agreed with Savoy that Nevers should be driven out of them. Aytona, therefore, advised that Savoy should be induced to obey the Emperor, as the Imperial Ministers promised that if he did so he should be given any compensation which Spain might ask for, whilst, unless he had the Emperor's sanction, he could not hope to retain anything of which he had taken possession.

Nevers saw that his adversaries were divided amongst themselves, whilst, on the other hand, he knew that once the Huguenots had been brought into subjection, all France would hasten to support him. He had, therefore, no reason to lend an ear to the Empress's advice and to stake the rich Mantuan heritage upon the assurances of the Imperial Court, by handing it over to the Imperial Commissaries.¹

Nevers, indeed, might have been fully justified by the course of events, for in April, 1628, the Spanish Empire in Italy had for a moment been at the brink of ruin. The Genoese had all but shaken off the hold of Spain.² In return for their refusal to return to Savoy the towns which they had taken from him during the war, Charles Emmanuel had organized a conspiracy against the patriciate in order to establish a plebeian government which would place itself under his protection. It has already been seen that Genoa was seething with disaffection. The ruling classes had broken their agreement with the people, and by closing the Golden Book had prevented the best qualified citizens from being admitted into their ranks, and thus rendered capable of holding public offices. The candidates were duly balloted for, but as they were never given a sufficient number of votes, not one plebeian had ever been admitted to office for many years. It was remarked, indeed, that the new nobility "who had been coopted from the Plebeians when these agreements

were made," had been the most obstinate in excluding their former equals, in the hope that if the memory of their recent origin was not kept fresh by the admission "of many of their former peers," they might in time pass for those Ancient Nobles who still kept them at arms' length. Under these circumstances the inhabitants of the Riviera and the mob of Genoa itself had determined to rise in arms under a leader named Vacchero, and after killing the Doge and Councillors, to place themselves under the protection of Savoy. Had the conspiracy succeeded, Spain would at a stroke have lost the Milanese and, perhaps, Flanders, and could with difficulty have retained her hold upon Naples. Vacchero was detected by an accident, and the rising was nipped in the bud, but Nevers was only strengthened in his determination to hold out.¹ At an interview in the garden palace of Marmirolo Count John of Nassau required him to deposit Mantua, Casale, and Pontestura in the Emperor's hands to be held by German garrisons until the case was decided, "promising that the Duke should receive satisfaction not only in justice but with advantage of favour. The Duke did require time to deliberate, and it is thought he will not return any categorical answer until he may know the opinion of the Pope and of the Venetians." He might well believe, like Wake, that "the affair of Genoa had put a bar between Spain and Savoy, and Mantua would serve to make Savoy's peace with the Emperor." Eggenberg, too, had written both to the Duke of Savoy and to Cordoba to tell them that they must lay aside all thoughts of dividing Monferrat between them, as that state recognised the Emperor as their immediate superior, thus giving Spain an unmistakable proof that she could not use Ferdinand II. as her tool at pleasure.² It mattered little to him that he was setting the two branches of the House of Hapsburg at loggerheads by doing so. The Imperial Commissaries found on their arrival at Mantua that things looked very different on the spot from what they had done at Prague, and that Nevers was far from being a mere Duke of Guastalla. The lord of the great fortresses of Mantua, Casale and Sabionetta and the kinsman of all the royal houses in Catholic Europe was a personage to be reckoned with seriously, although for the sake of consistency the Austrian Government claimed that Guastalla should not be excluded from the succession to Mantua and that Nevers should consider the question of accepting some exchange for Monferrat, under

the arbitration of the Pope and of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, a course which Agnelli strongly advised him to adopt, especially if Spain would take the settlement of the claims of Savoy and Lorraine upon herself.¹

Nevers, however, who was completely under the influence of his French advisers, and who had received renewed assurances of her support from Marie de Medicis, was in no mood to give way. His refusal to receive the Commissaries at Mantua and his bearing at the Conference at Marmirolo had given them great offence, and their report to the Emperor was couched in terms which gave him a most unfavourable impression of the Duke. So eager was Ferdinand to learn the contents of Nevers' letter to Agnelli that he had looked over the Bishop's shoulder to read it, but all he said was "Patience, Mr. Ambassador, don't fret yourself; you will always stand well in my eyes." The Aulic Councillor Questenberg added fuel to the flames, by saying that Nevers had treated the Act of suspension and summons to surrender his states with the utmost contempt, whilst his reply had been sent under flying seal, so that all the world might know what he thought of Cæsar and his ministers. The Empress and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who had come to Prague to canvass for the Crown of Denmark, with the title of Perpetual Vicar of the Empire, did their utmost to induce Ferdinand II. to leave the task of effecting a settlement to them, with Count Orso, Eggenberg, the Nuntio and Aytona as their representatives, and to this he agreed. The Commissaries proposed an arrangement based upon a compensation for Guastalla and the exchange of Monferrat, not for the Cremonese, but for some territory near Mantua in which Nevers could build a town and found a state, a proposal of which Philip IV. had approved three months earlier. The Duke might regret the loss of the nobility of Monferrat, but a hundred peasants were worth one noble, and if Savoy held the country round Casale, the place by itself would be worthless. The Venetians, wrote Agnelli, who was strongly in favour of this arrangement, would do nothing for him unless they saw the French flag in their ranks, and a French Secretary of State had written that France could do nothing until the business of La Rochelle was settled and that now the English fleet had arrived the result was most uncertain.²

Spain, too, was hesitating. The Count Duke was anxious for peace in Italy, provided that Spanish interests in the Milanese

were secured, but he had been talked over by some Ministers, who wished for a war in their own interests, and Philip IV. was now pressing that he should be allowed to hold the states himself, as otherwise it would look as if he were in arms against the Emperor. He instructed Aytona not to engage his word that Cordoba should hand back the territories which he had occupied, and as he foresaw that it would be most difficult to force Savoy to give up what he held, he was to point out that the Duke had taken action entirely upon his own responsibility, although in the Emperor's name. He was to induce Ferdinand II. to decide as to the right of succession to the States, but not as to that of possession, as if the latter question were adjudicated on "it will be a constant source of trouble as it has been in the past." If he could not secure this being done, he must get the Emperor to send his decision to Madrid before he published it, as he had done in the Piombino case. The King said that he had written to H.I.M. to blame him for his lukewarmness in the interests of Spain and for the damage which he was doing to the prestige of the House of Hapsburg both in Mantua and in Monferrat as also for his display of annoyance when he learnt that Cordoba was lying before Casale. By such a policy the authority of the Empire would be gravely weakened in Italy whilst if he acted with determination he could put down all the trouble there without drawing his sword. The tidings of Vacchero's conspiracy, however, opened Philip's eyes as to Charles Emmanuel's real intentions, and Agnelli heard he had said, "for the future he would be on good terms with Mgr. de Casale."¹

The good or ill-will of Spain was now of little account either at Mantua or at Prague. Scarcely had the English fleet left the Passage of Antioche on May the eighteenth when Richelieu gave his solemn promise to Gazzoldo that he would allow M. de Créquy, whom Nevers had specially asked for, to go as a volunteer to Italy, with any forces he could get together, even before La Rochelle had fallen, and that he would send orders to M. d'Ussel, who commanded in Dauphiné, not only to guard the passes, but to collect a force which he could throw into Piedmont at a moment's notice, but which as a blind to Savoy he was to employ in besieging Ponzon, a village on the Rhone, which was held by the Huguenots. Directly La Rochelle had fallen, which, the Cardinal hoped, would be by the end of June, then His Majesty would go to Lyons with a large force, speak out his

mind plainly, and push on with his army even further. "His Majesty wishes to make a league with the Pope and Venice, and would enter into serious negotiations with them about the business, as he had made up his mind to declare for Your Highness," in the middle of May, "but that they would not negotiate with Venice here, as they mistrust their ambassador," a fact which perhaps lessens the value of Zorzi's letters, "but at Venice itself through their resident, M. d'Avan." Venice would do what she could to assist Nevers with money, but for lack of means France could do little at present. In the Cardinal's eyes the most pressing matter was to secure Monferrat.¹

The Emperor, on the other hand, was as little inclined as Richelieu himself in the very moment of his triumph over the English to listen to Philip's lectures and admonitions. It was true that Stralsund had not yet fallen, but Denmark was crouching at his feet, and for the moment the Electors were giving him but little annoyance. Consequently he was free to take a more independent tone towards his Spanish kinsmen than usual. He had already learnt that Nevers was inclined to accept the proposals of the Commissaries especially as to arranging the exchange for Monferrat, but yet Agnelli warned his master that unless Guastalla was included in the line of succession, he would be building his house upon the sand. It was all very well for His Highness to count upon Austria. "The Emperor is kindness itself, the Empress your ardent supporter, and everyone is well disposed to you, but they are held in leading strings to keep them from straying on to forbidden ground, for the interests at stake are too great." When the case had been inquired into and D. Cesare had submitted his case to the Pope and to the Grand Duke, they would be in a position to give their decision. "When the case is settled, Y.H. is Duke of Mantua, and I venture to predict that when everything is decided the House of Austria will have no better friend than yourself. If the King and Their Imperial Majesties are so anxious that the case should be honourably decided, cannot you conceive that they may take it upon themselves to settle it hereafter, at a far greater risk to yourself? If you say that you will not consent to these proposals for your own sake, I can only say that if the case is settled by legal means you will be upon a firm foundation and no one will believe that anything said against your rights is well founded." It would be easy for him to settle with Guastalla, whose letter showed that he

bore him no ill-will, and the Empress urged him to do so as he would thus give unspeakable pleasure to the Emperor and the King of Spain. D. Cesare, it was true, was far more difficult to deal with, as he was of a harder nature. Ferdinand II. invited Agnelli to accompany him in his progress in Moravia, and for the moment an arrangement seemed possible.¹ Nevers, however, was unwilling to listen to reason. The Duke of Savoy had entered Monferrat, and occupied Trino and Pontestura, whilst the Spaniards were ravaging the country round Casale. Nevers, therefore, definitely refused to obey the Commissaries' orders to place his states in their hands, and was thought to be backing out of the arrangement which he had already agreed to accept. Nor had he taken the slightest notice of the Emperor's letter of complaint about his conduct to the Commissaries.² At the end of June the Marquis de Wateville, the new Minister from Savoy at Vienna, had been told by a Capuchin who was in H.I.M.'s confidence that Nevers had been placed under the Ban of the Empire both for calling on the French to assist him and for his obstinacy in refusing obedience to the Imperial orders. The news was premature, but on July the eleventh Ferdinand himself warned Agnelli that as Nevers, in Cordoba's words, would make no concessions unless to force, the Ban would be published against him without any regard to merely legal technicalities. At the same time, he had instructed Eggenberg to arrange an armistice which was openly flouted by the Spaniards, who reckoned on the assistance of Savoy to prevent the entrance of a French force into Italy, and were pressing for the admission of a Spanish force into Casale. Charles Emmanuel was, indeed, for the moment completely dominated by Cordoba and Losada, who was now Spanish Minister at Turin, and who knew, as Wake remarks, "that there is no bait under Heaven by which that Prince may be sooner caught than the hope of having Geneva" for the Cardinal of Savoy. That place was known to be but ill-provided with corn, and, if attacked, would probably fall, especially as twelve thousand French who had been levied for the service of Mantua were quartered near it. It would even be possible to attack it in the Emperor's name, as it might be put in the Ban under the Edict for reforming the Imperial Towns. Both France and Spain, it was true, hated and mistrusted the Duke of Savoy, and he so cordially reciprocated their feelings that "only the hope of getting Geneva can make him their prey." Wake had

some reason for his anxiety for Father Lammermann was doing his best to induce the Emperor to intervene, and it was thought at Vienna that if Stralsund fell Wallenstein's army might be employed against the "Calvinist Rome" despite the objections of Aytona, who muttered that as the town was under the protection of the French and Swiss, the point was one which should be settled at Madrid. Cordoba, meanwhile, was bombarding the Citadel of Casale, and it was thought that the place might be subdued within a month, to the terror of the Venetians, who had refused to lend Nevers any troops to invade the Milanese and force a passage to relieve it.¹

For the moment the prospect of obtaining the much coveted prize of Geneva had kept Savoy firmly on the side of Spain and of the Empire, and the Duke with two of his sons went to head the forces which were lying in the Valley of St. Pierre in readiness to resist the volunteers who had been levied in France by the Duke of Orleans to relieve Casale. The news of the defeat of these irregulars terrified the Court of Mantua and disposed Nevers to listen to proposals for an arrangement. For once the French had played into Guastalla's hands. Cordoba, and with reason, threw the whole blame for the failure of the negotiations upon Duke Charles, and once more pressed that the Imperial Ban, backed by a force of thirty thousand Germans, should be sent to him at Milan accompanied with orders to put it in force. Anxious as Eggenberg was not to kindle a fire which might prove to be unquenchable, he saw that it was impossible to allow the Imperial authority to be defied with impunity, and that measures must be taken to punish an offender who, as Agnelli frankly admitted, counted the Emperor for naught, and was wholly in the hands of the French. He could only excuse Nevers' conduct by saying that the French were protecting one "who was being despoiled of the states which God and Nature had given him" by assailants who had attacked him without any pretext, and whose sole object was to partition his inheritance amongst them.²

The Empress was now taking a course of baths at the Austrian watering place of Baden, where she was visited every day by the Emperor. To her Agnelli appealed, but she could only promise that she would repeat his explanations of his master's conduct to His Majesty and do her best to prevent him from taking any severe decision. Had it not been for the pressure from Spain,

Ferdinand II. might well have refrained from sending troops into Italy. "His own subjects are but little to be trusted, many princes are seriously displeased, and what is the most important point, this may cause the time for the election of his son as King of the Romans to be long delayed, and yet this election is most essential for the secure establishment of the House of Austria." The Emperor's intervention in Italy would, indeed, be a fresh challenge to the Electors. They were already irritated by his refusal to remove Wallenstein from the command of his armies, and probably through a breach of confidence on the part of the Capuchin Valerian Magni, the intimate alike of Maximilian of Bavaria and of Wallenstein, had learnt that the general intended to use that army in order to change the Empire into a hereditary monarchy for himself, a fact which Maximilian in April, 1628, had, through Bruneau, communicated both to the Infanta and to Philip IV. Consequently they were now but little inclined to choose a Hapsburg Prince as the successor to the Empire, and at the same time to allow Wallenstein to increase his reputation by a victorious campaign in Italy, undertaken solely in the family interests of the Hapsburgs. The news of the French invasion of Italy roused the Aulic Council to take action, and on the first of August Agnelli wrote that they intended shortly to decide whether or no the Ban should be issued. Both the Spaniards and Savoyards were most anxious that this should be done in order to justify both their occupation of Monferrat and D. Cesare's claims to the Mantovano. "They will succeed as they have saints in the front seats who pray for them," and they flattered themselves that the Emperor, in his pique against Nevers for his refusal to accept any of the proposed arrangements, would end by supporting them. "That Y.H. may not think that I am merely writing this as a kind of indirect complaint, I tell you on the word of a prelate that our affairs are at this very point, and that, in my opinion, there is now no means whatsoever of finding a remedy for them." In vain Agnelli appealed to the Empress, who had said that Spain was too powerful for her to do anything on Nevers' behalf. She was, however, "writing in her own hand to Eggenberg, and in such terms that when the Prince read the letter over to me we both cried together at the great love which she showed for her House and at her remembrance of her country." Eggenberg could only say that the case would be fully dealt with by the

Aulic Council in the Emperor's presence, would be dealt with with all fairness, as the matter was so patent to all the world, and that I might hope that my requests would be complied with." As Agnelli knew that the Prince had just received a sword worth four thousand thalers [£600] from Savoy, and, moreover, thought that the Aulic Council, from want of knowledge of the details, was but ill qualified to decide such a case, these assurances and tears brought him but little satisfaction.¹

The Bishop's one hope lay in the intervention of the Empress whom he again visited on the day after his touching interview with the Prime Minister. She, however, was indignant that Nevers would not do anything for D. Cesare, and the Bishop "went back home betwixt hope and fear," only to be again snubbed by Eggenberg, who evidently believed not a word either he or his master said, and again pressed the question as to the exchange of Monferrat. Agnelli, who felt himself beset by foes on every side, took a high tone, told his opponent roundly that if the terms offered to Guastalla did not satisfy him, no possible proposals about Monferrat would and said roundly "that he was not going to bring the house down about their ears, and if it fell later on, the Mantuans would be the only ones who were left unburied." His resolute language produced its effect and on August the fourteenth Strahlendorff and Nostitz came to enquire what Nevers really meant to do. They seemed fairly well pleased with his offer to Guastalla, and next day went back to the Empress, "who, spurred on by the hope I set before her of winning eternal fame, gets the more eager the more all the schemes proposed crumble into dust." She promised to do her best to secure a peace, and he had asked her to devote her attention to two points, firstly to get the execution of all the measures intended against Nevers delayed, and, secondly, that the case should be decided by the law. In return the envoy gave his word that his master would always be the humble servant of the House of Austria. He again urged the Duke to remember that he was only acting in his interest, and that he need not be ashamed if he was mistaken in his opinion to accept the guidance of others. He had brought all these troubles upon himself by his paltering. A few days later the Council decided to issue a peremptory summons to the Duke calling upon him to deposit all his states and everything belonging to them in the Emperor's hands within thirty days, and a decree was issued to forbid all the

Feudatories and Princes of the Empire to give him any assistance. The Emperor at once signed all the documents and by the twenty-first of August they had been despatched to Mantua. To escape from Agnelli's solicitations Ferdinand II. had immediately afterwards left for Korneuburg. "The Empress screams, pours out a torrent of words broken by shrieks, and gets the Emperor to go with her to the Prince to get them modified. They go, she comes out almost like a mad thing, bathed in sweat and tears—and all to no purpose.

"The Emperor follows her, repeating that she cannot but conform herself to her husband's wishes: though he afterwards left some order or another for M. Werdenberg, so that she did not altogether lose heart, but this had no effect, as you will see. The Nuncio and Tuscany went to the Prince and represented to him the injustice of this act, but all that they could get out of him was that it is a matter which has been gone into over and over again, and fully discussed. No other course, he said, can or ought to be taken, so all their arguments were wasted.

"I, as being more nearly concerned, was more guarded with Eggenberg. He told me, however, that the decision is irrevocable, and that it had already been communicated to Spain, Savoy, Lorraine, and Guastalla. Outbursts against them do no good, and to get clear of the worry he has had his trunks packed and is just off to Styria, so that we are left here without any hope of relief and at the mercy of inexorable fate. I asked him why had I had to send my secretary to Italy with such pressing representations and articles already formulated. He replies, 'It was the Empress's doing, and the Emperor knew nothing about it.' 'But how can this be so, when it was the Emperor himself who sent his Ministers to me to find out the precise wording of H.H.'s reply?' 'They did it *ex-officio* in order to be in a position to discuss it afterwards.' 'But why then did Y.E. get my secretary to come to your bedside, make him read you the articles, make some corrections in them yourself, explain them to him again, encourage him to take the journey, and urge him to make the utmost speed?' He answered that he did so to please the Empress. 'But,' retorted I, 'why act in a way which is so little to H.I.M.'s honour?' 'Because, in a word, of the necessities of the time which impose this on us.' 'And the letters which H.I.M. wrote

with his own hand to the Princess,' pressing for the arrangements which the Secretary was bringing with him to be ratified, 'and advising her to use her best efforts to ensure this? Am I to take it that they were written offhand?' The Prince sits mute, changes the subject and continues, 'How can H.I.M. act otherwise seeing that the Duke is given over heart and soul to the King of France? In Casale a M. de Guron is in command. Everyone in his suite is a Frenchman. His Majesty has been considering whether he ought to send an Ambassador Extraordinary to France to ask what the French King has to do with the Imperial States and vassals.' I replied straight out, 'Here, Prince, is your answer. What has Spain got to do with the Imperial States? If the negotiations between the Emperor and the Duke were conducted fairly, France would have no grounds for interposing. But if Spain, without any cause whatsoever is oppressing a friend of France, have the French not a right and a good one at that to protect him?' 'What right?' says the Prince. 'By the right of his being his vassal and kinsman, if by no other.' He again remains silent, but does not shift his position. Finally Mgr. Ballotta, as a last resort, wrote a note to the Prince yesterday to remind him what pleasure it would give His Holiness if this Monitorium were suspended and how displeased he would be if it were not. The Prince sent to tell him that all the documents had already been sent off, and that there was now nothing more to be done. The despatches are indeed already on their way to Milan."

The expostulations of the Venetian Resident and the anger of the French Envoy, who was indignant that the Monitorium should have censured Nevers "for placing himself, his states and Imperial fiefs under the protection of a foreign prince and king," words which had been inserted by Eggenberg in defiance of the Council, were equally without avail. The Prince was "one who can command," and after despatching his orders to Mantua he went off from Vienna on a three months' holiday.

"The Emperor, before leaving, sends for D. Cesare, scolds him for being out of the way, reminds him this is his business, and warns him that if he is over-greedy it will be to his own hurt, let him rest and be thankful for what he is promised, and tells him roundly that he is greatly displeased with him and his goings on. D. Cesare made his excuses in very general terms: he was bound to obey the King of Spain, and so could not do less than

what he was doing." His arguments were powerfully put, but carried no weight.

The Emperor, however, sent Werdenberg to tell the Nuncio that he should get D. Cesare to agree to the first article as His Reverence had drawn it up himself, but D. Cesare utterly refused to consent, on the ground that the Pope was allowing his colonels and soldiers to exchange into Nevers' service, and so he had good grounds for complaint against His Holiness. "Yesterday Werdenberg went to the Emperor to tell him the result of his negotiations with D. Cesare, so we shall see what more H.I.M. will do or say."

Such was the substance of Agnelli's despatch of August the twenty-first from Vienna, which reached Mantua almost simultaneously with Gazzoldo's warning that Créquy had refused to take service with Nevers, that nothing could be got from the French but words, and that Louis XIII. would do nothing as to Mantuan affairs until he returned to Paris, which he would not do until after the fall of La Rochelle. Almost at the same time the Duke of Savoy defeated the French Volunteers under d'Ussel.¹

Philip the Fourth's views were less conciliatory than ever. He instructed Aytona early in July to ask the Emperor to send two or three regiments to reinforce Cordoba, and declined to listen to Count Orso's suggestion that he should exchange the Cremonese for Monferrat, a proposal which he had several times refused already. "What I could consider is one for the deposit of Monferrat as it stands to-day with the inclusion of Casale and its citadel, and that when H.I.M. has given his decision, I should give some compensation for that part of it which may be in my hands, for it would be a great piece of injustice that I should be condemned to give up the whole of that state to the Duke of Nevers if he is not its rightful owner, and also have to deal with the claims of the farmers of its revenues, which I have already declined to admit." He would also have to compensate Savoy and the Duchess of Lorraine, and so would have to pay for the same thing twice over, in addition to incurring heavy expenses for the war. Aytona, was, however, to spin out the negotiations as long as possible, "so as to give time for the stroke against Casale."

On the tenth of July Philip again wrote to Vienna to say that Nevers was collecting large forces to resist Cordoba and that

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France was preparing to enter Savoy in order to prevent the Imperial Sequestration of Mantua and Monferrat from being carried out. He must induce the Emperor to put pressure upon France, "about the Bishop of Verdun's business," for Ferdinand II. had given deadly offence to Richelieu by claiming homage from the Bishop as a member of the Empire, "and also about Lorraine, to send some forces to the French frontiers in those parts so as to keep the most Christian from making trouble in Italy," and to lend some regiments to serve in Spanish pay both in Italy and in Flanders. Armed with these letters and with Philip's despatch of the twelfth of June Aytona accordingly sought an audience with the Emperor, and his account of the position of affairs in his despatches of the twenty-third of August and the sixth of September sums up the situation nearly as clearly as does that given by Agnelli writing on the twenty-first of August.

"Now I must explain to Your Highness," writes the Bishop, "what is the chief cause of this sudden and lasting revolution in our affairs, which was got, at last, from the mouth of D. Cesare himself, when, overwhelmed by the Nuncio's arguments, he did not know what more to reply or advance.

"Eight or ten days ago letters from Spain to the Emperor arrived, in which H.I.M. was reminded of the excessive charges, serious disadvantages and manifest dangers which the Crown of Spain had incurred for many a year past, by raising the Emperor to the throne and maintaining him upon it, by supplying him with men and money, and by giving him that mastery over his enemies which he now has. Now Spain saw its reward in that a Foreign Prince (such is the usual designation they bestow upon Y.H.) was installed in Italy. That Prince was no great friend of the House of Austria, and was French by birth, habits, and inclination. He was, thus, a manifest danger to the State of Milan and, as such, to yet other Kingdoms. As, therefore, the King, for his own security, was absolutely determined to hold Monferrat, it was but right that H.I.M. should assist him with all his might, and this he could not do more readily than by bringing the Duke of Nevers to obedience, for if he resigned his States into the Emperor's hands, Savoy and D. Gonzalez would do the same. This would smooth the King's path in an undertaking to which Nevers, out of his love for France, would never assent, and thus a twofold benefit would accrue to the House

of Austria. In the first place Savoy would thus be prevented from constructing the three fortresses which they intend to build in the part which they have occupied, and, in the second place, the Emperor would get himself esteemed for what he is. In the other case, in a country in which there is now but one fortress, namely Casale, which is such a constant source of anxiety to the King's State of Milan, there would be four fortresses, and the danger to that State would be greater than ever. The King now wishes to test the Emperor's sense of gratitude but, if matters do not turn out as he wishes, he will have war at any price, and will secure his ends by force of arms." The Emperor had told D. Cesare "that now is the time for him to take advantage of his protection, for, though he is inclined to extend it to him, should he give him cause to see otherwise, he will extinguish him with a breath." Such language had made D. Cesare raise his demands, and he was asking for the greater part of the Mantuan States, was said to wish to raise regiments, and was bestowing public employments as if he were already their sovereign, and was forever at the Spanish Embassy with the Ministers of Savoy and Lorraine, who were in high favour at Court. Now was the time for Nevers to appeal to his friends, and to send skilful diplomats to France, "*for there is little time to lose and little to be hoped for,*" a sentence carefully underlined. "I ought also to remind Y.H. to send with the imperial letters a covering despatch giving full particulars of all that has taken place about you to the electors, especially to Bavaria, Saxony, and Brandenburg. As all of these came into their states by a collateral succession, they are almost in the same case as Y.H. so that it is by no means an impossibility that the kinsmen and nephews of Saxony and Bavaria, who have no children, might be deprived of their inheritance, or, indeed, that even Brandenburg might be shut out from the succession to Pomerania, as being either a collateral or a foreigner in that State or on some other pretext. This is all to get them upon your side, just as the Ecclesiastics, also, must be upon grounds of justice, for they must be horrified by and oppose the Spanish plan. This is a two-fold one. They intend, in the first place, to secure the issue of the Imperial Ban and to make war upon the strength of it, as they argue that it will give them more justification for doing so. In the second they mean to force the Emperor to couple his troops with the royal armies because

they are in arms against a rebel under the ban of the Empire.

"I must not, moreover, omit to tell Y.H. that in conversation with Prince Eggenberg I tried to sound him by asking him whether if Y.H. would consent to deposit your states, H.I.M. would, at least, then consent to place them in the hands of some one in whom you have confidence. 'Certainly not,' replied the Prince, 'the Emperor means to manage his own affairs and would not even agree to accept the Infanta herself, as they talked of at Milan.' He added, 'How would the Count of Nassau do? After all, it would be best that he or some one of that kind should do it.' They have already taken this in hand.

"But," I asked, "is there no way of getting the summons and the suspension which have been sanctioned set aside?"

"There can be no legitimate reasons," he replied. "Your Highness must pay the penalty. There is no cure for this ill, and I must tell you about H.I.M.'s confessor's final effort.

"Sacred Majesty, I must put before you Justice, your own reputation, and Religion. As for the first, Y.I.M. has for the last year been keeping in jail a man who is a notorious homicide, yet you will not have the death sentence carried out because of the few reasons he adduces against his execution, and you are always telling me that when a human life is at stake one must act with the greatest deliberation. In this case thousands of innocents will perish, yet this does not weigh with you. As for Religion, Your Imperial Majesty, France, and Spain are going to throw aside your glorious task of crushing the heretics, so that you may be free to oppress a Catholic prince without any just cause, whilst as for your reputation, you seem to think that the world has no writers. The ruin of Italy will smirch your fame for ever, and that stain you will never be able to wash out, do what you will. That is what you will gain by this."

"Father, you chatter too much. I can't act otherwise," and the Emperor went off to his hunting. The Confessor is crying out loudly at this, as is a Doctor Giulio Massimo Ponzoni, who was at one time your Highness' lawyer, and who is always ready to do you a service. He knows this court by heart, and, though Bartolus has been of no good here, yet he may find means of being of use to you. I have done." Such is the despatch in which Agnelli gives the history of the causes which led to the Mantuan War. In his eyes nothing could have averted it.

"The Catholic will have war, and the retreat of the French who were refused the passage to Castel Dauphin, and driven back with very great loss, will only strengthen him in his views." The Duke of Savoy had asked for the investiture for the states which he had occupied in Monferrat and for the hand of an Archduchess for Cardinal Maurice, but the Emperor had replied only in general terms and had left the matter for the King of Spain to decide.¹

Aytana, on the same day, was writing his views as to the position to Madrid. The Emperor had been unable to do anything about the Mantuan question during his journey from Prague to Vienna, on account of the illness of Count Strahlendorf, the Vice Chancellor of the Empire, whom he always consulted as to legal matters. "But the Empress, the Nuncio, the Emperor's Confessor, and almost all the Privy Councillors have got His Majesty into such a state that I was forced to go through with him one by one all the obligations under which he lies to Your Majesty. I had five audiences with him, and in one of them told him that I could not but feel annoyed with him for delaying the decisions as to Nevers, as His Cæsarean Majesty by doing this seemed to wish to give the world to understand that he was separating his own interests from Your Majesty's. Although I never could or would believe that this was the case, yet it was more than enough, if other people thought it was, to cause irreparable injury to the common interests of the House of Austria. His Imperial Majesty replied with some heat that I was talking about impossibilities, and that God would never allow such a thing to come to pass, and that in order to undeceive the Nuncio he had told them that the moment the French set a foot in Italy, he would have all his forces sent into the country to protect Your Majesty's states, but that he must confess to me that he felt very much hurt that D. Gonzalez de Cordoba should have carried out the occupation in his name without his consent, and by doing so he had laid his hand on his sceptre. I excused D. Gonzalez by saying that he had used His Imperial Majesty's name in order that his measures might carry more authority, although he had not received any commission from H.I.M. and that the moment I instructed him to do so, he would change his style. I think my explanation satisfied H.I.M., as he at once issued a decree to order the Aulic Council to go into Nevers' affairs as soon as

possible, and to advise him as to what decision he should come to.

The Empress, in her rage at seeing the proceedings which had been commenced against the Duke of Nevers set going again, began her usual intrigues, but this time took care to keep them secret, for she does not dare to show her hand openly, since the Emperor gave her a round scolding before Prince Eggenberg, and told her then and there to mind her own business in future, for she bungled everything, and, moreover, only irritated him by her meddling, for she had once gone so far as to tell the Emperor himself that all the world could see how the Spaniards were flouting him, yet he did not seem to know it. The Emperor's Confessor, who is avowedly Y.M.'s opponent in these affairs, continues to do his best for the Duke of Nevers, and is indeed carried away by his headstrong character, though he is Y.M.'s born subject. Once when the Duke of Savoy's Ambassador came to see him, he said that the war they were engaged in was an unjust one, and repeated this in such violent language that everyone wondered greatly that he, being Your Majesty's subject, should dare to say such things.

"I contrived that this should get to the Emperor's ears, and H.I.M. ordered Prince Eggenberg to give his reverence a sound trouncing, but although he has since bridled his tongue a little, yet he defends and assists the Duke of Nevers as much as he can. They say he does so because the Duke of Nevers has founded so many colleges for the Company, and that they are very grateful for what he has done for them. The Nuncios, also, who count themselves amongst his supporters, are using all their influence and are working through all the Councillors who are favourable to Nevers, with the help of all the diplomats at this court." The intervention of the Jesuits was no surprise to Aytona who, indeed, had been rather astonished that they were holding their hands at Vienna. "Lately H.I.M., after the Aulic Council had been deliberating for some days, told them with his own mouth that in the interests of Your Majesty and the Duke of Savoy, who was now reconciled with Y.M., they should do everything which was not a crying injustice. They decided to issue a decree, of which I enclose a copy, on the condition that H.I.M. should receive a guarantee that if Nevers complied with it without reserve by submitting to the sequestration, Your Majesty's and Savoy's ministers should do the same, and

even those few Councillors here who are in Your Majesty's interest, concurred. I pressed them as hard as I could not to ask for guarantees from Y.M.'s ministers, but could do nothing." Finally, in order to prevent the settlement from being delayed, Aytona on his own responsibility assured the Emperor that Spain and Savoy would at once obey these orders if Nevers did the same and "handed over to H.I.M. all the territories he holds with Mantua and Casale, and disbands his forces and dismisses the French auxiliaries." He had done this because he thought it out of the question that Nevers would obey, "and by making this promise we shall force the Emperor to outlaw him for rebellion and deprive him of all his fiefs, which we have no other means of doing." He had explained to the Imperial Ministers that if either Savoy or D. Gonzalez occupied Casale, they would push on still further and that, in that case, it could not be expected that what had been torn from the Emperor's enemies at such a cost of blood and danger should be handed back to the Emperor. When Prince Eggenberg saw I was hesitating to make the offer I spoke of before Cardinal Dietrichstein, he told me not to mince my words, for if the case arose there would be no "lack of means," leaving me perfectly dumbfounded, so that I could only mutter my assent.

"The Ministers of Savoy, who are here, have been informed of what transpired, and are perfectly satisfied, as they have come to see that the promise is a meaningless compliment. They are very glad, however, that they have not been asked if their Duke would obey, and it is easy to see that this decree has produced its effect, for it has driven all Nevers' friends and backers to despair and has made them resort to the most desperate measures.

"The Empress has been overwhelming D. Cesare with her prayers and threats, has offered that the Pope will make him Cardinal and give him large grants from the revenues of the Church, and take his family under his protection. All this goes to show that the Pope is only anxious to deprive Y.M. of any legitimate pretext for going to war, and that his one object is to maintain the Duke of Nevers in Italy by any means he can.

"Those who have done the best service to Y.M. in this business have been Prince Eggenberg, who has made his way with the greatest skill against all but the full stream of the rest of the Council, and D. Cesare Gonzaga, who, not to speak of his own

interests, has shown the greatest devotion to Y.M., has refused all the offers of compensation which have been made him, and has been raising men for Y.M.'s service under a commission from D. Gonzalez. He had had great difficulty in getting the case of Mantua and Monferrat brought before the Imperial Tribunals, and even greater in getting the second decree of Sequestration issued, and these difficulties are not likely to diminish during the subsequent proceedings, for our enemies are many and the Emperor is very fearful of taking a wrong step, and my task will be all the harder because Eggenberg has gone home on leave for three months, and the Empress, the Confessor, and Count Trauttmannsdorff, who thinks that it is impossible to deny the justice of Nevers' case, are here on the spot. I am in despair because I have so few means of working for the good of Y.M.'s service, and of strengthening my hands." In short, H.M. might easily find himself a better representative at the Imperial Court.¹

Aytona's opinion was in the main correct. Agnelli, whose letters from Mantua were now reaching him through the Rector of the Jesuits' College at Vienna, had plucked up his courage, and was negotiating with D. Cesare, who was said to have received orders from Spain to accept any offers for an arrangement which might be made to him.² The Emperor, indeed, was wavering. When Aytona read Philip's despatch of June the twelfth to H.I.M. he only replied as he had done before, that he would do everything for his nephew's interests which he would do for his own. "But I could see that the Emperor has to force himself to do everything which he does for Y.M., as he feels it very much that he has to vex the Empress by doing it, and so, after issuing the last decree, gave her leave to try to come to some understanding with D. Cesare and myself. Yesterday, the fifth of September, she sent to ask me to come and see her, so I could not refuse to go, much as I should have liked to do so. Our conversation lasted for over an hour-and-a-half. She began by excusing herself for not being able to put a check upon her affection for her niece, or on her desire to avert the ruin of her House, although only upon terms which would be creditable to the Emperor and to Y.M. I told her that I quite understood that it was not H.M.'s intention to prejudice the interests of the House of Austria in order to assist Nevers, but that the plans for this object which the Nuncios and the Bishop of Mantua

were laying before His Majesty every day of the week were only calculated to achieve their own crooked ends which they were seeking in this business, and so I must entreat Her Majesty to be pleased to let justice and the Emperor's decrees take their course, and leave Y.M.'s forces to do their work, for once Y.M.'s armies had brought Nevers back to his obedience to the Emperor, Her Majesty might then do anything she pleased for the Duke with the full assurance that H.I.M.'s prestige and the common interests of His House would in no wise suffer, for now that it is clear that the Duke of Nevers is working in such a close understanding with all the enemies and rivals of the House of Austria, it will have a very ill look if she helps him, and her support would do the Duke of Nevers far more harm than good, as it would embolden him to refuse obedience, and this was the surest way to ruin him. She answered very angrily, 'Now my niece, the last pledge of my house, will have to go about begging, and the Emperor and the Catholic King will needs let this be.' I had to go over all my explanations once more, as I thought that her answer was quite beside the point of what I had been saying, but I could see she was in such a fearful passion that she would not listen to reason. She implored me to induce D. Cesare to come to terms with the Duke of Nevers, and, as to this, I had much ado to convince her that it was quite out of D. Cesare's power to do so, but all my arguments had no effect, and she could not be made to see that Your Majesty's and the Emperor's reputations must inevitably suffer, unless all the issues at stake were settled at the same time, and that Y.M. would have reason enough to feel aggrieved if he were to hear that H.I.M. wished him to drop D. Cesare, and lay down the arms which he had taken up in his cause, for it would look as if he had been acting in opposition to H.I.M.'s wishes, although the Emperor himself had told me but a short time before that his first object was to safeguard Y.M.'s reputation.

"She ended by asking me if I could suggest any way out of the difficulty, and said that negotiations for a settlement were already going on in Italy. This gave me my opening, and I told her that as the people in Italy were already treating with D. Gonzalez I should leave the business wholly in his hands, as this was by far the best way of bringing all the interests concerned to an agreement, and that then H.I.M. could assist in getting the terms carried out which might be concluded between

the Duke of Savoy, D. Gonzalez and the Duke of Nevers. I don't think the Empress seemed best pleased at this, but I could not find any more conciliatory language which I could use to her about a business which is in the position this is in to-day. I am expending my whole capital of care and patience in Your Majesty's service, as is indeed my duty, but the difficulties which crop up at every moment are very great. They all arise from the great love which the Emperor bears for the Empress, and she is a woman of the most ungovernable temper, a factor which Y.M. will always have to reckon with in your business here."

He had spoken to the Emperor about putting pressure upon France, and Wallenstein had already begun to prepare for sending some regiments to the frontiers of Champagne. "I must beseech Y.M. to bear in mind that all these questions as to making war, massing troops against France, and sending regiments to serve under Y.M.'s colours can only be settled by the Duke of Friedland, for even though the Emperor should wish to meet your wishes, that would matter little, if the Duke did not, but if the Duke should do so, the Emperor will certainly consent. Count Sforza has been placed about the Emperor's person by His Highness' orders. I have begged the Count to bring these matters before the Duke, and I hope he will do so, as he is a most intelligent and hard-working man and stands high in his favour."¹

Nevers had been much frightened by the repulse of D'Ussel's volunteers, and was now busily negotiating with D. Gonzalez and Savoy for a suspension of hostilities, which he secured before the middle of September. The news that Wallenstein had won a crushing victory over Christian IV., who had landed on the Island of Wolgast, on the twenty-second of August, had spread terror throughout Italy, as it was thought that the Imperial army would shortly march over the Alps into the Venetian plain, so even the Venetians were now inclined to listen to proposals for a settlement. The Emperor was greatly pleased at the truce, and would, indeed, gladly have brought about a peace if he could have done so, if only to please the Empress. Ferdinand II. was, however, not only a judge, but one for whom it was impossible to overlook his obligations to Spain, although the Empress still hoped that he might induce the government of Madrid to recognise Nevers, if he would obey the Monitory and

give some estates to D. Cesare. Finally, on September the thirtieth Agnelli received a letter from Duke Charles in which he offered to deposit Casale and Monferrat in the Emperor's hands provided the Savoyards did the same with the territories which they had seized, on condition that the Emperor would fix an early date for hearing his case and would release him from his engagement to accept some compensation for Monferrat. In that case he would come to Vienna, to pay his homage and to execute the deposit. He also asked that Mantua might be released from the sequestration. To these terms the Imperial Ministers agreed in the main, and the Duke was given some hopes that he might be granted the Investiture after he had executed the deposit of Casale. Count John of Nassau was named Administrator of Monferrat, the exchange of which was to be voluntary on Nevers' part. As H.I.M. told Agnelli, a general disarmament was impossible, as Savoy refused to lay down his arms on the excuse of Genoa, Spain, or some other pretext. He spoke in the kindest way of Nevers, and smiled when he was asked about the Investiture, so Agnelli augured better things in the future, and, in the meantime, much enjoyed a piece of a wild boar which H.I.M. had sent him. Ferdinand's wish was that Monferrat should be held by Savoy, Spain, and himself. It would be well that Duke Charles should fly the Imperial flag, as Cordoba thought that it was probable that the French garrisons would refuse to serve under it against the Spaniards.¹

The Emperor's confessor was warmly in favour of Nevers and never ceased reminding his penitent of the injustice which he was committing. Neither the Emperor or Empress, however, believed that the Duke would accept the terms which had been proposed, and Her Majesty had said plainly that if he refused she could do no more for him. The Emperor had, however, asked Aytona to do what he could to effect an arrangement but the Ambassador had no instructions and could only advise him to let justice take its course. However, when he learnt from Cordoba that, provided the Mantovano was not occupied, Nevers was willing to deposit Casale and its Citadel in the Emperor's hands, he urged that this proposal should be accepted, on condition that they were held by a garrison under Count John of Nassau, and independent of the Duke, and that Spain and Savoy might each keep what they held. This was the Emperor's own suggestion to him through Trauttmannsdorff,

and "I see that if Y.M. and the Duke of Savoy will not agree to it," the Emperor and his ministers, "in their present temper," would "at the very least give Duke Charles the investiture" even if they did not force Spain to hand over what she held. It was true that Savoy had effected the occupation in the Emperor's name, but it would be easy to make out that he had done so to satisfy his own claims, and he would be forced to obey the Emperor "as his sovereign lord." If terms could be arranged on this basis, Spain would have accomplished all that she had set out to achieve. She would have preserved her prestige for all the world would see that she had forced Nevers to obey his master and "that not a prince in Italy could dare to establish a state but by the leave and license of the House of Austria." Casale, if deposited in the Emperor's hands with Nassau as its administrator, would in reality be in those of Spain, for H.I.M. could be trusted not to dispose of it without their consent, whilst Nevers and Savoy would be indebted to Philip for any territories which they might receive, and the Emperor would be infinitely pleased that, thanks to him, one of the strongest fortresses in Italy would once more be held by an Imperial Garrison. On the other hand, he had shown some signs of annoyance when Aytona had proposed that the place should be held by a Spanish force under the Spanish flag, "as it would then look as if all his decrees were mere empty verbiage and not proofs of the sovereign authority which he claims over those fiefs."¹

Possibly Aytona forgot that though it mattered very little to Spain what the position of the Empire in Italy might be in theory, so long as the crown of the Cæsars was worn by the House of Austria, that crown was not held by hereditary succession. It might, therefore, be a danger to Spain in the future that she had contributed to strengthen that position, should the Imperial sceptre pass into other hands.

Nevers, however, was far from being willing to give way. In vain Agnelli warned him that he would be ruined if he hesitated to accept the proffered terms and refused to come to Vienna. "Your Highness' enemies are legion and close at hand, the Empress will be lost to you, the Emperor your foe. You cannot found your hopes upon your armies and upon treasures which are now drained dry, but solely upon your friends and upon the good faith of others, who may at any moment change their

minds, and, even if they are true to you, you can keep states without them, which they cannot help you to increase and, in fine, their friendship serves but to jeopardise. If Y.H. means to stake everything upon their support, and thus to bring these negotiations wholly to naught, war is certain, its event doubtful, and the dangers to ourselves more certain than the risks to others." Nevers might excuse himself by talking of Savoy, but it was Spain they had to deal with, and there was no discredit in yielding to her after they had proved their courage by withstanding her. "I can only submit to Y.H. that you should be satisfied to rely upon the judgment of the Serene Prince," in other words, of the Duke of Rethel, "whose keen eyes and intellect have surveyed the present position and observed the reasons which force us to bend before it, and to render obedience to these demands. He sees that to obey them means only that we are obeying God, in Whom he so sincerely trusts, and God Who is the Master of Time, moves all things with a judgment which we cannot fathom." . . . "I can only say that if Y.H. will second the views and comply with the inclinations of the Emperor, you will confound Savoy and D. Gonzalez, and will greatly oblige H.I.M., who declares that he is only too anxious to take up the sword of Imperial justice on your behalf. From the path of justice he will never swerve, however much he may be abused or vilipended by the Spaniards or any other." Agnelli and the Imperial Ministers had already offered that Rethel should be sent to Madrid as a pledge of his father's good-will, but Aytona had replied that such a visit would awaken the suspicions of Savoy.¹

Nevers, however, who knew that the Emperor had been greatly touched by his letter, in which he had offered to submit to H.M.'s orders and had signed himself simply "Charles de Gonzaga," had already determined to send his son to Vienna. Much to the Spanish Ambassador's annoyance, Rethel arrived there on the twenty-fourth of October, and was welcomed by his kinsmen with the greatest kindness. Aytona could only represent to the Imperial Ministers that he should not be received on the footing which the Empress desired, but only as Duke of Rethel. The Emperor at once ordered that he should be lodged in a Franciscan convent, and not in a house close to the Hofburg which had by the Empress' orders been got ready for him and hung with her own tapestries. "But the Empress is straining

every nerve to secure him honours and to forward his cause, and I am very much afraid that her frenzied entreaties will force the Emperor in despite of his own wishes to do what is so displeasing to him and to show favour to one of the parties interested, and so will give Y.M. the Duke of Savoy and D. Cesare good grounds for suspecting the impartiality of the Court when the case comes to be heard." The claims of blood and kindred, however, spoke strongly to both the Emperor and the Empress, and they could not refrain from showing their great affection for their niece's husband.¹

Had Nevers been really willing to comply with the Emperor's orders, a settlement might now have been arrived at. Aytona, however, had learnt that he was determined to disobey them, and sent through Trauttmannsdorff to warn the Emperor, who, however, turned a deaf ear to his warning. Despatches, however, arrived from Mantua, "which filled Rethel and his household with consternation, whilst the Empress, directly she had read them, had a return of her ague which had left her for the last week." Aytona, who divined that Nevers had refused obedience, at once urged the Emperor to depose him from his fiefs, "although unless these decrees and declarations are enforced by Y.M.'s arms with the effective support of the Emperor, they will be but empty words. Your Majesty may hope much from the Emperor's armies if they are in hands other than those of the Duke of Friedland." Rethel at once hastened to quit Vienna, and Agnelli wrote that their Imperial Majesties had shown great sorrow when they took leave of him.²

Nevers, indeed, had been merely playing for time and had been waiting until the French had got themselves free of La Rochelle.³

Thanks to a hint from Marie de Medicis he seems to have known by the end of October that the Third English Expedition would come to nothing. Nevers was, however, taking great risks, for as Rubens pointed out, he had now three enemies upon his hands, any one of which might be too much for him, his hope of receiving reinforcements of volunteers had been foiled, and the autumn rains had turned the roads into quagmires and spoiled the grass so that even if La Rochelle fell at once it would be impossible for the French army to advance to his help. Casale might fall at any time, for the open country was in the hands of the enemy, and the Po could be closed with a

few armed boats. Nevertheless Duke Charles stood firm, and by his stoutheartedness won the rich Mantuan lands for three generations for his house.¹

The news of the surrender of La Rochelle reached Vienna on November the twenty-second, and, although the intelligence was at first doubted, it was at once carried by the French Resident to Court. "Your rival's only comment upon it is that Y.H. will now let the negotiations drop, and will take a hand in the League which will be formed now that Peace has been signed between France and England. I say, as is the truth, that I have not yet received any official confirmation of the fall of the place, and, moreover, that I have every possible proof to show that Y.H. cherishes intentions precisely the opposite to those with which they credit you." When taxed by influential personages with his master's intended treachery, the Bishop could but meekly hint at the malignant insinuations which Nevers' enemies were whispering.²

France had had the weight of war at home lifted from her shoulders and was now free to play an active part not only in Germany but in Italy, and by playing that part to bring to the ground the greatness of her Hapsburg rivals. To the wars of the Valtelline and of the Mantuan Succession, the hegemony of Louis XIV. over Europe owes its origin. But for the senseless policy of English statesmen it is doubtful, however, if France would ever have secured that almost complete freedom from internal troubles, and that abasement of her competitors abroad which thus raised her to the pinnacle of power.

Carlisle was at Turin when the tidings of the surrender arrived. He was by no means, perhaps, a brilliant genius, and by his temperament and connections he was upon the whole friendly to the French, but he had a far better knowledge of foreign affairs than was possessed by the brilliant orators who thundered against Arbitrary government from the benches at St. Stephens. The despatch in which he and Wake reported to Lord Conway the impression produced upon Charles Emmanuel by the news gives a vivid picture of the bankruptcy of English statesmanship. No one, he says, and least of all the Duke and the Prince of Piedmont, had believed that Charles I. would sanction such negotiations as those between Montagu and Richelieu, for both Conway and the King himself had given them positive assurances to the contrary and pledges that they would not treat with France

without their knowledge. The outcome of Montagu's proceedings was that Savoy was utterly discouraged and that the reputation of the English ministers was lost. Courtier as Carlisle was, he might affect to believe that "The Virginitie of the King of England's honour in point of promise passed to any prince or state is yet entire," and had only been seemingly obscured for a moment by the intrigues of some ill-affected persons, "who had attempted the putting an ill foil under the crystal of his pure and immaculate intentions," which, however, would never be tarnished even by a breath of suspicion. "The balance of power in Europe is at the present in his hands, as the election of peace with France, Spain, or both may be reserved so entire unto him, that nothing but precipitation can hinder him from giving peace unto whom he please, and revenging himself of those that shall dare to refuse the according of his just demands," including the restoration of the Palatine, the maintenance of the Liberties of Germany, and the independence of the United Provinces. All these ends could be secured if he negotiated for peace through the Duke of Savoy, who held Spain in the hollow of his hand, whilst Spain again could give the law to the Emperor of Germany. An understanding with France was useless, for nothing was more certain that they had not the will, even if they had the power, to enforce the restitution of the Palatinate, and both the French King and the Cardinal intended "the ruin of our Religion." The Duke of Savoy and the Prince of Piedmont were most zealous Catholics, yet, when informed of Montagu's overtures, "moved only out of reason of State," they expressed "such a disdain of so weak proceeding that did make Religion blush in our faces and wish that we were as able to assure that no such things had been moved by him as we do confidently believe that His Majesty will never abandon that cause and party." If Charles would only "declare his royal pleasure" he could command the service of the excellent armies of Savoy, which numbered twenty-four thousand foot and five thousand horse. "All that we desire is that His Majesty's royal wording be constantly maintained, and that his Ministers may not be ashamed to show their faces." They will inform His Majesty of the true state of affairs when they have matured them, and in the meantime desire Conway to proceed with "feet of lead."¹

Such was the outcome of Charles the First's policy abroad,

shaped as it was to fit in with the exigencies of domestic faction.

But the question of the Mantuan Succession is one which raises far deeper and more enduring issues, and it is for this reason that we have sought to trace out its windings through the dusty records of the past.

The best hope for the future of the world is said to be the formation of a League of Nations which will enable international disputes to be settled by due process of law and not by the sword. From the history of the Mantuan Succession it is in some measure perhaps possible to collect how such a system worked when, in theory at least, it was in existence.

To the men of the Seventeenth Century the Holy Roman Empire stood for all and more than all, so far as words went, than the new born League of Nations connotes to thinkers of our own day. It was that Fifth Universal Monarchy, which by Divine dispensation, was to continue until the day of the Last Judgment, and just as every baptized Christian was, as such, a member of the Holy Roman Church, so, over a large part of Europe, it was believed that every baptized Christian was as such a subject of the Holy Roman Emperor. The Emperor, like the Supreme Pontiff, ruled by Divine Institution, and as the Pontiff administered in spiritual things the Divine Law which is contained in Holy Scripture and in the Canons of the Church, so the Emperor administered in temporal affairs that Law of the Roman Empire which, in some sense at least, was thought to be equally sacred.¹

By that Law the Emperor was entitled to delegate his authority, and, consequently, had the power to decide in accordance with Law any questions which might arise in connection with those whom he appointed as his delegates. It is evident that the question of the Mantuan Succession was one which it was within the competence of the Emperor to decide, and one indeed with which it was his bounden duty to deal. It could not be denied that the States of Mantua and Monferrat had been formed by the decrees of various Emperors out of territories which had from its origin formed a part of the Holy Roman Empire. Agnelli, it is true, professed to believe that by the Treaty of Constance which, in the year 1176, had been concluded by the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa with the Lombard rebels, these territories had been exempted from the jurisdiction of the

Imperial Courts. Yet it was beyond all doubt that almost the only basis upon which those who claimed to hold them by hereditary right could ground their pretensions was upon Imperial Charters of a far later date. It was, therefore, for the Imperial Tribunals alone to tender their advice to the Emperor as to the settlement of the dispute according to law, and it was for the Emperor to pronounce his decision agreeably to their representations.¹

Even if the claimants were to come to a settlement by agreement between themselves, that settlement would only become binding when it had been ratified by the Emperor. In theory, therefore, it was absolutely unnecessary that any dispute affecting territories within the limits of the Empire should be brought to the arbitrament of war. The courts were open and there were magistrates duly appointed to deal with such causes.

But to secure the assent of the great vassals of the Empire to this proposition, that is the assent of men who, with regard to the inhabitants of the territories which they administered, were in fact, if not in law, independent though not wholly absolute sovereigns, those vassals would have to be convinced that the tribunals which were to decide such cases were impartial and independent. Would those Courts be guided in their decisions solely by the rules of law and equity? Such a conviction was, however, far from being universally held, especially as to cases in which the interests of Religion were at stake. Thus the question whether or no the Crown of Bohemia was elective had, perforce, been decided in the shock of battle on the White Mountain, and not by the pleadings of the lawyers at Spire, and the dispute as to the succession to Cleves and Juliers had been the source of long years of war. The Religious Question it is true was not one of the issues in the Mantuan question, but that question had brought face to face the conflicting interests of France, of Spain, of Savoy, and even of the Emperor himself, and, therefore, it was certain that none of the other disputants would regard the impartiality of tribunals appointed by the Emperor as being beyond suspicion. To France, as to Spain, any question which affected the possession of Monferrat with its great fortress of Casale meant all, perhaps more than all, than any question which affects Egypt and the possession of Egypt would mean to England and to the Mediterranean Powers to-day. The legal position of Casale with regard to the Holy Roman Empire was precisely that which was occupied by Cairo

with regard to the Ottoman Empire before 1914. To Spain the control over Casale was as vital as the control over Cairo is to England. Yet, in strict law, Spain had no more right to exercise any act of sovereignty over Casale or even to interfere in its affairs without a mandate from the Emperor and as the executor of his orders, than England had to interfere in the concerns of Egypt without the authorisation of the Sultan of Turkey. Casale again formed a part of the Marquisate of Monferrat which was administered by a Marquis of Monferrat who held his rank by hereditary succession, established, however, by an Imperial grant, which laid down the conditions under which that hereditary succession came into force, and also his position as a vassal of the Holy Roman Empire. The grant of the Marquisate of Monferrat given by the Emperor Charles V. to Duke Frederick the Second of Mantua and his successors was in all essentials identical with the Firman by which Abdul Mejid as Sultan of Turkey granted the Khedivate of Egypt to the Albanian Mahomet Ali and his successors. In both cases the individual holder of the fief, on his succession to his title, had to receive an investiture granted to him by name from his suzerain before he could legally exercise his functions.

From this explanation it is clear why it was so difficult to secure the settlement of such a question as that of the Mantuan Succession by the action of the Imperial Courts of Law. It is, perhaps, conceivable that the rival claimants, if they alone had been concerned in the matter, might have been as willing to allow their differences to be determined by an action at law as the claimants to the Principality of Piombino had been three years before. But, as matters stood, neither of the parties could feel assured that those tribunals would exercise impartial justice, as the Emperor, by whom the members of those tribunals was appointed, could not but remember that the actual litigants were, in reality, but the representatives of the conflicting interests of two great world powers. Neither France nor Spain were likely to allow their puppets to take any action which would leave the issues at the mercy of the decision of the Imperial tribunals, unless under such conditions as would ensure that that decision would in no wise prejudice their own interests. They knew that the Emperor was, in no sense of the word, wholly independent. He had gained the Imperial Crown not as the hereditary representative of a dynasty, but by the choice of

electors. Just as the successor of St. Peter was elected by a conclave of Cardinals, who represented the whole body of the Faithful throughout the world, so the College of Electors represented the whole body of the subjects of the Empire. The Pope, as an ecclesiastic, could not leave his power to a legitimate descendant. Yet, so long as the Popes held the Temporal Power, their policy even in spiritual matters was in the main guided by their temporal interests as petty Italian princes. The Emperor was a married man who could leave legitimate descendants, and it was his natural wish, therefore, that he might see one of those descendants chosen as his successor in the Empire. Consequently he was forced, until his successor had been elected as King of the Romans and had thus acquired the right of succeeding him in the Empire without further election, to conform his policy, in the main, to the views of the Electoral College. Otherwise at his death the Imperial Power might pass into the hands of a rival house. Moreover, as the Empire had but very few resources belonging to it, any one who became Emperor must necessarily be the possessor of large hereditary states or otherwise it would be impossible for him to support the outlay necessary to maintain his authority. It was but natural therefore that the Emperor should at all times bear in mind the interests of his own states, which like other territories were liable to be attacked by their neighbours, whom he could best keep in check by means of his alliances. As a man, likewise, the Emperor was subject to the influence of his family and of those about him, whilst, as a Catholic, he was bound in questions of faith and morals, and morals included politics, to listen to the counsels of his spiritual director. Thus it was almost impossible for him to act with the impartiality of a judge in matters in which vast international interests including his own were at stake. We have seen how Ferdinand the Second, despite his wish to act in accordance with the dictates of justice, was the mark for every intrigue which might bias his decision, from the excited threats of Spain to the tears of his wife and the whisperings of his confessor. Had Nevers followed Agnelli's advice and placed himself in the Emperor's hands, he might perhaps have been granted the investiture without delay. His French advisers would not risk their interests by allowing him to comply with the requirements of the law. The outcome of his hesitation was the war of the Mantuan Succession.

It cannot, perhaps, be doubted that the story throws a flood of light upon the question as to how the League of Nations may work in practice. In the long run some super authority may have to be constituted, which will perform the work of government and administration, and by which the decisions of the tribunals of the League will be carried into effect. How is that authority to be brought into existence and how are the members of those tribunals to be chosen so as to ensure that all the peoples included in the League will feel confidence in their impartiality? If the super-authority is placed in the hands of a man elected either for a term of years like the President of the United States, or even for life like the First Napoleon as First Consul, that man will have to be elected, his successor, when the post became vacant, will have to be elected, and every election will be the occasion of bitter intestine disputes amongst the members of the League. Almost every Republic in which the President exercises any real authority has sooner or later been the scene of some civil war in connection with a Presidential Election, and to this risk the League of Nations would equally be exposed. The risk would certainly be increased by the decisions of the law-courts, for even if their members were appointed for life or during good behaviour, those members would be appointed by the super-authority, and when the vital interests of a nation were at stake, the defeated litigant would be disposed to view an adverse verdict with suspicion, and would be inclined to resist its execution. Where, too, under the present circumstances of the world could unbiassed judges be found to form such a tribunal? England would hesitate to allow a question as to the independence of Ireland or of India to be decided by a bench of judges, brought to Geneva from Stockholm, from Lima, and from Bern. If the super-authority were confided to a hereditary constitutional monarch whose powers were limited by those of his cabinet and of his parliament, his authority might be perhaps less liable to be challenged, but, on the other hand, the choice of such a ruler in these days of democratic ideas is fraught with the greatest difficulty, whilst it cannot be forgotten how narrowly even under our own limited monarchy the outbreak of Civil War in Ireland was escaped in 1914. If such a super-monarch had any real power, he would inevitably, in the end, be exposed to the suspicion of wishing to exercise that power

in the interests either of himself or of his dynasty. Such are some of the difficulties which assuredly will arise in connection with any League of Nations and such are some of the difficulties which prevented that Mediæval League of Nations, the Holy Roman Empire, from securing the world's peace against the risks of war. This is the lesson which we may draw from the story of the Mantuan Succession.

CHAPTER LXXXV

UNTIL the fate of Rochelle was decided, France was, perforce, held back from action abroad, and the disputants in the other regions of Europe were able to make a serious effort to settle their differences by peaceful means. Sweden was in treaty with Poland, Spain with England and with Holland. England in her turn was busied in an attempt to come to an arrangement with France, whilst the Emperor was eager to be freed from the burden of the Danish contest and to prevent war from breaking out in Italy. Everyone saw that when France was once more in a position to pursue her ambitious aims, all hopes of peace would vanish. Spinola, however, was as yet unable to devote himself to the tasks of diplomacy. He had come to Spain on Belgian business, and everyone believed that once that business was settled he would return to lead his armies against the Dutch. But the settlement was delayed by his disputes with Olivares, and his correspondence with the Infanta related for the most part to the preparations which would have to be made for the campaign in the North of Europe, for in his eyes the wars which were being fought out in the lands which stretched from the Niemen to the frontiers of Champagne formed under varying names but one single whole. His plans for the summer of 1628 rested in the main upon the co-operation of the Emperor and of the Catholic League.¹ Scarcely had he set out on his journey to Madrid, when the Infanta had despatched Count Octavio Sforza Visconti to Prague to arrange a plan of operations with the Duke of Friedland. If peace had not been made with Denmark by the beginning of the spring she suggested that vessels at Dunkirk should be sent to the Sound. If they could succeed in forcing a passage they would unite in some Baltic port with the naval forces which she hoped would be fitted out by Wallenstein and Poland, in accordance with the suggestions of her envoys, d'Auchi and Gabriel de Roy. She had, as she wrote to Madrid, already despatched qualified persons to survey the ports held by Wallenstein and to select a suitable base.²

Both Spain and the Emperor were indeed doing their utmost to secure the support of the Hanse Towns,¹ which, to use the words of a Genoese envoy, "sympathise as they may with their Protestant brethren, are trembling at Cæsar's good fortune, and so will probably bow before his commands. Lübeck, indeed, has already come out openly on the Imperial side." It was true that when he wrote, Anti-Catholic feeling was running high in Hamburg, where it was already more than suspected that the Emperor intended to restore to the Catholic Church the benefices and lands, then held by the City, which had been torn from it after the Peace of Passau, and that its streets were filled with Danish soldiers from the camp which lay almost at its gates. Tilly, however, was before Stade, and if Stade fell the trade of Hamburg would be at his mercy. Moreover, one of the nearest neighbours of the Hanse Towns was in active negotiation with Spain. The Duchy of Gottorp, although a member of the Empire as forming a portion of Holstein, and at the same time a Danish fief, was held as an appanage by Duke Frederick III., who descended from Frederick I. of Denmark and whose father, John Adolf, had been Archbishop of Bremen and Bishop of Lübeck, whilst his mother was a sister of Christian IV. In January 1627, it was rumoured at Hamburg that the Duke of Gottorp was inclined to grant his Catholic subjects the right of exercising their religion in public if the King of Spain would in return concede to him the right of free navigation in Spanish waters for all ships and mariners, even if Arminians, trading with his port of Friedrichstadt, a town which he had lately founded at the mouth of the Eyder, and that he was discussing such an arrangement with the Infanta at Brussels. Possibly, as the outcome of these negotiations, the Duke was displaying some reluctance to comply with the requisitions of his uncle and Suzerain to furnish him with supplies for the war. When Christian came in person to remonstrate a warm discussion took place between them, and the dispute grew so hot that the King gave his nephew a sound box on the ear on which the Duke clapped his hand to his sword. The scene was, said common report, witnessed by a clerk in the Ducal Chancellerie, whose kinsman, a Patrician of Hamburg, spread the tale far and wide. As Celio Levanto remarked with prudent reserve, "If it is true I can only say that the Catholics will be the gainers."² For the time Gottorp had, perforce, to maintain an appearance of

neutrality, but Spain was encouraged by his approaches and in the autumn of 1627 induced the Emperor to join her in an effort to secure the assistance of the Hansa in realising her naval plans by the offer of far reaching commercial advantages. The Emperor and the King of Spain expressed their earnest wish and desire that their subjects, their friends and confederates should trade freely with one another. To promote this object they proposed that a Council should be formed of the principal merchants and societies of their respective dominions, and also of the Hanse Towns and other towns of the North, which should be under the authority of His Imperial Majesty and of the King of Poland respectively in the places subject to them, and which should have in its hands the whole trade between the North and the Kingdom of Spain and its dominions. This Council was to act in concert with the Council of Commerce at Madrid, and with an Admiralty at Seville, composed of Germans and Flemings, which in 1624 had by a Royal Charter been given very extensive rights and franchises. Dantzic and many other towns in the Baltic, which were held by Poland, were members of the Hanseatic League, and as such would participate in these advantages, whilst freedom of navigation in the Baltic was guaranteed to all flags alike. Thus Dantzic and the Hanseatic Cities might hope to take the place formerly held by Lisbon and Seville as the centre of trade between the United Provinces and the East and West Indies. Such were the proposals which were submitted by Count Schwarzenberg to the Hansa authorities at Lübeck, and by Baron d'Auchy to the Senate at Dantzic, who were pressed by their Suzerain the King of Poland to accept them. If these offers were accepted Spain would, it was believed at Madrid, have at her disposal a fleet which might well make her the mistress not only of the Baltic but of the North Sea, and for a moment it seemed not unlikely that they would be agreed to. "The Poles," wrote Gordon, the English agent, from Warsaw to Conway, "would rather suffer the danger of Spanish and Austrian forces than be curbed by the Swedes, whom they think inferior to them," and "the Spanish faction" might soon "become absolute master in Poland." Moreover, Dantzic merchants had good reason to complain that, on suspicion of trading with Spain, their ships and goods had been captured by English privateers six months before they had received notice from

England that that trade was prohibited, whilst navigation between the Elbe and Tagus was under such strict surveillance that English and Dutch captains had searched and detained Hamburg vessels even in the Elbe itself. The Emperor, indeed, threatened to banish both nations from the Empire if these outrages continued. Yet even Dantzic replied that no answer could be given to the Spanish offers until after the Diet had been concluded at Lübeck at the end of the winter of 1628, and that until then no steps could be taken to fit out a fleet for sea in their ports. It was characteristic of the English diplomacy of that day that Gordon could, at this critical moment, write from Nienburgh, to remind Conway that he had not had one word from him since he had left England twelve months before.¹

When at length the Convention of the Hansa met, its answer to these brilliant offers was a distinct refusal. In vain the Emperor reminded the deputies of the injuries which they had in the past sustained from England. In 1598, indeed, Elizabeth, after the active complicity of the Hansa with Spain had been fully proved, had deprived them on the fourth of August of the rights and privileges which they had held from a time "to which the memory of man doth not run." Her proclamation had been drawn up, said Ferdinand, in terms which showed that the English looked upon the Germans as children, and contained charges which were disgraceful to their credit and honour as Germans. Through the monopolies and factories which the English had thus acquired they had got the whole of the cloth and other trades into their hands, though leaving them in outward appearance to their former owners, and had thus taken out of their purses many millions of good money, with which "they are able to bid defiance not only to your Cities but to the Roman Emperor himself." Ferdinand II., therefore, proposed to the Convention "that only the six Wendish towns, Lübeck, Hamburg, Rostock, Wismar, Stralsund, and Lüneburg, should trade direct with Spain, and that if Sweden, Denmark, France, England, and Holland had commodities for which there was a demand in Spain, they were to be sold in the said towns, and carried by them to Spain." The Convention, however, was aware that in reality those offers were mere airy nothings. The Emperor, it is true, had named Wallenstein Admiral of the Baltic and of the Ocean Sea, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany might be scheming to hold Denmark as Grand Admiral of the

Empire. But the Swedish and the Danish Fleets were the mistresses of the Baltic, and English men-of-war lay as guardships at the mouth of the Elbe in full sight of Tilly's batteries. Not a single frigate sailed the seas under the Imperial flag, and, apart from the distant navy of Spain, the only outside help to which the Hansa could look if it had to contend with the ships of Holland, of England, and of France was to be found in the handful of vessels which, by Spinola's foresight, had been fitted out in the Flemish dockyards. "The strength of our fleet at Dunkirk," wrote the Infanta on February the twelfth, 1628, "is as follows. Three sail put to sea lately, and there are eight others half-rigged which are just in readiness, and will sail in three divisions with the first fair wind to do all the harm they can to the enemy. Three other vessels, which belong to Count Wacquen's squadron, are also at sea, and it is hoped that three more of the same squadron will be able to follow them within the next twelve days. Several letters of marque belonging to private persons have gone cruising, and we hope that we shall obtain very good results as this is the time of year when the Dutch ship the French produce to their ports. We are doing our best for the health and comfort of the crews and encourage them with a good slice of the prize-money." Brave as the Flemish sailors were, they could have done little to protect the Hansa convoys against the attacks of such sea kings as those who, with Christian the Fourth to lead them, were raiding the long coastlines of Schleswig and of Holstein, from the Laaland harbours, or against the war vessels which under Gustaf Adolf were blockading Dantzic. Once more sea-power was proving itself to be the key to the situation, for if Wallenstein had not been forced to look to the safety of Mecklenburg, he would gladly have led his armies into Champagne as a warning to the French to refrain from meddling in Italy. La Rochelle might well have been saved had the Emperor not been entangled in the Northern Wars. The Hansa had few vessels of their own, and thus the Emperor's proposals fell upon deaf ears, whilst as the outcome of their refusal, Dantzic in its turn refused to supply the Emperor with shipping.¹

The rejection of Schwarzenberg's proposals struck a shrewd blow at the hopes which Spain had cherished of putting down her rebellious provinces by cutting off the dockyards of Holland from the Baltic Lands, and when on the tenth of January,

1628, the Emperor, despite the protests of his ministers, invested Wallenstein with the duchies which the Dukes of Mecklenburg had forfeited by their treason in the Danish War, his chief agent of dominion over the Northern Seas was lost to him in the sovereign. At this critical time Wallenstein interested himself almost wholly in the fortunes of Mecklenburg, even though for appearance sake he might seem to lend an ear to the blandishments with which the Infanta sought to lure him to support the tottering cause of Spain. If the Duke of Mecklenburg could by doing so have obtained undisputed possession of his newly won dominions, he would gladly have made peace with Denmark, and with this object induced the Emperor to recall Schwarzenberg from Lübeck, on receiving private assurances from Christian the Fourth, that if he could bring the Spanish schemes to nothing, the King would, in return, refrain in future from supporting his dispossessed rivals. It is true that in May, 1628, Wallenstein turned his arms against Stralsund, on its refusal to admit an Imperial garrison, and thus brought down upon himself the enmity not only of Denmark but of Sweden. His views in doing so were, however, in the main dictated by self interest. Stralsund, with its excellent harbour, controlled the communications between the mainland of Pomerania and the island of Rügen, and he saw clearly that if the place passed into Swedish or Danish hands, Rügen would at once be lost to him, and he had learnt from the experiences of the previous winter to know the value to a sea-power of an island thus placed with regard to a hostile coast. If Rügen fell into unfriendly hands he would lose the control of the ports of Pomerania, and not only would his schemes for making the Emperor the master of the Baltic, in such an event, run great risks of failure, but without the control of Pomerania it would be a difficult task for him to insure Mecklenburg against the attacks of the Danes and Swedes. Whilst in the middle of February, 1628 Count Sforza was hastening from Brussels to Prague, Wallenstein was occupied mainly in steps to secure himself in his new dominions. As he wrote to his trusty confederate Arnim, "I will gladly help on peace with hands and feet. However, I must have Mecklenburg and hold to this, as I won't have peace unless I get it." His suggestions for co-operating with the Infanta were evidently dictated by his views as to Mecklenburg, and it was perhaps an accident that they coincided with the plans which were submitted

to him through Sforza. Wallenstein's agent at Brussels had already explained to her that his object in seizing Pomerania and Mecklenburg had been to bar the door into Northern Germany against the Danes and Swedes, whilst by occupying Schleswig and Jutland he hoped to secure their two fleets. His one desire was to restore peace to Germany, and if he possessed himself of the Bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, he would be able to carry on the war against the Turks and Danes for six years more or even longer without throwing any charge upon the Emperor. The situation in North Germany was not unfavourable to Wallenstein's views. Discouraged by the failures of the Danes on land, the Protestant princes were veering round, and were doing their utmost to reconcile themselves with the Emperor, whilst the thrifty burghers of Hamburg, whose Senate but a few months before had closed their eyes whilst munitions stolen from the arsenals of the State were being transported into the Danish lines, were now eagerly competing in supplying the Imperial armies. As Wallenstein wrote to Philip the Fourth, in December, 1627, the League, by occupying East Friesland, had put great pressure upon the Hanseatic Cities who seemed to be inclining to the acceptance of the Spanish offers. In return Philip did his best to meet his views. He informed the Infanta that if the Emperor would break off negotiations with Denmark and would continue in his victorious progress, thirty sail should be sent from Spain to assist him in the Baltic, and that ships would also be furnished to him by Poland. He added that offers worthy of consideration had been received from persons who were willing to burn the warships moored in the Dutch and Swedish harbours. The King's letter was dated on the seventeenth of January, 1628. On the previous day he had for the first time instructed Aytona to urge the Emperor to dispute Nevers' claims to take possession of Mantua and of Monferrat. The Dutch had already anticipated the designs of Spain. They had offered to assist Christian IV. by sending reinforcements to garrison Elsinore and Helsingborg, which were then both Danish possessions and which completely closed the entrance to the Sound. As, however, they gave no guarantees that when the danger was over they would evacuate those important points, their proposals could not be accepted. Sweden, again, was roused by the prospect of Spanish intervention, but thought only how it might secure to itself the utmost profit

from the situation. Oxenstjerna, who was then Gustaf Adolf's chief adviser, saw that the danger which had threatened Sweden ever since the days of Charles IX. was now more menacing than ever, and yet realised that the Swedes might, in the end, be the gainers by the ruin of Denmark. For Sweden it was absolutely necessary that the Danish islands should not pass into Catholic hands, even if it proved impossible to drive the invaders from the peninsula of Jutland. The shipwreck of Denmark might be inevitable, but Sweden might yet guard beforehand against the event if Oxenstjerna could "fix the planks in His Royal Majesty's ship so firmly that it would be greatly strengthened." If the Imperialists overran the island of Fünen, Gustaf Adolf had determined to occupy Scania, that southernmost province of the Scandinavian Peninsula, which had for long been one of the richest possessions of Denmark. On the other hand, the Swedish Monarch, who fully realised that "all the wars which were going on in Europe were linked together and were directed to one end," and who believed that the triumph of Catholicism, which was making great progress not only in Northern Germany but in Poland and even in Prussia, would be the signal for his own ruin, had informed his Estates, when they met in January, 1628, that he had decided to save the German Protestants from destruction. In their turn the Estates assured him of their readiness to support him to the last.¹

In the following April Christian IV., despite his well-grounded mistrust of his Swedish rival, was induced to join with him in fitting out a fleet which made the Danes and Swedes the undisputed masters of the Baltic. A few weeks later Arnim laid siege to Stralsund, but, thanks to the Danish and the Swedish navies, its harbour remained open, and the reinforcements which poured into the place enabled it to withstand Wallenstein's most furious attacks, even though the Town Council was only too anxious to surrender to the Emperor. When on the fourth of August the last of the Imperial forces marched away from their entrenchments before the Frankenthor, the hopes that Cæsar's flag would float over the Baltic and the Northern Seas vanished into thin air. It was upon that day thirty years before that Elizabeth had signed the order which stripped the Hansa of their last privileges in England.²

The course of events in Italy contributed to favour Gustaf

Adolf's designs. By the middle of March Philip IV. had learnt from Spinola that France was committed beyond withdrawal to the support of Nevers, and had found to his surprise that the Emperor was by no means prepared to become the passive instrument of Spain.¹

The King saw clearly therefore that unless he could bring about peace in Northern Europe, his dominion over Italy would be gravely endangered, and took a step which shows, if other proof were needed, how baseless was the dream that the Hapsburgs were united in aiming at the acquirement of Universal Monarchy. In December, 1627, he had been approached by the Imperial agents with an offer to sell him for a large sum the conquered provinces of Schleswig and Jutland, whilst the Emperor had been flattering himself with the prospect of assuming the Danish Crown. This offer Philip had refused.² The events which followed in the death of the Duke of Mantua revealed the gulf which was fixed between Madrid and Vienna. On the tenth of March, 1628, instructions were despatched to Aytona to the effect that if the Emperor wished to conclude a General Peace, it was necessary that Spain and the Netherlands should be included in the settlement. As for himself, wrote Philip, he was at all times prepared to treat with the Dutch upon the following basis, namely the recognition of his sovereignty, the grant of Liberty of Religion, and the opening of the Scheldt. Almost, as if by an afterthought, he added in another paper that they must consent to give up the India Trade. Before, however, negotiations were begun they must recognize his sovereignty and agree to his proposals as to Religion. If the Emperor could arrange such a peace, he would give him one million four hundred thousand crowns [£350,000].³

It is evident that Spinola had been acting as the King's chief adviser for the instructions clearly reflect his views. In the previous February Count Henri de Berg had written to inform the Marquis that he had received a visit from a secret agent who told him that it would be advisable to begin negotiations with the Dutch without delay, as they were in the greatest fear of the Emperor's forces in East Friesland, and were therefore very desirous of coming to terms with Spain. He asked Spinola to send him in writing the terms upon which His Majesty would admit them to mercy, and offered to open the negotiations himself. The Dutch were making the utmost efforts to prepare

to defend themselves against the Imperial armies, as they had heard that war would be carried on against them by both land and sea. "If by any chance, however, the Emperor should not enjoy the same good fortune as he had done elsewhere, they would be relieved from their present apprehensions and, in that case, we should not be able to treat with them upon such advantageous terms."¹

It was probably at de Berg's instigation that the Infanta had entered into communications with the Dutch, even before Aytona could have received Philip's despatch requesting the Emperor's intervention. A certain commissary Kessler had been sent to Middelburg and to Rosendaal to negotiate with the Dutch deputies for the exchange of prisoners. From Kessler she learnt that those deputies would be willing to treat for a truce without raising the questions either of the Sovereignty of Spain or of the independence of the Provinces, and in her report to the King quoted Spinola as believing that their attitude was inspired by their fears of Wallenstein's and of Tilly's victorious hosts. Shrewd observers like Rubens, however, saw that though the States might be arming with feverish haste the Emperor would not break lightly with a power which could so easily ruin all his plans for obtaining the mastery of the seas, and their panic was all the more unreasoning because, as the Infanta herself confessed, she had not forces enough at her disposal to take the offensive, and might be in great difficulties if they were to attempt the invasion of the obedient provinces. At sea she was equally powerless, for when Wallenstein requested her to despatch ships to undertake operations in the Baltic, she could only reply that her vessels were not fitted for such a voyage and that she had no pilots who knew those seas. Spinola, however, was far more confident. When sending her a copy of his answer to de Berg, he said that it would be well to find out on what conditions the Dutch would treat, as if they were reasonable the negotiations might be begun at once. "I cannot but tell you that so far as I can see the Dutch would do themselves no harm if they came to terms now and secured an advantageous peace. This should be the object of our negotiations. I will only add I think you and I will have our hands full this year."²

It is clear that Spinola would gladly have made peace if he could have done so, especially as he cannot but have felt that

it was wholly uncertain whether the Emperor would afford Spain the assistance upon which the statesmen at Madrid counted with such certainty. Possibly for this reason the letter in which he announced to the Infanta the plans for the summer campaign which had been sanctioned by the King was, as will be seen, worded in terms which must have shown her that he would not accept the responsibility for framing them. If Scaglia, writing at the end of the previous December, is to be believed, the Marquis had gone to Spain in order to prove to the Government that it was indispensable "that they should either lay down a firm and sufficient foundation in Flanders upon which to carry on the war against the Dutch, or that, in case they were not prepared to do so, they should remain upon the defensive." The Infanta was in thorough accordance with his views, which however were opposed by the other members of her Council, who by laying stress upon the great expense of the war, had succeeded in bringing over Olivares to their side even before the Marquis set out from Brussels. During his journey through France he had been convinced that it would be wise for Spain to join Louis XIII. in repelling the expected English invasion, but he found to his great annoyance, that many of the leading statesmen at Madrid were violently opposed to such a course. Nor were they more inclined to take advantage of the willingness of England to negotiate, which Gerbier had expressed in his conversations with Rubens. The King, indeed, allowed Spinola to reply that he was equally ready to enter into such a discussion, but he had, at the same time, informed the Infanta that he was anxious to see the original correspondence in order to ascertain if Rubens fully understood its tenor. The Infanta was justly indignant at such an aspersion upon her agent, and knew well that all her councillors, with the significant exception however of Cardinal de la Cueva, who was the representative of the ultra-Spaniards, were in favour of such a peace. They thought, indeed, "that if Spain had come to terms with England, she would have entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with her, but that she was refraining from concluding any arrangement, so as to give time for France to be wasted away by the Rochelle War, for they think that the differences in France would be patched up forthwith, if Spain and England came to terms. They hold it for certain that Richelieu is so anxious to attack Savoy " that he wanted to leave only a block-

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ading force round Rochelle," and to march on Italy without delay, although he feared that his doing so would be the signal for peace between Spain and England. In a word, for all the outward show of courtesy, Spinola must have felt that in the face of the opposition of the Spanish party, he could hardly hope to secure his own aims. Probably it was for this reason that he came round to Olivares' views, which, as he well knew, were utterly opposed to those of the Infanta, who was only willing to co-operate with Wallenstein by sea, as she feared that if fresh forces were sent into Friesland, they would be overwhelmed by the Dutch. It may well be doubted if her proposals for naval co-operation were seriously intended. Olivares, on the other hand, hoped much from co-operation with the Emperor. He believed that Ferdinand II., with the sanction of the Empire, would declare the Dutch rebels, and would allow Tilly to invade their territories from East Friesland. Spinola and the King discussed the plans for the coming campaign, which after they had been approved of by Olivares were communicated to the Infanta in language which shows how little he agreed with them. "His Majesty has decided to instruct Aytona to request the Emperor to send Friedland orders to supply Y.R.H. with any reinforcements you may require for the proposed undertaking, and has instructed me to communicate with you as to the necessary arrangements for it, but although the Count Duke says that these plans must be carried out, H.M. leaves it entirely to Y.R.H. to decide." The matter had been discussed with D. Augustin Mexia, D. Fernando Giron and the Marquis of Leganes, "and after much giving and taking" it was decided "on the advice of D. Augustin and D. Fernando, although we all felt that it was impossible for us to come to any real decision," at such a distance from the theatre of events, "that the most feasible plans for this year would be either to besiege Rees, or if the season proves favourable, to endeavour with Friedland's support to push into the Veluwe on one side, and into Groningen on the other. Although we clearly see that it will be impossible to get a permanent foothold in either of them, yet it seems that at this juncture when we are negotiating for a settlement with the Dutch, the injury which they would sustain from such a raid would incline their people to speak out more boldly for peace, and so they think that the latter plan would be better than that of besieging Rees. I think

Friedland will agree with us, as Count Sforza writes that he does not wish us to get entangled in siege operations, would be by no means willing to supply us with men for them, and would only send us his worst new levies, who would go all to pieces in four days.

"The Count Duke told me he would talk this over with H.M. at Aranjuez. My own views are that Y.H. should send someone to discuss matters with Friedland and that all preparations should be made in accordance with the arrangements then come to. If they decided to enter the Veluwe and Groningen, dépôts would have to be formed at Lingen and some other towns in the Bishopric of Münster, and a very large number of transport waggons, I should think at least eight hundred, with about eight hundred bât animals would have to be provided to carry the supplies and ammunition for the two columns. If they decide upon the siege of Rees there would be no need for so much transport or supplies, and the base should be Wesel. Y.H. should discuss all this with Cardinal de la Cueva and D. Carlos Coloma and make a report to H.M. Should H.M., however, decide whilst at Aranjuez to adopt some other plan, I will at once send an express to Y.H." In the result Olivares allowed Spinola to send off his despatch as it stood, although he added that he had believed that some position would be occupied permanently in the districts to be invaded.¹

But the state of feeling at Vienna was far from being as favourable to Spain as was imagined at Madrid. Quite apart from the irritation which the Mantuan Question had caused in the Emperor's Councils, Ferdinand II. could never forget that the election of his son as King of the Romans still hung in the balance and that, therefore, he durst not disregard either the opinions of the Electors or the rights of the Empire in any instance in which the interests of the Empire were at stake. Such a question was that of intervening in the wars in the Netherlands, for the Dutch were members of the Empire, and without the sanction of the Diet and of the College of Electors, it was, therefore, impossible under the Constitutions of the Empire to employ the forces of the Empire against them. To such an intervention both the Electors and the Princes of Germany were thoroughly opposed. They felt instinctively that if the power of the Emperor were strengthened, the liberties of Germany, in the sense in which those liberties were understood in the

Council Halls of Munich and of Mainz would be placed in the greatest danger, and at the same time they found by daily experience that Wallenstein was but too anxious to trample their rights under foot, nominally perhaps to exalt the Emperor's authority, in reality, so they imagined, to make himself the master both of Ferdinand and of themselves. Maximilian, it is true, had under the pressure of circumstances rejected in the autumn of 1626 the overtures of the French envoy Marcheville for which on the morrow of the Danish King's overthrow at Lutter the time was hardly ripe, but the mission had shown him the position which was held by Bavaria in the eyes of the enemies of the Hapsburgs, and had encouraged him to adopt a more independent line of action. He resolved to secure the removal of Wallenstein from the command of the Imperial armies, and his efforts to obtain the support of his brother electors for this policy most unexpectedly coincided with the views of Spain, for during the whole of the summer of 1627 Aytona by the express orders of his master, was working hand in hand at Vienna with the Bavarian envoy Lenker against the Imperial Field Marshal. In October, 1627, the Electors met in Convention at Mühlhausen in Thuringen and unanimously demanded that the Duke of Friedland should be dismissed from his post as Generalissimo of the Imperial armies, a resolution in which they were even more thoroughly confirmed by his investiture with the Duchy of Mecklenburg. Such was the position of affairs when in March, 1628, the Infanta determined to send Jacques Bruneau, who had for long been the Flemish Agent in London, to assist Aytona at Vienna. As the Marquis of Evana explained to Agnelli in the Spanish Ambassador's name, "Bruneau had been instructed to put pressure upon the Emperor to persevere in his plans as to naval operations in the Baltic against the Dutch, which would be most seasonable at this moment, and the Infanta had sent instructions to Spinola at Madrid to take the same line with the King, so that the opportunity of recovering Grol might not be lost, and some other important enterprise might be undertaken. Every other object should, she said, be set aside for this, and all their resources, thoughts, and time should be devoted to it," but Evana hinted that H.R.H. did not quite understand that the course of events in Italy might lead to trouble there. "Wallenstein is, in some respects at least, in favour of her schemes, and it is understood that this

is the reason for his absolute refusal to disperse his forces," or, in other words, as Agnelli had previously explained, to give a man for a war in Italy, a comment which Aytona would have been perhaps unwilling to make. As we have already seen, Wallenstein, in his conversation with Werdenberg and Collalto, had held language which plainly showed that his one wish was to give Spain her deserts. He had not forgotten her policy during the preceding summer. About the same time Father Valerian Magni, who was the confidant of both Maximilian and Friedland, told Agnelli that Bavaria and Lorraine were trying to get the upper hand of the Emperor and were insisting that their ambassadors should take part in all diplomatic negotiations as a return for their armed support. They would willingly have consented to join Wallenstein in an expedition against the Turks, if he thought it inexpedient to carry out his plans as to the Baltic, but in that case would insist that a Spanish General should be in supreme command. Wallenstein and his followers would be harmless to the Princes of the Empire if they were fighting in the marshes of the Danube. That Wallenstein was sincere in his wish to undertake such an expedition can scarcely be doubted. He knew that the weakness of Poland was in the main due to those disputes between Sigismund and his magnates which arose from the injuries occasioned to the great Polish landowners by the never ceasing raids of the Tartars on the Southern Provinces of the Kingdom, and he knew also that the fear of a strong and united Poland which might be willing to support Sigismund's aims in the Baltic Lands was one of the chief reasons which held back Gustaf Adolf from taking action in Germany to support the German Protestants. By a victory over the Turks, therefore, he would not only benefit the Empire but himself likewise as Duke of Mecklenburg.¹

Bruneau had reached Prague on the tenth of April, and by Aytona's directions had proceeded to visit the principal courts of the Catholic League, and had in due course sent reports of his progress to the Infanta at Brussels. She in her turn on May the thirty-first forwarded copies of his letters to Spinola.

Writing from Kreutznach on the eighteenth of May, Bruneau gave an account of his conversation with Eggenberg and Collalto in Aytona's presence on the eleventh of April, when he had stated the points which Spain asked should be granted to her by the Emperor. These were the publication of the Ban against

the Dutch, the declaration of a rupture with them by the Emperor and the Catholic League, that no peace should be made in Germany unless Philip IV. and the Dutch were included in it upon terms honourable to Spain, finally that the rivers should be closed. It was not until the fourteenth that he saw Wallenstein. The Duke began by thanking him for having spoken to him about the breach with the Dutch and then complained bitterly of the movements of the Spanish armies in Italy, which, he said, hampered him in the execution of his plans. As to breaking with the Dutch he pointed out that he had already to guard more than two hundred leagues of coast in the North¹ and that owing to the late victories of the Danes in Fehmarn and to the new levies which they were making he would have to raise sixteen or eighteen thousand more men. It would, therefore, be impossible for him to take any action in the "Low Countries, but if His Majesty's ships would join him, he would do the Dutch what harm he could by sea." In a subsequent interview Friedland told him that Tilly was most anxious to do his best to help Spain, and that they should send him supplies from Flanders. Bruneau assured him that they would be sent. "His Excellency attaches great importance to the strength which the Allies, more particularly the English, derive from their navies, whilst we, on the other hand, have nothing which can stand up to them at sea, and says that, consequently, we shall have to make peace. In reply I pointed out that the English are by no means so dreadful as they are painted, as I had learnt by my own experience in the year 1625. They had then taken for all their hard work a year or more to get their fleet to sea, and that fleet had been used to little purpose, as all had seen. It was true enough that England is a populous country, but they have very few soldiers, and His Majesty's fleet at Dunkirk every day makes raids upon the Dutch and English. My arguments seemed to carry some weight with him, but he is showing himself to be much inclined to peace as one can see by the way in which he shirks undertaking anything difficult and engages himself only when he is very certain of success." After leaving Friedland, Aytona and Bruneau talked over their interview with Collalto, Trautmannsdorff, and Eggenberg, who all agreed that it would be far better for the Spaniards to count upon the help of Tilly rather than of Wallenstein. The views of the Imperial Ministers were not perhaps wholly disinterested.

Collalto and Eggenberg frankly told Bruneau that unless the Emperor could secure the consent of the Diet there could be no question of his coming to an open breach with the Dutch, and advised Spain to rely wholly upon her own efforts. They pointed out that the Emperor's forces were scattered all over East and North Germany, whilst those of the Catholic League were penned up in East Friesland. Friedland, therefore, could do nothing to help them, and they might as well throw their millions into the sea as give them to him.¹

For once both the Imperial Ministers and Wallenstein were speaking the truth. It might be true that the English Navy might be for the moment a negligible factor in the campaign, but the Danes had but just shown the new Duke of Mecklenburg that whilst an enemy's fleet was in being, his dreams of dominion over the coast lands of the Baltic were but visions of the night. From his lair at Rodby on the coast of Laaland, Christian IV. in his "Lobster" had led his fleet against Fehmarn, against Kiel and against Eckernförde, and though he had been driven back by the batteries of Kieler Fjörd, Wallenstein's mercenaries had learnt to dread the Danes, the Scotch, and the Norsemen, who manned the Danish cutters and gallies. Friedland had declined the Emperor's offer of the Crown of Denmark, because he knew that he could not keep it and had chosen Mecklenburg as the safest of the two dominions, and all through the winter had been seeking to secure the support of Sweden, without which he felt that it was useless for him to attempt to occupy the Danish islands. If he could have induced Denmark to conclude peace on the basis of the cession of Schleswig and Holstein and the payment of an indemnity for Jutland, he would willingly have done so in order to have his hands free to lead his army against the Turks, although he knew that to prevent the conclusion of such a peace in Germany, Spain would exhaust her intrigues, and England, France, and the Dutch would fight tooth and nail. Six weeks later, however, possibly as a result of Bruneau's arguments, he wrote to Arnim, who was just preparing to besiege Stralsund, "I hope to be in Mecklenburg shortly. If the Dutch are not a pack of fools I hope soon to make an arrangement between them and their King that they are to enjoy Freedom of Religion, and that, as for their form of Government, they are to have a sort of Republic upon certain conditions." In other words, he hoped to bring both Spain and her revolted

provinces to accept a compromise by which Spain would have lost nothing save her nominal rights of sovereignty, whilst the Dutch would have granted concessions which, in point of fact, would have made but a small change in the conditions under which the Catholics in the Provinces exercised their religion.¹

Bruneau's reception at Munich was even less encouraging than his reception at Prague. Maximilian and his advisers told the envoy in so many words that Friedland was the greatest enemy they had. "Some style him a 'Super-Emperor in the Empire,' and say that he looks down upon both Electors and Diet with the utmost contempt, refuses to obey the Emperor's commands, and speaks of H.I.M. in the most unbecoming terms. Some of his people openly say that they are not the Emperor's men, but that the Emperor is theirs, and his very footboys brag that two lines from their master carry more weight than six Imperial Commissaries." The one wish of every Prince and Minister with whom Bruneau had been treating was that Philip IV. and the Infanta should do their utmost to persuade the Emperor to get these evils remedied. Unless they could be prevented, it was useless to expect that the Catholic League would co-operate with Spain. "They all say that Friedland's one wish is to bring the League to ruin in order that he may be the only one who has an army at his back. If His Majesty and H.R.H. do not do their best to get Friedland put down, they will only confirm the very general belief that H.M. has a secret understanding with the Emperor to set up a Universal Monarchy and to make the Empire hereditary. I talked over this with the Chancellor of Mainz, who said that these allegations were absurd, and that all sensible and well-informed people knew them to be so, and at my request went on to give me his own views. The mob, he said, only looks at the relationship between H.M. and the Emperor and the good relations which exist between them, and draws the conclusion that the oppression under which Germany is groaning is the direct outcome of their desire for a Universal Monarchy and for a Hereditary Empire. But, he added, those who are better acquainted with what goes on at the Imperial Court and with the dreams and ambitions which fill Friedland's brain, believe that his sole object is to ensure his own greatness even at the expense of the Emperor, his son, and his whole house. They think that the object which he has in view in making himself so powerful, is that when

the time comes he may utterly ruin their prestige in the public eye. This is self-evident, he continued, to us who see and know the means which he is setting at work to secure the adjournment of the election of the King of the Romans. It also makes them very anxious when they see the way in which Friedland gives away his regiments to heretics like Holstein, Brandenburg, and Saxe-Lauenburg. We are certain that there are many Dutch in the Imperial ranks, and that they are doing all they can to sow discord and to make mischief. Trade throughout the Empire is at a standstill, and this exasperates everyone against the Emperor. Amongst other circumstances which go to show this the Chancellor said that when the merchants of Strasburg were on their way to the last Frankfort Fair, with what they call the Elector of Mainz's escort and safe-conduct, as is the usual custom, they were attacked by some of Brandenburg's Regiment, who killed some of them and plundered them of over two thousand Rixdollars [£250] and that the affair took place close to the town. Friedland, he continued, pockets a large part of the contributions, which are levied in the Empire, and has thus got the means to keep some of the Emperor's Ministers in his pay. It is well enough known who they are, and these very men are now utterly dumbfounded by his goings-on and are most anxious to see him removed from his command, as they know how unmanageable he is, and are frightened to death by his projects and chimeras. Those who feel the most kindly disposed towards him can only excuse him by saying that his designs are in no way harmful, but that his talents are not great enough to enable him to bear the burden of such a complicated machine, and that his fickleness is a very real danger. No one can ever feel certain that if he makes up his mind one day he may not change it the next. He steers himself by the stars and planets, and," adds Bruneau, "I have sometimes heard him say with my own ears that the watch in his head does not always go well, and he is led by his astrology to transact his business upon one day rather than upon another. . . . When Friedland speaks of de Roy he flies into a fury and swears that if the gentleman takes upon himself to interfere in any way whatsoever with the affairs of the fleet in the North, he will have him flung into the sea, and once used some threats of this kind before the Nuncio. He takes his oath that he will not have any minister holding him in leading strings, as he

hears people in Flanders sometimes try to do with the Marquis de los Balbases, and that he would have any one hung who tried this on with him. He ended, however, by telling me that he would be very pleased to be on good terms with Gabriel de Roy, now that Count Schwarzenberg, whom he loathes, had left Brussels. He said that Schwarzenberg's departure from Lübeck was his doing, for he had said he would not go near the place whilst the Count was there. Prince Eggenberg told me before I left Prague that he was trying to make things up between them.

"When I took leave of Friedland, he told me that he was going North shortly to see how matters were going on there, and that afterwards he would let me know his views as to breaking openly with the Dutch. In the meantime he sends his most humble services to Y.R.H." Bruneau had not seen the new Elector of Mainz, v. Greiffenklau, who two years before had been chosen to succeed v. Schweikhardt, as he already knew that the Catholic League were determined not to sanction a breach with the United Provinces, until they were secured against Friedland and his forces. At the moment they required every man they could muster for their own defence. "And, although I always hate to give an opinion, unless I am called upon to do so, I feel it my duty to point out that it would be of real service to H.M. if it were thought advisable that he should use his influence with the Emperor to induce him to take measures to relieve the Empire, or at the least its well disposed and obedient members, from the billettings, passages, and disorderly conduct of the soldiery, and that if, owing to military necessities, some regiments had to be left in certain provinces, strict discipline should be maintained so that trade within the Empire might be resumed and the labourers be enabled to live unmolested in their homes. I would also ask Y.R.H. to take it into your consideration whether if it be decided that Y.R.H. should make such representations to the Emperor at the request of the League, you should not at the same time ask them to state definitely what they will do for Y.R.H., and what they claim from H.M. in case that by your representations you secure them the favours they are seeking. They see, indeed, and openly confess that any hopes they cherish as to the re-establishment of a lasting peace in the Empire will be built upon the sand unless the Dutch question is settled either by force of arms or by a

treaty of peace. My reason for suggesting that conditional negotiations should be opened with the members of the League forthwith is that if they saw a prospect of securing what they ask for through Y.R.H. intervention, they would be willing to make more advantageous offers to H.M. than they would do after they had obtained their ends." It was Aytona's opinion that even if Bavaria would not agree to Bruneau's proposals without the consent of the League, Tilly should be sent at once supplies of money and munitions from Flanders in order that the Leaguers might be assured of H.R.H. good faith. Even if the League would not openly break with the Dutch they might allow some of their forces to be employed against them as auxiliaries under the Spanish flag, in the same way as the Dutch, despite their professed neutrality, were assisting the Danes. "But, unless they are relieved of Friedland, there can be no hope that the League will agree even to this." If the question of putting the Dutch in the Ban were brought before the Diet, "it should be pointed out that under the agreement which in 1548 was concluded at Augsburg between the Emperor and the Diet, the Empire is bound to defend the Seventeen Provinces as being members of and a Circle of the Empire, and that the Emperor's sovereign rights over them are explicitly reserved. If an Imperial Ban is published against the Dutch, His Spanish Majesty's rights as their sovereign will be in no wise prejudiced, and such a publication cannot possibly lead to any difficulties with the Emperor, as those who are appointed to execute the sentence are left a free hand to do as they please until the Empire has arrived at another decision, and until they have been repaid the cost of carrying it into execution." Aytona's estimate for securing the help of the Emperor and of the Catholic League shows that all parties looked upon Spain as a far more generous paymaster than the insignificant Duke of Mantua. He reckoned that the cost of the Baltic fleet, which was the sole means by which Wallenstein's support could be purchased, would amount to six hundred thousand Patacoons or German Reichsthalers a year, making nine hundred thousand Florins of sixty Creutzers each [£75,000], in addition to the six hundred thousand Ducats [£150,000] which had already been set apart for that purpose. The Catholic League, or at least those of their members who had already offered their services, would require six hundred thousand Florins a year [£50,000] in addition

to sixty thousand [£5,000] for the Elector of Cologne, or in other words for Maximilian of Bavaria's brother Ferdinand. The Emperor would want one hundred and eighty thousand Florins [£15,000], and Eggenberg was most pressing in his entreaties that Wallenstein should upon no account get wind of this, or he would at once pounce upon the money, and Ferdinand II. was in the greatest straits. Eggenberg asked for fifteen thousand Florins [£1,250] in one payment, whilst Meghem and Count Trauttmannsdorff should receive six thousand Florins each [£500] as an account on the pensions which they enjoyed. In all, the assistance of the Emperor and of the Empire despite its very problematical value would cost Spain at least two hundred and ninety-seven thousand pounds, which for all practical purposes she would have done far better to expend upon her own troops. Bruneau added some criticisms in a long letter in cypher. He reiterated that the outrages committed by the Imperial Army within the Empire were said by Maximilian to be the chief reason why the Catholic League would not take overt action against the Dutch, as they would otherwise have willingly done. "The Duke had told him that he and the Elector of Saxony were to have a secret meeting with the Emperor, at which as Electors they would point out to him the dangers which the Empire was running and would ask him to remove Friedland from his command. If Caesar would not consent, they would bring up the army of the Catholic League and would then repeat their request respectfully but firmly at another interview, as they think that H.I.M. is kindly and well meaning enough, but that the good prince is given over body and soul to Friedland, who does his best to keep the whole Court under his thumb—some by fear, some by gifts, and some (though these were a mere handful) by personal affection and the ties of kinship. They say he has given some at Court as much as one hundred thousand florins [£8,333], and that bad as they know his goings-on to be, they dare not breathe one syllable. As, however, they are faithful servants of the Emperor, they have still a chance of owning their faults and of so clearing themselves with their master." It was greatly to be wished that the King of Hungary should take the field in person, and it was desirable to support Count John of Nassau, Emden, and the two Mansfeldt brothers, Wolfgang and Philip, as being suitable to take Friedland's place in the command of the army and

Navy. If he were removed the army could be cut down by one half, and only picked men need be enlisted, and these would be far better trained and strictly disciplined. There was good reason to regret that the King of the Romans had not yet been elected, for if Friedland's goings on were not put a stop to, Ferdinand of Hungary might fail to secure election. People were, indeed, already talking of choosing as King of the Romans someone who would protect and defend them, and if Ferdinand were defeated the reformation of religion which was making such good progress might be greatly hampered and impeded.

The person who could give them the greatest assistance in carrying out their designs was Cardinal Klesel. "His Eminence would not have the slightest hesitation in using the weapon of excommunication, as many people were anxious that he should do, and they have been impressing upon me how necessary it is that this should be done before the Electors make their coup, and that Y.R.H. should represent this to their Imperial and Catholic Majesties, who are already said to have an understanding as to this with the object of securing the Universal Monarchy and making the Empire hereditary. The Elector of Bavaria said that the King of Denmark was for the moment unwilling to treat for peace and that he had seen a letter from him written in his own hand in which he says that he has not the slightest wish to do so directly or indirectly, as he foresees that that unwieldy structure, the Emperor's army, will soon topple down about H.I.M.'s ears, and then he will not only get back all that he has lost, but more into the bargain. God preserve us from such evils."

The Infanta might well say, when enclosing these despatches to Spinola, "It is clear from them that there would be no chance of carrying out this year any plan which depends upon the junction of the armies of the Emperor and of the Catholic League with our forces here, and so I am proposing to H.M. that for this summer we should take what men we can get, with any they may choose to send us from the Emperor's army, to serve with ours and remain on the defensive with them. The six hundred thousand ducats [£150,000] which H.M. has remitted to cover the outlays which would be entailed on us by an alliance with the Emperor and the Catholic League, could be employed to pay them, whilst any balance might be used either for the expenses

of any operations in Germany which might be arranged for next year, or else to provide for this army."

Whilst Spain was canvassing for the support of the Emperor and of the Catholic League, the Dutch, whilst continuing to treat with Kessler, were busily engaged in preparations to deal a shrewd blow at Spain in her most vital point. Their preparations for the land campaign were conducted with great secrecy, although it was believed in the middle of June that they would make Fort St. Andrew in the neighbourhood of Bois-le-Duc their base of operations. About the same time a formidable fleet, upon which two thousand soldiers had been "shipped without beat of drum," put to sea, whilst a swarm of privateers most of which had been fitted out at the expense of the West India Company, cruised against Spanish commerce. At first it was supposed that their intention was to recover Bahia, which had been so lately retaken by the Portuguese, but in the middle of July the Infanta's secret agents wrote from Amsterdam that the West India Company's vessels were to wait off Havana for the Silver Fleet, whilst a squadron from the Texel was to blockade Mardyke. Their warning was destined to reach Madrid too late to be of service. An attempt by the Spaniards to surprise Bergen with the aid of accomplices within the place failed owing to the treachery of one of the conspirators, who betrayed the design to the authorities. Its garrison was speedily reinforced by Orange, whilst the Spanish army was massed round Stabroeck, and lay idle for some weeks; thus the Netherlands "hovered in a state intermediate between peace and war." Spinola had been expected to arrive in Flanders about the end of May, but his coming was postponed from week to week. He knew, indeed, that if he left Spain without securing the settlement of his business, nothing more would be done about it after his back was turned. For months he did not write even to the Infanta, to whom his silence gave great anxiety, and it was not until the middle of August that she learnt the reason of his delay. The Spaniards had, in the meanwhile, at Cardinal Della Cueva's request, withdrawn the licences for trading with the Dutch in the hope that they would thus weaken the enemy. Their expectations proved erroneous for the loss fell upon the King's own subjects, so that Antwerp was decaying little by little, and as Rubens put it "had now come down to its own juice." Yet the Cardinal was too proud to confess his mistake by allowing

trade to be reopened. For a moment Spinola hoped that the Duke of Lorraine would take the field against France, and that Spain would support him in consequence of the assistance which the French were giving to Nevers, but the Infanta coldly replied to his suggestions that the Duke of Lorraine had no agent at Brussels, and in the middle of September it was known at Madrid that the efforts which Lorraine, Savoy, and the "Infanta of Flanders" were making to bring about a settlement with England and Holland offered some prospects of success.¹

Buckingham, indeed, was perfectly aware that England held the balance of power in Europe, and, therefore, whilst lending an ear to Montagu's proposals, was by no means inclined to bar the door against overtures from Spain. Gerbier continued to correspond with Rubens and his language was such as to lead to the belief that England was not disinclined to peace. With the same object he lent a friendly ear to the Duke of Savoy, who had been greatly flattered at being honoured with the title of King of Cyprus by the English Court, and who, when inclined, owing to the policy of the French in supporting Nevers, to go over to the Spanish side, had agreed not to take such a step without Charles's consent. In return he asked that the English should establish a regular trade with Villefranche, and also that they should interest themselves in promoting an arrangement between Savoy and Geneva. "If the Princes could hope for that agreement, with the King's help they would boldly compound with Spain and the Genoese, because what they lost on the one side would be recovered on the other." All through the earlier part of the winter of 1628 Charles Emmanuel continued to make advances to Wake on the subject of peace between England and Spain. In his opinion if Charles would but treat in time "Spain would come to reason and France would be less insolent." When, therefore, it was arranged in February that Carlisle was to be sent to the Hague, Lorraine, and Savoy, he was instructed to assure the Duke that the King of Great Britain desired a settlement about Geneva and as to trade with Piedmont, whilst he was also instructed, whilst on his way through Brabant, to endeavour at Queen Henrietta Maria's request to protect the interests of the Duchess of Croy's father in a lawsuit with Nevers. In other words, Carlisle's mission, which excited such consternation in the chancelleries of Venetian Embassies was chiefly intended to show the world that it lay with England to make peace or war.² His

choice as the messenger of such tidings would create the deeper impression because Carlisle had had the sole management of all business with France for many years. Scaglia's first object when he arrived in London in October, 1627, had been to arrange for a suspension of hostilities between England and France, but, when a few weeks later, he found that the relations between England, Holland and Germany formed the chief obstacle to the conclusion of peace between England and Spain, he lost no time in urging the Duke to find means to smooth away these difficulties. For the moment Scaglia's mission produced no results, but his accounts of Charles's attitude towards Spain were not unencouraging, and Carlisle's visit to Brussels was looked upon as an omen of peace by such eminent authorities as Mme. de Tserclaes, who informed all and sundry at the Hague that he had treated with the Infanta for a suspension of hostilities between Spain and England at sea. The story was a false one, for as the Infanta reported to Madrid, he had procured himself an invitation thither by writing to Rubens that if he were allowed to come to Brussels it might be a step upon the road to peace, yet in the audience which she had granted him upon the third of June, he had told her that he had no message to her from his master, and replied to her expressions of regret with empty compliments. The Prince of Orange told Soranzo that he had no knowledge beforehand of Carlisle's intended journey. For his own sake, indeed, Buckingham "desired peace with everybody," and, as no questions such as those connected with English relations with the Huguenots were at issue between England and Spain, the problem of arranging peace between the two powers was in reality one of little difficulty.¹

A report upon Scaglia's negotiations, which was drawn up for Olivares shortly after Buckingham's murder, goes to show how completely Charles I. was, like his father, in the hands of the smaller powers of Central and Southern Europe. Scaglia's object, so the report stated, had been from the outset to induce England to make peace with Spain rather than with France, so that the French might be prevented from assisting Nevers. Charles, however, had turned a deaf ear to these proposals in the first instance, owing to the influence of the Pope and the Venetians, who wished to prevent the extension of the power of Spain in Italy by forming a French party there so as to render it unnecessary for the French to intervene by force of arms within the

Italian frontiers. Subsequently, after the failure of the second attempt to relieve La Rochelle he had shown some inclination to treat with Spain through the mediation of Savoy. Scaglia had not, however, trusted to Charles' word, but had got a definite promise from him that England would not for the moment come to a definite settlement with the French, and had also induced Buckingham to pledge himself by a document written in his own hand that this promise should not be broken, notwithstanding the efforts of Tillières, the former French ambassador in London, and of the Venetians to prevent such a guarantee being given. Armed with these documents and with a statement from the King of the terms upon which he would be willing to treat for himself and his allies, he had gone with Antony Porter to Brussels to see the Infanta; from thence, with her consent, the party went on to Madrid.

Three points would have to be borne in mind in connection with these negotiations, namely, that England must not only agree to exclude France from such a peace, but must promise to act in accordance with the interests of Spain, secondly, that the conditions must be such that Spain could fulfil them without prejudice to her interests in Germany, lastly, that they might also secure the advancement of Religion and of Spanish prestige on such lines as the Count-Duke might think best. By such a treaty Spain would secure such a position, both in the Netherlands and in Germany, that she would be enabled to intervene in Italy at her pleasure. England, on the other hand, would never again be able to conclude any alliance with France against Spain; whilst France would be rendered so jealous of England that the latter would, in future, regard the Dutch, the Venetians, and the other hangers-on of France, with the utmost suspicion.¹

Whilst, however, Scaglia was on his way to Spain, he received the news of the Duke of Buckingham's murder, and at once said that this might give the French party in England an opening with the King. As has been seen, Olivares shared his apprehensions. The Abbé, therefore, suggested that the best means to defeat their intrigues would be that Savoy should be enabled to furnish England with proofs that Spain would conclude peace without delay, as Charles, for the sake of his own reputation, would be unwilling to shirk out of carrying out his promise to them, and would thus prevent the French from assisting either

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Nevers or the Dutch. It was, indeed, possible that he would continue the war with France not on the hollow pretence of helping the Huguenots, but avowedly to recover some of the French provinces which had formerly been held by England. In such circumstances the Emperor would be enabled to recover Verdun and Metz, perhaps even, with the assistance of Spain, to extend his conquests over other portions of France. Holland, were England and Spain to come to terms, would also be forced to conclude peace, as the Dutch would be ruined were the English ports closed to them, although it was difficult to conceive that the English would take such a course unless they could be made to see that they would become a great power if they crushed France with the help of Spain. But for the interference of foreign princes, the Dutch would be glad enough to make peace if Spain would recognise their independence, but a peace would be the signal for the outbreak of such disputes amongst their religious factions that the Catholics, who were still very strong there, would gladly invoke the intervention of Spain. The union between the provinces was only kept up by the pressure of the war, and by their fear that if they were reconquered by the Spaniards they would once more be reduced to their ancient state of wretchedness. Such were the reasons which induced the Republic to continue the contest. Although it had been stipulated in the last Treaty between France and Holland that the Dutch should not make peace with Spain without the consent of the French, this agreement had not yet been ratified by the States General owing to the pressure of England, which had acted at the suggestion of Savoy, as the Duke wished to save Spain from meeting with any needless difficulties. It was, therefore, much to be wished that Spain should endeavour to convince England that it was more advisable for her to prevent the ratification of the Franco-Dutch Treaty than to sign a peace with France herself. The Spaniards could only free their commerce from the attacks of the pirates who were ruining it by securing peace with Holland, and this could only be done if they could offer the Dutch stronger inducements to conclude it than were offered them by other powers to continue the war. If England, therefore, could be convinced that the differences which separated her from Spain concerned the interests of third parties and not of themselves as principals, a suspension of hostilities in which Holland could be included might easily be arranged, and then a

general peace would speedily follow. The only reason why the war had been brought about was because of the Palatine's affairs; in reality a German question. Thus Spain had been obliged to take the side of the Emperor who, however, had to consider the interests of Bavaria and others, whilst England, at the instigation of France, had contracted an offensive and defensive alliance with Holland for fifteen years, in order to induce the Dutch to work for the Palatine's restoration. Denmark, too, had entered the war mainly with the same object. It must be remembered, however, that Spain could not make any direct return to England if the English effected an arrangement for her with the Dutch. The restoration of the Palatine was a matter for the Emperor and Bavaria, and Spain could exercise her influence upon them only through diplomatic channels. If, however, a marriage could be arranged between the Palatine's eldest son and the Emperor's second daughter, and if the young man could be educated at Vienna, it would be a far easier matter to secure the restoration of the Palatinate, and, incidentally, the Catholics in England and Scotland would be the gainers. Charles I. was very anxious for the marriage, and as he was childless, and the Palatine's son was his next heir, his crown might well devolve upon a Catholic sovereign. Savoy might assist in the negotiations by arranging a conference between the representatives of all the powers concerned before the French party in England had succeeded in obtaining the conclusion of peace with France, and as Denmark and the Emperor were both anxious to come to terms, it would be easy to induce Christian IV. to agree to the Emperor's proposals. The Infanta had been instructed to keep the negotiations with England alive, and it would be no difficult matter to ensure the continuation of the war between England and France, if Spain were to give some assistance to Rochelle on condition that the Rochellers would not make peace unless France consented to observe the terms which she had originally granted to them, and which had been guaranteed by England. As those terms comprised the demolition of the fortifications of Fort St. Louis and of the Islands of Rhé and Oléron, the French would not be very ready to carry them into effect, and if the Huguenots continued the war England might easily be led to intervene in it again. Charles I. might even be induced to agree in the Armistice with Spain that he would not make peace with France, if it were made clear to him that England would be the gainer by peace.

with Spain, and the latter power could always arrange one between England and France if it thought fit to mediate.¹

Such was the view which Scaglia wished the world to take of his diplomatic aims, but it remained to be seen whether it would be easier to persuade Charles I. and his Puritan advisers in 1628 that Spain could not settle the Palatinate question at her own sweet will, than it had been to convince the Prince of Wales and Buckingham of that simple truth in the autumn of 1623, and whether Savoy, which in Puritan eyes figured chiefly as the arch-enemy of Geneva, would prove a more acceptable mediator than Buckingham's personal enemies Olivares and Inojosa. The Duke and his enmities might be buried in his pompous tomb at Westminster, but though England had even less real cause to quarrel with Spain than she had with France, Richelieu, triumphant at La Rochelle, might well seem a more formidable foe than Spain hampered by the troubles of Italy and powerless to influence Vienna save by bribes from an almost exhausted treasury. Had Charles I. been able to overcome his feelings of mistrust of the French, peace might well have been signed between the two powers within a few days after the fall of La Rochelle, for, as Zorzi wrote, the victory had been a bloodless one, and the refugees in the English dominions had been pardoned solely to please him. As it was, Montagu after his return from England at the beginning of November, had several fruitless interviews with the Cardinal, and finally went back on board the fleet on the ninth without having settled anything, and Charles took the first opportunity of disavowing him as his agent and of informing the Duke of Savoy that the proposals had in the first instance come from Richelieu, a statement which, indeed, was a half-truth. Zorzi, in his fury at Montagu's failure, attributed it mainly to Scaglia's intrigues with Carlisle at Turin, and brushed aside the suggestion that Savoy might possibly mediate successfully between France and England with contempt. "His Highness has no credit here and the Abbot has been already found out in England as a man perverse in his affections, and of a turbulent and misty disposition." Carleton at the Hague but a few weeks later was letting it be understood that "his King is not pleased at the employment of Montagu." Presumably Montagu had won himself friends in France, for at his death, in 1670 he was Abbot of Pontoise.

"This is Saint Martin's Day," ends Zorzi, "and as I write the

English fleet is hoisting sail and moving from the position where it has fruitlessly frittered away two whole months."

France had her hands free at last, and Richelieu had already warned Olivares without disguise "that whether La Rochelle falls or no, the Duke of Mantua will never be abandoned by his King."¹

CHAPTER LXXXVI

BUT for their own procrastination the Spaniards might well have faced with equanimity the situation which had been created by the fall of La Rochelle. As Rubens said with some bitterness, the great art of statesmanship in the eyes of the Madrid politicians was statecraft. They deceived all who approached them and sent them back empty-handed save for promises not destined to be fulfilled. Spinola was determined not to leave Spain until matters in Flanders had been settled upon a firm basis, but Philip IV. and his advisers simply trifled and dawdled and seemed blind to the rocks upon which they were running in the United Provinces. The Marquis would have been more usefully employed in Genoa, for since the suppression of Vacchero's conspiracy, the Republic had seemed to be slipping out of the grasp in which Spain had held her for a century. In 1528 Andrea Doria with the aid of a popular rising had expelled French influence from the Genoese Councils, and, from that moment, Spain had kept the governing classes true to her interests by giving them every facility for enriching themselves in her dominions. Since the accession of Philip IV., however, the financial position of Spain had been seriously weakened by over issues of the brass money which had ever since the time of Philip II. been in circulation side by side with her silver currency. At the outset the brass coins, of which about thirteen millions of reals' worth [£325,000] in all had been issued from the Royal Mint, had passed as equal to silver, but, in consequence of the frauds of the Baltic traders, who had smuggled in counterfeited coinage to the amount of thirty million reals [£750,000], its value had by 1628 fallen to about one-half, whilst the exchange abroad stood "at sixty in the hundred." It had, consequently, been necessary to prohibit the importation of copper, and, as an incidental consequence, to reject the overtures of Sweden for a commercial understanding. As the brass coins thus took the place of silver amongst the wealthier classes, and were used in making the payments due to the Treasury, the revenues of the State were proportionally diminished, and, as a remedy, it was decreed that these monies

should only pass at half their value. The prices of all commodities were immediately doubled, with the result that the poorer classes were reduced to the greatest privations and trade almost wholly ceased, as "the Exchequer held still to twenty in the hundred." The results were disastrous to the interests of the Genoese. The interest on the debt had to be reduced, payments were delayed or suspended, a percentage was struck off all accounts. The chief sufferers were the ruling classes of Genoa who thus became alienated from Spain and were gradually coming to see that they could only save what remained to them by freeing themselves from the bondage in which she held them. In the words of a note entitled, "Some thoughts as to the means of securing the continuance of the Spanish Monarchy," which was submitted to Olivares, and was sent by Monthoux to Turin, "some fresh means will have to be devised for keeping Genoa under control, for we may be sure that as the riches of private persons dwindle away their desire for liberty and their wish to see it better secured will as certainly increase to the great prejudice of the Spanish Crown. His Majesty should, therefore, strive to acquire the good will of the majority, and so should shape his policy in accordance with the laws of Genoa, which expressly lay down that every one who is qualified to take part in the government of the Republic shall do so, for up till now most of them have been kept out of their rights, just as has been the case in Casale, where the provisions in favour of the lesser nobility which were made in 1575 by the Legate of Pope Gregory XIII., the Emperor, and King Philip II., have never been carried out." The writer believed that by taking the side of those who had thus been deprived of their rights a Spanish faction could easily be brought into being both in Genoa and in Monferrat. No one knew better than Charles Emmanuel of Savoy that Genoa was the foundation stone of Spanish power in Italy, and that if the Republic were once to bethink herself that she was an independent state, the Duchy of Milan, if not the Kingdom of Naples, would be at the mercy of any power which could induce Savoy to loosen its hold over the passes of the Alps and to assert its claims over the lands which controlled the roads across the Apennines through the Valley of the Po. It was upon this account that Spinola had proposed to journey through Italy to Flanders, where his presence was equally required. The whole weight of Flemish affairs was now borne by the Infanta, and her health was suffering from the strain. In the

middle of July she was for a short time seriously unwell, but, after being let blood, she in some measure recovered. "Her health is most important for Belgium, as this Princess is endowed with all the virtues which are united with her sex, and, by her long experience has been trained to the government of these peoples and freed from all the illusions and prejudices which new arrivals bring with them from Spain. I think, therefore, that if H.R.H. and the Marquis could have the sole handling of our public affairs, matters would go on very prosperously and that we should soon see a decided change, not only in our own country, but everywhere else, for the interests of the whole world are now-a-days, so to say, bound up together, but we have tyros at the helm who will not listen to any opinions save their own and so everything is at a standstill." Rubens, however, was soon to be called upon to play an active part in Spanish diplomacy. He had already offered to come to Madrid in order to lay his correspondence before Philip IV., and accordingly, on the King's invitation, set out thither at the end of August, hoping to find an English agent with a passport from the Infanta following him to Spain. The painter reached Madrid on the tenth of September.¹

Despite the Infanta's illness, negotiations had meantime been proceeding with the Dutch. Kessler had been met at Rosendaal by the Burghermaster of Rotterdam, who, with the consent both of the Prince of Orange and of the States General had opened a discussion as to the Truce and Spanish arms seconded Spanish diplomacy. Although Coloma had been baffled in an attempt to capture Cadzand, de Berg, with a view to the eventual invasion of the Veluwe, was endeavouring to form a depôt of supplies at Lingen, but, owing to the loss of Groll, his convoys were obliged to take a roundabout road through Westphalia. His activities did not, however, escape the notice of the Dutch, whose attitude accordingly became somewhat more conciliatory. By the end of July Kessler reported that although the deputies declined to discuss a peace, yet they were willing to treat for a truce in a new form for any time which Spain might desire. As to Independence they would allow it to be dealt with in the manner proposed by Philip IV., but they said that they had no powers to treat the question of the Scheldt at Rosendaal, whilst, owing to the attitude of the preachers, it was impossible for them to grant any concessions to the Catholics. In Zealand, indeed, a private house, in which Mass was being celebrated, had lately

been attacked by a mob. The Infanta had replied that she could not make any concessions on the subject of Religion. In sending Kessler's report to Madrid she remarked that though the Dutch might be more easy to deal with whilst the Emperor's troops were on their borders, and France and England were at war, they were able to furnish fifty thousand florins [£4,166] a month to Denmark whilst the finances of Spain were on the point of exhaustion. The war in Flanders was costing her three hundred thousand ducats [£75,000] a month, out of which the pay of the soldiers amounted to two hundred and forty thousand [£60,000], and bread to forty-two thousand [£10,500], and she was hopelessly in debt to the Antwerp merchants. Had Spain been willing to meet the Dutch half-way, a truce might have been easily arranged, for although their deputies had said nothing about the Scheldt yet, in reply to the Infanta's declaration, they had told Kessler that they hoped that the point as to religion would, if it were pressed, be conceded.¹

Late in August she decided to send D. Francisco Zapata to Spain to report to the King upon the situation of affairs in Belgium. He was accompanied by Scaglia and Antony Porter, who had, at Charles I. and Buckingham's request, come from England to Brussels on their way to negotiate at Madrid for a truce or peace. Scaglia informed her that he had at first wished to decline the mission but had undertaken it on Buckingham's assurance that if Spain would come to terms with England and the Palatine the Dutch might do as they pleased. In other words England was quite prepared to take no further part in the concerns of the United Provinces, an attitude of mind to which the "favourite of England's" experiences at Rhé and at La Rochelle had, perhaps, inclined him, for the Duke had come to see that the Dutch were only too ready to prefer their own interests to their obligations towards their English allies. Scaglia advised that if Porter went to Spain, the negotiations should be carried on only in general terms and that no question should be raised as to the Catholics, as, were their claims mentioned, the discussion would be broken off at once. England, in his opinion, would lose little by throwing over Holland, for the Provinces, who feared that they would be sacrificed to the Palatine's interests, were anxious to shake off her control. The "Abbot" had been informed by Buckingham of Gerbier's negotiations with Rubens, although he was probably not aware that Gerbier, who had a profound

distrust both of Porter and of Scaglia, had told the Infanta under the seal of secrecy that the whole of the English Council were pressing the King to make proposals for peace with France which, they said, would be listened to readily, before he made any further attempt to relieve La Rochelle. As Charles I. was inclined to comply with their request, the negotiations between Spain and England must be hurried on.¹

From Brussels Scaglia proceeded with Gerbier to Italy, and on his way thither was met at Basle by the express who was carrying to Venice the news of Buckingham's assassination. The Abbé may well have seen in the tidings the death-blow of his hopes, and the whole party broke out into loud lamentations and passionate fits of weeping. Scaglia, however, who believed that Charles himself was sincerely desirous of peace, made the best of his way to Madrid, whilst Philip IV., despite his knowledge of Lord Holland's assurance of good will to "Mahroussa," found comfort in Cottington's promise that he would speedily arrive in some port of Guipuzcoa though without a formal commission from his sovereign. As he wrote to the Infanta, a peace should be arranged between England and Spain, neither the Palatine nor Denmark should be included in it, and all questions of diplomatic etiquette might be left out of consideration. Such was the state of affairs when he received, on the twentieth of November, a despatch from Mirabel to announce the fall of La Rochelle. To Olivares the news came as a bitter blow, for it seemed to him as if the game had slipped from his hands. At Naples the Spaniards, whose haughty bearing had so long excited the impotent anger of their Italian vassals, "were," wrote the Venetian Resident with ill-concealed joy, "as much affected as if Spain herself had lost a province. They know that France was displeased at their secret and effective help to the Rochellese, whilst that of England was open and a mere show." Naples was far beyond the orbit of English statesmanship, yet the news of Montagu's negotiations had penetrated even to the loungers in its market place. "They dread the consequences of a reconciliation between France and England," and live in fear of "something similar with Savoy, with the participation of the Pope who so readily granted the dispensation for the English marriage." Nor were their fears of England wholly unreasonable. Bruneau might strive to convince Wallenstein that the boasted sea power of the English was a tradition of the past generation: the strength of Spain at sea

was still more enfeebled. The Dunkirkers alone "could serve with any profit," and every one at Madrid, whether in the palace or on the exchange, awaited with the greatest anxiety "the decisions of the King of England, whose fleets are terrible to the people of Spain and to their King because of the India trade and of their treasure fleets." Yet in England public opinion was inclining to peace. To the London merchants the loss of their trade with Spain was of far greater importance than the wrongs of the Huguenots whether real or imaginary, and the strollers in Paul's Walk openly said that a peace with Spain would be far more honourable to the nation than would one with France. At Cadiz the Spaniards had merely been defending themselves against an attack, and ever since they had treated the English with the greatest courtesy. Even Contarini had to admit that "With Spain there is no question of the Huguenots or of the Queen's Household or jealousy about navigation, which always generates disagreements." Since the capture of Ormuz the English had been quite satisfied with their trade to India and to Sumatra, where their rivals were no longer the Catholic Portuguese but the Calvinist Dutch who by their recent atrocities at Amboyna had gone far to blot out the fading memories of the Inquisition in Mexico and in Peru which had stirred the hearts of Elizabeth's seamen in their battle against Spain. In America their trade with New England, with Virginia, and with the fisheries in Newfoundland amply sufficed to employ their best energies, and since Raleigh's disastrous failure they had shown no desire to trespass upon the jealously guarded Spanish Main. Though England was at war with both Spain and France, Wake could instruct the English merchants at Villefranche to assist the galleys which were on their way from Barcelona to guard Genoa against the menace of Guise's squadron. The English had not yet forgotten their age-long friendship with the House of Burgundy.¹

The gloomy apprehensions of the Spaniards as to their trade with the Indies were destined to be realised but not by English sailors. Whilst the diplomatists at Rosendaal were negotiating for a peace, the thought of which was most unpopular amongst the seafarers of the United Provinces who felt that they would gain little by the reopening of trade with Spain if they were debarred from the long voyages to the Indies East and West, the fleet which early in the summer had sailed from the Texel under

Piet Hein, Lieutenant Admiral of Holland, was steadily making its way towards the Gulf of Mexico. The admiral was a native of Delftshaven, and was now a man of fifty who had risen to high command mainly through his own exertions. Four years before he had, as Vice-Admiral, been in command of the expedition which had wrested Bahia from the Portuguese and had been himself amongst the foremost to scale the walls of the fortress of San Salvador. In 1627 he had attacked and destroyed twenty-six Portuguese vessels under its guns, and had cut out three others from the roadstead of Marea. He had subsequently been placed in command of the squadron, which had been fitted out in the hope of surprising the Silver Fleet which was to sail from New Spain to Cadiz in the summer of 1628. On the sixteenth of November the tidings reached the States General that their Admiral had accomplished his task. On the eighth of September Piet Hein had fallen in with the galleons off the Port of Matanzas, a Cuban harbour to the west of Havana, and had captured the whole fleet of four galleons and twelve merchant ships with the loss of only one or two men and after firing sixteen or twenty shots. Five of the vessels were laden with gold, silver, and precious merchandise, but the rest with cargoes of less value. The value of the booty was estimated at five millions of ducats [£1,250,000], of which about five hundred thousand crowns [£125,000] in all belonged to the King, but, through an irony of fate, the chief brunt of the loss fell upon the merchants of Amsterdam, Rouen, and Lower Britany. Bells rang, casks were broached, and bonfires blazed throughout the United Provinces, and a strong squadron was at once despatched to convey the spoils into the Dutch harbours. At Madrid the tidings were at first received with incredulity, and their wishes rather than any sounder reasons made the ministers believe that some of the vessels had escaped. The blow was, however, a terrible one, though it was due in the main to the carelessness of the Spaniards rather than to the skill of their assailants, for the Infanta's timely warning of the danger had been treated with contumely. The public of Madrid, however, were in ecstasies at the tidings of a calamity which, as they instinctively felt, threw a lurid light upon the incapacity and jealousies of their rulers. "Such is the strength of hatred, that men count their own losses as nothing, and scarcely feel them when they are tasting the sweetness of revenge. I am truly sorry for a King whom I know body and

soul from my daily intercourse with him to be endowed by nature with every gift of body and mind, and who would, but for his distrust of himself and for his deference to the opinions of others, have it in him to rise to the utmost height of fortune and of power. But he is now paying the penalty of his own credulity and of others' folly, and is scourged by the hatred which men feel for them rather than for himself." Spanish wit comforted itself by idle gibes at the victorious Admiral who was said to have gained his knowledge of American waters whilst he was living in exile after having been soundly whipped and banished from Holland "for some trifle or other. If every carted rogue is to cost this kingdom as much, it would be better to hang them all so that they may not go to the wars." But the jesters of the Calle Mayor could not lessen the gravity of the loss, for to use the words of the inscription on the splendid tomb in which the Admiral reposes amongst the heroes of his country in the Old Church at Delft, he had by wresting the Golden Fleece from Spain, "procured for the West Indian Company untold wealth, for the Spaniard poverty, for his Fatherland strength, and for himself undying fame." When the Infanta received the tidings from her secret agent at Rotterdam, the news must have chilled her to the heart. The capture of the Silver Fleet by Piet Hein proved, indeed, to be the turning point of the long struggle in the Netherlands for never again was Spain able to make any real headway in her Flemish provinces against the rising power of the Dutch, even though, for the moment, her treasury was replenished by the arrival of the Flota from Terra Firma and of some richly laden carracks from the East Indies. The effect of Hein's triumph was quickly reflected in the attitude of the Genoese envoy at Madrid. As was usually the case in great emergencies, Olivares had turned for help to the Genoese Legation. He was met with a stern refusal. "As Your Lordships have already heard I have bolted and barred the door against all approaches for pecuniary assistance. Please God you yourselves may have no urgent need for help in the near future owing to some new conspiracy against you. In any case if people here once come to see that Your Lordships are irrevocably decided not to contribute to their relief, they will think it the best plan not to overstrain your patience with their requests, and, in any case, if steps are taken here betimes with this object, they will produce a good effect.

"A Sergeant Major from Havana is arriving here to-morrow

with the despatches as to the loss of the Fleet from New Spain.

"It seems that it was sighted by the Dutch squadron which was lying in wait for it off Cape St. Antonio whilst it was on its way from San Juan de Ulloa to Havana. The Dutch at once gave chase, and so forced the fleet to make for Matanzas under press of sail. It seems that it was caught at anchor in the roadstead there. The crews saved themselves by swimming on shore after having landed the gold and jewels." All the supplies for Flanders and Milan were in drafts which could only be cashed when they fell due for payment, and the only resources which the Treasury could rely upon were a few good bills for two millions and a half [£625,000]. Yet no one for a moment thought of laying down their arms, and with great difficulty four millions of crowns [£1,000,000] were scraped together from some Genoese and Portuguese and by the sale of sugar for the supply of the Spanish forces in Italy. The resources of Genoa were, indeed, drained almost to the dregs by the long war with Savoy and by the delays placed in the way of the conclusion of peace by Richelieu's intrigues, which, however, had nearly driven both states back to the side of Spain out of their suspicions that France had her eye upon the Republic. None of the Genoese bills had been accepted at the last fair of Piancerola, and thus Spain could no longer rely upon any resources save those of the Portuguese and of the Fuggers of Augsburg which were far from being unlimited, or sufficient for her needs. The French took advantage of their opportunity and sent M. de Botru on a mission to Madrid to endeavour to effect a settlement of all the matters at issue between the two courts, a task in which he was zealously seconded by the Nuncio extraordinary. His orders were not destined to be fulfilled. In his first interview with Olivares, the Count Duke told him plainly that he was greatly grieved that the French should be assisting the Dutch, who were rebels and heretics, against all show of right. Botru, who probably knew that Gregory XV. had admitted that Louis XIII. was well advised in trying to come to terms with the Huguenots, as Spanish intrigues were at the bottom of all the religious troubles in France, could only reply that his King had on his accession to the Crown, found that matters were upon this footing between himself and the United Provinces, and had, therefore, been bound to continue to carry out his father's policy. The Count-Duke answered: "If you say that it is lawful for your King to assist heretics and rebels, I, for my

part, can show you the opinions of the Spanish theologians, who tell His Majesty that he may do the same in France, and therefore, if H.M. did wrong in doing so, France was equally doing wrong. It would be better, indeed, that the two powers should be at open war with one another, rather than that they should go on living as they were doing. They might be kinsmen and friends in name but the paltry sums which the French tossed to the Dutch forced the King to spend four millions a year [£800,000]. The money would be far better spent on a war with France by which Spain might get something or, at least, force the French to spend as much." According to Wake, Botru had been instructed to induce Spain to join in a league for the extirpation of heresy, a story for which it would have been difficult to discover the slightest grounds, and had also been commissioned to get the French accepted as mediators for Nevers upon his undertaking to submit himself wholly to the Emperor and to deliver up Casale into his hands, whilst the Spaniards were to deposit the territories which they had occupied in Monferrat in the hands either of the Pope, the Duke of Florence or the Duke of Bavaria, and the "Duke of Savoy's part" in those "of any Prince that were out of the House of Austria or Savoy."

For a moment it seemed not impossible that Spain might accept Botru's proposals. In the main they were in accordance with the views of both Cordoba and Aytona, who pointed out that the chief issue at stake was to get Casale out of Nevers' hands even at the price of inducing the Emperor to grant him the investiture of the Mantovano. Ferdinand II. regarded the occupation of that fortress by the Spaniards as a derogation from his sovereign rights, and at the same time was being pressed by the Empress and his Confessor to refuse to adopt any rigorous measures against Nevers, whose cause was favoured by all his ministers with the exception of Eggenberg. He informed Agnelli late in December that Savoy was now the only obstacle to an arrangement, and that it would give him sincere pleasure if Mantua would negotiate with that power directly, especially if some exchange could be arranged for Monferrat. Condoba, on his side, was doing his utmost to induce Savoy to agree to the proposed terms so that Nevers might not have the shadow of an excuse left for refusing to accept them, but should he decline to do so, Aytona was resolved to carry out his master's orders and to tell the Emperor "that, in any case, the fortress of Casale must be handed over to Your

Majesty's forces, and not to those of any other Power not excepting the Emperor's, for after having fully placed before Your Majesty my views as to the advisability of your agreeing to the said Treaty, I have no other course open to me but to carry out Your Majesty's orders." He added that he was certain that if Cordoba had seen the slightest chance of taking Casale, he would never have entered into any negotiations at all. If such was the military situation, the auguries to be drawn from the political outlook were scarcely more favourable to a Spanish triumph. Trautmannsdorff, it is true, had promised that if the Dutch and Spain could not come to terms, the Emperor at the next Diet would join in making war upon the United Provinces, but it was impossible for Spain to build upon such a fragile foundation as his words. Public feeling throughout the Empire was in favour of the Dutch. When the war first broke out the German heretics alone had been enemies of Spain, but now all the ecclesiastical electors with the Duke of Bavaria were thoroughly alienated from her both on public and on private grounds, and it was certain that they would never at any time do anything to promote her interests, "unless, indeed, they should, as time goes on, come to fear that the Dutch have the same ends in view, as they now suspect that Your Majesty has, namely that they are trying to make themselves predominant in the Empire. It is my opinion, therefore, that Your Majesty may rely upon Germany to help you to conclude peace with your rebels, but not to make war on them in case they refuse to come to terms."¹

Unfortunately Olivares had been greatly irritated by Botru's rudeness, whilst the Emperor was equally annoyed by the French proposals with regard to the settlement in Monferrat. When the French envoy, Baron de Quincé, who had come to Prague to announce the surrender of La Rochelle, touched upon the latter point, "H.I.M., who up till then had been talking quietly with him, suddenly grew very confused and turned deathly pale, but finally replied that he must ask to be given those points in writing," so that he might reply to them after consulting his Council. Philip IV., likewise, on the urgent representations of Count Frankenberg, had ordered Aytona to agree to Cordoba's proposals, as his one object throughout had been to place the Emperor's authority in Italy upon a firm foundation. He did so in the belief that the Emperor would hand over Casale to him at once if the French made the slightest movement, as were the

place to pass into their hands, the Spanish possessions in Italy would be in the utmost danger, and also that Nevers would be constrained to render implicit obedience to the Imperial orders. Before his despatch reached Vienna, Savoy had agreed to accept Cordoba's proposals and Cordoba for his part was endeavouring to arrange for a conference to treat for a settlement. Their offers came too late. On the seventeenth of January Ferdinand II. announced that he would abide by the report of the Imperial Commissioners and would, therefore, insist that Monferrat should be administered by Count John of Nassau, and that both that state and the Mantovano should be deposited in his hands until the case as to the succession had been decided in the Courts. But a few days later Olivares wrote to Mirabel to desire the French not to interfere further in "the affairs of Italy, which do properly belong to the Emperor," and to inform them that if they moved in Italy, Spain would do all in its power to maintain the Emperor's authority, "which," as Philip IV. himself pointed out, "would be impugned" if the case were submitted to another judge. France, indeed, had asked not only that the Pope should act as mediator at the Emperor's request in any cases which might arise between herself and Spain, but that she might draw up a list of German and Italian Catholic Princes from which the Spaniards might choose one to hold Mantua and Monferrat on deposit. In other words France proposed to secure the powers both of the Emperor and the Empire for herself, and Philip IV. had therefore no choice left to him but to refuse Botru's proposals, although at the same time, acting upon a hint from the French Ministers, he had instructed Mirabel to propose that the Citadel of Casale should be deposited on certain conditions in the hands of the Duke of Bavaria, a suggestion which was destined to have important results in the not distant future. Philip's zeal on behalf of the Emperor's authority was, however, not wholly disinterested. He pressed Ferdinand II. to punish Nevers for his disobedience to his orders by putting him in the Ban of the Empire, and to make an attempt to recover the long lost Metz, Toul, and Verdun, as the time was so seasonable for doing so. Not only was the Emperor to take up arms against France, but he was implored to furnish troops against the Dutch as he had done three years before during the siege of Breda, "since this affair is the one which concerns most nearly both his own interests and those of the Empire at the present time," an assertion which Aytona must have had some

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difficulty in making. With somewhat more justification he asked that both the Emperor and the Empire should assist him in preventing the French from making levies in the Grisons, where, however, since the conclusion of the Treaty of Monzon, the Protestants had cherished the deepest resentment against France, which, they believed, had abandoned their interests in the Valtelline at the behest of the Spaniards.¹

The Grisons' question was once more becoming one of pressing importance in view of the course of events in Italy. The principal strategic points in the Leagues had already been occupied by Imperial troops with the consent of the Diet, a consent which the Heads of the Leagues had not dared to refuse. By this occupation the country had suffered severely. The Imperial Generals had, indeed, promised that their troops should maintain good discipline, but even when their subordinates were inclined to do so, they found it impossible to carry out their instructions. Everywhere the houses and farms were plundered, the cattle were carried off, and requisitions were levied by which the country was utterly exhausted. Religious persecutions, moreover, were still raging, for Archduke Leopold was far more zealous in his support of the Catholic Faith than were either the King of Spain or the Emperor. The Protestant Ministers were expelled from the Lower Engadine, and the lay populations consented to make an outward show of professing the Catholic Religion in order to escape from banishment and the loss of their property. But, as was the case also in the Upper Palatinate, which Maximilian of Bavaria had forced back into Catholicism by billeting his troopers upon the recalcitrant Calvinists, their conversion was but a matter of form, and, in both instances, when the inhabitants shook off the yoke of their foreign oppressors, they returned to their former belief.²

For the moment, however, the Imperial interests were all powerful in the Leagues, which not only carried out the Emperor's orders to refuse a passage to the French volunteers who, in July 1628, were intending to pass the Alps to join Nevers, but a year later renewed their hereditary agreement with the House of Austria without making any stipulations in favour of Religious Liberty. Thus, so far at least as the authorities of the Leagues were concerned, the supporters of Catholicism had the right to use every effort to carry on their propaganda by force, and Father Ignatius, the head of the Capuchin Mission, obtained a formal

promise from the Court at Vienna that they would be assisted by Austrian troops. Famine, too, was raging, and many must have perished had not large quantities of rice been imported from Italy. Thus the good will of the Grisons, but for their geographical position, would have been of but little value to either France or Spain.¹

France was likely to derive more benefit from the skill of her diplomatists. The proposal that Casale should be placed in the hands of Bavaria, was said by Eggenberg to be the work of Nevers, who had hoped to cause ill feeling between Maximilian and the Emperor, if the latter refused to agree to it, and had also arranged that money should be sent from Italy to Bethlen Gabor to induce him to advance into Hungary. Nevers had rightly calculated as to Bavaria. Savoy was anxious that Cordoba should allow Casale to be entrusted to the custody of the Duke's daughter, Duchess Margaret of Mantua, and the Spaniards, possibly because they had discovered that the Duke of Bavaria was favourable to an arrangement with Nevers, finally decided to refuse to allow Mantua and Monferrat to be deposited in his hands. For the moment Maximilian appeared to acquiesce in silence but, when many years later he drew up the summary of his grounds of complaint against Spain, not the least important item in the list was "that when Bavaria was proposed as one of the powers amongst whom a sequestrator for Monferrat should be appointed, the Spanish officials opposed the proposal on the ground that the Spaniards distrust Bavaria." Possibly in this instance, as in that of the Valtelline, the Governor of the Milanese had taken upon himself to refuse to carry out the orders which had reached him from Madrid.²

It cannot be denied, however, that "the Spanish officials" were not without grounds for their suspicions. Maximilian was openly opposed to the intervention of the Emperor in Italy at the risk of involving Germany in yet another war. In the previous September, at the request of the Pope, he had replied to a message which Nevers had addressed to him and to the ecclesiastical electors through an envoy named Strozzi, by saying that he would gladly mediate with Ferdinand II. on his behalf, and accordingly expressed a hope to the Emperor that he would give a proof of his inclinations to peace in his dealings with Mantuan affairs. In his correspondence with the Curia, although not with the Chancery at Vienna, he always gave Nevers the title of Duke of Mantua.

Cardinal Barberino believed that the mediation of Bavaria would be most advantageous and the Pope was warm in his expressions of gratitude for the offer. The Emperor's decision to take up arms was a bitter disappointment to the statesmen of Munich. Ferdinand II. had not arrived at that decision without a great deal of hesitation. Even as late as the middle of February, Eggenberg told Agnelli that the Imperial armies would not enter Italy unless the French crossed the frontier, and the Nuncio added that the Emperor had informed him that Cordoba was more anxious for peace than any one else who was concerned with the question. The Governor of Milan had good cause to wish for a peaceful settlement. His treasury was empty, his troops were deserting or dying of hunger, he expected that the French squadron would attack the coast of Genoa at any moment, and he had no hope of relief from Spain. The Milanese might, indeed, be attacked simultaneously from Savoy, from the Valtelline, and from the Mantovano, and disaffection amongst its population might second the efforts of the invaders. He had no means for defending Casale and of the thirty thousand crowns sent from Spain [£7,500], His Majesty wished a large portion to be expended upon the purchase of satins, cloths, and embroidered hangings for the Queen of Hungary, his sister the Infanta Maria.¹

The Duke of Savoy was clamorous for help, as on the sixth of Jan., 1629, Louis XIII. had set out from Paris to take command of the army to relieve Casale. He had named Bassompierre as his Lieutenant. It was known that he intended to occupy Maurienne so as to cut off the communications between Spanish Burgundy and Savoy. Scaglia hastened to Milan and at his entreaty Cordoba sent all the men and money he could spare into Piedmont for he knew that if "Savoy topples over, it is all up with the poor Milanese." Peace was their only hope and yet Cordoba knew that Olivares was opposed to it. At Vienna the courtiers were loud in their assurances that their Imperial Master would never abandon Spain, but money was lacking, and the Austrians could not be certain that they would be supported were they to reinforce the Milanese either by Archduke Leopold or by Bavaria and the Catholic League, who might not be willing either to disarm or to allow the Diet to proceed to the election of the King of the Romans. Wallenstein, indeed, was a further source of anxiety. His one thought was to retain Mecklenburg at all costs, and thus the conclusion of peace with Denmark was

delayed, whilst he had in his irritation at the efforts of the Emperor to secure the election of his son Leopold to the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, held some very suspicious interviews with Tilly. M. de Marcheville, by Richelieu's orders, was making a fresh visit to Germany, and was encouraging the Electors, especially Bavaria, not to disarm. He went so far indeed as to promise Maximilian that at the death of the Emperor, "who is fifty and suffers from a quartan," France would send him twenty thousand soldiers to aid him in securing his election to the vacant throne.¹

In the late autumn of 1628 another attempt was made to detach both the League and Bavaria from the Emperor's interests. Despite Wallenstein's repulse from before Stralsund, where the Danes, under Colonel Henry Holk, had shared in the victory, Christian IV. was growing weary of the war. It is true that by his raids upon the coasts of Rügen and of Mecklenburg he kept Wallenstein in constant apprehension. It was, however, almost impossible for him to replace the men who fell in these expeditions. His Privy Council dreaded that the Emperor would attack the Sound, the dues on which were their chief source of revenue, and which would be deserted by shipping should the Imperial Armies approach it. They warned their master that if his last troops were beaten in these encounters on land, "it would be all up with the Crown of Denmark, as they had no place left where they could muster a fresh force of mercenaries." Christian IV. lent a willing ear to their remonstrances, although foreign observers thought that their fears for the Sound were exaggerated. The Emperor would never, wrote Barozzi, risk his army in such an attempt, for the Danish fleet was very strong, and were he to venture upon the undertaking he would at once bring the Hanse Towns, the Dutch and even England into the field against him, as the Freedom of the Seas was of vital consequence to them all, especially to the Dutch. Nor had the Emperor, whose naval forces hardly existed, the means to carry out any plan of the kind. Christian IV. was, however, not an absolute monarch, and he knew that he was far from being assured of the support of his Danish kingdom should he decide to continue the war against their wish. Wallenstein, on his side, was also growing more inclined to peace. Northern Germany was every day being drained of its supplies, and it was therefore becoming difficult for him to keep up the army upon which alone he could depend to secure him in the possession of his new Duchies. Yet not a

single place could be left ungarrisoned, as it was impossible to collect the supplies which had been requisitioned except by armed force. Both the Emperor and his Generalissimo were indeed most anxious to bring about a settlement with Denmark, and it remained to be seen if it came to a negotiation whether Friedland or Tilly would be most zealous in forwarding it. Christian IV., however, preferred to treat with the League for a separate peace, but Maximilian replied with a stern refusal to a letter in which the Queen Mother of Denmark, Sophia of Mecklenberg, approached the Electors who were then assembled at Heidelberg with some proposals on the subject.¹ The efforts of the French met with no better success; Wallenstein, however, expected that negotiations for a peace with both the Emperor and the Empire would begin on the sixteenth of January, 1629. Richelieu was far from being discouraged, and on the twenty-fifth of January despatched Baron Hercules Charnacé, one of his most experienced agents, upon a mission to Munich. He was instructed to pave the way for an alliance between the League and Denmark, to induce Maximilian to secure the postponement of the election of a King of the Romans and to promise him the active support of France for that object. He was also to inquire as to the advisability of establishing a French Legation in Bavaria. If Maximilian can be believed the Emperor was well aware that he was in treaty with Louis XIII., whilst Ballotta, the Nuncio at Vienna, wrote that the Pope, with Richelieu's approval, had repeatedly sent him instructions "to pave the way for a good understanding and, if possible, for an alliance between France and Bavaria." Such a purely defensive alliance would be in no wise contrary, urged the Nuncio, to the duty which Maximilian owed to the Emperor and the Empire. His right to hold the dignity of Elector was threatened and he was entitled to use every means to defend it against those who sought to wrest it from him. So long as Bavaria could count upon the support of the Emperor, of the Catholic League, or even of Spain, the alliance with France would not come into force. If, however, the Emperor and her other allies ceased to defend his retention of the Electorate, the Elector might well accept the assistance of France as he was too weak to do so with his unaided resources, and, moreover, the French had no intention of bringing about a breach between Bavaria and the Empire by engaging him in these negotiations. Malignant jealousy alone could see a pretext for depriving him of the Elec-

torate in his dealings with France. The particulars of the proposed alliance had been kept secret, because it was thought better that they should not be made publicly known until Louis XIII. and Richelieu were in a position to carry out their engagements, "that is until the Huguenots had been scattered, their strongholds levelled with the ground, the Catholic Religion made safe, and France freed from the fearful danger which threatened it at home." France was in no way acting as an enemy either to the House of Austria or to Spain by assisting the Catholic Estates of the Empire or by defending the Catholic Religion. The Elector of Saxony had, it was true, informed the Emperor of the offers which the French had made to him, but he had declined to embrace them. Louis XIII. would, however, regard it as a most unfriendly and treacherous act if Maximilian disclosed any particulars of these confidential communications, and would, in that case, break with him once and for all. He would get no thanks from the Imperial Ministers for his treachery and as he would then be left without a friend in the world, the Imperialists and the Spaniards might worry him about the Electorate as much as they pleased. Such appear to have been the arguments which were adduced by Charnacé and the Nuncio in support of the French proposals, which, however, as Maximilian's chief adviser, Jocher, remarked, when drawing up a history of the negotiations many months later, were only brought forward by France in her own interests. If she failed to carry out her promises to defend the Elector he might be left with a quarrel with the Emperor upon his hands and might fall between two stools. Maximilian was too wise a man to take such a risk. He believed that the Venetians who were urging him to accept the arrangement had been intriguing against him at Paris, and he must have known that the grounds upon which the Imperial Court were thinking of publishing the Ban against Nevers, namely that he had called upon the French to enter the Empire to assist him against the Emperor, might be held by hostile lawyers to be in substance not materially different from the charges which might be brought against himself were he to accept Charnacé's offers. He accordingly decided to decline them.

In his answer he pointed out that he would bring general suspicion upon himself were he to act as the negotiator of a separate peace between the League and Denmark, a country with which he was united by ties both of near kinship and of former friend-

ship. It would, moreover, be a breach of the Imperial Capitulations were either the Emperor or the Empire to conclude such an agreement unless by mutual consent. The Estates of the Empire had in many instances good reason to remember that they were under particular obligations to the Emperor and would, therefore, wish to avoid any occasion of difference with him. He could, therefore, only thank Louis XIII. for his friendly offers, and for the care which he had shown in the interests of the "Liberties of Germany." Such was the answer which Maximilian returned to Charnacé's proposals, but from that moment neither Richelieu nor his master ever forgot that it might be one day possible for them to arrange an alliance between France and Bavaria. They could not but remember that even when rejecting their overtures, Maximilian had mentioned the "Liberties of Germany," and they might in the future find a ground for intervening in the Empire to defend a constitution which might well have been framed in the interests of France but of which Maximilian himself was the zealous defender.¹

Whilst Charnacé was busied in his intrigues at Munich, the French forces which had been despatched to relieve Casale were hurrying towards the frontiers of Savoy, where at the end of February they were joined by Bassompierre. On February the twenty-eighth the royal party made their way up the rough track towards the summit of Mont Genève, noting on their road the pines famous for their turpentine, the larches on which grew the agaric, valued alike by the apothecary and by the dyer, and the ash-tree, which yielded the precious manna. From the top of the pass they gazed in admiration over the gorges through which on the one side the Durance wound its way towards the Rhone and on the other the Dora rushed foaming to Turin, and then getting into their sleighs sped down the mountain slopes to Sezanne. Within a few hours Charles Emmanuel learnt that the French King was on his frontier. His situation was far from being an enviable one. On the eighteenth of November, 1628, Carlisle had left for England carrying with him the news that the Savoyards were sneering at his master's weakness in abandoning La Rochelle. On the following day La Fontaine, an exempt of Louis XIII.'s bodyguard, arrived at Turin to announce the surrender of the Huguenot stronghold. He hastened in riding boots without a cloak to Madame and was overwhelmed with caresses. Next day he had a chilly though courteous welcome from the Duke and

Prince, who learnt with displeasure that Richelieu was on his way to Italy with thirty thousand men and that the King was following with an equal number to protect his friends in Italy "from the oppression under which they groaned." He would do great good to Savoy if they remained true to him. The Duke said that he never would change towards France. The Prince of Piedmont muttered that if the French King did not change his ministers or they change their policy he must expect to lose his friends, who were tired of their insolence. A Te Deum was sung at the Jesuits' Church and a bonfire lighted at the Duke's vineyard as signs of rejoicing at the overthrow of the heretics. Wake, who thought that France would attack Savoy through Genoa, believed that the French and Spaniards had an understanding and that the French forces in Burgundy were meant to overthrow Geneva, "and pull down that other nest of Huguenots." Fortunately for Wake, he within a few days received letters from Charles I. in which he expressed through Lord Holland his intention of standing by Savoy. Their bearer had been stopped by the health-officers in the Milanese, as the plague was raging on the Saint Gothard road and had turned back towards Basle to seek another passage across the mountains. He had finally arrived at Novara almost worn out with his sufferings, "but the misfortune of that poor creature who hath wandered in the Alps so many days hath brought us some advantage." The Duke and Prince were delighted by the news. "I did not spare to tell the Duke that I was more bound unto the Prince than unto him, in regard that I had observed that the Prince never wavered, whereas I found the faith of the Duke to be like that of Saint Peter when he walked upon the sea. The Duke did apologise wittily for himself, saying that his blood was more cold and his age more apt to entertain suspicions, especially after having been so often deceived, but that now he would set up his rest with his son, and run any fortune that His Majesty might set up for him." The Duke's blood might be cold and he might be willing to confess that he had been frequently deceived, yet he still flattered himself with the hope that he might act as mediator in the work of bringing about peace between England, Spain, and France. With this object Scaglia on the eleventh of December set out for Madrid, and a few days later Barozzi was on his way to London through Nancy and Brussels. Wake had told "the Abbot" in the presence of the Council that he must in his negotiations look as much towards

England as towards Savoy. England could not make peace without the consent of her allies in Germany, who would expect Spain to carry out any engagements which she might enter into which concerned their interests, whilst above all the English must be represented not as suitors for peace but as listening to overtures from France and Spain. Wake was rewarded with profuse promises from "the Abbot" and with yet more profuse thanks from the Duke. It was already known that Botru had been sent from Paris to Madrid in order to be beforehand with Scaglia. His mission was founded upon some hints dropped by Mirabel, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, as to the possibility of uniting Spain and France by an offensive and defensive alliance against all and sundry, and, as a means to this end, he was instructed to propose that Casale should be deposited in the hands of the Pope. Barozzi was instructed to act as intermediary between Charles I. and the Spanish Ministers through Scaglia, and Wake anxiously entreated that all the proposals might be submitted to him before they were answered, "otherwise I shall serve only as a cypher."¹

Barozzi accordingly set out for Nancy and Brussels, where he saw the Infanta, and after being detained at Dunkirk by contrary winds, made the best of his way to London. On his arrival he found that Carleton, now a peer, had succeeded Conway as Secretary of State. The envoy's first visitor was Gerbier, who brought him the disagreeable news that the French Ambassador had persuaded the King and Lord Treasurer Weston that the Duke of Savoy had been playing both with the French and the Spaniards and had ended by taking the command of the French forces in Italy. Gerbier had had hard work to undeceive them. The Queen, however, in her joy at the news that an arrangement had been come to with France, had made no objections when an agent was sent off secretly to negotiate in Spain. Barozzi was greatly hampered with trifling punctilios, for Charles I. "on account of his misfortunes in the war," was unwilling to make any advances until France had done so. Finally, after an audience with the King, it was arranged that he should only offer the services of the Duke and of the Prince of Piedmont, if he should be desired to do so. But the difficulties in the way of peace were by no means removed. The Queen clamoured against the Spaniards, because M. de Vautalet, whom she had sent to Paris with a message to the Queen Mother, had been taken by the Dunkirkers off the harbour of Boulogne and put to ransom as a prisoner of war. No redress

could be obtained. On the other hand the Dutch and Venetians, to delay a peace with France, were stirring up the Commons to refuse to vote supplies until the King had sanctioned the measures which had been brought forward against the Catholics and the Arminians. Yet every one conversant with the facts urged that the English ought to be in a position to keep up a fleet which would make the King the master of the seas as far as Cape Finisterre and would thus drive Spain to a peace. "They argue thus because they say that the Dutch by taking the Silver Fleet have brought Spain to her knees, and that within three or four years there will be rebellions everywhere in the Spanish Dominions, which she will be unable to put down. Roe, who is on his way to Constantinople, is the greatest opponent of a peace with Spain." For once the forecasts of English politicians were to prove correct, for within the next few years Brabant was in revolt, Portugal was once more to regain her ancient freedom, whilst Naples and Catalonia were all but lost to Castile. But for the constitutional issues at stake between Charles I. and his Parliament the fall of the Spanish Empire might well have been brought to pass and the Hapsburg Dominion in Europe have become but a memory of the past. It was not until after three hundred years, that men have come to see what Humanity gained from the Thirty Years War. Then as now, however, the average Englishman understood but little of the forces at work in Continental affairs. Weston had been engaged repeatedly upon important embassies, yet Barozzi notes that he had had hard work to make the Lord Treasurer see the influence and importance of Cardinal Richelieu.¹

Scaglia on his side, hampered though he was by the ill-will of his colleague, Monthoux, was equally busy. In his first visit he had questioned Olivares about the English negotiations, but the Count Duke had shown himself singularly reticent. "From the little I can get out of the gentleman I believe him to be determined to do his best to meet all Y.R.H.'s wishes, and that they will not conclude any arrangement with France which may be against your interests. They will certainly give you the most vigorous support, as they look upon it as their duty to do so, and are also very anxious for peace with England." Owing to Porter's visit to Spain and the report that Cottington was on the way to Guipuzcoa, it was hoped that the treaty would be signed at Madrid. "Olivares' own view is that the two Kings should be

friends, and that Spain should do her utmost to meet the wishes of England as to those matters which concern her. It might be worth while to consider whether a state could not be given to the Palatine at the expense of France. Such, in fine, is the message which he has sent them by Porter." Olivares fully agreed with Scaglia that Botru's proposals ought to be rejected. It was quite contrary to the interests of Spain that the Pope or any other prince should mix themselves up in the Mantuan business, and it would be sufficient if the territories in dispute were deposited in the Emperor's hands. He also seemed inclined to assist Savoy about Geneva although he believed that the French would stand by the Genevese. In a further conversation on the same evening the Count Duke explained that he wished to arrange an offensive league against France with England and also to find some compensation for the Palatine. Scaglia asked his master to tell Wake that matters could not possibly be going on better, and that in his opinion the Spaniards were acting in good faith, although the fact that they wished the negotiations to be carried on at Madrid might occasion some difficulty. As it was not yet time to raise the question in Germany, he had not written anything about the English business to Count de Castro, who was on his way to Vienna as Spanish Envoy Extraordinary. Scaglia had evidently been instructed by Charles Emmanuel to request that Spinola should be transferred to Italy as he writes, "I find they have gone so far forward about the business of Spinola for Flanders that I can do nothing for the present, but I will find a means of doing something later on."

"The blow of the Flota has been all but their death-stroke. As for their money matters they have made an effort to keep up appearances by means of Treasury Bills, which are, I fear, more show than substance. I will not say so for certain, as I believe that from now until the end of April they will be drawn without any limitations, and so they will get them accepted, but I fear that everything which falls due from April on will be drawn on the monies of the Gold Flota, for which they are now fitting out a fleet as convoy at an expense of a million crowns [£250,000]. God knows what the outcome will be for this is the fleet which the Dutch mean to attack in harbour and I know the vessels have already sailed which are under orders to do it. They have also taken the Merchants' Flota, which had on board two million crowns [£500,000] in silver and a million and a half in bills

[£375,000], and that without firing a shot, although it consisted of eighteen large armed vessels. Such blows as these weaken them all the more because they strengthen their most deadly and irreconcilable enemy, yet this Monarchy is so firmly fixed, that it cannot be struck down into the dust by a single stroke, and they are a people who will bring themselves to live on mud if by doing so they can keep up the dignity of their country to the last, and, finally, not to omit any particular, I may tell Y.R.H. that I believe the English business will be settled, but this I shall know more certainly in a day or two" . . . As for men in power, "The King gives proofs of understanding, but like the rest of them in these days never does anything. Olivares is very vain, very haughty, and very uncertain in his friendships. So far as I can gather he is universally detested, is a butt for every slander as never favourite has been before, yet is jealous for his master's glory, hates France like a good Spaniard, and if he sees a chance of putting in a blow will clutch at it."

A few days later Scaglia received a visit from Rubens who brought him a message from the Count Duke to urge him to take part in arranging an alliance with England against France. They knew that a war with the French was inevitable. He advised Scaglia "to do my utmost to get anything I want for myself, and added that I am the person they set most store by both because I am Y.R.H.'s minister, and because I have these negotiations in my hands." In a further interview, which lasted for four hours, with Olivares and the King, Scaglia was informed that they counted upon Savoy to attack France through Burgundy, where they would make all the necessary preparations, whilst their own army marched south from Flanders and Lorraine was brought into the field by the promise of Verdun. It is probable that the Spanish Government was acting in good faith in bringing forward these proposals, for they believed that they would be supported by Rohan and Bouillon in the South and South East of France and that a German army would enter Champagne. As an inducement to Savoy to act upon their suggestions Olivares a few days later told both Scaglia and Monthoux that the Council of State had decided that as soon as the Duke had come to terms with Genoa, Spain would assist him in carrying out his plans against Geneva, and left it to him to decide whether he would lay siege to the city or capture it by a sudden dash. They pledged themselves not to ask for any advantage for themselves from the tran-

saction. Such offers were well calculated to bring Charles Emmanuel over to the side of Spain, and he must have been the more gratified when he learnt that Spinola himself who, contrary to the wish of the Infanta, had persisted in remaining on in Spain for objects which he had kept a secret from everyone, inquired of his envoys how many men would be required for the expedition and whether a lodgment could be made in the moat. As the Abbé felt "that to leave such matters to be dealt with by an Abbot and a President is like setting two blind men a-fencing," he could only refer the Marquis for information about such professional subjects to that most distinguished military authority, his master at Turin. From Vienna, likewise, Savoy received encouragement to take the side of Spain. The Emperor, it is true, had decided not to attack France, but said that the Duke would get better terms if he came to an agreement with Spain without further delay. He knew, moreover, that in the previous August, Father Lammermann had promised to use his best efforts to induce his penitent, the Emperor, to assist him about Geneva, and aware as he was of Maximilian's connection with the Jesuits, he cannot but have attached weight to his refusal of the Pope's request that he should negotiate with Vienna for a settlement about Monferrat and to his declaration that he would stand by the Emperor at all risks.¹

Nor was Charles Emmanuel inclined to underrate his own importance. He believed himself to be the master not only of attached and warlike subjects, but of the strongest fortresses in Europe, and he knew that the Keys of Italy were in his hands. But for his countenance, men asked, would Cordoba have ventured to attack Casale, that masterpiece of the engineer's art, with but seven thousand men? Could not he incline at his will the balance of power?

For a moment Charles Emmanuel may have hesitated. When, however, he learnt that despite the entreaties of the Empress, Ferdinand II. had decided to range himself against Nevers by the side of Spain, the die was cast. On the second of February the Duke wrote to de Wateville, his envoy at Vienna, that he had determined to resist the French, and to close the passes of his Alps against them.²

The Duke had not displayed his wonted prudence in declaring himself upon the Spanish side and he was soon destined to repent of his precipitancy. The French were believed to be preparing

to attack him through Savoy, through Piedmont and through Nice, and Cordoba, who was still hampered by the necessity of at once retaining his hold upon Monferrat, and of protecting Milan against an attack from the Mantovano, if not simultaneously from the Grisons, could spare neither men nor money to assist him. Possibly as a blind, M. de l'Isle arrived at Turin about the middle of February from Paris bringing proposals that he should meet Louis XIII. to negotiate for a settlement, but his offers were couched in such vague terms that it proved impossible to accept them, although it was necessary to gain time so as to allow the promised reinforcements to arrive from Spain and Germany. With this object the Duke begged Cordoba to allow Casale to be placed in the hands of the Duchess of Mantua and to inform the Prince of Piedmont of his real wishes as to peace or war. After, however, de l'Isle had left Turin, he was taken whilst endeavouring to make his way into Casale by stealth and carrying very compromising correspondence.¹ On the twenty-seventh of February it was known at Turin that Louis XIII. was at Embrun and when tidings arrived a few days later that large quantities of bread were being baked at Briançon and at Sezaune, a frontier station only four miles from Susa, the Duke at once decided to remove to his frontier fortress. His forces were in no state to resist the advancing French. They were distributed over such a long line that they must always be inferior in numbers to them at any given point. Nevers was evidently acting in agreement with them, and Cordoba might well prove impotent to send him support. He, therefore, decided to make one more attempt to negotiate with Richelieu. On the fourth of March the Prince of Piedmont met the Cardinal at Chaumont, two miles above Susa. From the outset he can have had but little hopes of effecting a success. The Prince of Piedmont came to the interview smarting under the memories of a bitter personal affront. At de l'Isle's instigation he had agreed to go and meet his brother-in-law at Grenoble, on the understanding that Savoy would join France if she attacked Genoa. He had prepared to undertake the mission in royal state, and, despite the poverty-stricken condition of his father's treasury, was carrying with him eighteen "suites of rich apparel, of which one all embossed in diamonds is said to be the most rich that hath yet been seen," and crossed the melting snows on the Cenis with a long train of sumpter mules. When, however, Vittorio Amadeo reached St. Jean de Maurienne, he was

met by his brother, Prince Tommaso with the news that Louis XIII. had left Grenoble and had made his way to Embrun. The King excused himself by saying that he believed that Casale "was in its death agony," and that he must press on to relieve it. He again offered to supply Savoy with the means to attack Genoa, if the Duke would open him the passage through his states into Monferrat. Before the Prince and Cardinal met Nevers had entered the Milanese and the Spaniards, thought sanguine Wake, did not know to which saint to turn. To encourage the Duke, however, he was able to assure him that no arrangement had so far been concluded between England and France, and that his master willingly accepted his proposals to act as mediator and was sending for Scaglia to come to England. He added that the meaning of the offer from Savoy had not been understood at Whitehall until the arrival of Carlisle and Barozzi. The interview between the Prince of Piedmont and the Cardinal had no good results. His Eminence said that France was determined to relieve Casale, and though he agreed to meet the Duke on the sixth of March when Verrua was sent to arrange the ceremonial for the interview he received such an answer that all negotiations were broken off. For once Charles Emmanuel was playing a very daring part, for he had with him at Susa only four thousand two hundred men in all whilst the French forces consisted of twenty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse, and the Duke of Guise was threatening Nice with about sixteen thousand men. He pointed out that the King's honour would be fully satisfied if Casale were placed in deposit on the terms suggested by M. de Botru in Spain, and said that he could not understand how the King could "send armed forces against his own blood in the person of Madame; for himself he was determined to die sword in hand in the service of Spain."

The French by their refusal of his terms showed, indeed, that they had other designs in Italy than the relief of Casale, and Charles Emmanuel could not forget that the chief struggles of his reign had been with the French, and that he had won his greatest triumph when he wrested Saluzzo from their clutch. Broken as he was in health, oppressed with melancholy and secluding himself from the society of any save his physicians and the grooms of his chamber, he was peculiarly amenable to the influence of others. "In his chamber, he doth walk much and sing to himself, yet our Astronomers have made him a revolution this year which doth

promise him great future advantages and honours." He was to a great extent in the hands of his Prime Minister, the Count of Verrua, the brother of the arch-enemy of France Scaglia, who was only anxious to secure the glory of carrying through the negotiations for peace which he believed himself to have inaugurated, and who was always anxious to persuade the world that if Spain and the Empire could settle their differences with England, Holland and Denmark, they would be far more than a match for France, the Pope, who was at heart a Frenchman, and the Venetians. Scaglia's advices from Madrid may have done much to strengthen him in his determination. Though not disguising the financial straits to which the Spaniards had been reduced by the loss of the Flota, he yet pointed out that the Dutch, notwithstanding their victories at sea, were inclined to conclude a truce, and that as Spinola had been given full powers, he would use his utmost efforts to meet their wishes, "and will not break off the negotiations for any reasons which depend upon Spain. Count Olivares has asked me to write to England again and to tell them that the Emperor is inclined to that peace," in other words to a settlement between Spain and England, "and is anxious to send a representative here to treat about German affairs, and that the Duke of Bavaria shares his views. Count Olivares has therefore hopes of a good result." Spain was well aware that, in the last resort, the settlement of affairs in Italy must depend upon the Emperor and to prevent the French "from putting their fingers into the matter, and to get out of their difficulties, it is quite possible that they may of their own free will join them in referring the business to H.I.M. They still, indeed, think that when Nevers sees that matters are dragging on he will come round to their views. Though they use every means to disguise their present straits, Y.R.H. must keep a careful watch upon the Emperor's doings, for here they give out that he will break with France. You should be careful likewise that D. Gonzalez sends you enough money for you to raise all the forces that you may require, and that those forces should be under your own command. You can only count upon these two things," namely a rupture between the Emperor and France, and a subsidy in money from the Milanese "for as for their entering Picardy through Flanders, and their plans for invading France through Catalonia and Navarre, the first is impossible whilst the Dutch are in their present position, whilst, at this juncture, the others would be so

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difficult to carry out that they will only resort to them at the last extremity." It was, indeed, rumoured that Wallenstein had entered France with a large army and that he had left a Lieutenant-General to hold the Danes in check. The halo of victory glowed round the Imperial standards, and the veterans of the Lutter and of a hundred German fights might well prove the superiors of the nobles who had shown their prowess under the Lilies only against Buckingham's mobs and in the triumphs of a Civil War against fanatical burghers. It might not be long ere Collalto and his Cossacks appeared on the heights of the Saint Gotthard, or Turin heard that the Louvre was shaking with the thunder of Wallenstein's batteries. If, in a fit of panic terror, the Duke were to allow the French to pass through his valleys and to relieve Casale, he might find not only that he had lost for ever the great prize which he had sought in Monferrat, and had planted a most dangerous and enterprising enemy in the heart of Italy, but that he had incurred the undying hatred of the power which had been the ally of his House in good and evil fortune, and to which he owed the restoration of Savigliano, of Pinerolo and of Saluzzo. Such appear to have been the reflections which determined him to throw down his gauntlet to the French; he had not long to wait before they picked it up.

On March the fifth Charles Emmanuel arrived at Susa. Two days later he was wakened at six in the morning. He was roused to receive a message which had been brought by Créquy and Bassompierre to ask that he should receive a visit from Louis XIII. He declined the honour. Scarcely had the two marshals returned to their camp, when the King, though with great reluctance, allowed them to put themselves at the head of the forlorn hope. Down the steep pass charged the flower of the French nobles, driving the defenders and their Milanese commander, Bellone, from the barricades at the gate of the burgh and entering the town with the panic-stricken fugitives. It would, indeed, have been impossible for the Savoyards to have maintained their position. Some troops had been sent by shepherd's paths to the heights crowned by Forts Jullon and Gelasse, which commanded the town, and thus outflanked their defences. But for the bravery of a Spanish captain named Mercadure and a handful of his men the Duke and Prince themselves must have been taken prisoners. The auxiliaries from the Milanese ran away without firing a shot, and the Savoyards, who were but raw Militia, fled in a panic.

Many supposed, indeed, that the Duke was willing to allow the French to pass through his territories in order to prevent the Spaniards from taking possession of Casale, but that they were resolved to force their passage in order "to make him swallow their conditions," whilst owing to Spanish delays, he had been unable to make proper levies. These suppositions were false. "To take away all suspicion of complicity it is too notorious that the Prince of Piedmont had been killed upon ye place if one of ye French Musquetoni who was ready to discharge had not well figured him and foreborne to give fire; that the Duke and Prince were in as great danger of their persons as ever man living did escape, that the Marquis Villa was shot through the left shoulder, and the Count of Verrua precipitated down a rock, on the other side, M. de Schomberg received a musket shot in his thigh and Valance another in his side. Such persons would not have exposed themselves to such danger if they had been secretly agreed." The Citadel still held out, and if Cordoba could have sent him reinforcements, the Duke might have continued to resist, especially as he still held Avigliana, the position which closes the pass at its entrance into the plain of Piedmont, and which, owing to the hills, the intrenchments, and the artificial inundations, was almost impregnable. D. Gonzalez, however, was afraid to leave the Milanese at the mercy of Nevers and the Venetians and therefore advised the Duke to come to terms with the French. On March the eleventh the Citadel surrendered and on the same day the Duke concluded that Treaty of Susa which was to be the cause of two years of disastrous war, and to which Cordoba on his own initiative voluntarily acceded. On the nineteenth Richelieu received a notification from Nevers that the Siege of Casale had been raised three days before. The first act of the Mantuan War was at an end.¹

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THE terms of the Treaty of Susa were such as to offer but little prospect that it would effect a lasting settlement of the troubles in Italy. Whatever may have been the intentions of Savoy, Cordoba in sanctioning it even provisionally, was entering into an agreement which he had no power to conclude.

As between France and Savoy indeed, the conditions were not unendurably onerous to the Duke's interests, and the Treaty might well have ceased to be of importance after the news had arrived that the siege of Casale had been raised, if Spain had chosen to accept it.

The Duke of Savoy granted a passage through his territories to the French forces, which were on their way to relieve Casale, and promised to supply wheat and wine to revictual that fortress. As a guarantee that he would carry out his engagements he consented to place the Citadel of Susa in the hands of the French, who in their turn pledged themselves to restore it to him as soon as the conditions of the treaty had been carried out, an arrangement which was come to mainly to placate Spain. At the request of the Prince of Piedmont the French promised not to advance into Monferrat beyond Bussolino so as to give the Spaniards time to withdraw their forces from before Casale.

Serbellione, the Spanish representative at the Savoyard headquarters, when sending the particulars of the Treaty to Cordoba urged him, though without much reason, to get the best terms he could so as to secure the Milanese against an invasion. In point of fact, the French had not the slightest intention of attacking it, and the best-informed Spaniards never expected they would do so. The sacrifice of Susa was, indeed, a wanton one, as the Duke was now released from his obligations to Spain, but as Savoy was utterly ruined his defection would be of little consequence if only France and Spain held together. In Wake's opinion Richelieu was sparing Savoy so that he might have his hands free to deal with Rohan, who, with the secret support of Spain, had again risen in revolt. Once more the English envoy

recited his belief that all the Catholic powers, be they France and Spain, or the Emperor and Bavaria, would make up their differences and would join together in one final attempt to root out Protestantism from the earth. As a conclusion to his apocalyptic vision he drew a deduction which was inspired rather by the spirit of the Puritan than of the diplomatist. "In consequence we can make no treaty with France without wounding our godly Master in Heaven and conscience." England could now rely only upon allies of her own religion. Richelieu had told Verrua and the Prince of Piedmont "that we want nothing that is another's but only to protect our friends," and would not listen when they talked of a French attack upon Milan through Genoese territory. France would raise her terms to England, and Spain prove more supple. Finally, Scaglia was now utterly useless as a negotiator. Such were Wake's confidences to Carlisle, who must doubtless have read them with some amusement at the Minister's credulity. Whilst he was penning them the Duke of Savoy was in the act of writing to Cordoba that he owed his defeat to the delay in sending him reinforcements from the Milanese and to the failure of Germany to carry out her engagements.¹

Cordoba on his side agreed to the terms submitted to him by the victorious French. Louis XIII. acknowledged that it had never been the intention of the Catholic King to disturb the Duke of Mantua in the enjoyment of the territories of Mantua and of Monferrat. Cordoba, on the other hand, promised to withdraw the garrisons which he had placed in Monferrat at Nizza della Paglia and Deux Cents as well as the troops which had been put at the disposal of the Duke of Savoy to hold the places which he had occupied in the Marquisate. During the space of a month, however, the troops were to be employed to hold all those fortresses and territories on deposit in the Emperor's name, were to do homage to the Imperial Commissary, and were also to be bound by the terms of the oath of homage to give the Duke of Mantua or his representative at the expiration of the month the investiture both for the fortresses and for the lands between the Tanaro and the Bormida.

Don Gonzalez engaged that he could get the Convention ratified by his Government within the space of six weeks, and returned to him with a promise from his King that he would never make any attempt against the territories of the Duke of Mantua and

Monferrat, who in his turn was to pledge himself never to attack the territories of Spain or her allies, and would confine himself to assisting his own allies.

The Governor of Milan explained his conduct in concluding these agreements with the utmost cynicism to his brother at Madrid.

He confessed that he could not explain why the Savoyards did not increase their forces when the French were approaching, but supposed that their failure to do so was to be set down to their want of money, and he must specially point out to Olivares that there was nothing overt to show that the Duke was playing Spain false. "The paper I have signed will be of no prejudice to our interests." It had freed him for the moment from his anxieties lest the French should attack the Milanese, for had they advanced he must have retired from before Casale in order to defend it. As all the princes in Italy, including the Pope, wished Monferrat to remain free, it was possible that the Pontiff would now cease to work for a French occupation, which would be a great relief to their interests. It was on all accounts indispensable that Olivares should persuade the King to ratify the Peace of Susa. The Count-Duke had laughed at Cordoba's advice not to engage in a war in which so many of the Italian powers would side with the French. Louis XIII. had now the means of re-entering Italy at any moment he pleased, and if the Treaty were not ratified he might hold the fortresses in Monferrat on the very borders of the Milanese with French troops. Thus the Almighty had been pleased to use the very means by which they had intended to secure their dominions in Italy for opposite ends. As things stood the arrangement he proposed was the only way left to them to effect their object, and it would be folly were His Majesty to refuse to ratify it owing to his vexation at the slights which he had received from the French. Spain would never have been in her present state had Botru's warnings been listened to, "but the discourteous and disobliging way in which we Spaniards deal with every one offends every prince we treat with." Cordoba did not care whether Olivares made him his scape-goat or not. The worst which could befall him would be a removal from a government "which is the severest punishment my sins can receive in this life." If the Count-Duke means to renew the war "let him say so in so many words . . . I hate this shilly-shallying." People at Vienna were right in saying that

the Governor of Milan was more anxious for peace than anyone else. He must at times have regretted that he had been amongst the first "to spin those legal cob-webs to catch Nevers which had cost Spain so dear."¹

The French triumph at Susa was destined to have lasting effects alike in Italy and in Germany, but for the moment Richelieu was called back to France by fresh troubles amongst the Huguenots in Upper Languedoc.

Even before the surrender of La Rochelle the Cardinal had listened with approval to Zorzi's proposal that the King should publish an edict of general amnesty, but though he went on to say that he was very anxious to come to an accommodation with Rohan, the envoy feared that "this might be one of his usual tricks, possibly in order to make me insist the more when I write to England on their good disposition here."²

If such was His Eminence's object, his diplomacy for once proved singularly unsuccessful. In place of coming to terms with Rohan immediately after the surrender of La Rochelle, he induced the King to issue a proclamation of outlawry against those Huguenots who still remained in arms. The measure was received with great suspicion in England, and Charles I. not only repudiated Montagu, who had been one of the first to induce Rohan to revolt and who subsequently had played so great a part in bringing about the overthrow of the Rochellers, but filled his letters to Turin with his fears that France and Spain were plotting for the extirpation of heresy as a step to the establishment of a universal monarchy. In the meantime he refused to conclude a peace which but for a point of form about the Queen's household would have been long before settled. Cynics professed to believe that the attitude of Rohan was by no means unwelcome to the Queen Mother, and to those at Paris who were so active in favour of Nevers. Even in May 1628 the Mantuan Envoy Gazzoldo had been assured by Richelieu that he had instructed M. d'Ussel to besiege Ponzin, a castle on the Rhone which was held by the Huguenots, so that, without arousing the suspicions of Savoy, he might have forces in readiness to cross into Piedmont through Dauphiny, and meet the forces of Nevers in Monferrat. These arrangements were to be kept strictly secret until the business of Rochelle was over. As, however, the place held out more than five months longer, the Huguenot insurrection came to be an inconvenience rather than an in-

direct advantage to the interests of France, and its leaders took steps which showed that they were anxious to play the part which their fathers had played more than sixty years before. The Duchess of Rohan, as has been seen, invited Buckingham to seize the Bec d'Ambés. Her husband, or an adventurer acting in his name, entered into treasonable communication with the Court of Spain. Barozzi, on his way from Turin to London had made some stay at Nancy, and had there formed an acquaintance with a Colonel Clausel, who was one of the cosmopolitan soldiers of fortune who hung about the Court of Duke Charles IV. of Lorraine. During a somewhat varied career the Colonel had acquired an intimate knowledge of German politics, and was so well acquainted with them that Monthoux thought it worth while to report his views as to the question of the restoration of the Palatine at some length to Charles Emmanuel himself. At the end of December, 1628, this man arrived at Madrid as envoy from the Duke of Rohan and was received with open arms at the Legation of Savoy. Apparently he was presented by President Monthoux to Olivares and at once began his negotiations by requesting a subsidy of eight hundred thousand crowns [£200,000] a year for his master, but in the end reduced his demand to six hundred thousand [£150,000]. Olivares could not well decide such a delicate matter as that of assisting the French heretics upon his own responsibility. He therefore referred the question to a Junta of Theologians, who after some delay decided that it was lawful for Spain to do so. Accordingly he commissioned Spinola to discuss the business with Clausel, and as he was anxious to pay back the French in their own coin for the help which they had been for so long giving to the Dutch, he made Rohan an offer of two hundred thousand crowns [£50,000] within three months. This offer the envoy referred to his principal. Meanwhile the Count Duke could not disguise his uneasiness at the prospect of having to treat with a heretic, but as Scaglia viciously remarked when Monthoux and the theologians told him he might, "what had been an elephant did not seem quite so large and bulky." Spinola had said that he thought that they could afford four hundred thousand crowns [£100,000] a year and that they might risk two hundred thousand at once, but Monthoux talked him round into agreeing not to venture a farthing until they had M. de Rohan's own security. When Clausel was asked how he wished the money

to be paid he said that he would take part of the amount in doppie, a gold coin then worth about fourteen shillings and eightpence, which he could exchange at Genoa, and part in bills of exchange on Bern, Geneva and other places in Switzerland, and let slip that he was going to Venice. The news that the Colonel was to visit Venice made the President more than ever suspicious of his new friend, and he spoke to Spinola and the other ministers engaged in the affair. They met at the legation that night, and after consulting together privately, sent for Clausel and told him that they would not give him a Maravedi unless he produced an authority from M. de Rohan. The gallant warrior stormed and blustered in language which would have done credit to any matamore on the stage, but finally calmed down, and agreed to take articles to be signed by M. de Rohan. His offer was accepted, although all the Spaniards thought him a consummate cheat and were furious with the Savoyards for introducing him to them.

It was all important however to Spain that the disturbances in France should continue until she had conducted a peace with England, and as a diversion by Rohan would be of advantage to England as well as to themselves, they eventually agreed to give him a subsidy of two hundred and thirty-two thousand crowns [£58,000] a year.¹ The insurgents in Languedoc were in the meantime in treaty with Wake to secure the support of Charles I., to whom Rohan gave his promise that he would not accept of any peace without his approval. Thus if England and Spain could come to terms the rebels might count upon the support of both powers, whilst notwithstanding her successes in Piedmont France could not advance in Italy until she was not only assured of the aid of the Pope and the Venetians, but had secured her rear at home. Accordingly a few days after the surrender of Susa, M. d'Esplan was despatched to Rohan with reasonable terms. His offers were rejected. For a moment Wake hoped that the attitude of Savoy by detaining Louis XIII. in Italy would force him to lay aside his plans of attacking the Huguenots for the whole summer. In the middle of April, however, Schomberg was despatched to Valence to prepare for the campaign. Richelieu indeed was more disposed than he had been to listen to overtures from the insurgents for Clausel's servant had been taken by the royal forces whilst on his way to Rohan, and for the first time it became known that Rohan was supported by Spain.

The Prince of Piedmont likewise positively assured the Cardinal that England would not make peace unless the Protestants were satisfied. By the beginning of May, the news had reached Turin that peace had been concluded between England and France on very similar terms to those proposed by Contarini in the previous year, and that it was to be proclaimed upon the twentieth of May N.S. Charles I. agreed to intercede for the Huguenots by an ambassador if they had not already concluded peace, and in the meantime had recommended Rohan and Soubise to the French King's favour through the Venetian ambassadors. As usual Wake was pessimistic as to the result. "Susa will probably not be restored very quickly. Spain will doubtless ratify the peace in Italy for fear of France and England, and then Rohan will not receive such good conditions, so that a new rupture between France and England will be forced upon the latter." Rohan, on his side, was being urged on to stand out by the hothead Clausel, "who promised him assistance from Spain, whilst the Spanish ministers in Italy were only afraid that he would be overborne and that France would then be set free to carry out her Italian plans."¹

The difficulty was settled by the quick action of Louis XIII. and Richelieu. Although no answer as to the ratification of the Treaty of Susa had yet been received from Madrid, the King set out on his return to France on the twenty-eighth of April leaving everything in confusion, and on the eleventh of May was followed by Richelieu and Bassompierre. On the fourteenth of May he arrived before Privas, which was evacuated by the Huguenots on the twenty-eighth. After reducing some forts in the mountains of the Vivarais, the Royalists laid siege to Alais, which surrendered on the sixteenth of June and was entered by the King on the following day. Negotiations for peace were at once commenced and the treaty after being ratified by the General Assembly of the Evangelical Churches at Anduze was published at Nîmes on the sixth of July. The tidings of its conclusion were received with great joy at Turin. Its terms as regards the religious rights of the Protestants were generous but they consented to the demolition of their strongholds and agreed to give hostages for the fulfilment of these engagements.²

Whilst Louis XIII. was still at Privas he received news that Count de Merode had occupied the Pass of the Steig and the Rhine bridge at Chur with twelve thousand men and was thus

holding for the Imperialists the road which led from South Germany into the Grisons through the Valley of the Rhine. His purpose was to attack Mantua, whilst the Spaniards with the secret support of Savoy once more invaded Monferrat. Thus the second period of the war of the Mantuan Succession began, but a few weeks before Protestantism, as a church militant on earth, vanished for ever from France by the Treaty of Alais. Rohan went into banishment at Venice and Richelieu was left with his hands freed at home to enter into his contest with the House of Austria abroad. The Cardinal's triumphant entry into Montauban in August marks the moment when the Wars of Religion which had so long devastated his country reached their end. In a sense it may mark the moment when the prelude to the French Revolution opened.¹

The Duke of Savoy was very slow in carrying out his engagements under the Treaty of Susa, and it was not until April the first that the Prince of Piedmont was authorised to arrange for the passage of the French reinforcements into Monferrat. To Cordoba he repeated that though the French were displaying ill-faith he would perform his obligations to them, although he continued to remain faithful to Spain at heart. At Vienna the Duke's attitude was viewed with suspicion. It was believed that France would assist him in his designs upon Genoa, and that he was now wholly in the French interest. On the fifth of April he had an interview at Susa with both the King and Richelieu. The latter discussed the negotiations between England and France, and said that if the English would abandon the cause of Rohan there would be no difficulty in concluding a treaty. His Eminence boasted that he would make himself the master of the British Ocean to prevent a diversion on the part of the British fleet. A few days later despatches arrived from Dorchester to announce the conclusion of peace with France, but adding that this event would in no wise prejudice Scaglia's negotiations at Madrid, which had received the approval of the King and Queen of Bohemia, and of the United Provinces, although they expressed some distrust of the intentions of Spain. Although both the Spaniards and the Duke of Savoy were greatly annoyed by the presence of French troops in Monferrat, he consented to negotiate with some of the French ministers as to the exchange of Bresse and Old Savoy for the Marquisate of Saluzzo, whilst they in their turn promised to help him to recover

Geneva and Vaud provided their master's name did not appear in the transaction. All parties were indeed only anxious to gain time, for they knew that peace or war in Languedoc depended upon the Spanish reply as to the ratification of the Treaty of Susa. This ratification Cordoba was most anxious to secure, and Wake believed that his efforts would be successful when the news of the peace between France and England reached Madrid. Early in April Cordoba, with the approval of Savoy, sent Don Martin de Aragon to explain the position of affairs to the Council of State. He had but little encouragement to give. The army in Italy was exhausted, and discipline had broken down, thanks to the bad management of the commissariat and pay offices, whilst neither money nor workmen could be found to repair the half-ruined fortresses of the Milanese, where the peasantry had the almost impossible task of supplying the requisitions of the soldiery who were billeted upon them. The French were in Monferrat, and could at any moment send forces from Languedoc through the open gate of Susa, and if Spain would not join in securing peace, would continue in alliance with the Pope and the Venetians. There were no forces in Lombardy to make head against the enemy, "and all those who reach us from the other parts of Italy are but toys for babies, as they are nothing but a pack of fever-stricken Neapolitans who in a fortnight leave us with a state full of highwaymen and first-class footpads. The Spaniards are a mere handful and desert in a month, for they say that in a hundred months they get one pay and two hundred barrels of powder, yet people sit in their offices at Madrid and think that with ten thousand crowns [£2,500] they have bought the army for a hundred years, stock, lock, and barrel. This is not much to carry on a war like this with." After all, if His Majesty did ratify the treaty, he was only leaving Nevers in Mantua and Monferrat, which he had no means left of wresting out of his clutches, and he was in no way bound by any engagements with Savoy, which would be pleased enough to get her share of the Marquisate settled upon Cardinal Maurice, if he married a daughter of the Emperor, as the Duke had, indeed, proposed at the outset of the negotiations. All the Italian princes were watching to see what Spain would do. "If anything is done at all it should be done by an army from Spain commanded by His Majesty in person. What His Majesty should do is to gain time to repair the fortresses in Lom-

bardly even if he has to sell his jewels to pay the masons." Not a word had reached him from Madrid since the sixth of February. Finally Don Martin was to say that if Olivares decided to continue the war in Italy, Cordoba would resign at once. "Otherwise he will lose his life from fatigue, and possibly Spain will lose the Milanese."¹

Cordoba was not a man to veil his meaning under compliments, yet his words were destined to carry but little weight in high places at the Spanish Court. Even Scaglia confessed that the state of affairs in Spain gave him real cause for anxiety, although indeed they might improve if the Gold Fleet arrived in safety, if a truce was concluded with Holland, or lastly, if the troubles in France continued. Possibly to gratify the Electors, Philip IV. had requested the Infanta to secure that the Emperor should be included in the treaties with England and Holland, but though Spinola was most anxious for a settlement in Flanders, and the governing classes in the United Provinces, more particularly the Prince of Orange, were known to favour one, Scaglia could only say that though people at Madrid gave out that the negotiations were going on as well as they had done before the news of the loss of the Flota arrived, he himself feared that their successes would make the Dutch far more difficult to satisfy. It was soon known that the French were making large offers to Orange to induce him to resist the conclusion of peace but, at the same time, Reigersborch found that the highflying Precisians in the Provinces could not believe much good of Richelieu and that what he said as to the Cardinal's inclinations carried little weight, even with the three leading Pensionaries. The fact that His Eminence had recently ordered the occupation of Orange's hereditary principality in Provence by French troops rendered them suspicious as to his intentions. Men in the inmost Government circles at Madrid professed, indeed, to believe that the Dutch would speedily conclude a Truce for a long period, such was their anxiety to prevent the French from breaking through their entanglements in Italy. Spinola was left a free hand to treat with the Dutch, whilst the news that Olivares had been consulted by the Emperor as to the advisability of his concluding an armistice with Denmark filled the politicians with fresh confidence. By Scaglia's advice the Count Duke wrote to Vienna to recommend that the armistice should be granted, stating, likewise, that the Dutch were willing to agree to a suspension of hostilities so as to give time to arrange

a Truce. The negotiations with England looked equally promising, and Olivares began to scheme for a league between Spain, Savoy and the Emperor against France, in which even Bavaria and England might be induced to join if the Palatine were given a state carved out of French territory. Everything, however, depended upon the arrival of the Gold Fleet, for although three-fourths of the money would have to be spent abroad, yet the fact that they were able to offer to pay their proposed levies would be of the greatest value, especially as it was the business of the municipalities and not of the state to find the means to do so. Olivares' confident predictions encouraged the King to talk of going to Italy in person and, despite the tidings from Susa, he was more resolved than ever to make no concessions. On the tenth of April Scaglia was able to announce that the Gold Fleet had arrived with bullion to the amount of fourteen million pesos [£2,800,000], whilst a few days later carracks from the East Indies and Brazil had anchored off Belem with cargoes of diamonds, pearls, dye woods and sugar to the amount of six millions more [£1,200,000]. "Thus within a week about twenty millions [£4,000,000] have arrived in these kingdoms, and most of it is in gold and silver. The arrival of the Flota has indeed brought us, as Your Royal Highness may imagine, strength and comfort, and really we may indeed marvel when we see, besides this, how all are vying with one another in offering their help to His Majesty." Thanks to the arrival of so much bullion the mints would be reopened to the coinage of gold and silver, and that of copper could be suspended, so that the proclamation by which the brass money passed at a fictitious value could be withdrawn and the Kingdom, which would have gone to utter ruin, had that proclamation remained in force, "will be put on a sound footing again." The news that the Gold Fleet would arrive by the end of Lent had reached Madrid on March the twenty-second. On the first of April Scaglia wrote that the letters from Holland seemed to show that the Peace negotiations were going on well and might be concluded successfully any day. "Y.R.H. should continue to use your good offices in the negotiations with England. I must, however, admit that I am very much worried by the look of affairs, for I know what the dilatoriness of this Government and the intrigues of the French have to answer for."¹ To all appearance the news which reached Madrid from Vienna was equally encouraging. Early in February the Electors had met in conven-

tion at Heidelberg, and though they had refused to allow the troops of the Catholic League under Tilly to be used against the Dutch, they had sanctioned the employment of any means to assist Spain which did not infringe their neutrality. In other words they were willing to allow regiments for the Spanish service to be raised in the Empire, and thus relieved the Spanish treasury of a serious burden, for these only cost twenty-three thousand thalers [£8,050], a regiment in place of sixty-three thousand [£22,500]. A few weeks later the Emperor, the Elector of Bavaria, and the other estates of the Empire submitted to Philip IV. their proposals for a general peace, with their plan for compelling the Dutch to accede to it by force of arms, subject, however, to the final decision of the next diet. In his reply the King, who doubtless saw that these offers in no way really engaged the Empire, suggested that it would be better if they would enter into a league with him.¹

On the following day, however, he sent peremptory instructions to Aytona to press the Emperor to issue the Ban against Nevers and to join him in taking up arms to enforce it. He pointed out that the French would certainly be encouraged by their success at Susa to enter upon far greater undertakings in Italy and that Spain had only incurred their enmity because he had endeavoured to uphold the Imperial authority in those provinces, and had thus, in their eyes, forfeited all claim to their gratitude for the services which he had rendered to them in the past. It may be doubted whether the King had struck the right note in his appeal to Ferdinand II.

Cæsar, indeed, was far from thinking that the cause of Spain was identical with his own. All through the winter he had been occupied with hunting in all weathers, rain, storm, and sunshine, and when at the last wild-boar hunt of the season a wild sow "avenged all her relations who have fallen this year by wounding six men in all, including Count Montecuculi, a page of the Empress, and a keeper," H.I.M. had shown greater interest than he had done in the most thrilling letters from Milan or from Mantua. For the rest of the winter he had been employed in hawking heron, duck and choughs, but had at last been stirred into taking action by the news that Nevers had defied his authority and, unless he was granted his own terms, threatened that he would not only take Casale but would invade Milan. Aytona besieged him with his entreaties that he should send twelve thousand men from

Alsace through Burgundy into Savoy to aid the Duke to resist the French. The Viennese courtiers were never weary of repeating that His Imperial Majesty would never abandon Spain if the French attacked the Milanese, but, as Agnelli remarked, they had no money, so their assurances came in reality to very little. "I had a good talk with Father Lammermann, who says that if Your Highness will take the opportunity, when the Imperial Commissaries return here, to ask for the Investiture of Mantua, H.I.M. may, as I said in my last letter, very possibly grant it to you." "The sole result of the prayers, complaints, intrigues and entreaties of the Spanish Ambassador and his supporters is that it is the Emperor himself who is giving way to the wishes of some of his ministers rather than the ministers who are doing so to his. H.I.M. has no intention of doing wrong but can scarcely bring about any good." So long as Casale held out there was some hope of a satisfactory arrangement and all eagerly awaited Nevers' reply to the Imperial Commissaries in the hope that it might afford some fresh opening for a negotiation. "The news which reaches us daily from various quarters makes H.I.M. very sad and he shows it in his looks for he cannot disguise from himself the travail in which Italy and all the world are groaning to-day." Friedland had written to say that he did not know how he was to keep the Imperial Armies together during the next three months, for he had not got one farthing and had no supplies except bread and beer. His Majesty, indeed, was by no means inclined to issue the Ban against Nevers, although it seemed as if, in the end, he would not be able to stand up against the pressure of the Spaniards.¹

Such was the state of affairs when the news reached Agnelli at the end of March of the events which had taken place at Susa. "Who knows but that good may come out of this evil, and that this may prove to be the first beginning of the peace of which we are hearing vague rumours." Notwithstanding their set back "the Spaniards are still taking the high hand, and when their Ambassadors the other day were dining with one of the principal ministers, and their healths were drunk in Casale wine they replied, with what was thought matchless impertinence, 'We will not return you this in wine before Casale is back in our hands.' All Your Highness's assurances are utterly disbelieved here, and so your letter of March the ninth goes for nothing, but this is God's doing." It might be hoped that Louis XIII. would be the more

displeased by the Imperial Decree against Nevers because it had been issued almost immediately after the representations made by his resident, and that he would be still more annoyed by the further decree issued as a reply to them. "As to this it seems a decree of fate, that at every time when I or others have made any representations for our relief, an unexpected decree has always appeared in place of a reply *ad interim*. Here they are still talking of and hoping for peace. To me it seems strange that when there is not only an imminent risk of war and of a most frightful one at that, but when war really exists, men can entertain any thoughts of a peace which is approaching with such long, slow steps. But if Peace does come it will be the work of God alone. May it please His Divine Majesty to open to us the way to it, for I see no hope of it from men. We may propose an arrangement, Y.H. may submit yourself to the Emperor, you may offer terms, you may suggest that everything should be referred to His Holiness, all this is very well and may prove to the purpose, but two things will not leave us the time to employ these methods or allow them to be taken as in good faith, the hard-pressed siege of Casale and the sword which hangs over us unsheathed. Peace, then, if it comes, will be the work of God alone."¹

The Duke's reply to the commissaries was thought by Agnelli to be in the main satisfactory, as it was respectful in its tone to H.I.M. and to the House of Austria, though not to the Commissaries themselves. It seemed to leave some loopholes for a negotiation, but Nevers had belied his words by his deeds. The Emperor and "the Court which governs" were bitterly annoyed because it seemed as if he did nothing without consulting France and Venice, and also because of his language to the Commissaries. In defiance of his obligations to the Emperor and of his assertions of his wish for peace, he had taken up arms to assert his claims to Sabionetta, which was held by a branch of the Gonzaghi as an Imperial fief. In other words Nevers with his own hand had struck a blow at the foundation upon which his own claims rested, for it could not be denied that it was for the Emperor alone to decide as to his pretensions to the disputed duchy. "The Spanish Ambassadors never stop goading on the Emperor" to publish the ban and to send troops into Italy. "Till now, however, they have not captured H.M.'s heart for either the one object or the other, but I set little store by this as at any moment an importunate letter from the King of Spain or their over-

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whelming pressure may overcome all his good resolutions and turn the world upside down. We shall see." As usual personal influences exercised an important part in determining the Imperial policy. Eggenberg, Collalto and Werdenberg were opposing any proposals for a diversion against Friuli "possibly because their properties lie near it."

Agnelli had seen the Emperor who had listened to his eloquent representations as to the wishes of the powers to engage him in a war for their own ends without moving a muscle of his countenance and "not saying a word except 'Give me the Duke's letter, Monsignore. I will not let it prejudice him and I will see.' Then with a pleasanter face he listened to my congratulations upon the Empress' recovery, and I took my leave of him. I have heard from persons who may count as being amongst the innermost circle at court that the Emperor in his heart of hearts is in extacies at the thrusts which Spain and Savoy have had, that he is all for peace, and that he would manifest his inclinations to the world but for the Spaniards. I hear that the Empress still cherishes hopes of it. I have heard too that what annoys him most of all is the plea that His Holiness would settle the case in a fortnight. The French proposal that the decision must be given within five months has also infuriated him, as he says, that it looks as if the King would like to limit the power and authority of the Imperial Crown at his own will and pleasure."¹

But if Ferdinand II. was a lover of law, he was also amenable to the dictates of religion, and the two influences were waging war in his breast.

"I do not attend the Imperial Chapel regularly though I do so occasionally, but the Tuscan Ambassador tells me that not a day passes without H.I.M.'s preacher Father Sgambati, a Jesuit, bringing into his sermons a discourse on justice and injustice as illustrated in Y.H.'s case, and with all due respect, stirring up H.I.M. to do what is just. This makes the Spanish Ambassadors turn red, and they don't often show themselves there. He does not mention any individuals but speaks in such plain terms as to need no interpreter, so that as H.I.M.'s Confessor and Preacher are on our side, and our friends and defenders, they have good reason to ask Y.H. to give still further proofs of your goodwill to their order. I am using every means I can think of to evince my gratitude to them and to gain their favour. It is almost impossible to bring the regiments which they are raising up to

strength. Possibly there is a real shortage of men on account of the many armies there are now on foot.

"In the meantime I can tell Y.H. that Their Majesties desire a peaceable settlement more than anything in the world, but for the moment they are at a loss because they have not had the least syllable from either D. Gonzalez, the Imperial Commissaries, or the Duke of Savoy; just as if they were no longer in this world. At times they almost think that everything may be done without them but they don't dare to say so. That is a good joke of Savoy's to think he had deserved well of Spain, but we shall hear even better ones." The Empress seemed to believe that after all Charles Emmanuel had acted well, and Agnelli had had some difficulty in convincing her that Nevers had in reality shown far more respect for H.I.M.'s authority, an assertion which he must have found some difficulty in proving. "What I said pleased her, but she ended by saying that H.I.M. is waiting for reports and information from various quarters. From this I gather that the Emperor is just a little bit anxious lest his authority may be altogether put out of court."

For a wonder both the Pope and the Jesuits were at work on the same side and their interests happened to coincide with those of France and, therefore, of Nevers. It would be no difficult matter, therefore, to persuade the Emperor that the claims of Religion were paramount to those of Law even if the letter of the law could not be proved to be in Nevers' favour.¹

But the Spaniards did not rely wholly upon the goodwill of Ferdinand II. and of their supporters at Vienna. They had not forgotten Aytona's warning that the Emperor's wishes counted for little, Friedland's for everything, and that he was necessarily bound to come into every arrangement which his generalissimo might desire. They had, indeed, good grounds for hoping that they had secured themselves Friedland's goodwill. The new Duke of Mecklenburg was far from assured of his ability to retain the dominions which he had so lately won. The Poles had all but concluded a truce with Sweden, and he felt that unless Arnim could keep the Swedish King in check by entering Prussia, it would not be long before Gustaf Adolf had forced his way into Northern Germany, where Stralsund had already placed itself under his protection. Rumours were in circulation that the Protestants would be forced to give back to the Catholic Church all the ecclesiastical property which they had seized since the

Peace of Passau in 1552, and the embers of the old resentments were blazing up in the hearts of all the Evangelical Cities and Princes, even of those who, like the Elector of Brandenburg and the Corporation of Hanover, had remained true to the Emperor throughout the worst crises of the Danish War. If Protestant North Germany rose in revolt at a moment when the conclusion of peace with Denmark was still uncertain, how could Wallenstein defend the thousand miles of coastline between Prussia and the Elbe as well as the banks of that great river against the attacks of the Danish fleet, of the circle of Lower Saxony, and of the enemies of Austria across the eastern frontier? He had no ships and his men were deserting or dying off like flies. Wallenstein had risen from the ranks, and he had not forgotten that he had risen by his own wits. If he was destined to lose Mecklenburg he might yet win a principality elsewhere from the necessities if not from the gratitude of Spain. He approached Aytona with an offer to march into Italy with sixty-thousand men, and to join Cordoba in an attack upon the Venetians. He would thus cut through the root from which sprang all the trouble and turmoil in Italy.¹

The ambassador urged his master to accept the Duke's proposals without delay. It was certain he would get himself out of his difficulties by doing so and at an expense far less than if he sent a force of eight thousand foot and two thousand horse from Spain at his own charges. "It is true I dread the Duke's changeful humour, yet I have two good reasons for thinking that, in this case, he would hold to his word. In the first place he can carry out the undertaking with the large force he proposes with the utmost ease; in the second he stands to gain enormously by possessing himself of states which are under the wing of the greatness of Your Majesty and of your house, and which will thus assure his fortune in a country which is far less subject than is Mecklenburg to the changes and shifts of Fortune." Once his army had joined those of Spain and Savoy there was nothing in Italy which could resist it for a moment. Philip IV. himself would gain not only the territories which he occupied in Monferrat with Casale, but also those which the Venetians had usurped in the Milanese. He would also show his enemies that they were wrong in thinking themselves immune from his attacks because he was too weak to defend even his own dominions. Count Sforza might act as intermediary with Friedland if any alteration

were made in the terms he proposed. "I think it best, however, that at present at least they should be accepted as they stand, for the Duke is so touchy that the merest trifle may make him change his mind, but once we have got him well into the toils, Your Majesty may strike out or put in what you will." Aytona's despatch reached Madrid shortly after the news had arrived that the Gold Fleet was in safety, and the King at once ordered Sforza to communicate with Wallenstein. On the sixth of April the Count, therefore, wrote to inform him that His Majesty agreed to his proposals as to the expedition against Venetia, but that nothing would be done until an armistice or truce had been concluded with the Dutch. The negotiations with them had been pressed forward as much as possible, and the news that one had been signed was expected to arrive from Flanders at any moment. It would be advisable that Wallenstein should do his utmost to secure the suspension of hostilities with Denmark, and at the same time to put pressure upon the Dutch to come to a settlement either by making some serious representations to their resident or by sending a detachment to join the Spaniards in a demonstration upon their frontier. Aytona had already induced the Emperor to give his sanction to Friedland's proposals though with the proviso that they were only to take effect if the Venetians or French broke with Spain or Savoy or sent troops to reinforce Nevers.¹

As two of these contingencies had come to pass, Philip IV. decided to disregard Cordoba's warnings, and on the fifth of May informed Aytona that he had refused to ratify the agreement which the Governor of Milan without his knowledge had concluded with the French after they had entered Italy. He wished, however, that the troops which Friedland had offered him for the expedition against Venetia should be employed in a demonstration against Metz, and begged the Emperor to consent to a suspension of hostilities with Denmark. Two days before he had sent a solemn promise to Ferdinand II. that he would leave Nevers in undisturbed possession of Mantua and Monferrat if the King of France would undertake to do the same and to withdraw his forces from Monferrat, Susa, Piedmont, and Italy. His offer came too late. Nevers by invading the Cremonese and by refusing to deposit his states in the hands of the Imperial Commissaries had given "those deities Spain and Austria such a slap in the face that they will never forget it. They will cer-

tainly do everything which they cannot get out of doing, but their desire for revenge will never slacken. Even when it looks as if all had been settled and satisfaction had been given in writing to Cæsar's offended dignity (and God grant that this may prove sufficient), you must not imagine that you will get anything but what pure necessity or reasons of state policy will induce them to concede to you. Anyone who thinks otherwise will be building a mighty palace on the waters of the abyss." Strahlendorff, indeed, gave good hopes of peace but the great obstacle in the way to it was Eggenberg, who was always firm and decided, and did not shift and change like the other ministers. "I cannot imagine why, but I think it must be owing to D. Cesare." Agnelli may have forgotten the rumour that Guastalla had bought over Eggenberg with a heavy bribe."¹

At Madrid Cordoba's conduct in signing the Articles of Susa was visited with the utmost censure. Even Pallaireino, who was no friend of Spain, wrote of the treaty as a shameful one, and Rubens hesitated to decide whether the Spanish representatives in Italy had incurred greater ignominy by their conduct of the war or by their management of the negotiations which followed on it. He could only imagine that the Duke of Savoy must have something wrong in his brain because he always stood up so boldly to the Spaniards though he grovelled before the French, but their own slackness was the cause of the disasters which had overtaken Spain, not only at Susa, but in the loss of the fleet. The most indifferent sneered as they quoted Cordoba's brave words as to defending the prestige of the country with the sword and making it certain that France would not hold a foot of ground in Italy.

Khevenhüller informed his master at Vienna that D. Gonzalez would have to pay a heavy price for all his blunders. When Rubens set out for Flanders at the end of April he was said to be instructed to offer terms which the Dutch were, it was hoped, certain to accept, and peace with England was looked upon as imminent. Spain needed all her strength to face her difficulties in Italy. Agnelli had still hopes that he might be able to prevent a war. He quoted Khevenhüller as writing that the King of Spain was more inclined to peace and only insisted that the Emperor should persuade Nevers to deposit his states in the Commissaries' hands now that the presence of the French forces offered him a guarantee, and added that in Philip's opinion the Duke would do well to do so as the French could not always be

sending armies into Italy, whilst he himself could do him a hurt any time he pleased. "Your Highness, therefore, had best be upon good terms with Spain."¹ Events, however, were gradually moving against the House of Austria. Arnim had been forced to withdraw from Poland where it was thought that the peasants had a secret understanding with the Swedes, and thus Wallenstein would have necessarily to devote his attention to his own duchies, whilst the Elector of Treves had occupied a city in the Palatinate which was garrisoned by the Spaniards on the ground that it formed part of the domains of his see. This dispute had arisen at a very inopportune moment. At the beginning of May the Dutch had laid siege to Bois-le-duc, and according to the French Resident in Brussels, people there thought that it would be lost in a week. Almost at the same time the Catholic League, of which the Elector of Treves was a not uninfluential member, had conceived suspicions that the Spaniards had suggested to the Emperor that he should employ his powerful armies in Germany to make the Empire hereditary in his family. These suspicions might well put an end to any project for their co-operation with Spain, whether in the Netherlands or elsewhere. In the same letter Agnelli wrote that the Edict of Restitution had been accepted by Nuremberg, but that Strasburg and Ulm had refused to put it in force. But a few weeks before a new solvent had been thrown into the witches' cauldron of Imperial politics, which in its workings was loosening the bonds which held together the fabric of the Holy Roman Empire.¹

If either the Jesuits or Urban the Eighth had been sincere in their professions as to the restoration of the Unity of the Catholic Church, it is certain that the Edict of Restitution would never have been issued. But the Jesuits, blinded as they were by their hatred of Spain, thought nothing of ruining the House of Austria, if by doing so they could keep the war out of Italy where the course of events since the Spanish occupation of the Valtelline had made Urban VIII. forget that he was the successor of Saint Peter and remember only that he was the Ruler of the States of the Church. Had Ferdinand II. been content to allow the former ecclesiastical possessions throughout Germany to remain in the hands of their lay holders, it is probable that neither the Swedes nor the French would ever have acquired a foothold within her bounds. His bigotry was aroused by the Jesuits, and he was led to adopt a policy with regard to the former lands of the

Church which his advisers must have known to have been identical with that which had lost England and Scotland to the Catholic Faith, and which could only be excused ostensibly if the causes of the Danish War were taken into account. If the archbishoprics and bishoprics, which lay near the mouths of the great German rivers, passed into the hands of hostile and lay holders, the trade of Germany would be at the mercy of her foreign rivals. On the other hand, if they were restored to the Catholic Church, they might well form suitable appanages for the poorly endowed younger sons of princely and Catholic families. Such were amongst the considerations, no doubt, which decided the Convention of Electors at its meeting at Heidelberg in March, 1629, to approve of the Edict. Possibly their acquiescence may have been in part the work of the Jesuits; possibly they did not foresee the results which that acquiescence would produce amongst the Protestant Estates.¹

Such was the situation in the Empire when the questions became urgent as to a decision about Mantua and Monferrat and as to the intervention of the Empire in the affairs of Holland.

Richelieu, indeed, was once more at work. Since 1626 he had offered the succession to the Imperial Crown to Savoy, to Lorraine and to Bavaria in turn. The Duke of Savoy hemmed in as he was between the Milanese and Franche Comté had refused to incur the anger of Spain and Austria by an acceptance which neither power would ever forget. Lorraine, as a vassal of the Emperor for several of his states, was equally reluctant to run a risk which might well end in his ruin, whilst like Bavaria he recognised at the same time that the Austrian House was the mainstay of Catholicism in the Empire, and Maximilian well knew that Bavaria was too weak to withstand the attacks of Protestantism without Austrian support. Thus Richelieu had failed for the time in his efforts to secure the control of the Empire for a puppet of France.² Savoy was now openly engaged on the side of Spain, whilst the Cardinal, thanks to his own mistakes had driven back Lorraine into the Imperial camp. He had indeed offered that he would secure Charles IV. a divorce from his wife Nicole of Lorraine and would thus leave him free to marry his own niece, the Duchess of Aiguillon. The Duke, who was still in love with his bride, spurned his proposals, and for the first time a coolness arose between Lorraine and France. In his annoyance Richelieu instituted a Court of Inquiry to examine the claims which the sees of Metz, of Toul, and of Verdun

which since 1552 had been occupied by France, but which in International Law were still members of the Empire, advanced to portions of the territories of Lorraine which were held to have originally formed a part of the domains of those churches. The Court pronounced a verdict against the Duke. At the same time he laid a claim to the possession as a lapsed fief of the Duchy of Bar on the ground that in 1615 the States General of Lorraine had introduced the Salic Law into that Duchy and had decreed its union with Lorraine without the consent of Louis XIII. as its suzerain. Charles IV. excused himself by saying that when his ancestor René II. had changed the order of succession in the Duchy by his will in 1508, he had done so without consulting either Louis XI. or Charles VIII. He had, however, put himself technically in the wrong as regards France by refusing on the advice of his ministers to kiss hands at Paris as homage for the Barrois although he had sent a gentleman to do homage for it as his proxy, and he also displayed great resentment against the French Government which had driven his cousin the Bishop of Verdun, who was nominally a prince of the Empire, into exile at Cologne, because he had excommunicated all who were working on the citadel which the French wished to build in his episcopal city.¹

The Cardinal refused satisfaction and Charles IV. despatched an embassy to Vienna to point out to the Emperor the injuries which the French were inflicting upon the Empire by their encroachments on its territories round Metz, to renew his allegiance to him, and to ask for his support.²

A few months later he had lent a willing ear to Walter Montagu when he came to him with overtures from Buckingham to join the League which he was forming as a counterpoise to the alliance between France and Spain. His relations with England became known when in the autumn of 1627 Montagu on his way back from a visit to Rohan in Languedoc was, as has been seen, seized within the territory of Lorraine by French agents and carried off to the Bastille. His papers clearly proved the Duke's intrigues. After vain efforts to secure Montagu's release through diplomatic channels, the Duke in March, 1628, went in person to Paris, and although the Cardinal probably intended his concession merely as a blind to his ulterior motive of securing a secret understanding with Buckingham, he ostensibly allowed the envoy to return to London at Charles the

Fourth's request. In reality the Duke was running great personal risk by placing himself in the power of the King of France, for the Cardinal looked upon him as a treacherous vassal, and treason to the state was a crime which His Eminence neither forgot nor forgave. Charles IV. was, therefore, forced to rely still more upon the support of his sovereign the Holy Roman Emperor and, to secure Ferdinand II.'s good will, undertook a negotiation with the Duke of Wurtemberg and in the summer of 1628 endeavoured in a personal interview with him at Colmar to effect an arrangement between the Emperor and the King of Bohemia. His efforts proved unsuccessful because Ferdinand II. insisted that Frederick should not only transfer his electorate to Bavaria but should himself do homage as a vassal of the House of Austria, and should repay all those sums advanced for the Bohemian War for which Bavaria and Saxony held Upper Austria and Lusatia in pledge. The Duke of Wurtemberg endeavoured to secure some modifications in these terms; he failed, and the conversations at Colmar produced no results. From that time, however, the Duke of Lorraine had of necessity to remain true to the House of Austria, who saw in him the sovereign of states which from their geographical position were of no slight value to every enemy of France. Richelieu, on the other hand, looked upon the interference of the Emperor in his dispute with Lorraine as yet another ground for his belief that the greatness of France must inevitably be built up on the ruins of Austria and of Spain. For his purposes it was from henceforth useless for him to seek the friendship of Charles IV.¹

Far otherwise was the position of Bavaria as it bore upon the Cardinal's policy. But a few months before, it is true, Maximilian had declined to accept Charnacé's proposals, yet he had done so upon grounds which showed that though he was a faithful subject of the Emperor as the sovereign of the Holy Roman Empire, he yet looked upon him as a constitutional and not as an absolute monarch, and clearly distinguished between the liberty of Germany and the person of its ruler. It was possible, therefore, that if the German ruler and the German constitution came into conflict, Maximilian might be led both by his sense of duty and by his sense of his own interests to come forward as the champion of those who were like himself defending their rights against the encroachments of a tyrant. It was manifest

that he believed the liberty of Germany to be already endangered by Ferdinand II. through his dependence upon Wallenstein, and it might be possible, therefore, to induce him to turn to the French for support in his efforts to ward off the peril. Accordingly Richelieu decided on the morrow of his success at Susa to address himself once more to Munich and on March the twelfth despatched thither some secret articles which were duly considered and annotated by the elector. In these articles the Cardinal endeavoured so far as possible to avoid any proposal the acceptance of which might bring Bavaria into direct conflict with either the Emperor or the League. Arts. 1, 2. He approved not only of a separate negotiation for peace between Bavaria and Denmark, but agreed that the Electoral dignity should be retained by Maximilian on the conditions on which it had been granted to him by the Emperor, and which had been recognised by the Electors. [Maximilian notes, Art. 1. Bavaria would wait to see the outcome of the negotiations between the Emperor and Denmark. Art. 2. Accepts the French offer with pleasure.] Art. 3. France would support the Elector with men and money if he were assailed in his lands or dignities. Art. 4. Would intervene with England, Denmark and their allies to secure assurances from them that they would not attack the portions of the Palatinate which had been occupied by the Elector. [Approved, but is the outlawed Palatine to be taken as being one of the allies?] As regarded the question of the Upper Palatinate, the Elector remarks that he was holding it, together with some places in the Lower Palatinate, until a decision as to the question of its ownership had been given by the Emperor, and, therefore, all that Bavaria asked was that the Emperor and the electors should decide whether or not he was to restore it to the Palatine or his family. He therefore declined to accept the French offer to induce England and Denmark to recognise that he had the right to occupy it as an ally of the King of France, and, therefore, as an ally of their own. Art. 5. Maximilian was asked to bind himself both as Elector and as a member of the Catholic League not to attack France. [Accepted, but with the addition of the words "except in cases which must be excepted by law."] Art. 6. He was to engage himself to assist France, if she was attacked by any power, and called upon him to give her his assistance. [Bavaria refused to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance, but would stand by France in case of need.]¹

It was evident that though so far as words went Maximilian might be the Emperor's most faithful subject, he might yet easily be led to take up an independent attitude, if at any time the Emperor's policy failed to coincide with his own views. It was plain, likewise, that the possibility of such an occurrence made him inclined upon the whole to lean to the side of France, if he could do so without sinking into dependence upon her. It was clear, therefore, that Spain had but little reason to count upon the goodwill of Maximilian whether as elector or as a member of the Catholic League. Yet events both in Italy and in the Netherlands were rapidly driving Philip IV. to depend more and more upon the active assistance of both, at a moment when France, freed alike from the burden of the Wars of Religion and of the ever latent danger of English rivalry, was seeking to obtain on the Continent of Europe that outlet which she had failed to acquire whether in the Far East or in the New World during the Great Age of colonisation, and which she could only win at the expense of the House of Austria.

When offering to leave the Duke of Nevers undisturbed on condition that the French would withdraw from Italy, Philip IV. had seen that it might be necessary to use force to compel them to do so. He had, therefore, requested the Emperor to send twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse to reinforce Cordoba in the Milanese. Such was Ferdinand's exasperation at the news that French garrisons under Créquy had been left both in Susa and in Monferrat even after Richelieu's departure for Languedoc, that he had arranged to take such a step even before the King's letter reached him. He had done so thanks to Eggenberg and Collalto. H.I.M. at Aytona's request had consulted the Aulic Council as to whether it would be within his just rights or not to expel the French from the Imperial fiefs by force of arms with the assistance of Spain, and whether, in the second place, it would be lawful for him to sequester Nevers for treason felony. By a majority the Council decided in the affirmative, although some of the ministers wished to treat the offence merely as contumacy, and through Eggenberg's intervention an identical resolution was passed by the Council of State. As the Prince told Aytona, H.I.M., now that he was fully informed as to the particulars, had resolved in his own breast to take this decision and would make it public at a suitable time. Nothing could be more to the interests of Spain than the

action of the two Councils, thanks to which "the Emperor is making this case his own, is sending an army to Italy, and is asking Y.M. for your assistance." As Khevenhüller had remarked to Maximilian but three weeks before, the King of Spain, as feudatory of the Empire for Milan, was to be called upon to make a demonstration against Nevers on behalf of his Imperial Suzerain. Eggenberg went on to say that twenty thousand men were to be sent across the Alps under one of the best of the generals if the King of France refused to comply with a summons to evacuate the fiefs within a fixed time. They were to work in concert with the Spanish troops and were to be quartered in the Imperial fiefs so as not to overburden the Milanese. It was most important that the expedition should be commanded by either Friedland or Collalto, as they were the only generals who could either keep the Germans in order or who could ensure that the number of men promised would be really sent. The Germans were so eager for the war that if the Spaniards gave them proper support they would recover all that had been lost. Collalto thought that their first object should be to drive the French out of Italy. The Venetians might be left alone for the time unless they tried to help Nevers, and could be dealt with later on. For the present the Emperor did not wish to take part in an expedition against Metz as he had so much upon his hands and wanted to be in a position to send reinforcements to Flanders.

Friedland approved of the Emperor's Italian plans, but did not know that H.I.M. and Eggenberg wished Collalto to command the expedition. They trembled at the thought of offending the Duke of Mecklenburg by telling him of their decision. They had, indeed, already sent him orders through Sforza to hurry his forces into Italy without delay over the passes which they already held, and dreaded the necessity of undeceiving him. Collalto, however, was much better fitted for the post than was Friedland, as he was very affable, well informed and intelligent. The plan of campaign which the Duke himself had proposed involved some delays, and they had to give him something to do in order to avoid awakening suspicions of their designs in his mind.¹

The Duke of Mecklenburg was in reality more concerned with the affairs of Denmark and of Sweden than with those of Italy and was probably more interested in casting the horoscope of the King of Sweden than in the prospect of reigning in some

Venetian palace. The Emperor, on the other hand, despite his ministers, still believed in the possibility of peace in Italy. He urged Nevers to place himself entirely in his hands, to submit to the Imperial authority, and to show his devotion to the House of Austria. The Empress did not scruple to say that things would go on better when the French King left Italy for he must not think that he could stay there and order about the vassals of the Empire like so many footboys. Agnelli went indeed so far as to write that "The Spaniards are making a tool of the Emperor, and are the masters of his armies, authority and resources. This is so true that Wallenstein will not give them a man on any account whatsoever, though the Spaniards have engaged to pay them and to take them off his hands, and he could not disband his forces in any other way except at an immense expense to himself, for the Emperor has no money and does not know where to turn for any. The new levies will be made by those who have already made so much out of the Empire, and who are now going to employ their gains as the means of advancing themselves to high honours and are, therefore, pouring forth fervent prayers with clasped hands for commissions to raise new forces, companies, and regiments at their own expense. I do not often find my authority in the wrong. He knows all this: it is he who has the management of this whole business; let Y.H. and the French look to it.

"The peace with Denmark has set the Imperial forces free. Some of them are being sent into Silesia for fear of the Swedes, others into the Grisons, where they have fortified suitable positions, have occupied Chur, and, it is rumoured, have arrested a French Commissioner whom they found there. It is said that the Emperor is only doing this for the sake of his own prestige, and that he made a disadvantageous peace with Denmark in order to relieve the Empire from the fearful burden of the Imperial soldiery which it can no longer support. Trautmannsdorff has explained to me that the Emperor's prestige is the issue at stake in Italy, because the decision as to Mantua lies wholly in his hands. He will give a just decision, and everyone ought to submit themselves to it, but he cannot pronounce his verdict whilst France stands sword in hand, and thus looks as if she were putting pressure upon the Imperial dignity. It would be well, therefore, that both France and Spain should withdraw their troops before sentence is given, but as it is quite possible

that France may not believe in the sincerity of Spain or may cherish ulterior designs in Italy, and so may refuse to do so, H.I.M. has decided to send forces thither to support his authority. It might be still open to Y.H. to submit yourself to the Emperor notwithstanding the French King's declaration."¹

Agnelli may have been wrong as to the influence which Spain exercised at Vienna, but he was right as to the attitude of Wallenstein with regard to the Italian expedition. As Friedland wrote to the Emperor, he had given orders as soon as peace had been signed with Denmark that three regiments of infantry and some cavalry should march towards the Low Countries. H.I.M. was in such delight at the news that he sent orders to Collalto not to communicate the tidings to Aytona as he wished to give them him himself. "I have written this to Bruneau but have told him to keep his mouth shut about it, until he knows the Duke of Bavaria's 'Yes' or 'No,' for if the Duke will give the men he is being asked for, it will be all the better, but if he will not, we shall see his intentions more clearly, and ascertain what Y.M. can hope from him." If the Bavarian troops were allowed to go to the Netherlands, they would be placed under the command of Montecuculi and march straight to Bois-le-Duc.²

On the eighteenth of June Cordoba wrote to inform Aytona that the Imperial troops had occupied the passage of the Grisons but that they might disband at any moment as he had no money to pay them. He begged that the Emperor would send fresh forces towards the Lake of Constance, both to support those already in the Leagues and to overawe the Swiss. If the passes in Rhoetia were lost, the Spanish possessions in Italy would be in the greatest danger, and not a man could be spared from Germany to reinforce them.

The danger point to Spain was the opportunity of France, but even the Jesuits now began to see that the excessive predominance of France might be as great a danger to the balance of power in Italy as the overweening power of Spain had been in the past.

For the moment the German princes seemed to be inclined to submit to the authority of Cæsar, and except for some restiveness on the part of Saxony, had acquiesced without remonstrance in the Edict of Restitution. The Emperor might be used as a check in Italy upon both France and Spain. Agnelli received a visit from Father Lammermann and the Emperor's secretary, bringing him friendly messages from H.I.M.

They said that the Emperor was sending his forces into Italy because the French by fortifying Susa were a perpetual danger to the Milanese, and by holding Savoy in leading strings might turn the world upside down whenever they pleased.

Trautmannsdorff again reiterated his assurances that the one wish of the Imperial Government was to get the French out of Italy, and "once they are out of it," to re-establish peace. "Y.H.," he added, "has no reason to form such ill designs, as people say you have done, or to talk of handing Casale over to the French upon conditions." For once Agnelli's temper was aroused, possibly by Lammermann's change of tone, and he urged his master to get the French to make a demonstration upon the borders of Flanders with a large force so as to show the Spaniards what had come of their introduction of the Imperialists into Italy.

Literally speaking, the charge was a false one, for Count de Merode had seized the Luziensteig some days before Philip IV.'s request to his uncle to despatch a force to Italy had reached Vienna. Thus Count de Monterrey, his minister at Rome, had some ground for asking the Pope to act as mediator between France and the Emperor on the plea that his master had had no part in the invasion of Rhoetia.¹

To the Grisons the Austrian occupation, although undertaken with the consent of the Heads of the Leagues, came as an almost fatal blow.

Ever since the previous autumn when Father Ignatius had brought back from Vienna the promise that the Catholic religion should be set up again by armed force in the Lower Engadine and in the Münsterthal, religious persecution had been raging in the districts which were held by the Archduke Leopold. He expelled the Protestant Ministers who took refuge at Zuz in the Upper Engadine, under the protection of Conradin v. Planta. Vulpius, indeed, in the Spring of 1629, stole back to his old home. There he preached eight sermons by night in one week, and baptised over twenty children in secret. Besides this religious persecution, which probably affected but a few of the more zealous Protestants, as the majority of the inhabitants of the Lower Engadine appear to have attended the services of the Capuchin missions without any visible repugnance, the country had also to suffer from the outrages of its foreign garrison. Promises had, indeed, been given that strict discipline would be maintained amongst them, but excessive requisitions were levied upon the

parishes, the crops were wantonly destroyed, houses were plundered of their furniture, and cattle were driven off from the pastures. The harvest failed, and the valleys, as has been said, would have been devastated by famine had not large quantities of rice been imported from Italy.

Dearth was followed by an outbreak of the plague, which had been raging in the Rhine Valley and on the great roads through Switzerland since 1627. Two years later it broke out in the Grisons with unheard of violence, and before it ceased in 1631 had swept away twenty thousand souls or a fourth part of the population. The disease was not infectious and was indeed only relatively contagious, for the historian Juvalta, who lost two children by the disease, says that his wife escaped infection, although she slept in the same room with the sick. The churches were closed; for fourteen months services were held in the open-air, and, as the churchyards were too small to contain the dead, the corpses were buried in the fields. Even the highest mountain hamlets did not escape the ravages of the pestilence. Thus a lady from Sedrun who had fled for refuge to a *châlet* on one of the Lower Alps, was shortly afterwards found there lying dead, with her two boys both hale and hearty hanging on her breasts. Thirty years later one of them was Abbot of Disentis, the other President of the Upper League.

The plague had no terror for Merode's mercenaries. They plundered the country with German thoroughness, and before they left it had stripped not only the League but also the Valtelline and the County of Chiavenna bare of all supplies. For two years the Austrians, and with them the Catholic reaction, reigned supreme in the Grisons, whilst Joseph Mohr, now Bishop of Chur, who in August, 1629 received the Regalia or reserved Imperial rights from the Emperor, asserted the claims of his see to both spiritual and temporal power in the most exaggerated form.¹

Louis XIII., as has been seen, had received the news of Merode's occupation of the Luziensteig but a few days after the surrender of Privas. Like Richelieu, he well knew the importance of the Rhoetian passes. His desire to free his hands for immediate action led him to agree but a month later to that Treaty of Alais, which was destined to prove the end of the religious wars in France. Scarcely had he signed it than he sent a request to the Thirteen Cantons to call a Diet at Soleure to consider the position. The Assembly met on the twenty-sixth of August and was

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addressed by the French Ambassador Brulart de Leon, who after explaining the situation, asked for leave to recruit six thousand Swiss. Thanks to the exertions of Casati, the Spanish representative, the Five Catholic Cantons were induced to refused their consent for the time being, nominally on account of the plague. A few weeks later Richelieu concluded an agreement at Fontainebleau with the Republic of Venice for the restoration of the Liberty of the Grisons, and despatched Charnacé once more to Munich as the bearer of fresh proposals to the Elector of Bavaria.¹

The ground in Germany was now better prepared for the French approaches than it had been in the autumn of 1628. Austrian obstinacy and Spanish hesitation had done their work, whilst the course of events in the Netherlands seemed to show that the stars in their courses were turning against Spain. For the moment Maximilian had hesitated to close with the offers which Richelieu had sent him on the morrow of the surrender of Susa, but, as we have seen, the tone of his refusal was such as not to exclude the possibility of his acceptance of them in the future.

At their meeting at Heidelberg the Catholic League had decided to warn the Emperor not to infringe the neutrality of the Empire by sending assistance to the Infanta Isabella against the Dutch, and had agreed to reject any representations from foreign powers in favour of the restoration of the Palatine Frederick unless they were accompanied by an offer of compensation to Bavaria. In championing the cause of Maximilian the directors of the Catholic League were championing their own. In the eyes of London preachers Frederick might be a confessor for the Faith, amongst his neighbours in the Rhine Valley he was looked upon as an overbearing tyrant. The electors of Mainz, of Trier, of Cologne could not forget that they lived in exile from their episcopal cities, because former Palatines had supported the burghers in their rebellions against their authority, whilst, under the shelter of his protection, heresy had flourished at Worms, and all the possessions of the Church, which lay in and near the Palatinate, had had to pay blackmail to the Dey of Heidelberg. No sooner had Ferdinand II. received the resolutions of the League, than he despatched Antony, Abbot of Kremsmünster, on a mission to its directors. He was instructed to discuss with them the negotiations in progress with Denmark, the war in Italy, and the threatened attack of the French upon Germany. He was to point out that the attitude of the French

in Italy might prove a source of the greatest danger to the Empire, but that hesitation was the gravest risk of all. The Abbot's exhortations and wise saws met with but a chilling reception. The Electors of Cologne and Treves and the Bishop of Wurzburg joined in pointing out to Maximilian that it was most undesirable to employ the forces of the League in Italy, although but a few days later his brother of Cologne qualified his previous warning by admitting that peace should be made with Denmark so that the army might evacuate the Danish provinces and be in readiness to resist France, should the French find a pretext for invading Germany in the course of events in Italy. At the same time he urged that negotiations for a General Peace should be begun at once in accordance with the resolution which had been arrived at by the Electors in their meeting at Mühlhausen. Maximilian, in his reply, approved of the suggestion as to the conclusion of peace with Denmark. Almost at the same time he appears to have learnt that the suggestion that Monferrat should be deposited in his hands had been set aside, and to have received a hint "from high quarters" that when peace was concluded between England and Spain it would be arranged by a secret article that not only those places in the Palatinate which were held by the Spaniards but those which were occupied by himself were to be handed back to the Palatine. His garrisons were, indeed, in case of his refusal, to be expelled by force. The Palatine, moreover, was to be absolved from the Ban. Furthermore, although the Castle of Stein, which commanded an important passage over the river, lies to the East of the Rhine, the Spaniards would not allow the Bavarians to take possession of it, whilst they had wantonly seized the woods which supplied fuel to the University of Heidelberg. Under such circumstances Maximilian could feel but little enthusiasm for the cause of Spain, and when in the middle of May he received a letter from the Emperor enclosing a pressing appeal from the Infanta Isabella for help from the army of the League in order to relieve Bois-le-Duc, which was in the extremity of danger, he replied by a refusal founded upon the resolution adopted by the League to maintain its neutrality as regarded the Dutch. It was true that by the same resolution the League had agreed that, in order to prevent the Spaniards from feeling that their interests were being neglected, the Emperor was at liberty to give them what help he could indirectly, if he

could do so without compromising the neutrality of the League. Of this proviso Maximilian made good use in his letter to Aytona, in which he also took the opportunity of assuring the ambassador that he felt the good and evil fortune of Spain as if it were his own, but he had already pointed out to the Electors of Cologne and of Mainz that if they gave the Emperor any assistance against the United Provinces, the Dutch would regard it as a breach of neutrality, and his reply to the Emperor contained no hint of any qualification. As International Law stood at that time it was, however, perfectly possible to allow the forces of a professedly neutral power to serve an ally as auxiliaries without involving any breach of its obligations to the power against whom they were fighting. Thus, although France and Spain were professedly at peace, Spanish artillerymen had fought to the death against Schomberg's cavalry at Susa. Had indeed the Spaniards chosen to act promptly, Maximilian's attitude would have had but little effect upon the course of events either in the Netherlands or in Italy.

But as Conway pointed out, the Spaniards had "many irons in the fire and some hammers lifted up to beat." The stroke was long in falling.¹

Of all the diplomatic affairs which Spain had in hand, an understanding with Wallenstein was probably the most important. After long negotiations and much haggling, peace had been concluded between the Empire and Denmark at Lübeck upon the twelfth of May. The terms of the Treaty did not diminish the territories over which Christian the Fourth had hitherto ruled, nor did they impose upon him any obligations for the future with but a single exception. The King bound himself not to interfere henceforth in the conflict in Germany, and to resign the rights which his sons held to the German Bishoprics. Christian IV., however, felt that his failure struck a severe blow at his prestige; he contrasted his position with that of Gustaf Adolf, who had so lately secured so many triumphs in Poland, and only signed the treaty under severe pressure from his Privy Council. In reality, he had lost but little, and though his wounded vanity might smart in secret, he had more justification for his words than he would have admitted to himself, when a month later he told a friend "Peace is made so I have no grounds to complain." Otto Vennius summed up the position in one of those allegorical canvasses so dear to the art lovers

of the time. In a picture now in the gallery at Rosenborg the King is seen as the Happy Mediator in the European turmoil. Around him gather envoys from every land, before him march the Blessings of Peace, high in the air swing Caps of Liberty, and above the throng hovers the Bird of Wisdom.¹

Gustaf Adolf had claimed that his envoys should be admitted to the Peace Conference. His request was refused for even Christian IV. doubted the justice of his grounds for his hostility to the Emperor, and failed to support it. The Swedish envoy was dismissed, therefore, with but scant courtesy from Lübeck, and his dismissal proved to be the cause of a future conflict. Events in Poland, however, even before the end of 1629, opened a way for Gustaf Adolf to enter upon his German designs. Arnim had been sent by Wallenstein to support Sigismund of Poland against the Swedes, but in his resentment at having been placed under the orders of the Polish Monarch did little to carry out his mission. He refused to attack the Swedes who had gathered round Marienburg, and so discouraged Sigismund by his disobedience that he concluded first a suspension of hostilities, and then a truce for a long period with his rivals, and thus freed Sweden from an entanglement which had long prevented her from taking action to support the Protestants of Germany. The Polish nobles and the Polish peasants alike were weary of a conflict which concerned no interests but those of their King, and Sigismund turned a deaf ear to Wallenstein's warnings of the dangers which his pusillanimity was bringing upon the Catholic cause.²

For the moment, however, Wallenstein was freed from his anxieties as to Mecklenburg by the peace with Denmark, and was at liberty to devote his thoughts to the situation, as it affected the interests of the House of Hapsburg elsewhere than in Northern Germany. It would have been well for Spain had she seized the opportunity, for had Wallenstein agreed to assist her in conjunction with Tilly, the wishes of the Emperor and the commands of the Catholic League would have done but little to hold back their victorious hosts. In the middle of May Philip had despatched Sforza to Brussels and to Vienna armed with a letter to Aytona in which the King gave him full powers to come to an understanding with Friedland on the basis which the Duke had himself proposed. Thank to Sforza's negligence this letter only came into Aytona's hands on the fourth of

July. Two days later he received Philip's despatch of the eleventh of June in which the King said that he thought that Friedland should not proceed to Italy until the following March. At the same time an express arrived from Friedland to say that the Infanta had proposed that all the forces coming from the North except those which were on their way to Bois-le-Duc should be sent into West Friesland. The Duke said that he inclined to fall in with her views but that he would decide nothing until he had seen Collalto and had received leave from H.I.M. to do so. Sforza, added Friedland, had told him that Spinola thought that the Italian expedition should be put off until the following March, because owing to the delay in his arriving at Milan none of the necessary preparations had been made there. The Duke's letter threw the Emperor and his Ministers, more particularly those who were in the Spanish interest, into a fury. Within an hour after he had read it, H.I.M. wrote to the Duke with his own hand forbidding him to enter Friesland on any pretext whatsoever, and ordering him to march to Italy in person with all the forces which he could scrape together, as the Emperor's object in ordering him to enter it was to restore his prestige and to defend his dominions. Count Collalto, who was at Vienna, would join him as soon as possible. "We were so aghast at seeing the Emperor in such a towering rage that we decided that Count Castro, who was at Laxenburg, two leagues from here, should see Prince Eggenberg and try to disabuse him of the notion that Y.M. has changed your mind, or departed one inch from what the Emperor wished, and should explain that what Count Sforza had asked from Friedland was merely a suggestion which had been made by Y.M. and your ministers without any hidden motive." Aytona did not leave the task to another but hastened after his messenger to Laxenburg. "I found Eggenberg in an awful temper, and without mincing matters he told me straight out that he thought it very strange that, at the very moment when Y.M. was sending me orders to come to terms with Count Sforza and had begged them for reinforcements for Italy with this object, Sforza himself was by the instructions of either Y.M. or your ministers trying to talk the Duke of Friedland out of the Italian plan, and to get him to engage in other undertakings without the Emperor's knowledge. He himself, solely out of his wish to serve Y.M., had with the greatest possible trouble succeeded

in persuading H.I.M. to stand up for his own reputation and for Y.M.'s in Italy, and at the very moment when he had succeeded in winning him over and when the common interests of the House of Austria could have been placed upon a sound footing, and made safe for many a day, Y.M. slackens. The business had, however, gone so far and the Emperor had so completely tied his hands by what he had done and said at Y.M.'s request that it must now go forward as it had been begun. H.I.M. had, therefore, sent orders to the Duke of Friedland to march into Italy in person with a force large enough in the first place to turn the French out of the country, and to occupy Mantua and Monferrat, and after doing so, to conclude a peace upon favourable terms without offending any particular interests, and giving security to Y.M.'s dominions in Italy, whilst placing the authority of the Emperor in that country on its proper footing. If any of the Italian powers sided with the French or Nevers, the Duke had instructions to make war on them also. Even if Y.M. and your servants in Italy do not wish to carry out the promises of support upon which they counted when they entered upon this business, the Emperor means, notwithstanding, that his forces shall enter Italy, for they will find means to secure allies in other quarters. As for the relief of Bois-le-Duc, they would, if necessary, give seven or eight thousand more men over and above the twenty two thousand. I told the Prince he had no right to say Y.M. would not carry out your promise to support them." The reasons why the King thought that the expedition should be postponed were obvious. At the time when he sent off Count Sforza he did not know that peace had been concluded with Denmark, and that such large reinforcements had been sent to Bois-le-Duc, or of the occupation of the Grisons. These were the reasons which had prompted H.I.M. to come to such a quick decision, whilst the Spanish government in their ignorance of them were inclined to hesitate. Aytona added that he was quite ready to conclude the agreement with Sforza without further delay. "Eggenberg replied that the arrangement with Sforza was only to be concluded when it had been decided to declare war on the Venetians. This the Emperor was unwilling to do until they had given some overt assistance to Nevers. All they had to do for the moment was to discuss the reasons which they were to put forward to justify their project for the expulsion of the French from Italy,

and for the occupation of Mantua and of Monferrat. All that he expected from Y.M.'s servants in Italy was that they should supply the Imperial forces with a little bread, some munitions, and a few cannon." This, as the Prince remarked with some truth, was very little to ask of them when one reflected what the House of Austria would gain from such an undertaking. Aytona could not but agree to write to Cordoba upon the subject, although with fervent protestations that, when the interests of the Emperor were at stake, the Governor of Milan needed no such stimulus. "Such, Sire, was my conversation with Prince Eggenberg, and although the reasons which have moved the Emperor's ministers to decide upon the Italian expedition in such an offhand fashion, namely mistrust and pique, are in themselves by no means sound ones, yet they will have every effect which Y.M. can wish for, for as they mean to expel the French and to occupy Mantua and Monferrat, Your Majesty's enemies in Italy who are already maddened and alarmed by the occupation of the passage and are calling up reinforcements from every direction, will have no time to prepare for resistance as they would do if the expedition were put off until next year." He was convinced that H.M. would never have written to Cordoba that he had decided that there was to be no campaign in Italy that summer had he known how favourable the situation was both for humbling the French in the dust and for bringing the Italian Powers once and for all under his control either by a Spanish peace or a victorious war.

He had not dared to hint to the Emperor that Philip IV. wished the expedition to be postponed. "I must entreat Y.M. to reflect how such a milk and water proposal would sound to H.I.M.'s ears after all Your Majesty's fiery words, with which I have so often deafened them when I was trying to prod him into the war, and what reason he and his ministers would have to distrust me were I now to oppose it." In any case the Spanish officials in Italy might be depended upon to assist the Imperial forces in every way, and if the King would only show his confidence in the Germans and express his satisfaction at their services they in their turn would do all they could for the cause of Spain, "and, as they tell all the world, would endure all things rather than suffer an enemy to lay a finger upon the State of Milan. It cannot seem credible, Sire, that those who at this very moment are straining every nerve in their enthusiastic devotion to relieve

Bois-le-duc just as if it were Vienna, and who are keeping Y.M. in the Palatinate although all Germany is crying out against them for doing so, would wish to do Y.M. a wrong in Italy." If, however, the Imperialists were subjected to further slights and their mistrust was increased by the slowness of the Spaniards in assisting them, "Y.M. will find the Imperial armies in Italy very bad neighbours." It would be even more hurtful to the Spanish interests, if the Imperial Government gave up any idea of the Italian expedition, "for they would withdraw their forces both from the Passage and from the relief of Bois-le-duc, and would make war on the Turk, which is the one project of which they think and dream, and which all Y.M.'s enemies are pressing on them, for once the Emperor has his hands full on the Danube, his support will fail Y.M. This is what they count on most to secure the success of their designs, and I must add that H.I.M. has given his word to the electors and the Empire that he will only keep up a very limited force on foot within the Empire, and so, if he does not engage in a war with the Turk, he will have to disband his army. The whole force of the storm which the enemies of the House of Austria are conjuring up will, in that case, fall upon Your Majesty's dominions, and you will never from this time forth be able to secure any help from the Emperor, for in their vexation at the thought of what they will have failed to gain owing to Y.M. not having assisted them, they will harden their hearts against you in an almost inconceivable degree, and will become your most bitter enemies, so that they will separate Y.M. from H.I.M. for all time. Though your interests may appear one and indivisible, yet the malice of some of H.I.M.'s evil-minded subjects has risen to such a pitch that they openly argue that the Emperor would be far more powerful if he were to break with Y.M."

So important did Aytona think this despatch that he not only sent copies to Cordoba and to the Infanta, but sent it to Madrid by Ottavio Villani, one of his legal advisers, who had the whole subject at his fingers ends, and who was ready to undertake the arduous journey from Vienna so that he might give His Majesty the fullest information by word of mouth.

Such was the real state of affairs as regarded the relations between the two branches of the House of Austria, at the moment when every Protestant statesman in Europe was repeating with parrot-like monotony that Spain and Austria were seeking Universal Monarchy, whilst, on the other hand, France which, accord-

ing to its well wishers in Holland, was every day getting shut in more closely by the ever-growing territories of Spain, was, in utter forgetfulness of her temporal and geographical interests, seeking to league herself with those powers for the extirpation of the Reformed Religion. It is difficult to believe that the champions of Protestantism placed the slightest faith in their own assertions.¹

In any case Louis XIII. believed that it was not impossible to cleave asunder the bands which in the past had bound Spain and Austria in an inseparable union. Scarcely had he signed the Peace of Alais when he despatched M. de Sabran to Vienna with instructions to effect, if possible, a peaceful settlement. As Agnelli wrote, the Emperor would thus have an opportunity of extricating himself from the labyrinth which he had so blindly entered. Should, however, Sabran fail in his mission, either because his master wished to show his displeasure at the entrance of the Imperialists into the Grisons or because the Viennese Cabinet had decided upon openly asserting the Emperor's authority in Italy, war would be inevitable. Eggenberg was saying everywhere that Wallenstein would be in Italy before the King of France could arrive there, whilst Count John of Nassau repeated to the Bishop the Emperor's words to himself that he would have the war at any price. Had the Spaniards used their opportunities they would have had the control of the Emperor's policy in their own hands. The Queen of Hungary had not yet left Madrid, and if her brother declared that she should not join her husband until the election of the King of the Romans was over, he could bend his uncle to his will. Eggenberg and Collalto, however, were hotter than any one else for war. Not without reason they felt that Urban VIII. by his intrigues was reopening the whole question of the respective rights of the Papal and the Imperial power in its most threatening form. Both talked loudly of Wallenstein as the second Attila and threatened that his hordes would make Italy a bloodstained desert. To them neither religion nor morality counted for anything when the power of the House of Hapsburg was at stake. As the Hapsburg Cæsar's champions they trampled down all such considerations in the dust.¹ Wallenstein, however, was not wholly free to act as he would. He was still engrossed in his quarrel with Magdeburg, which had refused to comply with his request for a contribution, and to the Duke of Mecklenburg his own affairs were of far more importance than were those of the

Emperor, of the Empire, or of the House of Austria. "No one can conceive how H.I.M. can use German troops for this war without his German general and confidant, although the Spaniards do not want to have German troops in Italy if they can help it, especially if they are commanded by a general who enjoys such influence and is such a splendid man. It is the truth, however, that H.I.M. is more of a Spaniard than of a German, and does things which the very King of Spain himself does not want done." To the Spaniards Wallenstein, the tall, dark man, whose black eyes shining in his pale, haggard face struck terror into the hearts of those on whom he gazed, was, indeed, a portent of evil omen. His wild looks might well recall to them memories of those Moorish prophets who had led the hosts of the Almoravides or of the Almohades on the battlefields of Castile. Agnelli was in touch with Father Luca, who was one of the Empress's confidants, and who was a friend of some of the leading English Catholics. From him he learnt that the Emperor and Bavaria were at loggerheads because the King of France was pressing for the complete restoration of the Palatinate. The reverend father added that he himself had been the first to tell the Emperor that a Spanish envoy was in London who had offered to give up not only those portions of the Palatine's dominions which were occupied by Spanish garrisons, but also those which were held by the Imperial and the Bavarian forces. The secret as to Rubens' mission had been disclosed by Contarini, but although it is true that Rubens had induced Charles the First to recognize the fact that Spain could not hand over her portion of the Palatinate without the consent of both the Emperor and Bavaria and was still less in a position to force them to make any concessions whatsoever to the Palatine, the knowledge that such negotiations were in progress in London was not calculated to inspire the cabinets of Vienna and of Munich with any goodwill for the Madrid Government. But the Emperor had now decided to take up a line of action which, though cloaked under a show of zeal for the interests of Spain, was inspired by the desire of restoring the authority of the Empire in Italy on the footing on which it had stood before the Treaty of Constance had deprived Cæsar of any real power in the lands south of the Alps. In vain the Empress strove once more to use her influence in favour of Nevers. When she sent a confidant to Eggenberg to inquire how matters were going in Italy, the Prince replied, "Tell the Empress the Emperor does not like her meddling with

Italy and begs she will leave off doing so. This is a real loss to us." The Emperor's favourite indeed was the Empress's most deadly enemy, and Leonora was no longer young enough to exert upon her cold-blooded husband such influences as those before which Buckingham had been forced to bow. "Her Majesty is always bathed in tears, and dares not say a word about the business though she sees it portends our ruin and the utter destruction of her own family." By the fourth of August it was known that M. de Sabran's mission had failed and a week later the envoy set out upon his return to France. Before his departure he sent to warn Nevers that he must now strike a blow for himself and must no longer cherish any hope of receiving justice or even courtesy, "thanks to those who make H.I.M. believe what they please." The Austrian Government was seizing the funds which had been assigned to their creditors to replenish their empty treasury, "which does not look as if they have much to carry on such a war as this will be with, but they talk of nothing but of fattening themselves to bursting in Italy."¹

Charles de Nevers saw his danger and decided to seek help from every enemy of Spain. Although, as Agnelli told him, he ran the risk of displeasing the Pope, "who dislikes hearing of understandings between Catholic Princes and the enemies of Holy Church," a statement which was, perhaps, not altogether consonant with actual facts, the Duke spoke of sending envoys to England, to Denmark, and to Sweden. If, as the Venetian Resident at Vienna had pointed out, the Swedes and Dutch could be induced to send some forces by way of Stralsund to attack Mecklenburg, it was certain that Wallenstein would never abandon a state which was the chief source of his greatness. "The Emperor says he will have war; the ministers want to send Wallenstein; the Spaniards swear they will not have Y.H. in Italy, or at least that they will assure themselves of you if they cannot do anything more." "For the love of God look to your defence by every weapon and method of war. They will listen to you fast enough if you speak sword in hand. The words of unarmed men fall on deaf ears." The Spaniards were already ravaging the Valtelline, so that if their enemies recovered it, they would find nothing but a desert. The fate of the Valtelline might soon be that of Mantua and of Monferrat. Nevers' obstinacy was to cost his subjects dear.²

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

CORDOBA meanwhile, although too late, had come to see that his intrigues were likely to prove in the end to be the ruin of his country, and in vain endeavoured to avert a conflict which but for him might never have brought France face to face with the Emperor in a struggle for supremacy in Europe. But for his French advisers Nevers, on the other hand, might well have consented to do homage to the Emperor and to allow the fortifications of Casale if not of Mantua to be demolished. Had he made these concessions he would have been left in undisturbed possession of dominions, which rich as they were would have counted in the balance of European power for less than a Republic of Lucca or than a Principality of Mirandola, when once their ruler had ceased to be the master of two of the strongest fortresses in the then world.

By the end of April, 1629, the Governor of Milan was writing to his brother that the Mantuan question was far from having been permanently settled. The French were still in the Citadel of Susa and had despatched a detachment into Monferrat, and their councillors were entangled in a network of intrigues and lies whose authors, as he said, were "waxing fat upon him." Many people thought that if the treaty was ratified the French would evacuate Italy forthwith and would turn their arms against their heretics at home. If, however, the ratification was refused, it would be to their interest and to that of their Italian allies to bring about a war without delay, as if they wanted one they would never again have so good an opportunity for making it. To Spain, on the other hand, the maintenance of peace in Italy was the one thing needful, and they must never cease in their endeavours to convince the smaller powers in the Peninsula of their wish to preserve it. "May God guide His Majesty to a right decision, for notwithstanding all the slights and annoyances I have had to suffer, I have never failed to put my views before him without disguise." Even Richelieu before his departure from Susa wrote to thank Cordoba for his loyal

conduct towards his opponents, which had done so much to prevent a rupture, and added that the Governor's punctilious fairness had been one of the chief grounds on which he had decided to leave Italy. "I am sending H.M. a copy of his letter, not because I believe one word he writes, but because I don't want them to think I am corresponding with His Eminence behind their backs. It cannot be denied, however, that the Cardinal has some good points about him." He had just received despatches dated the third of May from the King and from the Count Duke containing H.M.'s definite refusal to ratify the provisional agreements into which Cordoba had entered, although, as Monferrat had already been evacuated by his forces, and he had promised not to disturb Nevers in his possession of his states, on the condition, however, that the French withdrew from Italy, this refusal was of consequence solely in a diplomatic sense. He was not aware, however, that in a letter dated two days later Philip IV. had not only informed Aytona that he had refused to ratify the agreement because it had been concluded without his knowledge after the French had entered Italy, but had instructed him to ask that the troops which Friedland had offered for the expedition against Venetia might be employed in a demonstration against Metz, seeing that by entering Monferrat both the French and the Venetians had defied the Emperor's authority.¹

The course of events in the Netherlands was rendering Spain more than ever dependent upon the good will both of the Emperor and of the Empire, and this consideration alone can explain the grounds on which the King showed himself so exceedingly zealous for the maintenance of the Imperial authority at a time when, had he looked facts in the face, he must have known that his own dominions in Italy would, if he went to war, be in the utmost danger. The Council at Madrid seemed to live in a world of dreams and took the figments of their fancies for realities. Cordoba, struggling as he was with a treasury perennially empty might well grumble when he received remittances calculated on an estimated strength of twelve thousand men, for he had thirty thousand on the muster rolls. "They must think that troops improve in quality by being half starved or will strive to escape from their misery by dying like the Turks." Could they imagine that with his raw, untrained, unequipped levies he could have turned the French out of Susa or should he have

entangled his army in the fastnesses of the Alps at a moment when if Savoy had yielded to the Cardinal's blandishments the Duke and Créquy might have marched side by side into Milan without shot fired or stroke of sword. The King had raised endless difficulties as to the conditions which Cordoba had accepted, and these the French would be ready enough to fasten on, but Olivares upon the whole seemed inclined enough to peace provided only that he could ensure that it would be a lasting one. The Council, however, did not know if they wanted a safe peace or a safe war, and the affairs of Spain were in the hands of a mob of wrangling Ministers "who don't understand a word about either peace or war. Their Excellencies will forgive me for saying this, for I don't mean for a moment to deny that there are some members of the Council who are eminent in every point of view, but I can see that they are swamped by the others. The Germans have decided to occupy the Grisons so as to keep the door into Italy open. H.M.'s servants at the Imperial Court arranged for this at the time when it was thought that the French would invade the State of Milan. This will cause a fine commotion everywhere. I did my best to turn them from their purpose when I saw that the French had retired, but they would not listen to me, so I have since held my tongue, as I did not like to interfere at a moment when I expect my successor will soon be here and I do not know what instructions he will bring with him as to war or peace." The future Governor of Milan would, indeed, have his work cut out for him. The Germans would cost sixty thousand crowns [£15,000] a month, without reckoning the expense of reinforcing them.

"Bois-le-Duc is besieged and now they will have to assist that army into the bargain. Let them find the money to meet all this if they can, for if they fail to do so their prestige will once again fall to the ground. I fear the news from Flanders will make Marquis Spinola hurry back there at once, and they will never dare to send Cardinal Borgia here in this time of wars and tumults. Would to God I shall not have to stay here dying of rage and worry, and that only to lose my reputation again, for armies without money waste to nothing in a day or two, and making war without good armies would lead to the end we know to our cost." The Spaniards might well have cause for indecision, for the time seemed near at hand when they might have to choose between the abandonment of the Netherlands

and the admission of the French into the heart of Upper Italy, if they could not come to an agreement with England and with the United Provinces. As so often before, all thoughts turned to Spinola, and at the beginning of May Khevenhüller had heard that he had resigned his post in the Netherlands and was to be appointed Governor and Captain General of Milan for life. At that moment Scaglia believed that a war between France and Spain was certain. "The Spaniards not only think that their honour has been slighted, but imagine when they see the French in Monferrat that the State of Milan will come to cost them as much as Flanders does, and that they must therefore clear the country of them, as they could do easily enough whilst France continues in her present state." The dispute might, however, be settled if the Emperor would adjudge the whole of Monferrat to Savoy, "for from his sentence there is no appeal." Spinola himself, however, was by no means anxious to quit the Netherlands for good. On the thirteenth of May news reached Madrid that the Dutch had appeared before Bois-le-Duc, and although it was thought that the place would make a stout defence, the Marquis knew it must inevitably surrender unless it was relieved with the help of the Emperor and of the Catholic League. It was, therefore, all important to conclude a Truce with Holland, and until this object was attained he wished at any cost to remain in Spain. "In my opinion," wrote Khevenhüller, to Maximilian, "Spinola has never done a finer piece of work than what he has now achieved in Spain. When he first got here they were all ready to stone him. Now he has the whole Council on his side, does what he likes with the Count-Duke willy-nilly, lets him nag and displays both patience and firmness. At the same time he holds the whole power and might of the Spanish Monarchy in his hands; he is the general of their armies, rules the Netherlands, the Palatinate, and Milan as governor, is Lord Steward to H.R.H. the Infanta Isabella, did not find a word to cavil at in the King's severe and most appropriate decree, and lastly has got all the money together which he will take with him."

Unfortunately for Spain, peace had been concluded between France and England on the twentieth of May, whilst so far she had failed to come to terms with either the English or the Dutch. On the other hand now that the Emperor had got the Danish War off his hands, he would have little difficulty in

punishing Nevers for his disobedience, and the Protestant Princes of Northern Germany had seen themselves forced for the first time since the Peace of Passau to acknowledge that the Imperial Authority was something more than a lawyer's phrase. They agreed to carry out the Edict of Restitution and to hand back to the Catholic Church, or in other words, to the nominees of the Catholic League, ecclesiastical properties which from their geographical situation controlled most of the trade routes leading from the interior of Germany to her coast lands on the Baltic and on the North Sea. Saxony, indeed, had made some demur but in the end had obeyed the law and had refused some advantageous offers from the French. Ferdinand II. might well feel that he had reached his goal. The ruler who but nine years before had been bearded by heretics at the door of his own palace chapel, and who had seemed left without any earthly help, could now in his turn send aid to the Catholic cause in Poland and could support his kinsmen in the Netherlands and in Italy. New levies were daily being raised and it was expected that reinforcements would be sent to Hungary to protect those countries against an attack by Bethlen Gabor and the Turks. Such was the picture of the position of the Imperial Government which de Wateville drew for the Duke of Savoy. Charles Emmanuel, however, did not fail to see the reverse of the medal. He knew that the French had decided to retain Susa, that they were raising fresh fortifications there, and that they would not ratify the peace with Spain until Nevers had been invested with Mantua and with Monferrat.¹

Cordoba, likewise, viewed the future with apprehension. "It looks to me as if the peace with England which the Count Duke had in his box is now in Cardinal Richelieu's; please God there may be another left for us. The Truce with the Dutch must be in a fair way, for they have besieged us in Bois-le-Duc. Alas! dear Brother! A statesman cannot govern by his whims but only by patience and unceasing care." In his eyes the only outcome of Merode's seizure of the Luziensteig would be a fresh outbreak of war in Italy. The warlike attitude of Monterrey at Rome, and the troops who were hastening along every road from Genoa and Naples to the Milanese, had aroused the apprehensions of every enemy of Spain. Once they had taken up arms to defend themselves against her attack, they could not draw back, and the contest so lightly entered into might well bring

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her rule in Italy to an end. The Council might well bethink themselves of the time when Mme. de Parma had brought about a satisfactory settlement in the Netherlands. Alva in his wish to secure the prestige of Spain had sought to overthrow that settlement and to crush down the liberties of the Netherlands in the dust. There was no need, thought Cordoba, for him to recall to them the outcome. How could Spain, indeed, hope to bend Nevers to her will when the Dutch were at the gates of Bois-le-Duc and Savoy was in secret alliance against her with France and Venice? Philip IV. must strain every nerve if he would relieve the threatened fortress, and would it be well, therefore, for him to allow the affairs of Italy to get into such a state that France and her allies might be driven as a counter-stroke to his imaginary designs against them to proclaim another Duke of Milan and thus provoke a war in which Spain could anticipate nothing but defeat? Yet if the Spanish Ministers would only conduct the negotiations in such a fashion as to prove that they really wished for peace, the French and their Italian allies would probably meet them half way.

It would be impossible for Merode to hold the Grisons unless he was strongly reinforced, and if he had to evacuate them his expedition would have done more harm than good. If it were still possible it would be best if he could be prevented from entering them at all. Unless some one could be sent to Paris who could prove that the expedition to Rhoetia had been decided upon in consequence of what had taken place in the past and that it was in no wise intended to be the starting point of any fresh designs for the future on the part of Spain, a renewal of the war in Italy could not be prevented. Cordoba pointed out that it was impossible for him to negotiate for peace, as he had lost all credit in the eyes of the French and the Venetians, "who see how little my deeds correspond with my words." His one hope was that Spinola might speedily arrive to replace him, although he feared that the situation in Flanders would force him to hasten northwards and to leave Italy without having concluded a settlement.

The Duke of Savoy fully agreed with Cordoba in thinking that the seizure of the Grisons was a disastrous mistake. The Emperor, it was true, had wished to make a display of his authority in Italy, but by doing so he might well have thrown difficulties in the way of the peaceful settlement which both

France and Spain professed to desire. It would have been far better if the German forces could have been employed in threatening the French frontier so as to prevent reinforcements from being sent into Italy through Susa. It would be easy enough for Louis XIII. to come to a settlement with Rohan, who was no longer supported by England, and once the French had their hands free he might see himself threatened with utter destruction and "have to take the law from their arms, or at the least allow them to use my states as their base of operations, and serve merely as fuel for this fire." Unless Spain could support him effectually, he must perforce yield to the French. It was all very well for people in Germany to say that it was absolutely necessary that the passages of the Alps should be kept open in case of war in Italy, and that what had taken place in the Grisons would not prevent a peaceful settlement being carried through. It would be far better to keep war away from Italy altogether, and this could best be done by placing Savoy in a position to defend himself against a French attack. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the assurances of support which he was receiving from Spain and Germany, but time was of the essence of the matter, and the Duke did not mean to be caught napping again. As money and men were both wanting it might not be easy for Cordoba to comply with his requests, even if as the Duke suggested he advanced him the funds of the City of Milan and laid an additional and heavy impost upon wine.¹

The Duke's zeal for the cause of Spain was as usual inspired by an acute sense of his own interests. The Bishop of Ventimiglia had been hinting to Olivares that it might be as well that he should allow his master to fill up the Archbishopric of Santiago, which was worth sixty thousand crowns [£15,000] a year, in place of handing it over to the Pope. Olivares had refused to comply stating that he was obliged to keep the Curia in good humour, but offering to allow the Duke to dispose of that of Cordova which was of the same value. Till the outcome of his requests was known the Duke could not afford to break with Spain. He can have derived but little encouragement to withstand the pressure of the French from the reports which reached him from Madrid. "Spinola says that he will have sixty thousand men, what with Germans and others, under him when he gets to Italy, but when he sees Rohan all but brought to bay and Nevers firm in the saddle in Monferrat,

I think he will do nothing, unless indeed France is kept busy by a Huguenot rising and an attack by the Emperor. H.I.M., however, will not lift a finger until he knows for certain whether or no Spain means to come to terms with France upon the basis of depositing Mantua and Monferrat in the hands of a third party to be chosen by Spain and the Emperor." It might be hoped that Wake would be able to prevent the conclusion of peace between England and France until an English representative had arrived in Spain with full powers to treat, and it would be no difficult matter for him to do so. "France does not want a war with Spain upon any terms whatsoever, and hates the very thought of the restoration of the Palatinate, although it weighs in against this Crown in other matters. Its one object is to increase its own power at the expense of others, and it never stirs an inch to help its friends. I need only refer to the way in which it drew back at Susa and to all that happened in that connection as a proof of what I say, and we must not forget how it has kept the peace during the last few years. The only prospect, therefore, which England can have of securing the Palatine's restoration is that she should come to terms with Spain, with the hope of getting France and Spain to set their teeth in one another's throats, but if Spain is to set itself to put through the Palatine's business, the way must be opened up for them by setting their hands free in other quarters. They will have to be made to see that others will join with them in the undertaking, and thus everyone will get what he wants. Such are the arguments which Y.R.H. should urge upon Wake." It was conceivable perhaps that arguments which might carry weight with Wake might fail to do so with Olivares, even though in the eyes of the Spanish Ministers a settlement with England was worth many sacrifices. Scarcely indeed had they learnt of the conclusion of Treaty of Susa than Philip IV. had written to Aytona that he would willingly give up the towns in the Palatinate which had been deposited in his hands by James I. on condition that they should be given back to him, if by so doing he could give the English any satisfaction. At the same time the King had asked Scaglia to inform Barozzi that he was willing to treat with the Emperor and Bavaria for the restoration of the Palatinate, and would send a minister to negotiate in London. Barozzi at once took the letter to Greenwich, where the Court was then staying. Charles read the despatch with the greatest

pleasure and instructed Carlisle, Pembroke and Lord Treasurer Weston to draft a reply. He said that he looked upon the Armistice with France as an arrangement which could be broken through at any time if this step should be necessary to make peace with Spain. As Olivares was anxious that the negotiations should be carried on at Madrid he would at once send Cottington there, and would not allow any other minister to interfere in a matter which so closely touched Spanish good faith. The news of Cottington's impending arrival produced an immediate effect on the minds of Olivares and his colleagues. They now talked of nothing but war and planned an invasion of France through Catalonia and Navarre if the Emperor would support them by entering Champagne. That Savoy would attack Dauphiny and that the Huguenots would rise in arms under Rohan were looked upon as verities too sacred to be disputed. "I had believed all along that the Count-Duke was afraid to declare war on France before he had arranged a settlement with the United Provinces but now they say so openly enough. Therefore, considering the siege of Bois-le-Duc and the other circumstances which I need not enlarge upon to Y.R.H., I hold that it will be very difficult for them to make peace with the Dutch, and that unless they do so they will never break with France. The Emperor's ambassador told me in so many words that if Spain does not break with France, they cannot reasonably expect the Emperor to do so by himself, and that he personally cannot see how his Court can engage themselves in such a war unless Spain keeps its promise to them and declares war at the same time. However, they seem to be making preparations here to help the Duke of Rohan, but as usual dawdle and procrastinate so much that I fear they will be too late. It is possible, on the other hand, that France may invade Italy again on the ground of the refusal to grant the Investiture to Nevers, unless the Emperor and the Huguenots make a diversion, for Spain will never allow the Emperor to overlook his conduct." Scaglia was urging Spinola to set out for Italy, but the Marquis was very reluctant to do so, for he at least knew the all-importance of a settlement with Holland, and his earnest desire was, as has been said, to remain in Spain until the news arrived that it had been concluded. On the twenty-sixth of June Olivares requested Scaglia to inform his master that the news from England was very satisfactory. From Carlisle's letters he had reason to be-

lieve that Charles I. was not only willing to make peace with Spain but would gladly join with her in any undertaking which promised to bring some advantage to himself and to his relations. "The King has read the letters with great pleasure and sees from them how much he owes to Y.R.H.'s good offices in this matter."¹ A few days later it was known that the Imperial troops had entered the Valtelline, and by doing so had once and for all thrown down the glove to the French. Once more the Spanish Ministers mistook their dreams for facts. France would quickly be brought to reason, for the invasion of the Imperialists through Champagne and of the Spaniards through Catalonia would compel her to disperse her forces and at the same time to hold down the Huguenots of the South West and to guard the road to Paris against the raids of the Croats and the Cossacks. It was true that they had not yet heard whether Friedland would consent to be the leader of an invading army, and that the delay in Cottington's arrival was dulling their hopes of peace with England. On the other hand, the Venetian Ambassador and his satellites began to see that things would not go well with France. "They know that Spinola will leave no stone unturned to secure his ends, and that he will get the Emperor to keep the French with their hands full, so that he may be left unhampered when carrying through his business in Italy. They live in terror of a peace with Holland as they know that the King has left the negotiators a free hand as to the terms, and see that thanks to the Danish peace England has lost all hopes of getting any help from France about her own interests, that is to say, as to the restoration of the Palatine. She will, therefore, be all the more keen to come to an understanding with Spain. In fact, the good Venetians dread that the contagion may spread, for they know people here will overlook every other consideration if they can strike a blow at France, and that they will strip the flesh off the King's bones to get the cash for this. They have indeed just sent orders to strike new money," a euphemism for a further debasement of the coinage. "The Emperor on his side has pledged himself to them to the hilt by the proclamation he has issued against Nevers with the sanction and approval of the Electors and members of the Empire, and, moreover, has given Denmark such good terms solely and only to get the Danes off his hands." In short, when Scaglia left Madrid for Italy on the twenty-fifth of July he plumed himself

that he had nipped the French ambitions in the bud and that he had saved Spain if not all Catholic Europe by his diplomatic skill.¹

The Abbot had, indeed, had one disappointment. The Spanish Treasury had failed in its promise to repay him the twenty-four thousand crowns [£6,000], which had been due to Savoy on account of Prince Philibert for over ten years, and so he had been unable to buy the tapestries which his master had ordered from Antwerp. Nor had His Spanish Majesty sent the twelve horses from his own stables which he had promised to the Duke, "though this is no great matter, as he had not an animal in them which is worth sixpence." Nor had he been able to procure any India goods although he had sent Madame Royale a large packet of the skin and other gloves for which the shops of the Calle Mayor were famous. In due course he arrived at Turin, taking Milan on his road, to be met however by news which must have shown him how baseless were his dreams of diplomatic triumphs.²

By the beginning of July rumours were in circulation in Savoy that Louis XIII. had come to terms with Rohan and that he would soon recross the Alps with a large army. Charles Emmanuel had neither a farthing in his treasury nor a man to defend him. He would be obliged therefore to lay aside his schemes for acting as arbiter in the impending contest, and to place himself in the hands of the French. Had not Spinola been detained at Madrid, Savoy might perhaps have remained true to Spain. But a report had spread all over Italy that his delay was due to want of money, and everywhere hopes were expressed without disguise that some fresh disaster might overtake the hated Spaniards. Nor was it improbable that these wishes might be fulfilled. The fortresses in the Milanese were in ruins, its finances in utter disorder, there were no stores in its arsenals, and no guns on its walls, whilst as Cordoba found it most difficult to get the bills sent him from Spain discounted, he could sometimes hardly supply his men with bread. The Germans who had occupied the Grisons were threatening to evacuate them unless they were promptly paid, and if the Imperialists once drew back from supporting Spain, she could scarcely hope to escape destruction. Savoy was negotiating with the Pope, Nevers, and the Venetians, and France, with the support of these powers was busily preparing for war. Had

Philip IV. refrained from inducing the Emperor to take part in the war at the very time when he had given his decision to the French as to his rejection of the Treaty of Susa, Spanish affairs would have been in an infinitely better state. It was true that like the smaller Italian powers the French had been alarmed when they heard that the Imperialists had entered the Grisons but their terror was changing into contempt when they saw that Spinola had not yet appeared in Italy. If indeed the Emperor were to evacuate the passes they might well find themselves in a position to threaten Milan. In vain the Cardinal of Savoy pressed Cordoba to retain his command. His one wish was to be allowed to retire. He seemed forgotten by the Council at Madrid and had received from them neither instructions as to peace or war nor any supplies of money. On the seventh of July Charles Emmanuel finally wrote to inform the Governor of Milan that he had decided to treat with the French. He had not only received Cordoba's assurances that neither the Imperialists nor the Spaniards were intending to advance into the Mantovano and Monferrat, but gathered from their reply to Marshal Créquy's representations that negotiations for peace could be continued if the King of Spain accepted the draft signed by Cordoba as to the Treaty of Susa. He was, therefore, sending his secretary Bonelli, to Vienna to arrange with the Emperor that Nevers should do homage to H.I.M. and receive the investiture for his states and that the French should subsequently evacuate Italy. So far as words went, Richelieu was only too anxious to lull Spain and her Italian allies into security. When Cordoba's secretary Antonio de Navas visited him at Nîmes, where the Cardinal had been residing during his negotiations with the Huguenots, he was received with the warmest assurances of His Eminence's desire to maintain the existing good relations between the two Powers. He only wished that the Italian question should be settled in such a way as to leave them undisturbed. Once the Emperor had granted the investiture to Nevers, the French would evacuate Monferrat and when the Imperial forces had left the Grisons they would hand over Susa to Savoy and refrain from further undertakings in Italy, unless any other troubles arose there. In such an event he would at once re-enter the country with thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, including the levies whom he had raised in Burgundy and in Languedoc, and those whom he would

find at Susa. He pledged his word as a Cardinal and as a man of honour that he would carry out his promises, but to Navas' disgust added that he was restoring Susa not at the request of Spain but to fulfil his engagements to Savoy. Two days before this conversation, on the sixteenth of July, 1629, Spinola had finally been appointed Governor of Milan and Commander of the Spanish forces in Italy, and at once set out to take up his new appointment, attended by a large suite, amongst whom was Velasquez, who desired to continue his studies of Italian art. The Marquis landed at Genoa on the nineteenth of September. He had delayed his coming too long, for the position of affairs had been completely changed by the restoration of peace in France. Scarcely indeed had Louis XIII. got Privas into his hands when he sent his first valet Bachelier to arrange with M. de Thoyras, who had so successfully repelled the English attacks upon the Isle of Rhé, to discuss with Nevers the measures which should be taken if the Imperialists entered Italy. It would be advisable that the French forces in Monferrat should be concentrated in Casale and in some other fortified positions, which could be held by three out of their four regiments with the support of the Mantuan troops and of the Militia, which was chiefly composed of farm labourers and artisans. If Mantua could not find garrisons for Nizza della Paglia and Acqui it would be better to slight their fortifications and leave them as open villages than to allow the enemy to occupy them. It was his chief object to provide for the safety of the most important places in Monferrat and the Mantovano without incurring too great a risk to his army, and this plan could not be carried out unless Nevers strained every nerve in his own defence. Finally Thoyras was instructed to do nothing without consulting M. de Créquy.

War, however, was rapidly becoming inevitable. The Duke of Maine whilst on his way to Casale was carried off prisoner by a Spanish party of raiders, and Collalto's vanguard entered the Milanese. Philip IV. had replied to a request from the French that he would support Sabran's application to the Emperor to grant the investiture to Nevers by once more repeating that he had asked H.I.M. to decide the case as soon as possible and to invest the lawful heirs with the states in dispute. At Vienna everyone was crying out for war, and the last hopes of peace vanished whilst Eggenberg was quibbling because Sabran had drawn up his notes in French instead of in Italian. The

French envoy took his departure on the tenth of August, and to all appearances Nevers' cause was lost. "The Confessor who was once all powerful can no longer find a word which will touch the Emperor's heart; the Empress is forbidden to speak: you may guess what my position is." For a moment the intervention of the Papal Nuncios at Paris seemed to offer some prospect of a peaceful settlement. They suggested that the Emperor should grant the Investiture to Nevers at the joint request of the Kings of France and Spain, and that the Pope should decide as to the compensation to be given to the other claimants, particularly to Guastalla, should the Emperor invite him to do so, and on the condition that whatever his decision might be, it should not become the pretext for a war. If Spain accepted these conditions, the French would evacuate Monferrat. Philip IV. again replied by an indirect refusal. He said that he had sent Spinola to Italy with instructions to arrange with the Emperor's ministers that a settlement, as had always been his first object, should be concluded upon terms which would ensure the happiness and tranquillity of Italy. The King indeed had learnt from Antonio de Navas that the paper containing these proposals had been given to the Nuncio by Richelieu, and it was clear, as he wrote to Spinola, from what the Nuncio himself had said, that they were only intended to gain time, so as to allow the strength of the Imperial and Spanish forces to dwindle away. The Cardinal, as Charles Emmanuel had from the first foretold to Cordoba, told the Nuncio that the good relations which had existed between France and Spain had been troubled by the entrance of the Imperialists into the Grisons, and merely shrugged his shoulders when reminded that they had done so with the consent of the Leaguers themselves who were under the protection of France and yet had not addressed any complaint to the French Court. "As the King of France, if he had these Italian troubles off his hands, would be a triumphant victor, and the Dutch would then acquire far greater strength at the very moment when those rebels need it most, and as the terms the Nuncios propose are quite unacceptable into the bargain, I have given orders that they are to be refused." After all, it was the Emperor who had the most at stake and it was for him to say what kind of a settlement he would agree to. Spain could only aim at securing one which would ensure the happiness of Italy. Spinola must do his best to drive the

invaders out of the Peninsula as it was evident that these proposals were not offered in good faith. Possibly the Duke of Savoy might, and with justice, have disputed Philip's claim to pose as the Peace Giver of the Italian world. As he told Cordoba, unless he received speedy help his own states and not the Milanese would have to bear the brunt of a French invasion, and if they became the battle ground of three great armies he would be plunged into utter ruin.¹

Whilst Philip IV. was cooing peace, the courtiers at Vienna were screaming for war. By the beginning of September the Aulic Council were investigating the precedents which would justify them in depriving Nevers of his states as a punishment for having called the French into the Empire. It was clear that they were all set upon war. "Our worst foe is a faithless man whose one aim is to bring about a conflict. His Highness is an enemy of Italy." Eggenberg, like all the other German officials, had indeed but little cause to love the threadbare adventurers from Siena, from Mantua, and from tumbledown castles in the Marches who snarled and fought with them for the crumbs which fell from Cæsar's table, richly laden with the confiscated spoils of Austrian, of Moravian, and of Bohemian rebels. It was reported indeed that H.I.M. would give his sentence immediately Wallenstein had arrived in Italy. "This is the Prime Minister's last idea. He hates us like poison, but has the deciding voice in everything." Agnelli could only hope that Wallenstein would not stir until he had overcome the resistance of the City of Magdeburg which was still holding out against his requests for money. He had, however, sent Colonel Aldringer, one of his most trusted lieutenants, into Suabia, where he was mustering a large force at Memmingen to march in support of Collalto. In the very week in which Spinola was entering Genoa, Agnelli could only say that though the Empress still had hopes of peace, he must necessarily believe that she was completely mistaken, as nothing turned out as she fancied it would. "I don't care what they are saying at Milan, at Madrid, or at Mantua, for here which is the place which matters, I do not see a sign of peace but absolutely the reverse." Even when the course of events in Flanders was inclining the Spaniards to come to terms with Nevers, Eggenberg, Collalto and the Emperor breathed nothing but fire and fury, chiefly because Spain did not wish for war. Collalto indeed looked upon war

as the means by which he would raise himself to greatness, and dragged the Emperor in his train as an unresisting captive. Olivares in Spain, Eggenberg in Vienna, and Collalto in Italy were "one mind in three bodies. It is no use for Y.H. to conceal your relations with France any longer. The Spanish prate of peace is a trick to lull you to sleep, and if they do take you in, you will some day find this out to your cost."¹

But for the irresolution of the Spanish Ministers it is evident that Wallenstein might have arrived in Italy, whilst the civil war was still raging in France. Philip IV., in his answer to Aytona's letter of remonstrance of the fifteenth of June, did his best to excuse his change of purpose in setting aside the agreement with Friedland which he had sanctioned in the preceding April. It was the Infanta he said who had asked Friedland to go to West Friesland, for his instructions to Sforza had merely been to ask that Imperial troops could be sent against that province as a diversion for the sake of relieving the pressure on Bois-le-Duc. Aytona must above all things prove to the satisfaction of the Emperor and his Ministers that Spain had been acting in good faith. It had been agreed that the expedition against Venetia was not to be undertaken until a Truce had been signed with the Dutch, and by the diversion against West Friesland he had hoped not only to hasten the conclusion of such a truce, but also the despatch of the "secret expedition." His one wish was to be of service to the Emperor and he could not render such help to H.I.M. until he had the war in the Netherlands off his shoulders.

The Emperor, on the other hand, had himself broken faith with him. He had sent an enormous force under Friedland against Mantua, in place of sending only the twelve thousand foot and two thousand foot which he had been asked to supply, and making a diversion in Champagne whilst the Spaniards dealt with Nevers. "This has thrown the whole plan out of gear, and moreover H.I.M. has not only failed to bring the Truce to a speedy conclusion and thus to facilitate the secret expedition, but has declared war only against Nevers and not against the Venetians as well." Thus the Milanese would have to become the base of operations for the Imperial forces, and would have to bear the whole burden of the war, which, otherwise, would have fallen upon a much wider area." Yet the injured monarch was still only anxious to give his uncle

every possible satisfaction, and had sent instructions to that effect to Spinola. Aytona was, however, to press the Emperor to send a large force into Champagne at the moment when his troops were entering Italy so as to prevent the French "from attacking him in his own house," and thus delaying the settlement of Italian affairs in the interests of his Imperial authority. Philip IV. dreaded too "lest there should be a risk of the Catholic Religion becoming infected in those provinces, as this is a danger I am keeping a most careful look-out for." The Inquisition at Milan knew but too well with what enthusiasm the teaching of the heretics from the Valtelline and the Waldensian Vallies had been welcomed in Northern Italy, and dreaded the effect of the presence of German Lutheran levies. The Imperial forces would indeed be of far greater use in West Friesland than in Mantua. Finally, he impressed upon his ambassador that he must induce the Emperor to give the fullest possible powers both to Friedland and to Collalto. "The one thing that matters is that they should set negotiations going about Mantua by frightfulness."¹

To Spinola the King wrote that he must give every assistance to Friedland's troops who were on the march to Italy. He must on no account give the Emperor any grounds for displeasure, as were H.I.M. to abandon their cause they would be in a sorry plight. He must get Friedland to agree to a peace which would be honourable both to the Emperor and to Spain. This would be impossible unless Nevers consented to place himself under the Emperor's protection, as otherwise he would be a constant source of trouble to the Imperial Government. "If you cannot bring Friedland to consent, you must try to persuade him, but without letting him see your hand, not to take part in person in the expedition to Mantua, but to let Collalto command it, and tell him that he should march into Friuli so that when the Venetians see the enemy in their own house, they may not employ their forces to reinforce Nevers but to defend their own goods and chattels. If you can talk Friedland into this, I should say you need not ask him to cut down the strength of the forces which he is sending into Italy, as he will certainly want to keep the bulk of them with him, and so Collalto will have to do with fewer Germans. If you fail in this too, and find that Friedland has made up his mind once and for all to come in person with his whole army to take possession of the Imperial

fiefs, I think that in that case you will have to speak out and to get him to promise not to march in through the Milanese on any pretext whatsoever, and also that he will so far as may be, quarter the Emperor's troops in the territories of the princes who have treated us badly in this business. It will be no light punishment for them to have to play the host to such guests. You must offer to furnish Friedland with bread and munitions for I think we should lose more if the Germans pillaged on the pretext that we were starving them than it would cost us to supply them. You must also try to enlist under my colours as many of Friedland's veterans as you can, for it is to my interest not only to increase my own army but to deplete the Emperor's as it is by no means to our advantage that he should have a large one or, I may say, one as large as mine, and we must be prepared for all events." In case of active operations taking place, Spinola must see that both armies had their share in the fighting. If possible, Friedland should occupy the Mantovano so that the Germans should have less excuse for entering the Milanese, whilst he himself occupied Monferrat in the Emperor's name as the Spaniards had more to gain by a campaign in the Marquisate. "Once more I must impress this upon you. See it is your maxim. If you have to sell your very shirt, you must not stand with folded arms whilst the Imperialists are fighting. I could not sit down under such a slur." Philip IV. reposed but little confidence in his allies. He knew but too well how hated he was at Vienna and how little dependence he could place upon the Princes of the Empire, upon Friedland, perhaps even upon the Emperor. The Bishop of Mantua, patient as he was, who had seen in the failure of Sabran's mission the ruin of his country, could not but frame his own explanation of the King's conduct. "Clear as it is that all the failures of Spain and of the House of Austria are the work of Divine Providence, yet their hearts are not softened by their misfortunes." Within a few weeks Mantua was to be avenged at Wesel and at Boisle-Duc.¹

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THE capture of the Silver Fleet and the French victory at La Rochelle had greatly encouraged those in the United Provinces who found their advantage in the continuance of the war with Spain. The shareholders in the West India Company saw before their eyes a glittering prospect of fresh triumphs and of fresh profits; peace, on the other hand, spelt ruin to the shippers and to the seamen of Rotterdam and of the cities on the Zuyder Zee. To the preachers the struggle against Antichrist was a part of the Divine Order, and all alike felt that with the help of France such a conflict could be waged without danger and with the certainty of success. Yet a large and influential party, who numbered Prince Frederick Henry in their ranks, eagerly desired peace, and, whilst bonfires blazed and mobs shouted around the waggons groaning under their loads of silver and of cochineal which were conveying the spoils of Matanzas to the treasure vaults of the Hague, grave pensionaries turned a deaf ear to hints of Richelieu's wish for an alliance.¹

To the Infanta Isabella the outlook at the beginning of 1629 was one of all but unbroken gloom. Her resources were exhausted, and though every express from Madrid brought her letters pressing her to despatch reinforcements to Savoy, she was in no position to spare a man or a ducat. She had already learnt from Spinola that she could not count for the present upon any further supplies of money from Spain, and that it was impossible for her to hope that Lorraine would make a diversion by breaking with France. The Marquis seemed rooted in Madrid and showed not the slightest intention of returning to the Netherlands, although she was never tired of impressing upon him that everything was going to ruin in his absence. "He, however, follows only the inspiration of his conscience, and though I cannot penetrate his designs, has hardened his heart, and somehow or another contrives to avoid obeying the King's reiterated commands. I know not what the outcome will be, although I see well enough what they are driving at. But the result

is on the knees of the Gods." Rubens for once might mistrust Spinola's judgment, but a general who knew that money is the sinews of war might well think that his place was at the Treasury Board in Madrid and not in his palace on the Coudenberg at Brussels. In vain the Infanta warned him that it was a miracle that Belgium had so far remained quiet despite her dire penury. "As for the Truce I have not the slightest hope that we shall now secure the terms which Kessler had arranged with the Dutch. They know only too well in what straits we are here (for it is idle for us to try to disguise them when all feel the pinch), and they are so cock-a-hoop at the taking of the Silver Fleet that I fear Señor Nicolaide will arrive with the despatches you mention at a very bad moment, and perhaps it might have been as well not to send him." The Infanta's conjectures were not unfounded. The Council of Ministers had at last come to a decision as to the proposals which Kessler had laid before them in the previous September, and, oblivious of the disaster at Matanzas, were in the middle of December sending orders to Brussels that he should meet the Dutch deputies, should ascertain from them the exact points which was in dispute as to each proposal, and should finally send his report to Spinola, "for as I am still here, I will try to arrange them as soon as possible. In case any delays should arise in this business about the Truce, and I take it there will be very long ones, Y.R.H. must conclude a suspension of hostilities at once, and send us constant expresses to keep us informed of all that takes place." As Spinola was writing on the twenty-third of January, it is evident that he did not consider that time was a very essential element in any diplomatic negotiation. Listlessness and carelessness, conjoined with "a want of understanding," were indeed the causes of all the disasters which were overtaking Spain, and yet men did not hesitate to cast upon the hard-working Olivares the responsibility for their own criminal folly and for the consequences of the jealousies and disputes which paralysed their counsels. Rubens was painting pictures of the Royal Family and of the King on horseback for the Infanta Isabella, and Philip the Fourth spent many hours of each day in chatting with the painter familiarly in his studio. "I must say, and that on very good grounds, I sincerely pity the King. Nature has endowed him with every gift of mind and body, and from my daily intercourse with him I have now

learnt to know him as he really is and to his inmost depths. If only H.M. did not distrust himself too much and put too much trust in others he would, God knows, be equal to any fortune or to any height of power. But he is now paying the penalty of his own credulity and for the stupidity of others, and is the mark for all the fiery darts of a hatred which he has done nothing to deserve. But this is the will of the Gods." Such was the King of Spain, who was so soon to be tested in the furnace of unsuccessful war.¹

With some difficulty Spinola had been able to scrape together two million four hundred thousand crowns [£600,000] in bills to send to Brussels and authority was also given to the Infanta to dispose of Crown Lands to the value of one million three hundred thousand [£325,000.] It was calculated that this sum would enable her to carry on the war until the middle of July, although the bills could only be cashed at a ruinous discount, as it had been arranged that they should be met out of the specie which was to arrive by the Silver Fleet in the following November. To meet the expenses for the latter part of the summer they were treating with a merchant named Maestraten, of Madrid, to form a company to take over the monopoly of the supply of salt from Spain to Holland, to England and to the Hanse Towns. If this scheme fell through, the Infanta might grant licenses to Dutch and English merchants to carry their goods to Spain, and to purchase salt there. "By these means Y.R.H. will, I hope, secure a supply of ready money." As Spinola was aware that the Dutch herring fisheries were the backbone of their financial system and that the herrings could not be cured without the salt from the salterns of Setubal and Las Caracas, the proposal was that of a statesman driven to desperation, and is a singular contrast to the ideas which had inspired his policy with regard to the closure of the Baltic and of the great German rivers to the shipping of the United Provinces. Yet details like these seem to show that Napoleon borrowed his idea of a Continental blockade from Spinola, and in the end that system proved disastrous alike to the House of Hapsburg and to the House of Bonaparte. But until Spinola's bills arrived the Infanta could do nothing to ward off the dangers which threatened to overwhelm her. "Our needs here," she wrote on the twenty-fifth of January, "increase every hour. It seems a miracle that we have not had a general mutiny and that

the enemy has not made some attempt. Our state could not be worse, every one is in distress, and each moment brings me a thousand fears." On the other hand, the coffers of the United Provinces were full to overflowing. The whole trade of Iceland was in the hands of the Dutch, and the shopkeepers of the New Exchange were purchasing in Amsterdam the painted chintzes which they had formerly sought in Lisbon or at Madrid. The West India Company had lent to the State a large part of their prize money from the Silver Fleet at a moderate rate of interest. In Holland alone the States had increased taxes by three million florins [£250,000], and were raising two million [£166,000] more by various loans, on the security "of the farm of the thirtieth and fortieth pennies," which formed a kind of tax upon sales. Great preparations were in progress everywhere, and it was thought that their army would take the field at the beginning of March. "We are certain that thanks to our wretched state here they will make great progress, as they know everything there is to know about our situation, for it is impossible to disguise it. If they lay siege to some fortress like Breda or Boisle-Duc, and there are rumours afloat that they will attempt one or the other of them, or if they attack some other important place, we cannot see how we could possibly relieve them. We have not got one penny to put a man in the field, and are short of powder, ammunition, artillery stores, transport waggons, draught horses, and every other requisite for the baggage train. We have not one single thing of the kind in store, and for lack of funds can neither purchase any nor put them in repair if we had them. There is not a round of ammunition in our forts, not to speak of anything else required for their defence. The soldiers are in such straits that it is quite incomprehensible to me how they have stood their privations, for most of them have not had a penny of pay for over four months and have been living on commissariat bread, for which we are a hundred thousand crowns [£25,000] in debt to the contractor, and it is only now that we have been able to give them a few placks on account which we have scraped together by felling timber in some of Y.M.'s forests and by selling some trading licences to Dutchmen so as to get a little ready cash for absolute necessities, although it is against the law to do so. Some of the provinces have paid small sums for exemption from billeting, but this has all gone in paying the placks to the soldiers and

those are only palliatives, as we cannot hope to get another penny by such means. In short, we have drained every source of revenue stone dry. It is only thanks to God's Providence that we have not had a general mutiny. One might break out at any minute. If it does we are lost. I am giving Y.M. this faithful picture of our situation that you may see how necessary it is that you should apply the remedy by sending us the supplies which you usually remit to us at this season." Such was the state to which the capture of one year's produce of the mines of Mexico had reduced the finances of the Spanish monarchy. "Bawbees" were being doled out to the sentries at Brussels when the storehouses of Amsterdam were overflowing with gold and silver.¹

Philip the Fourth, however, could do nothing to supply the necessities of his Netherlands provinces. Owing to the loss of the Silver Fleet and the calls of the war in Italy, "I find," wrote the King, "that I am somewhat short of means, and cannot comply with your requests as I would and should gladly do. I count, however, so firmly upon the loyalty and love which your provinces have always shown me, that I must ask them to give me some help in the shape of money for my present needs, and am sending Lieutenant General D. Francisco Zapata as my agent to arrange the business, and have instructed him to obey Y.R.H.'s directions in every respect." Whether Zapata's appearance was calculated to fill the starving burghers of Flanders with such enthusiasm that they would forget their own needs in their zeal to supply the wants of the Spanish Crown might perhaps be doubted. Truly the statesmen of Madrid lived in a world of their own far apart from that of every day mortals. A fortnight later the King, who had just decided to refuse Botru's proposals, proved somewhat more complaisant. "You will have received the letters which Marquis Spinola sent off by express on the fourth inst. by my orders, and will have seen by them that I have decided to conclude an armistice with the Dutch for the term of two years, on such terms and conditions as they may propose. . . . Since the express left, I have reflected that it would be better to conclude one for four or six years, provided that it covers not only operations on land but those at sea throughout every part of the ocean whether in the Indies or in the East Indies, and that the Dutch should be granted freedom of trade and navigation throughout Europe.

I have agreed to this because my Treasury would save greatly by such an armistice, and I am informing Y.R.H. of my decision so that the negotiations for the Truce may be begun on these lines without more delay." It might well be asked if the Dutch in the first flush of their naval success would consent to be excluded from the Indies for six or even for four years. Yet the terms mark an advance on the commercial projects which had been framed but a year before to secure for Spain the alliance of the Hansa. The Infanta could only reply that the Dutch Deputies at Rosendaal had referred the King's letter to Spinola to the States General, and that in the meantime a fleet of over eighty sail was being fitted out for the West Indies, a portion of which had already sailed. Hopes indeed ran high in the United Provinces that their arms would achieve great successes both by sea and land in the coming campaign.¹

Carlos Coloma, who with Count Henri de Berg had been left in command of the army whilst Spinola was in Spain was even more despondent. He warned Secretary Villela that during the whole war the obedient provinces had never been in such danger as they were at that moment, "for I must say that H.M. is mistaken if he thinks he has got generals here. He has not, for I am merely a scapegoat for these people's faults. I have no authority whatsoever. If I had, the country people would not be so discontented as they are." The one hope for the provinces, as it was the only thing which the Dutch dreaded, was that Spinola should return. If he did not do so or if someone with the same powers was not sent to replace him, "everything will come down with a crash, and then the King will lose the best and most faithful territories in his dominions." Possibly from motives of economy Coloma had laid aside Spinola's naval plans and the Flemish dockyards were silent at a moment when the Spanish Cabinet was toying with projects for maritime operations which were destined to bring into the field a new and dangerous foe. For the time, there was not a single ship afloat in the North Sea which was in a state to be sent against the Dutch, who were thus free to continue their preparations for the summer campaign both by land and on the ocean without fear of disturbance by armed force, and under the mask of the negotiations still in progress at Rosendaal. As there seemed some hopes that they might be brought to a favourable conclusion, the Spanish Government ordered that all the Dutch

prisoners of war in Spain should be released. Nothing, however, could overcome their habits of procrastination, and the Infanta in vain entreated Spinola to induce the King to send her orders to sign an armistice. As the month of March wore on, her anxieties became daily more poignant. The Dutch, she discovered, intended to seize Matanzas and to hold it as a base for their operations against the Indies. A large fleet, however, had already been despatched from Cadiz to the Spanish Main. The States General, on the other hand, had not as yet replied to His Majesty's proposals, as their decision was delayed by a violent dispute between the Arminians and the Gomarists. She had good reason to fear that their answer would be an unfavourable one, for they were now so strong both on land and sea that they were in a position to threaten an attack on both East and West Flanders, at points so far apart as Antwerp, Hulst, Dunkirk and Mardyke. She thought that they would make an attempt on the new works at Mardyke, but they were strongly held. As she could not discount any acceptances on Spain, her treasury would be emptied by the end of April. From England alone she had received any cheering tidings. If she might trust the reports of her agents in London, "her most noble indulgent and sweet carriage" together with Scaglia's confident letters, "had gained much upon the King's disposition." She had heard from Weston that England would send a minister to treat at Madrid if the Spaniards would accredit one to St. James. It was indeed Charles I. wish to bring about a general peace, and with this object his agents were already negotiating at the Hague and elsewhere. As Philip the Fourth had given similar instructions to Aytona, a settlement might possibly have been arrived at had the parties been acting in good faith. Good faith, however, was not much valued amongst the statesmen of that day. Cottington, who had been given a peerage as a reward for his long years of diplomatic labours, was the only man "of whom Spain could really hope" amongst the councillors at Whitehall "being a wise and an honest and in very good esteem of our King." On the other hand, the French party were pressing hard for a peace with France, for which, if Cottington could be believed, his sovereign had no desire to treat.¹

There was now, however, the not distant hope of an heir to the throne, and the King's joy at the prospect had not only "assuaged his fury against the French," but had lent new

weight to the Queen's influence. She was supported by a large party at Court, as "all our Scottish courtiers and many of the English prefer peace with France before peace with Spain and among them none playeth the juggler better than doth your faithful servant the Earl of Carlisle, who doth discover all he thinks for Spain's disadvantage to his friends in France, assuring them that the Lords over here is all Spanish insomuch as in truth both the Queen here and the French in France are somewhat jealous of him." Such were the opinions of the London correspondent of "Sieur Jacques Ilan, merchant in Antwerp," who in his turn forwarded on the letters to "Monsieur Damville at Liege," a gentleman who appears to have been on confidential relations with Rubens, and who was probably not unknown to the Jesuit provincial. As all correspondence addressed to Ilan was regularly copied in Sir John Coke's Office, the Government must have possessed some interesting sidelights as to Rubens' mission. Some authorities have, indeed, supposed that the writer was Sir John Coke himself. At the same time, it must be remembered that Carlisle was a warm supporter of the theory that his master by prudent diplomacy could hold the balance of power in Europe, and had done nothing to break off Scaglia's negotiations, possibly because he thought that they might lead to the Restoration of the Palatine, who, like his wife, was "well prepared for a peace with Spain." A peace on such terms might have been a boon to Charles I., but such a settlement Spain was powerless to effect.¹

The news of the taking of Susa reached Madrid early in April, and on the fifth Philip IV. wrote to inform the Infanta that he was treating with the French for a suspension of hostilities in Italy. She was, therefore, to press the Dutch to agree to conclude a Truce for the term of ten or twelve years, and that as soon as possible, for all the Council thought it indispensable to settle matters in Flanders owing to the course which affairs in Italy had taken. Spinola was sending her a précis of a memorandum which he had addressed to him on the subject with his reply, but it "is as well that Y.R.H. should understand that with regard to the point as to 'Free' you must conduct yourself at all times and in all circumstances in accordance with my instructions and that you are not to deviate from them by one hair's breadth. As regards all the other points, you may settle them as you may think best for my service. I leave this

entirely in Y.R.H.'s hands, and have particular satisfaction in doing so, as I have every confidence that you will settle this business as satisfactorily as you have done everything else which has passed through your hands." Spain still held tenaciously to a point which might well seem to be one purely of form. Such points of form were realities in the eyes of the legists and of the publicists of that age. So long indeed as Philip the Fourth was still recognised as the Suzerain of the Netherlands, he retained the right of calling upon the Empire to assist him in subduing his rebel subjects, and this right the Dutch for their part were determined to oblige him to renounce. The only tangible reasons for which he can have wished to retain the power of recovering provinces which had been lost to his house for fifty-two years were the fear firstly that by renouncing it he might lose prestige, and in the second place that the seaborne trade of Spain and above all of Portugal might be ruined if the Dutch were allowed the rights of unrestricted intercourse with the East and West Indies. Yet in his instructions to the Infanta he had left it entirely to her to decide whether or not the India trade should be conceded to the United Provinces. His opponents, therefore, might well argue that Spain was not treating in good faith whilst she refused to recognise their complete and Autonomous independence, and that it was her intention to treat any arrangement as waste paper if she felt herself strong enough to do so at any future time. Such were the vital questions at issue in a dispute which seemed in appearance but one of words. It would have been well for the world if Philip IV. could have roused himself from his idle dreams and could have brought himself to consent to the loss of provinces which had so long passed from under the sceptre of his house.

In the same despatch he sent orders that during Spinola's absence on leave Henri de Berg should have the command of his armies on the Rhine, whilst those in France were to be under D. Carlos Coloma. His instructions, however, were not to take effect if a truce or a suspension of hostilities was concluded with the Dutch. Depleted as he knew his armies in the Netherlands to be, he yet pressed the Infanta to send three thousand Walloons to Spain with the sixteen ships which were under orders at Dunkirk to join the fleet which was to reinforce the West Indies, and in the following autumn to escort the Silver

Fleet thence to Cadiz. He also asked for supplies of powder and match, although he did not specify from what sources the Infanta was to provide them.

On the thirteenth, however, the King again wrote to announce that the fleet from Peru, under General Thomas de Lazpurri, had entered Cadiz. It consisted of thirty one sail and brought a cargo worth nearly nine millions of pesos [£2,025,000], a sum which rumour on Change in London swelled to fourteen [£3,125,000.] Within sixteen days a courier had carried the glad tidings from Madrid to Brussels. Throughout the Obedient Provinces the news was welcomed with rejoicing, for now, as the courtiers at Whitehall whispered, the Spaniards would be able to pay their soldiers, and the hopes of the Dutch would be doomed to disappointment. The Infanta received it with pious thankfulness, but in her answer she was careful to point out that unless a large sum could be remitted to her without delay, only failure could be looked for. It would be impossible for her, she wrote, to send any ships to Spain from Dunkirk unless she could find the money to pay her debts to the contractors and to fit them for the voyage. If the King could not furnish her with the sums required it would be out of the question for them to sail. As for sending the force of Walloons he asked for, there were simply not enough of them to keep the regiments in Flanders up to strength, and it was for that reason that she had had to take so many regiments of Germans into her pay. Nor were her anxieties less as to affairs abroad. She had heard rumours that the King of France was intending to make an attempt upon Genoa, and that, if he did so, a rupture would ensue with Spain. If war broke out, the mails and couriers through France would be stopped, and she would be unable to correspond with Madrid, whilst the Genoese business houses in Flanders would lose the little credit which they still had, and thus make it all but impossible for her to procure money. The Governor of Burgundy had informed her that the French were massing forces near the frontier and that they had broken down the bridge at Gressy, thus interrupting his communications with Savoy.

As Savoy was said to have joined the French, she had not given the King's letter to de Berg and Coloma. The Dutch, had agreed to send delegates to a conference at Rosendaal with instructions to discuss the points at issue, and the Danes

were willing to treat with the Emperor. Thus there were still some hopes of peace.¹

Those hopes were not destined to be long lived. Willing as the Dutch might be to talk of peace, they had not delayed their preparations for war. Their army was in readiness to take the field by the middle of April; the garrisons in Friesland were marching to the Rhine, and three thousand Scotch were expected in the Maas with the first fair wind. Their one fear was lest Spinola should return from Spain. Yet rumours were current at the Hague that a raid might be attempted from the coast upon the place, and Admiral Hein was quoted as having said that such a plan was feasible. Two schemes of operations were proposed for the campaign. One party desired that an attack should be made upon Wesel, the stronghold which guarded not only the junction of the Rhine and the Lippe, but the highway from the Netherlands to Eastern and to Northern Europe. With Wesel in their hands they could easily occupy Lingën, and thus block the eastern end of the road which entered Overijssel through the gap in the Bourtange Moss. Others again urged that siege should be laid to Bois-le-Duc, the fortress which was the pride of North Brabant, and the greatest centre of Catholicism in that Catholic region. By the capture of Bois-le-Duc they would not only acquire twelve leagues of territory but would open a path into the heart of the obedient provinces. The latter suggestion was adopted, and early in May it was known at Brussels that the place was so closely beleaguered that the persons who had brought the despatches from its governor had been forced to make their way by stealth out of the city at night. No tidings could have been more unwelcome.²

The city of Bois-le-Duc, or in Flemish Hertogenbosch, was with Brussels, Louvain, and Antwerp, one of the four capitals of Brabant and had long ranked amongst the strongest of its frontier fortresses. The place, which was then about four or five miles in circumference, stands upon a rising ground in the middle of extensive marshes which are flooded during the greater part of the year, and could be reached only by strongly fortified causeways. Its ditches were kept constantly filled with water from the river Domel, which at this point unites with the Aa and the Dieze and six miles lower down flows into the Maas opposite the island of Boumel. The streets which were regularly built centred in a handsome market-place famous for its fine

buildings of timber. Above them rose the Church of St. John, which since the time of Philip II. had been the seat of a bishop and was renowned throughout the Netherlands for its fine clock and for the lofty tower which was visible all over the flat plains and fens which stretch from the Maas to the estuaries of Zealand. The place was everywhere intersected by navigable canals, which were crossed by more than fifty stone bridges. The inhabitants were well known for their military disposition, and were enriched not only by their linen and woollen manufactures but by their trade in cutlery and needles. They were with but few exceptions devoted to the Catholic Faith and, therefore, to the cause of Spain. Thus the loss of Bois-le-Duc would be a counter stroke to that of Breda, and might indeed prove of even more portentous import. Then the great rivers to the northward had guarded the heart of Holland against attack: between Bois-le-Duc and Brussels there were few obstacles, whether of art or nature, save the narrow Dyle.¹

Early in January the authorities at Brussels had learnt that large forces were collecting at St. Gertruydenberg, Heusden and Bergen-op-Zoom, and Cardinal de la Cueva was so thoroughly convinced that an attack would be attempted upon Bois-le-Duc, that on the seventh of February he had given detailed instructions to D. Carlos Coloma as to the measures to be taken in view of such a contingency. The soldiers were to be paid punctually, for they could not wait for their pay as they did in other garrisons because they were charged the same prices as the townspeople for every article of consumption, and as nothing could be brought into the place except by convoy, living was very dear. A stock of money sufficient to provide for two or three months was to be kept in hand for the event of a siege. Lastly, the garrison was to be reinforced at once and provision to be made for raising four free companies. The Infanta with her own hand wrote an order that these steps should be taken without delay. On the other hand, rumours were in circulation that the Prince of Orange intended to attack Breda, and its governor, Balanzon, a military politician whose large illegible handwriting was familiar to many European statesmen, and who numbered the Duke of Savoy amongst his correspondents, was kept in constant anxiety by the dispersal of seditious handbills in Flemish amongst its garrison. "Gallant Soldiers and Faithful Comrades," ran one which he forwarded

to the Infanta, "how much longer shall we let ourselves be tricked like children? Cannot we see they are feeding us with lies and sustaining us with empty hopes? They tried to make us think that the Silver Fleet with our arrears on board was safe in Spain. It is in the hands of the Dutch." If, however, the soldiers held a general meeting and made themselves masters of Breda, the arrears would be paid up at once. As a remedy Balanzon seized the handbills and issued stringent orders that the Huguenots who had been expelled from the place should be prevented from re-entering it, as he suspected them of being the authors.

He was, however, in no position to defend the town, for in the middle of March he had been left without money for seven weeks, and the garrison was reduced to a handful. Yet though reports from three different sources stated that the Prince of Orange intended to attack Breda, another informant stated definitely that a proposal for making an attempt upon Bois-le-Duc was still under consideration, and that if it were adopted it would be carried out at the beginning of April. His assertion proved to be correct.¹

On the third of April a large flotilla of boats laden with supplies and of sixty pontoons with artillery was brought up the Waal by the Dutch, and on the same day they began to throw a bridge over the Maas at Grave. There could be but little doubt therefore that they had decided that the capture of Bois-le-Duc should be their first object.

They had good reason to feel confident of success, for the place was but ill-prepared for any serious resistance. Fifteen months before, in January, 1628, at a time when it was feared that if the great rivers froze the Dutch might make a raid across them from Arnheim with their cavalry into Brabant, D'Aubemont who was then in command of the great fortress, had reported on its condition to the Infanta.

In this memorandum he had warned her in the most emphatic terms that, as things stood, he could expect nothing but defeat. The strength of his garrison, including both officers and men, was two thousand eight hundred. Out of their number, however, only a thousand were available for the defence of the place itself, as he was forced to hold not only the detached forts but also the towns of Eindhoven, Heswick, and Boxtel, and if the waters rose, a thousand would be required for the outer forts alone.

Of his musketeers, three hundred were scraps of boys. The floods rose fifteen feet, and when at their highest reached within five or six feet of the top of the walls. Should the walls give way he had neither money to repair them nor wood to stockade the breach. Nothing would be easier for the Dutch to get together fifty or sixty large shalloops and to transport the garrison of Dordrecht across the flooded marshes in them to attack the place, which in that case would inevitably be taken at a single blow. D'Aubermont's appeals fell upon deaf ears. A few months later he was replaced by his uncle, the Baron of Grobbendonck, the successor of that Caspar Schets, whose fame as a financier had been great at Brussels in the days of Alva and of Margaret of Parma. Like his nephew, however, he had done little to remedy the defects of either the fortifications or of a garrison in which discipline was so slack that the captains had thought it beneath their dignity to mount guard themselves. Well might D'Aubermont ask if such conduct was tolerated at Bergen or at Breda.¹

During the winter of 1628 Grobbendonck played his part in an episode which throws a curious light upon the relations which had sprung up between the contending armies, which for two generations were to be the finishing schools of most of the greatest gentlemen in Europe. Amongst the numerous natural children of Maurice, Prince of Orange, was a certain Charles of Nassau, at the time a lad of sixteen, who had been placed at the University of Leyden under the charge of a tutor. About Christmas he ran away from his pedagogue, and sought a little relaxation amongst the officers of the garrison of Heusden, where one of his relations was quartered. After "giving himself a very good time for some days," to quote the letter in which William of Wassenaer, Governor of Heusden, explained matters to the worthy Governor of Bois-le-Duc, "he got hold of a horse and two pistols, with which he has jogged off to Bois-le-Duc. I must, therefore, ask you, Sir, to have the great kindness to have him put under arrest and to detain him until I can send you instructions from Mgr. the Prince of Orange, from whom I heard this evening. His Highness says that he is a thoughtless scapegrace of a lad who has run away from school, and I should be very grateful, therefore, if you would arrange to have him sent back there, as you will thus place the Prince under infinite obligations to you. If you are good enough to hand young

Nassau over to me, I should be greatly obliged if you would give me a passport for a mounted escort to fetch him through your lines at Vlymont on Sunday next at ten o'clock.'

The matter, however, was a far more complicated one than Wassenaer supposed. He had perhaps forgotten that the Catholic Church took a motherly interest in the soul of every heretic even if that heretic were only a runaway schoolboy, a circumstance of which young Nassau himself seems to have been perfectly aware. His escapade had already become an affair of state, and Grobbendonck, therefore, could not send him back to receive a well-merited whipping without the consent of the highest authorities in the Obedient Provinces.

"Madame," wrote the Baron to the Infanta, "a young man of sixteen named Charles of Nassau, a natural son of the late Count Nassau, Prince of Orange, arrived at the gate of this city and asked me for my protection and a safe conduct, as he said that he had got himself into a scrape, because he had killed a French gentleman who belonged to the Bodyguard of the Prince of Orange, and that he was anxious to take service here. He is a good-looking young fellow enough, but seems to be a bit of a blackguard, and I am afraid has not told me the whole truth, as I should judge indeed from the Governor of Heusden's letter which says nothing about the scrape he talks of, but only that he has run away from school unbeknown to his relations, as Your Highness will see from the enclosed. I must, therefore, humbly ask Y.R.H. whether it is your pleasure that I should comply with the Prince of Orange's request to send him back to him, or whether I should leave it to the boy whether he will go back or stay, and if he stays what I am to do with him." At the same time, he asked Secretary de la Faille to see that the matter was dealt with as soon as possible, as he was afraid that both the Prince of Orange and the Governor of Heusden would be pressing him for an answer.

Her Royal Highness, who so far as circumstances would permit, had for long been upon the most friendly terms with the Prince of Orange, hastened to reply to Grobbendonck's enquiry without delay. "Dear and Well Beloved Sir, We have received your letter of the sixth inst. as to the arrival of Charles de Nassau at Bois-le-Duc, and in reply request you to instruct the Bishop of Bois-le-Duc by our order to examine the young man particularly, so as to ascertain if there is any sign that he wishes to

become a convert, as in that case you may keep him with you. If, however, there is no sign that he has any such intention, you may send him back as the Governor of Heusden requests."

Michael Opgrave, Bishop of Bois-le-Duc, was a court favourite whose appointment had not been received with universal acclamation, but he was soon to prove himself a man of true metal, by his refusal to desert his flock when the city fell.

In accordance with the Infanta's instructions he accordingly questioned the young runaway himself. "I found him to be a mere child. His judgment is weak, his language puerile, and his understanding so feeble and inconsequent that I cannot make up my mind whether his bad conduct is due merely to his extreme youth or whether it must be set down to his perverted disposition, and to an ill bringing-up. In speaking of religious subjects he says not a word to show that he has ever bestowed a thought upon the subject before, or come to a conclusion on any point. It is true that he says he is quite ready to be received into the Catholic Roman Faith, but though he does not raise the slightest difficulty or objection to any article of our creed, yet I am afraid this is only a proof of his utter thoughtlessness, and of a wish to gain our goodwill, and that if he goes back to Holland he will cast aside our religion as lightly as he would now accept it. I think, upon the whole, it would be well if it could be managed that he should spend a short time at some place rather further from the front, where he could be given some instruction in Religion, and where we could get some acquaintance with his disposition and behaviour."

Unfortunately nothing remains to tell what befell the truant and catechumen.¹

Grobbendonck's thoughts were soon to be occupied with more engrossing subjects. On the eleventh of April he received a warning from Balançon that an attempt to take advantage of the floods, which were very high, to effect the surprise of Bois-le-Duc would very shortly be made, but though he set little store by the warning, he was convinced that the enemy would lay siege to the place. At the same time he wrote that he had learnt that some merchants from Antwerp who were at the Hague were making arrangements to betray their city to the Dutch, and that they had assured them that they would be assisted in their design by many good patriots within its walls.

A week later Grobbendonck again wrote to the Infanta,

but in a far more serious tone. He was, he said, in no position to sustain a siege. His people were very few in number, and discontented, and he was but ill-supplied. If Her Highness did not fulfil the promise which she had made him when he left Brussels that she would send him money by the end of April he would be undone. He had a garrison only two thousand strong and required at least fifteen hundred more, whilst the Dutch had at least three thousand, and if they attacked the place from the side of Grave it would be impossible to throw in reinforcements except under the cover of an army. If no reinforcements could be spared he asked only that his officers who were on leave should be sent back to duty. Even if the waters remained high the enemy would encamp upon the heights and endeavour to take the town by blockade, for he was warned by the Catholics, especially by those of Nymwegen and by his spies at the Hague, that he would certainly be attacked, though Balançon still believed that Breda was in danger.¹

At the end of April the Dutch concentrated their forces round Nymwegen and Schenckenschans, where on the twenty-eighth they were joined by Prince Frederick Henry, who at once advanced to the Mooker Heide where he held a general muster. Next day he crossed the Maas at Grave and marched towards Bois-le-Duc, where he arrived on the following day, after occupying Heswick on his road, and took up his quarters at the Castle of Heym. The Governor of Bois-le-Duc saw little hope of escaping from the impending ruin, and his fears were shared by every well-wisher of Spain. The waters were falling fast, and it would, therefore, be easy for the enemy to close every avenue of approach to the town. If troops were not sent at once, the reinforcements would arrive too late yet, as he remarked pathetically, they had to be paid whether they were employed or not. His own people, all at least of them who could get outside the gates, were deserting, and their example would certainly be followed by any who might be sent to hold the outer lines. The guard rooms were overcrowded with men who had been laid by the heels for insulting their officers. He was sending Captain Kessler to Her Royal Highness to explain the position and to beg that two engineers might be sent to him who could take it in turns if there was a siege to go round the works. If it should turn out that they were not required he would send them back to Count Henri de Berg. His one consolation

was that there was enough grain in his granaries to supply a large army. Such was the state of the most important fortress in North Brabant at the moment when it was on the point of being besieged by overwhelming forces. But it was no one's business to see that Coloma carried out Cueva's orders, for Spinola was "absent on leave" at Madrid.¹

Nor could it be said that those in power at Brussels had been left unwarned. Ten or twelve times a day expresses entered de la Faille's cabinet with letters from Catholic sympathisers who had heard that an attack was in contemplation on Bois-le-Duc, and the Secretary knew that the Dutch had sent out from Crevecœur skiffs carrying engineers accompanied by soldiers who were natives of the place to sound the floods and to survey the avenues by which the marshes could be crossed. In reply to Grobbendonck's entreaties the Infanta promised that she would have two hundred men sent to him from Breda and three hundred from Maestricht. On that very day, however, he was writing to inform her that the Dutch army had broken up from its quarters and was encamped on Mooker Heath. Scarcely had the Infanta received this despatch than she wrote to entreat de Berg, who was at Roermond, to march towards Bois-le-Duc, although it had been his intention after hearing that the enemy were concentrated round Grave to advance towards Diest so as to cover Maestricht. With her own hand she added as an apostille, "It will be well that Count Henri should come to Diest at once, as on his way there he could find out whether it would be possible to throw some forces into Bois-le-Duc." De Berg, however, paid no attention either to her orders or to her entreaties. Whether he was acting in bad faith or whether he was convinced on reconnoitring the position that it would be impossible for him to carry her wishes into effect it is perhaps impossible to decide. Grobbendonck was forced to admit that it would be out of the question to throw troops into the place without a great effort. By the first of May the enemy had surrounded the town, but as the headquarters of the various divisions lay at wide distances apart, the Governor half believed that if the attack was made at once it would be easy to break their lines and to throw in reinforcements through the gaps. But the delay had proved fatal. Even on the second not a man from either Breda or Maestricht had yet made his appearance. "If they had marched here at once they could

have got in easily, but the enemy are sapping up to the forts and will soon take them although they are not in such strength as was expected."¹

The posts which left Brussels on the third of May carried the tidings to Madrid that the siege of Bois-le-Duc had begun. An attempt, wrote the Infanta, was to be made from Breda to relieve it, and she was sending for reinforcements from the Palatinate "as the place is so important and there are so many and such good Catholics in it." The Spaniards received the news with composure, their sovereign with consternation. "Bois-le-Duc," wrote Scaglia, "will certainly hold out longer than many people think it will. Plenty of money has been sent to Flanders, and possibly reinforcements will follow from Italy. The Pope, whom they stand in such awe of here, is very anxious that some attempt should be made on Geneva, and the hope of one seems to be drawing him over to the Spanish side." Philip IV., however, was now keenly awake to the dangers of his position, threatened as he was alike in Italy and in the Netherlands, and left without support by his kinsmen at Vienna. He was convinced that Savoy was in league with France, and that he could only hope to secure the success of his policy in Italy by inducing Friedland to make a diversion in the Veneto. Consequently, even before he had received the news that the Dutch had entered the field, he had, as has been seen, instructed Aytona as to the conditions upon which he would recognise Nevers, although he would not ratify the convention which Cordoba had entered into with the French. On the thirteenth of May the news reached him that the siege of Bois-le-Duc had begun. He at once sent orders to the Infanta that she should authorise Rubens, who was at Brussels on his way to London, to conclude a suspension of hostilities with England on condition that Weston and Cottington should be sent to negotiate in Spain. She was also to employ de la Ville, who was the Agent of the Duke of Lorraine, to treat at Whitehall. The army in Flanders was to be placed under the command of de Berg until Spinola could arrive to replace him, and the forces on the French frontier under that of Coloma. Bois-le-Duc was to be relieved at any price, even if it cost him all his states. He had written to entreat the Emperor to make as great efforts to succour the city as he would have done had he been shut up in it himself, and had addressed both Bavaria and the Catholic Electors in language not

less impressive. "As this matter is so all-important I have given orders that public prayers should everywhere be said to commend it to God and I hereby charge Y.R.H. to have the same done in Belgium, for, though I am preparing to employ every human means for its preservation, I confide the defence of this place solely to His just, mighty and all pitying Hand." Such was the spirit in which Philip IV. sought to atone for the vacillation of his trusted councillors and for the treachery of those who should have been his defenders in Flanders." The effects of Spinola's absence were everywhere to be seen. The captain of the "Adventure," which was sent over from England to fetch Rubens from Dunkirk, reported to the Admiralty that the town was very poor," all the ships of the King of Spain being there in harbour, and the people full of faction for want of pay. There are riding before this town nine Hollanders, the Admiral of Holland, the Chief Commander, but they purpose shortly to remove for there is no expectation of the ships coming out of Dunkirk." For a moment, indeed, it had been thought that a naval attack would be made upon the port. Yet a few months before the privateers from Dunkirk had swept the Dutch traders and fishers from the seas.

The Infanta might invoke the aid of Heaven, but she was also endeavouring to use the aid of diplomacy on earth, although at the outset it seemed likely that her utmost efforts would result only in failure.¹

CHAPTER XC

NO sooner had the Infanta received the news that the Dutch had thrown their whole army against Bois-le-Duc than she sent an express to Vienna with letters to entreat the Emperor to send her all the reinforcements which he could spare her in her urgent need. Ferdinand II. could, however, do but little without the consent of the Catholic League. He accordingly forwarded the despatches on to Munich, with the comment that he was sending Friedland with his own troops into Lower Burgundy, but that the Bavarian forces were in a position to arrive in that province with much greater speed, a truth which Aytona likewise enforced upon Maximilian even at the cost of an admission that if Bois-le-Duc were left to depend solely upon the Emperor's assistance, it would inevitably be lost. Finally Aytona in an eloquent peroration reminded the Elector that his duty to God, to the Spanish King, to the Infanta and to the afflicted Belgians made it imperative upon him to comply with the Emperor's request. Maximilian was used to such appeals and he had, moreover, not forgotten that the Spaniards but three years before had turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of the League for help against the victorious Danes. To the Emperor he merely replied that he was quite aware that until peace had been signed with Denmark, it would be impossible to send the Imperial forces to assist the Infanta. He could not but point out to H.I.M. that the Catholic League had decided to maintain strict neutrality as regarded Holland, and that it might be a difficult matter to induce them to reverse their decision, which had once more been confirmed at their meetings at Heidelberg in the preceding February, although they were willing to offer such help as they could give without involving themselves in a conflict with the Dutch. He omitted to state that he had already warned the Electors of Cologne and of Mainz that if they gave the Emperor any assistance against the United Provinces the latter would look upon it as a breach of neutrality. To the courtiers at the Hofburg it seemed incredible that any German prince should dare to take up an independent attitude against his

Imperial liege lord, and rumours were everywhere in circulation that Collalto would be placed in command of the army which was to enter France through Lorraine and that levies were being made by Bavaria, by Saxony, and by many other states of the Empire to support him. It was also thought that a diversion would be made by an attack on Picardy, and that the Emperor would comply with the request of the Bishop of Verdun that he would aid him to maintain his rights as a Prince of the Empire against the encroachments of the French.

In reality, nothing was more improbable than that the Catholic League would allow itself to be involved in a series of wars in which it saw that its own interests were likely to gain but little, for if the Imperial authority were strengthened, that of the members of the Empire would be proportionately weakened. All the directors of the Catholic League save Maximilian were ecclesiastics, yet they failed to realise that the Cause of God was in any sense identical with that of Spain or even of the hapless Belgians. In their meeting at Heidelberg they had united in a protest against the exaction of the Imperial soldiery which were fast bringing Germany to its ruin, and had declared that the contributions must be lessened. A rupture with Holland must be avoided at all hazards, and they again reminded the Emperor that at their meeting at Wurzburg in the previous September they had decided that in no case must their army be employed against the Dutch even if Spain failed to come to terms with her revolted provinces and with England. At most the Emperor might intervene indirectly in her favour if he could do so without incurring the censure of the States General. Finally they had given H.I.M. an emphatic warning that he must turn a deaf ear to any representations from the Infanta Isabella, and that they would resist any proposals from foreign powers for the restitution of the Palatinate unless full satisfaction was given to Maximilian, thus renewing the resolutions which had been arrived at by the meeting of Electors at Mühlhausen in the autumn of 1627.¹

Notwithstanding the Heidelberg Resolutions, Ferdinand II. thought that he might induce the Electors and the Princes of the Empire to support him in his efforts to maintain the Imperial authority in Italy, but his faithful envoy the Abbot of Kremsmünster, found that they had no mind to involve themselves in an Italian war at the risk of bringing about a French invasion of Germany, and that their one wish was that a

general peace might be speedily concluded. It was obvious therefore, that the Infanta could expect but little aid from the champions of the Catholic Religion in Germany.

The military power, however, counted in her eyes far more than the Civil authorities. If Friedland and Tilly proved willing to come to her help it would matter little whether they did so with the sanction of their nominal masters or not. There were, indeed, some not unfavourable omens. Colonel Gubern commanded the important frontier stronghold of Lingen as Tilly's lieutenant. To Gubern Count Henri had appealed for help when he heard that Bois-le-Duc was in danger, and he had at once sent two companies of foot from his garrison to join the Spanish headquarters at Diest. "I have done so," ran Gubern's report to Tilly, "for the sake of the common cause." Possibly that stern soldier-champion of the Catholic Faith might understand the words "Common cause" in a somewhat different sense to that which they conveyed to the ears of an Elector of Cologne or of a Bishop of Wurzburg. The victor of Lutter cared little for pious Rhine prelates or for Jesuit trained dukes. If need were, he might yet take his own line about helping the Infanta of Brussels, and remember that he himself was by birth one of the "afflicted Belgians."¹

By the eighth of May the Dutch had completed their lines and were vigorously pressing forward the attack. Their army was composed of four divisions which were under the Prince of Orange as Commander-in-Chief with Colonel Pincen, Baron Brederode, Count Earnest and Count William of Nassau as his subordinates, and according to Colonel Gubern consisted of two hundred and sixty companies of foot and seventy-six troops of horse, besides a large number of pioneers. Even mills had been provided to pump off the water from the marshes.

The lines of circumvallation were "marvellously strong," and by the end of May it was believed that it would be impossible to force them. The speed with which they had been carried out seemed beyond belief especially to those who knew that they had been carried for sixty rods through a morass, which the besiegers had believed to be impassable. Thanks to the skill of the Boers from Holland, the "Hollanders' Dam," as Prince Frederick Henry named it in their honour, had been constructed to stop the gap. They had first enclosed a short stretch of the bog in squares with planks and boards which they had carried down to

the bottom sand, had then dragged out the peat by sheer strength of muscle and sinew, and had forthwith filled up the hole with broom and good earth. At any moment of the day or night the workers might see the Prince appear amongst them to encourage and superintend their labours. According to an English observer who visited the Dutch lines in July, their outer works then measured about twenty-five miles round. In many places they were furnished with a double ditch and two parapets like a gallery, which in marshy spots was built of sound earth and withies. At intervals of a half-musket shot they were strengthened with redoubts, one of which as Grobbendonck carefully noted stood upon a heath "near the town-gallows to the west," hornworks, and forts trenched, palissaded, and furnished with many strong batteries. The second line had a trench and parapets. In it was quartered the detachment which kept watch on the movements of Henri de Berg. The innermost was fortified on the side of the town with redoubts and sconces. The siege-works constructed before Groll in the previous summer had been looked upon as a masterpiece of military art: they were far surpassed by those before Bois-le-Duc. "I believe so much ground was never thrown up in so little time since Noah's flood." The defenders, on the other hand, were forced to rely mainly upon the natural advantages of their position. The marshes which surrounded the place could be laid under water with but little difficulty, and were guarded by two forts of which the largest, Fort St. Antony, lay "most remote" from the town, whilst two traverses and a large hornwork lay between the smaller fort and the City gate. The out-garrisons at Eindhoven and Boxtel might also assist the besieged in maintaining their communications with a relieving army.

To the North of the Dutch position was the Fort of Crevecoeur from which a good road ran to Bois-le-Duc. Near it lay Colonel Pincen who, it was believed, would make the main attack. Next to Pincen lay the Prince of Orange, who, besides his own guards, had the French and English auxiliaries with him, and was faced by Great and Little Fort St. Antony, or, as they were known by the Dutch, the Vuchterschans. The larger fort was very strongly fortified with ditches, hornworks, a counterscarp, a false braye, and walls, and was completely commanded by the smaller one, which, however, could be far more easily approached, although it could only be assaulted at the cost of a great loss of men and

was protected by some inland dykes. The third quarter was commanded by Baron Brederode who was faced by the great redoubt of Pettebeer, and the fourth by Count Earnest of Nassau who had to carry his approaches against the town wall across the inundation by a gallery of withies and earth "brought by hand," seventy-two rods long, and cannon proof, whilst with a second line he was attacking a hornwork and traverse before the great gate. The last quarter was that held by Count William of Nassau, which extended to Eingolden, where it met with the line from Crevecoeur. At Eingolden a squadron of near three thousand sail of transports protected by men-of-war and destined to supply an army which by friend and foe alike was looked upon as unconquerable, was riding at anchor. Well might de Berg write to Grobbendonck "that it was as possible to reach Heaven as to succour him."¹

Yet the Baron of Grobbendonck held out bravely, as if to prove to the world that the Flemish nobles, whom Spanish swash-bucklers looked upon with such scorn, could yet fight as boldly as any Castilian cavalier for the honour of Spain and of her king. The bombardment began on May the thirteenth, but the besieged opened the floodgates of the canals, and the inrush of water washed away the road which Count Earnest was constructing through the marshes near Houten and thus delayed the completion of the lines of circumvallation. Night after night fire-signals shone red on Saint John's belfry, and messenger after messenger made his way through the floods which everywhere covered the meadows to the depth of a foot, bearing frantic appeals for help to the Infanta, to de Berg, and even to the Duke of Neuburg, although it was more than suspected that His Ducal Highness had a secret understanding with the Dutch. For a moment these appeals seemed fruitless. It was rumoured that Admiral Piet Hein with the aid of two thousand of the English who had fought at La Rochelle might at any moment make a descent upon the coast of Flanders to attack Antwerp with his fleet, and the government at Brussels, in their fear lest the dykes of that city or those of Hulst, the key to the dyke system of East Flanders, might fall into his hands, kept back the troops who were so sorely needed in North Brabant. The Infanta could only entreat the Baron to hold out until relief could reach him, and assure him that she was doing her utmost to procure it. She knew but too well the issues which were at stake. As

Father Alessandro wrote to Kuttner from Rome with malicious glee, "Bois-le-Duc is besieged, and the Spaniards fear that they will lose it. If they do the Infanta will have to evacuate Brussels and all Brabant will be laid under contribution." But the Holy Father would thus be enabled to annex Urbino without interference, and to the Curia the future acquisition of Urbino under the eyes of an unremonstrating Spanish Ambassador seemed far more important than the possible loss of the Obedient Netherlands wholly or in part to the Catholic fold.¹

On the seventeenth of May the Infanta sent D. Juan de Benavides to Spain to press for the despatch of reinforcements. Once more she pointed out the ruin which the loss of Bois-le-Duc with its bishopric, its monasteries, its nunneries, and its population of devoted Catholics would bring upon Catholicism. Frederick Henry was attacking the place with forty thousand foot, six thousand horse and a great train of artillery, whilst all the troops whom she could spare to relieve it, at a time when she might at any moment be attacked in Flanders, had not been paid for months, and were short of every kind of stores and equipment. The Emperor had promised to send her what help he could, although he had just despatched eight thousand foot and a thousand horse into Alsace to relieve the pressure upon Italy. It might well have been doubted whether Spain could do much to assist her, but at that very moment all the Provinces, Cities and Boroughs of Castile as well as its noble and landed proprietors had received a special summons to furnish men and money for the war and brevets of the Military Orders and Patents of Nobility were on sale to increase the King's resources. The contributions raised in response to the appeal were enormous, and four hundred and fifty thousand crowns [£112,500] were at once despatched to Flanders. The same express carried the news that Spain and England had mutually agreed to exchange envoys and to arrange for hostilities to be suspended whilst the negotiations for peace were being carried on. It was hoped, indeed, that England would not make a treaty with France.

Tidings of good import also reached the Infanta from Rosendaal. The Dutch had accepted the preamble of the treaty in the form in which it had been sent from Spain so as to avoid any difficulty arising as to the use of the word "Free," and had arranged that the Truce itself should not consist of separate articles, but solely of references to that of 1609. It was thus

merely a repetition of the previous one. On the other hand her expectations that the article as to the freedom of the provinces would be annulled had not been fulfilled. The Dutch stated with great truth that the Spaniards had procrastinated in confirming the terms which had been submitted to them in the previous July and that they had only themselves to thank for a delay during which "Your Majesty has not said one word." Since July the position of Spain had changed considerably for the worse. "Your Majesty" must however take into consideration that it is most advisable for you to accept their proposals now that Bois-le-Duc is in such danger. If that place falls the spirit of the Obedient Netherlands will be utterly broken. You must remember also that the use of the word 'Free' in the first article appears rather to imply that they are authorized to conclude a treaty, than to recognize them as sovereign and independent states, and that the Kings of France and England have all along understood it in the former sense. During a truce you have always had to treat the Dutch as neutrals, and when it expires its articles forthwith became null and void. It is, therefore for Y.M. to consider whether for the sake of a point of such little real importance, you should risk the loss of these provinces which are now utterly worn out and may, if you press them still harder, refuse you any further aids. If they were to adopt such a course the rebels could be encouraged to inflict injuries upon you which on account of the distance at which these states lie from Spain could if they were ever remedied, only be so in part or after long delays." She pointed out that H.M.'s prestige would only suffer if the word "Free" were employed in the Truce, and that the use of it might be avoided by stating simply that the Second Truce renewed the previous one. She must beg him to let her have his answer by the tenth of June at the latest, as procrastination was at the bottom of all their troubles.¹

The Infanta was wholly justified in the event for offering advice which, had it been accepted at Madrid, would have relieved Spain from all its difficulties in the Netherlands, if not in Italy. But fate had decreed that the Spanish Empire was to be brought to the brink of ruin by its lawyers.

Philip IV., on the other hand, was still buoyed up by his hopes. He was convinced that there was no chance of a rupture with France, although he feared that the French, by entering Italy, showed that they contemplated undertakings extending far

of his peoples if he would have them fulfil their duty towards himself. The States of Flanders and of Brabant were the natural defenders of the liberties of the Obedient Provinces, and were far from being merely the passive instruments with which the sovereign carried out his will. All through Europe save in Germany or perhaps rather in the states which still owed allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire "of the German nation," representative institutions, as representative institutions had been understood in the Middle Ages, were still instinct with life, and the only European sovereigns who were really the absolute or the all but absolute masters of their peoples, were those German princes who, like Maximilian of Bavaria, were such eager champions of the liberties of Germany. Unfortunately for Spain it was with these absolute monarchlets that the Infanta Isabella had to deal, for to them a Hapsburg monarchy meant all that her own despotic rule would have meant to the States of Flanders. Yet, once again, she was forced to acknowledge that without the help of the armies of the Emperor and of the Catholic League, Bois-le-duc could never be relieved.¹ Grobbendonck meanwhile was doing his best. Almost daily the besieged were making sallies against the trenches, but though they had succeeded in flooding Count Ernest's headquarters, they never succeeded in penetrating the lines of circumvallation. In the middle of May a Lorrainer who had deserted from the Regiment of Châtillon, made his way into the town. From him Grobbendonck learnt that the besieging force consisted only of twenty thousand men, and that the French and English were daily deserting their colours. If Count Henri de Berg would make a diversion in the direction of Nymwegen, the siege would be raised forthwith. As the Count had only provisions for fourteen days the Infanta remarked that it would be useless for him to attack the besiegers' camps. On the other hand Grobbendonck had good reason to fear that the enemy, after bombarding the place, would attempt to take it by assault. The Governor thought upon the whole that the best plan to raise the siege would be to attack the lines of circumvallation on both sides simultaneously as, in his opinion, the diversion suggested by the Lorrainer would produce no effect. His apprehensions were speedily realised. On the twenty-third of May the English, who had carried a sap almost up to the half moon of Fort Saint Anthony, attempted to storm it. They had already laid a mine under the half moon which they hoped to be able to explode after

they had driven the Spaniards back upon it. But, in the rush, the pikemen got so mixed up with the enemy that the scheme proved impossible to carry out. Hand grenades and bombs were, however, thrown into the Little Fort, and the garrison were forced to take refuge in the counterscarp from the shower of iron. The Dutch had flooded the meadows near the Maas, and had thrown up earthworks to bar the road across them against the relieving force, whilst, on the other hand, the river was so low that it was useless for the Spaniards to cut the great Littayen Dyke which they still held. Night after night rockets rose from the belfry of Saint John's, and fire signals blazed on its parapets. On the second of June the Aldermen of the city wrote that unless relief were sent at once the earthworks would be stormed and then the place would have to surrender. All the Infanta could answer was that the Governor should raise thirty or forty thousand dollars [£3,750 to £5,000] from the townspeople, and that the States of Brabant had voted a final grant for the relief. But the fates were against Spain. De Berg misunderstood the fire-signals when two fires were lit on each side of the town belfry, and lay quiescent in his camp, although the Infanta, who knew only too well what these signs meant, urged him to hasten. By the twenty-fourth of June the enemy had begun to entrench themselves between the town and the fort of Saint Isabella, despite all the efforts of the besieged, who swept the glacis with breech-loading mortars, for they saw clearly that if the Dutch succeeded in effecting a lodgement, "all the evil" which they so much dreaded "might come to pass." Grobbendonck was now pressed close on all sides, his powder was running out, and he was only able to raise the two thousand Philippias [£500], with which he gave his men a third of their scanty pay, by showing a receipt from an Antwerp money changer that the Infanta had paid down the sum in advance. Nor had his messengers been more fortunate. The bearer of some letters from Berg had been seized by the Prince of Orange and had confessed under torture the time and place at which the attempt at a relief was to be made. Another had got drowned in the floods and the enemy had discovered letters from the Infanta, de Berg, and the Infanta's private secretary, Verreyken, hidden in the brim of his hat. From this correspondence it was clear that de Berg would do his best to raise the siege, but that the attempt would necessarily be delayed by the difficulty in making the preparations

required for so large a force. In consequence the besiegers' lines were strengthened, and large reinforcements, including six thousand mercenaries, of whom two thousand were Scotch, were hurried up. Nor was it possible for Grobbendonck to hope that the peasantry would be of any assistance in procuring information as they were now thoroughly cowed, and would not give his messengers the slightest aid.¹

By the end of May the Spaniards, under de Berg, were concentrating between Malines and Lierre, but even the Dutch remarked that they were coming together very slowly and that their commander, who had been appointed solely to please the States of Flanders, showed but little zeal in carrying out his task. At the end of June, however, he took the field, and mustered an army of twenty-thousand foot, five thousand horse, and sixty guns at Turnhout, from which he advanced towards Bois-le-duc by the old Roman road of the Langestraat. In his train he carried a number of small boats on waggons. When his cavalry reached Vlyment, they were sighted both from the Dutch camp and from the town, but were driven back by a few shots from the Three Sisters Redoubt. All night long drums were beating and links were flitting about in the city, whilst the besiegers stood to their arms in momentary expectation of a sortie. None, however, was made, and though de Berg's cavalry raided the Dutch lines of communication and not only took a convoy of forty waggons laden with ammunition but recovered Boxtel, he lay at that place for twenty-one days, occupied chiefly in entrenching his position and did nothing to co-operate with the besieged who, on the fourth of July made a fruitless sally in order to cut the Dommel Dyke. Some of his officers, however, sounded the waters in the flooded meadows, and reported that it would be possible to find a way through them to the town. It was arranged that twelve hundred men should be detached as a forlorn hope to make the attempt, but two peasants engaged to guide them were captured by the Dutch, and duly hanged. Many, indeed, believed that the unfortunate men had been betrayed by Count Henri himself. On the seventeenth of July the Spaniards made a desperate attempt to force a way through the lines. Famine was raging in the city, and the Prince of Orange had captured both Great and Little Fort Saint Antony with the traverse between the Little Fort and the Town and was now within thirty paces of the walls. The garrison of the Great Fort which was divided by a cross-trench, might well

have held out for some days, but they feared that the Little Fort which commanded it would be carried by assault and that they would then be cut off. They, therefore, evacuated it on July the seventeenth, and it was at once occupied by a Dutch and by a French company. The Little Fort was evacuated next day, and Colonel Harwood with some English troops not only rushed into it, but followed up the flying enemy into the traverse, which, it was thought, would have proved very difficult to reduce. The forts were found to be very strongly fortified, "and the capture of each of them means as much as that of a town." On receiving the news Count Henri marched off from Bortel towards the Maas on the pretext that it was impossible for him to do anything against the Dutch position. His letter to Grobbendonck fell into the hands of the Prince of Orange by a clever trick. The Prince had employed as a spy a peasant who was also in the pay of the Spaniards and who had undertaken to convey de Berg's letter to its destination. This man, on his return to the Dutch headquarters, boasted loudly of what he had learnt in the enemy's lines and was profuse in his offers of service in the town. Orange's suspicions were aroused but as he was afraid that the man had not, at the moment, got any papers on him, he despatched him to his destination and ordered a trooper to follow him closely, to seize him when he got near the outworks of the fortress, and to bring him back at once with everything that he had about him. These orders were carried out and the letter was discovered. It showed that de Berg was marching in the direction of Wesel where he hoped that he would be met by the Imperial troops who were on their march thither and that he would then attempt some notable exploit "which would oblige the Dutch to meet him in the open field." If he was victorious they would have to raise the siege. The Count's intentions may have been good but English observers thought that he would have done better to maintain his position at Bortel for the Dutch were in such fear of his army, which they believed numbered twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse, that whilst he lay near them the Prince of Orange "accompanied by the King of Bohemia," who was serving with him as a volunteer, and the whole army "watched twenty nights together, and if he had continued to keep them in that alarm he had sooner wearied than he can now divert them." Royal and distinguished visitors were as common before Bois-le-Duc as they had been before Breda.

Besides the King of Bohemia, the second son of the King of Denmark visited Orange on his road to France to see the "excellent and world-renowned siege works," whilst Sir Thomas Roe who was journeying to Constantinople told Elizabeth of Bohemia "of the things admirable and beyond description" which he had found in the camp. The Queen of Bohemia was at Rhenen, three hours away, and it was only when she learnt from Orange that owing to de Berg's advance the neighbourhood might soon become the seat of war that she removed to Vianen on her way to Rotterdam.

The eyes of the European world were now turned from Italy to North Brabant.¹

Spinola indeed had from the first been seriously alarmed. Like the Infanta he knew that in the interests of Spain it was all important that the conferences at Rosendaal should result in a satisfactory settlement and in vain urged the King to come to a decision as to the proposals which had been laid before him through Kessler, and to overcome his inclination to rely upon the counsels of others. In reply to the letter from the Infanta which was brought him by D. Juan de Benavides, he, on the sixth of June, sent her a copy of the King's instructions as to the truce. "Your R.H. will be surprised to see the names of the persons whom you are to consult and also by the omissions from the list. Those who have been left out will certainly complain loudly and I must say there need have been no question of raising this extra difficulty as the whole of the Council of State with but one exception have decided that the truce should be concluded, and H.M. himself has told me in so many words that he recognizes it is the only thing to be done. But as H.M. has instructed you to take this step, I thought it best not to raise any objections, as it would only have caused delay had I done so, and some one would have been sure to say I do nothing but criticise everything. As for the grumblers I spoke of, Y.R.H., might possibly arrange that all those called in to advise you should be consulted privately and sworn to secrecy so that no one may know who has been called on. As for acting upon their advice I can only tell you that it is beyond all doubt that you must settle this business without more delay and conclude the truce without waiting for further instructions. If you do, it will, as matters stand here, only cause us irreparable injury.

"To save Bois-le-Duc I brought the Breda business before

H.M. I must say I did so with the greatest pain as I cannot bear to think that we may have to lose a place which cost us so dear to win. For my own part I think we ought on no account to give it up unless no other way can be found for relieving Bois-le-Duc. I still hope, however, that Y.H. will not only save that town but conclude the Truce as this is the one thing needful for us. Otherwise we shall lose all."

Spinola begged the Infanta to let him know whether the attempt to raise the siege had already been begun, and if it should not have proved successful, what her plans for the future were and what prospects they offered. He asked that the despatches should be sent to Italy as well as to Madrid so that wherever he might be he might receive them without delay. For the first time he seemed to acknowledge that his work in the Netherlands was done.¹

Philip IV., in view of the seriousness of the position, had written to Aytona to ask that Friedland should not proceed to Italy until the following March. Casale was, indeed, in little danger whilst the Huguenots were still in revolt in France. At the same time he ordered Cordoba to send all the forces he could spare to Flanders, in case the French had withdrawn their army from Italy, and only keep enough to secure the Milanese. D. Gonzalez was also to arrange if possible that the Emperor should send his nine thousand German infantry and thousand horse, who were then on their march to Italy, to join the Infanta in the Netherlands. Thus, by the end of August she would have a large force under her orders. Spinola, therefore, asked her to ascertain whether the enemy expected to reduce Bois-le-Duc by blockade. If this was their intention, "It would give you a breathing space; and you would find it feasible to quarter your forces below Emmerich and to lay siege at the same time both to that place and to Rees. If you have received reinforcements from Friedland you could also lay siege to Grave, although I must acknowledge you would find it difficult to undertake so many things at once." In any case she ought to keep a large force in Brabant and employ the remainder in an expedition against Rees and Emmerich, if the plan should appear practicable on further inquiry. It would be necessary, however, to ascertain whether they could remain in those neighbourhoods if the rivers rose or during the winter, before she began her preparations. A pontoon bridge would have to be thrown over the Rhine below Emmerich, and if

enough horses and waggons could not be found to transport it entire in one convoy the pontoons could be carried up separately, and the artillery could also be sent in different divisions. Boats would have to be provided for the ferry across the river before the bridge was completed, and some large ones which could be carried up in pieces and put together on the spot would be of special service. She would find Abraham Melin a capable boat builder. As there was little powder in store more would have to be manufactured, "for if we lay siege to Emmerich, I think we should be prepared to storm the town." If it were possible she should put boats on the river below Emmerich, especially if they could be kept there during the winter. "The place, I mean, is, as Y.R.H. knows, very near both the Veluwe and the Betuwe." He would endeavour to arrange with the King for the supply of the money required, and would see that in case the troops could be spared from Italy the money intended for the Milanese should be sent to Brussels, an arrangement which might have left Cordoba helpless in the presence of an army in mutiny and of Nevers in the Cremonese. It was certain, however, that the Spanish treasury could not supply the needs both of Italy and of the Netherlands, and that nothing but a trifle could be expected from the States of Flanders or of Brabant even if they consented to vote extraordinary supplies. As it was there was a deficit of two millions and seventy-five thousand ducats [£418,890] on the year in Flanders, and, as Olivares fully agreed, nothing could be expected from Spain beyond the six hundred thousand crowns [£150,000] which the Infanta was empowered to raise by selling the Crown lands in the Obedient Provinces. The Count Duke, however, pledged his word that the supplies for the remaining months of the year would be provided in due course, "Please God this may come true."¹

Three days before Spinola had sent his plan of operations to Brussels, the Infanta had despatched to her nephew the terms which Kessler had received from the Dutch deputies as the final offer of the States General.

They proposed that the Truce should be concluded for a term of thirty-four years or if the Spaniards wished it for forty, and that the conditions and articles should be identical with those of the Truce of 1609. As the King had requested that ships of all kinds and from all ports should be allowed to go up the Scheldt to Antwerp without being obliged to tranship their cargoes in

Zealand, the Dutch asked that the proposal should be submitted to a conference, but that if no terms could be arranged this should not prevent the conclusion of the Truce.

Once more the Infanta recapitulated in minute detail the familiar arguments in favour of the Truce, but laid special stress on the divergence of opinion between the burghers and cities and the prelates and nobles in the Obedient Netherlands. The middle classes looked at nothing but their own immediate interests, and if they saw these threatened would not hesitate to provoke a revolution which would be the ruin of the provinces and of which the English, the Germans, and the French would assist the Dutch to take the fullest advantage. For the first time, indeed, she appears to have perceived that her people might in some eventualities fail to recognise that their interests were inseparable from those of their rulers. Yet the idea, which she again repeated, that peace would be the signal for the outbreak of civil troubles in Holland had long been familiar to her.

For these reasons it would be advisable to pretend to accept the Article by which the Dutch were acknowledged as "Free," as by doing so the rights of Spain and of His Majesty would not be prejudiced in any way, and she pointed out that they themselves were quite prepared to agree to a quibble upon the subject of Religion. By recognising the Dutch as a sovereign and independent State, His Majesty would show the world that he did not set his own interests above those of God. When the term of the Truce expired he would recover his former jurisdiction over the Dutch after having temporarily abandoned it. Thus it would be futile to insist that the First Article should be omitted. In conclusion she begged to be sent powers to sign the Truce at once.

The state of affairs at Bois-le-Duc lent the strongest support to her arguments, if any support were needed. The enemies' lines were so strongly fortified and their approaches so close to the town that de Berg, Grobbendonck, and other officers who had examined the question thought that the relief could only be carried out by two armies acting in concert. For the moment, however, the Spanish forces were helpless as money could not be got together to pay the men, or to supply the artillery, stores and transport. She had written to Aytona to persuade the Emperor to send her some troops, and with the same object had sent an envoy to Bavaria and to the Catholic Electors. Aytona had replied that he thought that now peace had been signed with

Denmark some help might be furnished to her. At the same moment Burlamachi was informing Sir John Coke that though the Spanish and Dutch camps were in view of one another, and the Emperor's forces were arrived near Cologne, it was, notwithstanding, even betting at Antwerp "that the Dutch will carry it in this siege." On the twentieth of June the Infanta's letter reached Madrid.¹

By Spinola it was welcomed as glad tidings of great joy. "I must confess to Y.R.H. that I have had the happiest day to-day that I have had since I left Brussels, for it has brought me Your Highness' despatch of the third inst. I hope Y.R.H. has arranged the Truce business satisfactorily by now. This is your only hope of saving your states, which, otherwise, I look upon as lost. What may turn out even more important in the end is that H.M. and all of us here are eager to see these matters settled. We are waiting for the arrival of the express with the news that the truce is signed with the utmost anxiety. God grant that he may be here soon. We reckon that the moment Y.R.H. received H.M.'s despatch of the sixth inst. you sent orders for it to be concluded without a second's delay, and we should like it to be for forty years. Thus Bois-le-Duc will be saved and your States and H.M.'s monarchy set upon a firm foundation."

As we read the despatch which Philip the Fourth penned upon that sixth of June we feel that his soul was stirred to its inmost depths, and see the emotions which were hidden behind that fair, proud, impassive face. Three days before he had sent an express to Brussels to carry to the Infanta the decisions which had been arrived at by the Council, which had met upon the previous day within eighteen hours of the arrival of D. Juan de Benavides. The King himself had been "at the window" during its session to hear the debate. He impressed upon her that no change must be made in the conditions which he had laid down as to the truce, and hoped that the Dutch would agree to this unless they saw themselves strong enough to prevent Bois-le-Duc from being relieved. She was also to summon Count Henri de Berg and tell him that Rubens had sent the Count Duke a report of a conversation which he had had with him as to the possibility of carrying through the Truce by a bargain with the Prince of Orange for the return of Breda. "If this could be done without any loss of prestige, and on the conditions stated in this letter, the Count and Y.H. may make the Prince the offer

in my name, and he must try to get the place dismantled. Y.H. may also tell the Count that he is not to break off the discussion, if the Prince refuses to listen to this proposal, but that I empower him to make him a further offer. If the Prince can get us better conditions in the Truce on the three points of the Sovereignty, Religion, and the Antwerp River on the terms I am asking, and within the present year, I will create His Highness a Grandee of this Kingdom and a Councillor of State and will grant him a large estate in Italy. If he can get us better terms as to the two first points, I offer the same, and if he can do so as to Religion, on condition that I renounce the Sovereignty, the same. If, however, he can only do so as to the points of 'Independence' and the River, I will make him a present of over one hundred thousand crowns [£25,000]. Your Highness may make him this offer in my name and give him your guarantee under our hand that I will fulfil my promise the very day and hour the Truce is signed. You may also furnish him at my expense with the means to reward all those who take part in carrying this business through, and give him every possible security that I will carry out this engagement. You must understand that my one and only object in doing this is to save Bois-le-Duc, as there is nothing on earth which can make me resign myself to its loss or to seeing Religion ruined there. Any sacrifice by which I could escape this would be a trivial thing. The express with the reply to Your Highness' despatch shall be sent off as soon as possible, but though this one will reach you not two days before him, I cannot but send him, as Y.H. must not wait a single hour before taking these steps." If Count Henri could not leave his post she must send Secretary Nicolaide to him with these instructions, "but what matters most is that he should have the powers from Y.R.H."

In his formal reply to the Infanta's letter, the King's language was still more emphatic.

"I have had this business commended very heartily to God, and I have prayed Him to give me light and grace to take the course which may be best for our Holy Faith, for the Catholic Religion, for your states, and for the subjects whom I love so well. I have decided to send Y.R.H. by this express with all possible despatch my instructions by which you will see how it cuts me to the quick that matters should have come to such a pass that the Dutch rebels dare to ask me to renew the last truce as it stood. But things being as they are, and as Y.H. is so warmly in favour

of the treaty, I hereby consent to allow the truce to be concluded in the form of that of 1609, and must request Y.H. to communicate the particulars of all that has passed in these negotiations to Cardinal de la Cueva, Count Henri, and others, at your discretion, and if you cannot communicate with Count Henri, Balanzon, Ballon, or any other of them because they are absent on duty or in the field, you must send a confidential agent to consult them, and after you have learnt the views of persons of their experience you will be the better able to come to a decision. In any case, Y.R.H. must do your utmost to prevent the terms I sent you as to the point of 'Independence' from being changed in any way. As to 'Religion,' and the 'Antwerp River,' you must use every effort to get better ones. As Rubens wrote that Count Henri told him he would stake his reputation that he could get the Truce signed on the lines we desire as to 'Independence,' and the other points which involve our prestige, I have decided that if we can ensure that they will raise the siege of Bois-le-duc and conclude the truce on our terms if we hand them over Breda with the fortifications demolished, it may be handed over at once, and if they insisted on the fortifications being preserved, you must give it them notwithstanding. Whilst the negotiations are going on we must strain every nerve to relieve Bois-de-duc, and not lay down our arms till the truce is signed. If, however, by the time this express reaches you, it has pleased God either that Bois-le-Duc should have been relieved or that there should be a good prospect of it being so, Y.R.H. must in that case not give way one inch as to my terms.

"As regards the question of granting the enemy free access to the Indies both of Castile and Portugal, Y.H. will, as regards the former, make it sure, without inserting any article in the Truce to that effect, that if they have occupied any position in them, they are to give it back to us, and this provision must also apply to any fleet or other property of mine which they may have seized during the present year, and they must agree not to hold any kind of intercourse with them whether commercially or otherwise for the future and that they will not enter them with either ships of war or trading vessels. You must also induce them to dissolve their Company for trade in those waters which has inflicted much damage upon us, so that neither they nor the company can trouble us henceforth in the West Indies. They are to engage not to send any ships of war

into the Portuguese Indies during the truce. You must see that both these questions are satisfactorily settled whether Bois-le-Duc has been relieved or, only seems likely to be so." In other words whilst the Dutch were apparently to be allowed to send unarmed vessels to the Eastern Seas, they were wholly excluded from any trade with tropical America.

It remained to be seen whether they would consider such a concession as of practical value. In any case the offer proved how far Spain was willing to sacrifice her prejudices in the cause of peace.

"If, on the other hand, there is no hope of the place being relieved, Y.H. will endeavour to arrange that the enemy should give up Bois-le-Duc in exchange for Breda, as I said I had made up my mind to do, *but Y.H. must bear in mind that Breda is upon no account to be given up unless they make the truce I am asking for*, and let go Bois-le-Duc. If, however, they will not agree to this and Bois-le-Duc is hard pressed, *I leave everything entirely to Y.H. so that after you have exhausted all the means I suggest, you may do what you think best after reviewing the situation*, for Y.H. must see how irretrievable a false step would be. *As for the Indies, you must in any case try to settle the business on the lines I have laid down.* You must see that I would not have come into a truce which is so discreditable to ourselves and to our nation on any consideration whatsoever except to free Bois-le-Duc, a city in which there are so many Catholics and such good and fruitful subjects. But I offer to God this bitter pain that I may see this city delivered out of the hands of its enemies, and if the position of these Kingdoms were on a different and firmer footing, I would gladly go myself to defend such faithful states and subjects and to bring them forth from their overwhelming distress. But, please God, I shall be able to do so some day, and Y.H. may rest assured that every effort humanly possible will be made to send you all the reinforcements we can. In fine, I must again tell Y.H. that if the Dutch will not give up the India Company, and if God, to chasten us, will not allow the terms of the last Truce to be bettered, seeing that my Kingdom of Castile must have a breathing space, for it would not be just to lay such a burden on my subjects here for the sake of a matter so little to our credit, and that I am doing this for the sake of the welfare and tranquillity of the Obedient Provinces and solely with this object, those Provinces themselves should give me what aid they can. I am writing to my uncle the Emperor

to implore him in the strongest terms to give us all the help he can in relieving Bois-le-Duc, and I am instructing the Marquis of Aytona to press him as hard as words can do it to comply. I must ask Y.H. to keep me fully informed as to all you do."

Even at the eleventh hour Philip IV. could not make up his mind to yield, and to give up his claims to rights which he could never hope to exercise effectually and yet, for the peace of the world it was unfortunate that the Dutch could not afford to treat his claims to sovereignty as a matter of empty form, whilst the Holy Roman Empire was something more than an empty name. It mattered little to Louis XIII., that Charles the First, King of Great Britain and of Ireland, should style himself King of France: it mattered much to the Dutch, as members of the Holy Roman Empire, that a King of Spain should style himself Count of Holland. Such points must often arise in any League of Nations.¹

Before the King's courier could reach Brussels, the situation at Bois-le-Duc had changed for the worse. On the fourth of July the besieged had made an unsuccessful sally to cut the Domel Dyke, and the prisoners taken stated that famine was raging within the walls. Henri de Berg, meanwhile, had, as has been seen, advanced close up to the besiegers' lines, but had fallen back under circumstances which later on were thought to cast grave suspicions upon his courage or his honour. The Infanta, however, had sent for him as soon as she had received her nephew's instructions to do so, and had closely questioned him as to his conversation with Rubens. "The Count said that he had not gone so far as Rubens alleged, but had only told him that he had heard that the Prince of Orange had let fall an observation to the effect that his brother Maurice had lost the brightest jewel amongst his heirlooms, meaning Breda, but that he would try to get another in its place. He had sounded Orange through a third person, but the Prince had answered that he would not on any account soever blot out or put in a comma in the declaration which the States had made through Kessler, and so I can see no hope of getting the Truce improved either by this means or by any other." To Spinola the Infanta wrote after her interview with Count Henri, "The enemy has had two months space during which to strengthen and entrench himself before Bois-le-Duc, and his lines are now so strong as to give me the greatest anxiety for we have not yet been able to devise any plan to relieve the

town. I can only say we shall do all we can one way or the other, but what vexes me most is our utter want of money to meet our excessive outgoings and I live in terror of some awful rising. We are eagerly expecting the Emperor's people. They are beginning to arrive somewhere in the County of Berg, and when the whole force has got together, we shall consider how they can best be employed. I will bear in mind your advice as to attempting Emmerich and Rees and will see what can be done. I have received your two letters of June the sixth and twentieth. You will see by the enclosed copies of my letters to the King of this day how things stand as to the Truce with the Dutch. I am only too anxious for a settlement, as I know but too well how important it is upon all accounts. I shall continue to do my best to effect one as I have done hitherto. All my efforts have, however, been of little profit thanks to the delays in Spain and to their inability to come to any definite decisions. God guard and keep you. May He be our Ruler and Guide."

Litanies might ring through the aisles of Burgos, and the altars of Madrid might blaze with candles, yet the counsels of the wise were darkened in its palace. Spain was doomed to be lost by indecision.

On the other hand the King's plans for furnishing the supplies for Flanders met with the Infanta's approbation, even though she remarked that she would find it difficult to raise the six hundred thousand crowns [£150,000] from the sale of the Crown Lands, and that what was remitted from Spain would not nearly cover her expenses.

Spinola's reply was couched in a despondent tone. "I have received three separate letters from Y.R.H. of the tenth inst. as to the Truce, the relief of Bois-le-Duc, and the supplies. I can only say that we are all deeply grieved at the failure of the attempt to throw reinforcements into the place, although, please God, the next one will be more successful, and we trust the diversion, if it is decided to make one, will have a good effect.

"Everyone from H.M. downwards is very sorry that the Truce has not been carried through, especially those of the Council, without exception, and H.M. has spoken to me about it twice but was confident that Y.H. will have signed and sealed it by the time this express reaches you. Lest, however, you should not yet have done so, H.M. is sending you orders herewith to conclude it finally without any further delay as Y.H. will see by his letters.

I cannot but throw myself at Your Highness' feet and humbly entreat you with all due respect, not to allow any further difficulties to be raised, for it is all important not to lose one second. It is feared, indeed, that if, thanks to these delays, the enemy should grow more confident of taking Bois-le-Duc, they will not agree to hold by the terms which they offered at the outset, and in their turn will spin out matters as we have been doing till now so that they may first make themselves masters of the place, and I need not say how we should suffer both materially and in prestige." As to the supplies he could only say that he was not told everything, but he had heard they were trying to negotiate a loan of two hundred thousand crowns [£50,000]. He had been told that they would raise another for Milan, but had now learnt that they could not carry it through and so he would have to leave for Italy without the money. Ten days before, on July the sixteenth, 1629, the Marquis had been named Governor of Milan and General in Chief of the Spanish forces in Italy. As Khevenhüller had said, Spinola had done his best to escape from an appointment which would call him away from Madrid before the conclusion of the Truce in Flanders, but the moment it was known that the Imperial forces had seized the Luziensteig, the Council, in their terror "lest the Italian world should be turned upside down," looked to him as the only person who could quell the coming storm, and, in their confidence that the Truce in Flanders was concluded, forced him to accept it.

Scarcely had the seal been affixed to Spinola's commission when the campaign in the Netherlands entered into a new phase, and an attempt was made to raise the siege of Bois-le-Duc by a diversion against the enemy at two of their most vulnerable points. That attempt was the outcome of Spinola's counsels.

On July the thirtieth the Infanta was able to inform him that a large Spanish force had entered the Veluwe.¹

CHAPTER XCI

DIRECTLY de Berg had learned of the failure of the second attempt to relieve Bois-le-Duc, he had determined with the sanction of a Council of War held at Brussels to make a diversion by laying siege to some important place. His letter to Grobben-donck was intercepted, and Orange had become aware that he intended to march to join the Imperial forces who were approaching Wesel. On the seventeenth of July Count Henri broke up his camp at Bortel, and marched towards the Maas, where he made an unsuccessful attack upon the House of Gennepe. Learning that Grave had been reinforced, he turned towards Nymwegen, crossed the Rhine upon the twenty-second, and sent on six hundred light armed infantry towards the Yssel, who on the twenty-third crossed that river in shalloops, thanks to the negligence of the officers appointed to command the defences, battered the guardship which was lying upon the mud to pieces, and seized a position at Issel which they at once fortified as a bridgehead. They were under the command of Colonel Gubern, who disposed his scanty force so skilfully that they "made a gallant show" and were generally reported to number eight hundred to twelve hundred men. Possibly to appease the annoyance of the Dutch it was reported that the two companies left to guard the passage had fallen to a man, a statement which scarcely tallies with Sir Edward Vere's assertions as to the conduct of some of their commanders. No sooner had the news reached the Prince of Orange than he despatched Count Styrum with eighty companies of foot and two thousand horse to hasten from Grave into the Veluwe to make head against the invaders, whilst the trainbands and the levies of the West India Company hurried from Amsterdam to join him. The action took place on the twenty-fifth. In the first onset the Spaniards were driven back upon the river and many of them were drowned. They in their turn rallied and drove back the Dutch in disorder, thus securing their position on both sides of the stream, where they erected a stockade from which the cavalry raided the open

country as far as Zutphen and Doesburg, whilst the country people by the orders of the States General retreated into the towns with their goods and cattle. Thus the forayers could collect but scanty supplies, and letters from de Berg were intercepted in which he ordered every baker and brewer throughout North Brabant to work his hardest, as all the ovens in Veluwe and Yssel Land had been broken down and every mill pin carried off.¹

Three weeks earlier the Emperor had despatched Count John of Nassau with the rank of Lieutenant General to command the Imperial troops numbering twenty-two thousand men who were to join the Spaniards, and by the twenty-fourth they were already marching on the Yssel by Cologne and Wesel. But for Aytona's diplomacy it is probable that the Emperor would have refused to intervene in the teeth of the attitude of the Electors and of the Catholic League. Aytona had, however, convinced the Emperor that Spain positively refused to join in making a diversion in Venetia in concert with an Imperial force under Wallenstein, until the Truce with Holland had been concluded, and that an attack upon West Friesland and the "secret expedition" were both intended as means to put pressure on the Duke to come to an agreement. The Emperor, on the other hand, was more anxious than ever to secure the election of his son the King of Hungary as King of the Romans, and on their side the Electors were more than ever determined not to appear at such an election whilst the Emperor's army remained in the Empire, and above all, whilst Wallenstein continued in command. Agnelli pointed out with truth that "as the Emperor is making every effort imaginable to bring on this election, we may all the more certainly believe that this General will enter either Italy, France, or Flanders. Matters are fast coming to a climax in Italy. Collalto is at Nuremberg, and is to have an interview with Friedland at Memmingen; the quarters are ordered in the Grisons, and from the Grisons on Y.H. can get better information as to their proceedings than I can send you. These Imperialist gentlemen, however, are still trying to deceive us by giving us to understand one thing in place of another, and thus leave us without a chance of warning Italy of their intentions." But as Wallenstein was unlikely to leave his possessions in North Germany exposed to an attack from Sweden, unless he was assured of his promised compensation in Venetia,

it was absolutely necessary for the Emperor to assist in bringing about a settlement in Holland, and with this end in view, to supply Spain with what help he could himself provide, notwithstanding the reluctance and indeed the refusal of Bavaria.¹ Maximilian was more disinclined than ever to assist a power which he looked upon as a dangerous if a secret enemy. His irritation was fed by Khevenhüller's reports from Madrid. Thanks to the habitual procrastination of the Spanish officials, his claims to compensation for the seizure of the Castle of Stein and for the woods taken from Heidelberg University, still remained unsettled despite the personal intervention of Olivares. On the other hand, the accounts he received as to the position of affairs in England showed him that he could not safely rely upon Spanish support if it became necessary to conciliate Charles I. by throwing Bavaria on one side. "I understand that Philip (*sic.*) Rubens, who left here three weeks ago for London, to continue the negotiations for peace, reports that the King of England told him in so many words that he would never conclude peace unless the exiled Palatine is restored and the Dutch accept the Truce upon the lines of that of 1609 which had been already agreed to by this Government, even if Boisle-Duc should have fallen in the meantime." On the other hand, the King of France was pressing Spain to ask the Emperor to invest Nevers with Mantua and Monferrat as a favour to herself. This account was in some degree coloured, but it was such as to make Maximilian even more averse than before to any proposal for assisting Spain at the cost of involving the Empire in a war with the Dutch. Chancellor Jocher's views were yet more decided, because they were based upon the practical interests of the Electorate. As he noted a few months later, "As the Spaniards cannot harm us in any other way, they are keeping back from us the Castle of Stein, which brings in but two hundred gold guildens [£50] a year, though Cæsar sold it to the Bavarian, and are thus able to keep the Rhine passage and everything beyond the river out of the hands of the Bavarians. Such is the only proof of their goodwill they have given us. It is as plain as daylight that they mean to try and see if they can treat us as their subjects, so the more the Bavarian asserts himself, the more he will have to put up with. We may well laugh in our sleeves when we see how shocked the Spaniards and other foreigners seem because the Bavarian will not throw

his friendship with the Frenchman to the winds but draws nearer to him every day." Such were the motives which inspired the advisers of that great champion of the Catholic Religion and of the Liberty of Germany Maximilian of Bavaria.¹

The Emperor and Friedland, on the other hand, displayed the greatest willingness to assist the Infanta in her distress. Friedland hurried troops towards Friesland, under Torquato Conti, whilst by the twenty-eighth of July Count John of Nassau had joined de Berg near Wesel and was advancing with him to support the light infantry who had already crossed the Yssel. Unfortunately, the resources of the Brussels treasury were exhausted, and unless three hundred thousand ducats [£75,000], in addition to the usual subsidies, could be furnished from Madrid, it would be impossible for any plan to be taken in hand to relieve Bois-le-Duc. The veterans of the Danish wars were not men to leave unpaid. Without reinforcements from the Milanese the depleted ranks of the Spanish and Italian infantry could not be brought up to strength. Thus the cause of Spain was rendered more than ever dependent upon foreign aid. Jealousies were rife at the Imperial Court, and the Emperor and his ministers were furious that Friedland should have detached forces against West Friesland without their consent. It was their object that he should march towards Italy with his army without delay. The letter in which Philip IV. thanked his uncle for his kindness was taken almost as a sarcasm, and their displeasure was increased by his request that Wallenstein should command the expedition to North Brabant. Coloma, on the other hand, who was deeply hurt at being left without employment, was to be consoled with a mission to negotiate in England.²

De Berg's plan of campaign was based in the main upon the memories of Spinola's exploits in 1606 and 1607, which had done so much to overcome the reluctance of the Dutch to enter into the truce of 1609, and which had never been forgotten amongst the soldiers of Spain. Early in 1624 Olivares had forwarded to Brussels a memorandum upon German affairs by an unnamed writer which exercised a lasting influence upon Spanish policy with regard to their relations both with the North and with Northern Germany and which clearly foreshadows a campaign like that of de Berg five years later.

The writer recommended that the Spanish government should endeavour to acquire the friendship of the petty princes of

Northern Germany in place of striving to secure the alliance of either France or England, who would always be at heart their jealous rivals and would seek to deceive them in every way. These princes still retained their hereditary respect for the House of Austria, and, if they were Catholics, supported the Emperor. Those who did not do so could be gained over. The Dukes of Holstein, Brunswick, and Luneburg lived in terror of the King of Denmark and would be glad if Spain would support them against him. The Hanse Towns drew their supplies partly from the countries between the Rhine and the Weser many of which were occupied by the Spanish army, and partly from the Bishopric of Osnabrück which was then held by Cardinal Zollern who owed his election to the Infanta and who ought to be made to reside in his diocese in place of living at Rome where he was not of the slightest use. If the support of these princes could be secured it would be feasible to use their territories as a base from which to attack Holland. It might in that case be possible to occupy some port upon the Zuyder Zee, the most suitable being Harderwijk, and, at the same time, to oblige the Dutch to increase their forces in West Friesland and thus to lay a heavy burden upon those countries. A good fleet in the Flemish ports would do much to secure the communications by sea between Flanders and Spain, and could also harry the Dutch fisheries. If the Duke of Luneburg could be bought over, he would be of service in inducing his relations to put a bridle upon the Hanse Towns and upon the King of Denmark. The King of Denmark was fortifying an island in the Elbe named Kreutzsande which lay near the mouth of the river, and was building a town opposite to it named Leutstat, or Glückstadt, which he was peopling with the Arminians and the Jews who were leaving Holland. It would be as well, added the writer, that the Catholic forces in the Empire should be employed to stop this plan, for if the King of Denmark, as was supposed, intended to make himself the master of the mouth of the Elbe for his own ends, he would inflict a grave injury upon the Empire, and this it was the duty of the Emperor as its head to prevent. In any case, Spain under colour of assisting the Emperor ought to extend her line of garrisons from the Weser to the Elbe, so that the German Protestants might be cut off from help from abroad.¹

Much water had flowed down the Elbe since 1624, but, in the main, the counsels of the writer had been justified by events. With but very few exceptions the Princes of Northern Germany

and the members of the Hanseatic League had remained faithful to their allegiance to the Emperor throughout the Danish War, and had allowed the Edict of Restitution to be carried out in their dominions without resistance. The rebels against the Imperial authority were for the most part to be found in the lands east of the Elbe, whilst to the west of that river, after the signature of the Peace of Lübeck, there were but few signs of unwillingness to accept the dictates of Friedland and of Tilly. It would have been well, indeed, for Spain if she had confined her intervention in the affairs of Northern Germany to the territories on her own side of the Elbe, and had refrained from designs which had been without any advantage to herself. Had the Catholic League been willing to join the Emperor in coming to her aid, it might have been easy for her to bring Holland to the ground by an attack upon her Eastern frontier whilst the Veluwe was being invaded from the South. But a Duke of Friedland who was also Duke of Mecklenburg was no longer the Wallenstein of 1624, and the potentates of the Catholic League would do nothing to forward the interests of a power who was the friend of Friedland and of an Emperor who was no longer a helpless puppet in their hands.

The Dutch upon the other hand could not but feel some anxiety at the advance of the Imperial forces. From France they could expect but little assistance whilst her difficulties at home still remained unsettled. England hampered as she was by the disputes between her King and her Parliament could only act through diplomatists whom the Continental Courts in general now treated with but scant respect. They could, therefore, rely only upon their own exertions and upon such help as they might receive from Sweden.

By the middle of July it was known at the Hague that the advance guard of the Imperial forces had arrived in the Duchy of Berg, and that large reinforcements had been ordered by Montecuculi to join him there. It was thought that sixteen regiments would be sent in all, and that part of them would be detached under Count John of Nassau to march to the relief of Bois-le-Duc, whilst the remainder under Count Mansfeldt were left as an army of observation between the Rhine and the Maas, the base being established at Maestricht. By the twentieth the States General had increased their forces by six thousand men, and had ordered a large fleet to sea to hover off the coast of Flanders. To prevent

the Archbishop of Cologne from taking part in the invasion they informed his agent Van der Vecken that they would hold his master responsible for any damages which they might receive from his subjects, to which the agent replied that the Archbishop had assured him that nothing of the kind would take place, an answer which must have served to reassure them as to the intentions of the Catholic League. It was thought, indeed, that "with God's help" the Dutch would have but little difficulty in holding their own against both the Imperialists and the Spanish without raising the siege. It was believed that simultaneous attacks would be made both upon the Veluwe and upon Friesland, and, after four thousand men had been detached to garrison Grave and Gennep, eighty companies were sent to defend the Yssel passages. "The representatives of Friesland say that they can protect their province with eight thousand foot and sixteen troops of horse. All the three avenues by which the enemy could approach them are guarded by a first-class fortress. Those coming from East Friesland must pass through the defile of Ackerfort, those from Münster through the Bourtange Moss, and those from the County of Bentheim through Coevorden. Thus we may still be of good cheer as to the outcome." Bois-le-Duc, was, however, offering a far stouter resistance than had been foreseen, and the capture of the forts had produced but little effect upon the spirits of the besieged.

The news that de Berg's forces had crossed the Yssel filled all Holland with consternation. This "unlooked for accident put the people throughout the State's dominions into such a fright and consternation that all men (that wished well to the cause) were afraid we should have been drawn from hence a little before our harvest, but the violence of the fit somewhat assuaged, and the humours settling we fell upon the resolution to stay whatsoever came of it till we had the Town, and accordingly fell to make our provision and took a course that the enemy should hurt us as little as might be." On the twenty-fifth Count Earnest Casimir was accordingly despatched to Arnheim with about thirty thousand men, amongst whom were the troops which Morgan had brought with him from Denmark, to make head against the enemy; whilst on the other hand, de Berg hurried up reinforcements from the Waal to Issel. It was thought that as they would have to march by Wesel, they would take four days to join Gubern whilst the Dutch could reach Styrum

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in twenty-four hours from Grave. Vere, indeed, professed to believe that it was impossible for the invaders to hold their ground, as Earnest Casimir was "keeping them so short" that they were dying of starvation within a fortnight after their victory. With some exaggeration he wrote that not so much as a man or beast was lost in all the Veluwe, and that all the Dutch garrisons were well "furnished with men and all things fitting." Bois-le-Duc he predicted would surrender within a month from the eighth of August. Reigersborch summed up the situation in words which might, in the main, have been copied from the Infanta's most confidential notes. "I have already told you that there is a great talk of a Truce here. I know for certain that it was on good grounds, and that the arrangement was to be identical with the previous one in every respect, except that it was to be for a far longer term. Yet people here, I mean the deputies, do not at all relish the idea for things are going far too well at Bois-le-Duc, so they say that the settlement must be concluded on the same footing as if we really had the place in our hands. In the meantime, however, our opponent is striking back. He is in the Veluwe and, if we cannot turn him out of it, will soon withdraw his offers. If things go badly here our people will be glad enough to treat, that is if they can get fair terms and not simply conditions dictated by the victors. But such is our character as a nation. Bullies in prosperity, cringing curs in adversity. All this is an absolute secret, though I know it to be the truth, so you must keep it to yourself."¹

Reigersborch was mistaken as to the probable attitude of the Spaniards even in the event of victory for they were but too well aware of the real position of their affairs. Scarcely had the Infanta learnt of de Berg's defeat on the fourth of July than she wrote that the attempt to relieve Bois-le-Duc would certainly be renewed. It was true that it might again fail as the besieger's lines were almost impregnable and the place was so closely blockaded that no one could pass in or out. In that case their only hope of raising the siege was by making an incursion through the Veluwe into the heart of Holland. She had not consulted any of those persons whose names had been suggested by the King, but had sent her secretary Pedro de San Juan to de Berg's headquarters to ascertain his views as to the truce and as to the possibility of obtaining better terms as to the Surecrainty, Religion, and the Trade with the Indies if they gave up Breda to the Prince of Orange.

Kessler had had another interview with the Dutch deputy Van Berkel who had brought him the answer from the States General as to the arrangements which Philip IV. had proposed about the India Trade.

As regards the East Indies they desired that the conditions laid down in the Truce of 1609 should be renewed without any alteration. They wished that the Truce should come into force in the West Indies from the moment it was signed and that it should not be postponed for a year in order to give time to notify all parties concerned that it had been concluded, as had been done on the previous occasion.

Kessler had sent his observations on the subject by Van Berkel to the States General and to the Prince of Orange, and she expected that they would send their answer by the fifteenth of July. When she had received it she would finally decide whether she would agree to the Truce or not. So confident, indeed, was she that an agreement would be arrived at, that she had concluded an agreement with the Dutch that they would release all the Spanish prisoners in their hands. As they were faithfully fulfilling their engagements, she requested the King to give orders that all the Dutch prisoners in Spain should be set free.

Within sixteen days her despatch had reached Madrid, and was acknowledged by the King on July the twenty-sixth. "All I can say is that I should have been very glad if the Truce had been signed and sealed for if during the interval the Dutch see their prospects of taking Bois-le-Duc improve, they will not come into it until the place has fallen, so that we should not only lose that most important city, but should suffer in our prestige to the last degree. With the proviso that you must bear in mind that my object is to leave the West Indies and the trade in those seas as free (from the interference of the Dutch) as they were left in the previous treaty and also to save the town of Bois-le-Duc, I leave it entirely to Y.R.H. to conclude the Truce in such a form as you may think best. If, however, the Dutch should not have consented to declare in writing that they will leave the Indies free as they did before, it would be within our rights to expel them from any position which they may have occupied in those regions, for they have given us a promise verbally that they will leave them in the state in which they were during the continuance of the previous Truce. Although it is my earnest hope that the Truce will have been concluded by the time you receive this despatch,

yet, in case it should not have been, I think it right that I should once more explain to Y.R.H. by this express that it is my wish that you should do so at the earliest moment possible. I am sending Y.R.H. a second form of credentials in which I have omitted the title of Count of Holland so that if the Dutch should happen to raise any difficulties as to that which I sent Y.R.H. some months ago, in which there is that title, you may make use of this one in which it is left out, but you must see that this last power is kept as secret as possible. It is upon no account to be made public unless the Dutch will not allow the first to pass."

Yet though Philip IV. had renounced the empty title which had been the cause of eight years of war, his hopes that by this sacrifice he would put an end to the contest were not destined to be realised.¹

De Berg's counterstroke had proved more serious than amateur strategists at the Binnenhof had thought possible whilst the trumpets of Wallenstein's veterans as they marched north-westwards through the Westphalian moorlands resounded through the streets of Amsterdam like the call to the Day of Doom. Alike amongst the Councillors of State and amongst the commanders in the Veluwe carelessness had been extreme and the breakdown "great beyond all measure." At Vienna it was rumoured that the siege of Bois-le-Duc had been raised. It had been costing the besiegers forty thousand francs [£1,666], a day. Wild proposals were made that the States General and the Council of State should remove their sittings to Utrecht. Had these proposals been carried into effect the first authorities in the United Provinces would have been at the mercy of the invader. Meanwhile the little garrison at Issel was holding out stoutly, and Count Henri who had been joined by the Imperial forces and a large convoy from Wesel, moved up from Zevenaar through the heaths and pinebarrens towards Amersfoort, where large supplies of corn were known to have been stored, whilst his cavalry foraged the country up to the very suburbs of Utrecht. Confusion reigned supreme. Hundreds of peasants were hurried from their homes to cut the dykes and thus to lay under water the wide belt of green pastures which stretch southwards to the Maas from the mud banks of the Zuyder Zee, and which then as now formed an impassable barrier to guard the wealthy cities of Holland, their tulip gardens and villas against any assailant from the German lands. Yet the dykes stood unpierced and the boats sent

by canal from Amsterdam to remove the stores in the granaries of Amersfoort failed to arrive in time. Even then the Dutch siege engineers ranked amongst the most skilful in the world. Yet the Utrechters were allowed to entrench not only their city but their plantations and their gardens, so that it would have been a hard task for ten thousand men to hold their improvised fortifications. On August the thirteenth de Berg in person appeared before Amersfoort. He summoned the place twice to surrender and threatened that he would bombard it with the great guns which had been a present to him from the City of Antwerp. Twice the summons was refused by the Council of War. On the third occasion the Imperialists sent in a trumpeter who was able to give the Town Council full and accurate particulars both as to the strength of the garrison, the number of their guns and the quantities of their supplies. As such details could only have been furnished by some traitor in the town, the burghers persuaded the military authorities to treat for a surrender, and, although Colonel Morgan was hastening with a large force to relieve it, the "Key to Utrecht" fell into the hands of the Spaniards without a stroke of sword or thrust of spear. Great was the consternation amongst the besiegers of Bois-le-Duc, but the belfry of St. John's rocked with joy-peals, salutes thundered from the batteries, and the garrison held high festival, as they hailed the tidings which seemed to foretell their deliverance, and war-weary as they were gained heart to carry themselves in the battle even more gallantly than before. Every circumstance added to the discouragement of the Dutch. The high officers, especially Captain Dorp, who acquiesced in the surrender were loudly execrated, and the Prince of Orange sent orders to the Council of State to institute an inquiry into their conduct without delay, and to bring those found guilty to immediate trial before the Courts. "As in this country the only crime we think possible is Treason, as if Cowardice had been banished from the world, people will have it that the burghermasters have sold the town, and so once more the Remonstrants are held to blame, and that merely because Mr. Pieter Van Dam, who is a burghermaster, and Hans Manis, the Sheriff, happen to be Arminians." The accusation may have been well founded for in the previous May, Philip IV. himself had given orders that a grant of two thousand ducats [£500], should be given to William van Barneveldt who was living in great poverty in the Obedient Netherlands on the ground that he might

be employed to stir up the dying embers of the religious disputes of ten years before. In their turn the Arminians did not hesitate to attribute the disaster to the treachery of the Papists who, whilst de Berg was advancing, had carried themselves "in a wholly unedifying fashion" both in Utrecht and in Holland, "just as if we were their enemies and the Spaniards their friends," wrote scandalized Reigersborch. "I should never have believed this possible before. It is a good thing, perhaps, that they should have displayed their feelings so openly, but it would be better still if those feelings did not exist. Many people are convinced that the Spaniards have received money both from Holland and Utrecht. This should be a good lesson to us and should teach us that we should do well to adopt a wiser policy and endeavour to devise means to induce the Catholics to identify themselves with the interests of the State, unless, on the other hand, we can render them absolutely powerless to harm us. There is no middle course open." Even Holland was not a Happy Eden of toleration in a world of bigots, and the petty persecutions carried on by Gomarist presbyters and constables were not calculated to win a heretic state the affections of its orthodox vassals. Within a few hours the tidings that Amersfoort had fallen spread far and wide through the United Provinces, and everywhere eager purchasers were tearing from the postboys' hands the small, ill-printed, dingy sheets containing the articles of the Capitulation which were published as Extra Editions by the Courants and the Gazettes. Journalistic enterprise was far from being unknown amongst the editors of Holland. Meanwhile de Berg had established his headquarters at Amersfoort and whilst he was busied in settling the indemnities which were to be paid by the Veluwe, his subordinates were hurrying forwards towards Utrecht and the great sluices which regulated the inundations of the "Water Line." All Holland was in terror, and townsmen who had never seen a foe since the days when Alva had been driven back from the walls of Leyden trembled as they thought that Wallenstein's riders and Tilly's Pandours might soon be at their gates. At any moment the tramp of a Spanish trumpeter brave in cuirass of Milan, with gold chain, falling lace, and waving plumes might be heard echoing through the Stadhuis Hall, as he bore up the stately staircase the summons to surrender to the Council Chamber of Amsterdam.¹

But, as has so often been the case in the long history of Holland

the darkest hour was to be that just before the dawn. "At this very instant God in His Providence and as it were by a miracle has restored our courage, for by His Divine Permission, the town of Wesel has fallen into our hands by surprise, and the experts say that this will render it impossible for the enemy to maintain their position in the Veluwe."

Wesel had long been held to be one of the strongest and most populous cities in that Duchy of Cleves, which had so long been in dispute between the Catholic Duke of Neuburg and the Protestant Elector of Brandenburg. It stood at the junction of the Rhine and the Lippe, and was the centre through which the chief communications between the Netherlands and Northern Europe passed. Its inhabitants were enriched not only by the trade which they carried on in the vessels which lay in their haven, but by the travellers who traversed their city in the post-waggon, which plied at fixed dates as far as Lübeck and Dantzic. The citadel was held by a Spanish garrison although Neuburg had never ceased to request that it might be given back into his hands.

On the east bank of the Rhine, twelve miles below Wesel, stood Emmerich, also a city of the Duchy of Cleves, and, like Cleves, of an origin so ancient that it was said by mediæval chroniclers to surpass in antiquity even Rome itself. It carried on a large river trade and, with its neighbour Rees, had been occupied by the Dutch ever since the commencement of the troubles in the Duchies. Spinola, who well knew that whilst Emmerich and Rees were in the hands of the enemy, the communications between Wesel and the Veluwe were far from being secure, would have preferred to see de Berg undertake its siege before he committed himself to an advance beyond the Yssel. It was unfortunate for Spain that his advice should have been disregarded by the Council of War at Brussels.

Neither the inhabitants of Wesel nor their nominal sovereign were devoted to the interests of Spain or to the Catholic cause. There was still a strong party in the town, which belonged to the Reformed Church, whilst their Duke, although he owed his dominions to his return to the Roman fold, was at heart an enemy both of the Spaniards and of the Emperor. He had always been mistrusted by Archduke Albert, and though he had during a visit to Madrid been received with unwonted honours, he could not forgive Olivares for his refusal to withdraw

the Spanish garrisons from his dominions. Nor had he any sincere attachment to the Austrian members of the House of Hapsburg. The Dukes of Neuburg were the heads of a junior branch of the House of Wittelsbach, and, in his own opinion at least, he had, if Maximilian of Bavaria died childless, a fair claim to succeed him in the Electorate which he had obtained in 1623. In the spring of 1628, Neuburg during a visit to Prague discussed his expectations with the Emperor, but his hopes were speedily nipped in the bud by the unsympathetic Ferdinand II. In his fury at his disappointment the Duke poured forth his grievances to Agnelli, who at once transmitted an account of the conversation to Mantua. He was leaving Bohemia, he said, in utter disgust because the Emperor, who had told him that the Electorate should come to him after Maximilian's death, had secretly promised it to the Elector for his successors, and had added moreover that it was only fair that Bavaria should retain those portions of the Palatinate, which had been promised to Neuburg, as some compensation for the vast sums which he had expended during the war, and for which he had held Upper Austria in pledge until, of his own accord, he had handed it back to its hereditary ruler, the Emperor. Nor would Ferdinand II. ever consent to grant him the investiture of those districts of Cleves which he had held during the previous nineteen years alleging as his ground for his refusal that the Aulic Council for the sake of the public peace had decided that they must again be placed under sequestration by an Imperial decree in order to prevent Saxony and Brandenburg from asserting their claims by force of arms. It was scarcely probable that Nevers would fail to bring such interesting information to the knowledge of his friends in Paris, and within a few months it was known at Brussels that Neuburg was in communication with the authorities at the Hague. Once more Spain was betrayed by the friends for whom she had sacrificed so much.¹

Under these circumstances it might well be expected that treachery would be at work in Wesel, especially at a time when the garrison had been reduced to a skeleton and when the thoughts of all were centred upon the progress of events in the Veluwe. It is uncertain whether the suggestion that an attempt should be made to capture the town by surprise was originally made by some discontent burghers, as Khevenhüller writing many years later states, or by a young man named Wolf, who held

some subordinate position in the garrison at Rees, and who, according to Carleton's letter from the Hague of August the twenty-second, was the author of the project. Three of the citizens, Peter Muller, his brother Dietrich and Johann Rothleder, had, however, for some weeks been in communication with the Prince of Orange, who had learnt from them that a bulwark was being built adjoining the town wall on the east side of the city, and that the gap in the ramparts was closed only by a palisade. The garrison was composed of six companies of Spaniards and eight of other nations and numbered in all about eleven hundred men. As soon as the attempt was decided upon, Count Styrum and Colonel Otto van Ghendt were appointed to carry it into execution, and a force of fifteen hundred musketeers and eight hundred horse drawn from the garrisons of Rees, of Emmerich, and of the towns on the Yssel, was secretly collected at Schenken Schans and placed under the command of Herr von Dide. At nightfall on the fourteenth of August they set out on their march and arrived before Wesel at daybreak on the fifteenth. Here they were met by the two Mullers and Rothleder, who had stolen out of the town before the gates were closed on the previous evening, and who had passed the night in earnest prayer for the success of their undertaking. To prevent confusion van Gendt had written out some little tickets which he made his officers draw so that they might know the exact places and order in which they were to make their attacks, each of them having under his command one hundred and fifty men. The first onset was made upon the new Bulwark and was headed by Peter Muller, who beat down the palisade with a hammer and rushed into the town followed by his men. Hastening to the house of a friendly smith, they roused him with a shout that Wesel was in the Beggars' hands. The smith opened his door at once and gave them a sledge hammer with which they burst open the Bruyesche Gate, and admitted the horse who were drawn up waiting outside it. Thence they ran to the walls and guard houses cutting down every Spaniard whom they met, and finally gathered in the Market Place, where they were joined by the detachments who had made their way in through the other gates. The handful of Spaniards and Walloons, who were in Wesel, made a brave resistance, but the Germans threw down their arms. Three Spanish Captains, sixty soldiers and some Walloons were killed, and the rest were made

prisoners. Amongst them was the Governor, Francisco de Lozano, who was sent to Arnheim with some of his principal officers and some Jesuits. The guardship lying in the river was sunk, the bridge of boats was cut, and the pontoons sent adrift down the Rhine. All the houses belonging to Spaniards, Jews, or Catholics, together with the officers' quarters, were plundered, and in the confusion the burghers amply compensated themselves for the losses which they had sustained at the hands of the garrison by seizing the goods which they had brought with them out of Germany. The booty taken was immense, for not only had quantities of corn been collected for the supply of de Berg's army, but a great park of artillery and ammunition had been formed in the town. It was long remembered how the Dutch measured out with their spears and divided up amongst themselves the bales of cloth for the clothing of the troops which had been stored in the vaults. Count de Berg lost his most valuable baggage, Montecuculi his ready money, and every Spanish officer was stripped of all he possessed. Even the Croats for once were plundered of their spoils. Within a few hours afterwards the redoubts in the Rhine and on the Lippe were in the hands of the Dutch, and no passage over the Rhine was open to the Spanish forces below Rheinberg. The news of the fall of Wesel reached the Hague on the twentieth and London on the twenty-fourth. Everywhere the tidings were received as an omen that the surrender of Bois-le-Duc was at hand.¹

To the Infanta the loss of Wesel was a heart-breaking grief. She had but just heard from Kessler that the Dutch were requesting guarantees that if the Truce was concluded they should not be attacked by the Imperial forces, although, on the other hand, they were convinced that they would secure such a guarantee by getting possession of Bois-le-Duc, and had asked whether the negotiations would be continued if they took the place. The proposal was, she thought, merely made to gain time, so that they might have the town in their hands when the truce was signed, especially as they had not shown the slightest signs of fear when the Spaniards and Imperialists were united whilst the siege was still in progress, so they were not likely to take much account of the Imperialists by themselves. She had, therefore, replied that if Bois-le-Duc fell she would break off the negotiations at once. She was prepared for the worst, yet all her resolution was needed to bear up against the loss

of the base of de Berg's operations, from which so much had been hoped. "Our prestige has sustained a fearful blow when we remember that the enemy have succeeded in surprising a town of such importance, at a time when they had on their hands not only a siege of the first class, but the defence of the Veluwe, and it might have been thought that all their available forces were fully employed. I shall never get over the shock." The Dutch, on the other hand, put no restraint on their exultation at their victory. When the news reached Orange's headquarters on the twentieth of August, all the batteries along the lines of circumvallation thundered forth their salvoes. Salutes were fired from the Prince's yacht off Crevecœur, every musketeer in the camps discharged his piece, the pikemen marched up and down carrying blazing bundles of straw upon their pikes so that the very air seemed to shimmer with their light. Tar barrels and lanterns flared at the mastheads of the vessels which lay at anchor in hundreds in the Dieze, and the cavalry turned, charged, and wheeled, firing volley after volley in the open field. Soberer observers could only hope that the populace would learn wisdom from their miraculous deliverance, and that now the provinces had all but reached their natural boundaries, the country might be left to rest for many a long year, so that those who ruled it might have the time to correct many a rampant abuse. Victories after all were but the affair of the passing day, and the fortune of war was ever liable to change. It would be well, therefore, if they could learn to prefer certainties to uncertainties. In plainer language the writer might have said that the Truce should be concluded even before the fall of Boisle-Duc.¹ Had the negotiations between Kessler and van Berkel been kept strictly secret, it is possible that they might have succeeded, but under the conditions of a republican government secrecy was impossible, and some of those descendants of the Walloon exiles, who were amongst the bitterest opponents of the Spaniards, became acquainted with what was going on at Rosendaal. The news became known "to the man in the street, and everyone who speaks in favour of a Truce is at once called traitor, so I cannot see how the business is to be gone into with any regard to the true interests of the country. Former experiences make people timid, and it seems that 'Our Nephew,' or in other words Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange, "will not advise one way or the other. The proposals he made for one

met with a very bad reception, so that he will now leave the task of bringing them forward to others, and the whole affair may easily fall through." Thus even if the Infanta had decided to continue the negotiations whether Bois-le-Duc was lost to her or not, it was very uncertain whether the Dutch in their exultation at their victory would have agreed to accept offers to which they had seemed inclined to refuse a hearing when the enemy were at the gates of Utrecht.¹ But there was now no question but that the siege must go on to its destined end, and the victors exulted in the thought that the fall of Wesel would increase "the jealousies which were rising in the Empire." Had the Spaniards and the Imperialists continued to push on into Holland, their lines of communication across the Yssel would certainly now have been cut. Count Henri was, therefore, forced to evacuate Amersfoort on the night of the twenty-fourth of August, and fell back upon Issel, where two forts had been thrown up to secure the bridge-head. In these he placed a strong garrison under Count John of Nassau, so that he might have the means of re-entering the Veluwe in his hands, should circumstances allow him to do so. Part of his cavalry and infantry were detached to Rheinberg, where a bridge was thrown over the river to replace that which had been lost at Wesel. With the remainder of his army Count Henri, by the express orders of the Infanta, set out in the direction of Bois-le-Duc, whilst Balanzon was despatched from Brussels to join him with some troops who had been hastily got together. The waters were rising, and it was hoped that the relief might be effected if the siege lines were attacked on two sides at once. The Imperialists, who had been plundering and torturing the wealthy Utrecht boors, soon fell back to Issel, as the country had been stripped of supplies and famine stared them in the face.²

Meanwhile the leaguer was being pressed on with ever increasing violence. After the loss of the two outer forts, the garrison had fallen back upon some traverses, which with an artificial inundation they had soon been obliged to abandon, but had then made a stand in a redoubt which they had lately built on a dyke which formed the only approach to the town. The besiegers advanced their trenches, and on the fourth of August, in the presence of the Prince of Orange, Mons. Douchaut, who commanded the approaches, exploded a mine under the false bray, and a party of shock troops rushed across

two bridges which they had thrown over the ditch, to attack the breach. The defenders fought with the energy of despair, and drove back the assailants in disorder. On the tenth, two peasants who had just left the town were taken as prisoners to the Dutch headquarters. On them were found carrier pigeons and letters stating that the place could only hold out three weeks longer. In vain the Spaniards made sally after sally to cut the dykes. Once only they succeeded when a party in boats carried off some guns from a battery near the great redoubt and returned in triumph to the town after plundering some sutlers and "knocking the bottoms out of two beer barrels." Powder was growing scarce, and countrymen who were taken by the besiegers whilst smuggling it into the place, were forthwith hanged. The news of the loss of Wesel failed to damp the courage of the garrison, who hard pressed as they were, drove back the enemy time after time, inflicting upon them very heavy losses. On August the twenty-fifth, the Dutch cavalry captured a large convoy on its way to Breda, and between that day and the tenth of September, mines were constantly being sprung under the advanced works of the fortress. "The losses in the town," wrote the Infanta on the ninth, "have been about a thousand killed and five hundred wounded, at least two soldiers, who got out the other day, tell us so. There is nothing fresh to say about the Truce, and the Dutch now never mention it. Although the deputy from Holland arranged with Kessler at their last conference at Rosendaal that they should let one another know within twelve days what the wishes and intentions of their respective sides were, the Dutch deputy has not only never written one word but has not even acknowledged two letters which Kessler addressed to him. We infer from this that they do not wish to proceed with the negotiations until they see how matters turn out at Bois-le-Duc, which will, they expect, fall very shortly. People here, and indeed everywhere in the provinces, are so angry and disheartened at this and at the loss of Wesel, that they give me the greatest anxiety, especially as tongues are beginning to wag very freely."¹ Diplomats throughout Europe were watching the struggle with the keenest interest. The English postponed the definite conclusion of peace with France until the tenth of September so as to give time for the despatch of Cottington to Spain and for the reception of Coloma in London, for, as Charles the First told Barozzi, he did

not regard a peace with France as an obstacle to the negotiation of a settlement with Spain and did not intend to take sides with either power. Wake was instructed to negotiate with Spinola in Italy and to defer for the present any efforts to secure the restitution of Susa to Savoy. But again the endless procrastination of the Madrid government stood in the way of an arrangement. Cottington was detained in London as no answer arrived from Spain during the fateful days whilst de Berg was in the Veluwe, and Rubens was forced to admit that if the diversion failed Bois-le-Duc must inevitably fall. At Vienna it had been foreseen from the outset that even though the Dutch had reduced their besieging forces to twelve thousand men in order to defend their own territories, de Berg would not achieve his object. "The Prince of Orange has made up his mind to have Bois-le-Duc at any cost. Our last letters from Brussels of August the fourth express great doubts as to what the upshot will be." But three weeks earlier the same Brussels newswriters had been convinced that Bois-le-Duc would be relieved when the Imperial and Royal forces arrived, "but the former will probably be used to make a diversion against Emden in Friesland." The shifting, changing policy of Philip and his councillors was to prove the cause of a ruinous disaster. By the first of September Agnelli wrote, "Everyone says Bois-le-Duc is all but sped. The Dutch have taken everything outside the walls. The rest is easy. They think it will live till September the fifteenth at furthest. The son of the King of Denmark, the Prince of Wurtemberg, and the Palatine of the Rhine are at the Prince of Orange's headquarters. Count Henri de Berg with his Spaniards and Italians is busied in sacking and burning villages, and looks to nothing else so that as the Dutch under Count Earnest Casimir have by now arrived in the Veluwe from Bois-le-Duc to oppose them, they will soon be paid out for their doings." When a few days later the news from Wesel seemed to portend the speedy fulfilment of his prediction, the Bishop remarked, as has been said, with unction, "It is clear as daylight that all the misfortunes which have befallen Spain and the House of Austria are the work of Divine providence, and yet they do not seem to have softened their hearts." It was not long before the misfortunes of the Spaniards culminated in the surrender of the capital of North Brabant within a day of the date which had been fixed a month before

by Sir Edward Vere. He had not lived to witness the event which he had so eagerly desired, for in the middle of August he had been killed by a chance musket shot through the head.

Whilst joy bells were ringing and psalms of thanksgiving were echoing in the churches of the Hague, the pioneers before Bois-le-Duc had been steadily pushing their trenches towards the ramparts. At early dawn on the tenth of September, the Prince of Orange had ridden up to inspect a mine made by the enemy which his sappers had discovered under the stone bulwark of the city, and had had it exploded successfully. The English division, whose watch it was, rushed through the breach into the Half Moon and drove the garrison back into the town. In their turn the besieged made a desperate rally and drove off the Dutch, who had come up in support. The Dutch, however, shouting loudly, came on again, the garrison drew out to meet them, they fell back for a long distance, and the Spaniards hurried in pursuit over ground which was heavily mined. The mine was fired, and many of the pursuers were blown into the air. They fled in confusion, followed closely by the besiegers, who carried with a rush all the defences outside the Vuchter Gate, threw up shelter works to protect themselves against the fire from the town, and after exploding another mine under the stone bulwark, sent forward a small detachment to reconnoitre the inner works, whilst others hid in the hole made by the explosion. Thereupon a drummer came out with a flag of truce to inquire after several gentlemen who he said had been buried under the mine. The Prince gave orders to the sappers to look for them, but whilst the work was going on the drummer again beat a parley and asked for their commanding officer, as he was anxious to see the Prince, and to speak with him about a conference to treat. He was soon followed by four of the leading burghers, who were brought to the Prince, whom they found sitting on a little bench in the gallery of his headquarters at Honteln Castle surrounded by some of his most famous officers. The deputies amongst whom were the Bishop and the Dean of Bois-le-Duc, asked him to agree to a suspension of hostilities for four days so as to allow them to communicate with the Infanta. If no relieving force reached them within that time, they would then treat for a capitulation. He bluntly refused their request, but in place of breaking off the conversation they consented to negotiate and to exchange hostages without delay. All firing

ceased, and the ramparts were covered with citizens and ecclesiastics gazing on the besiegers' lines. On the thirteenth the Deputies dined with the Prince, and afterwards drove home in his coach. Whilst they were at dinner the Dutch hostages came back to the camp and those from Bois-le-Duc returned to their own lines, taking with them the final decision both of the States General and of Orange. On the fourteenth the articles of the capitulation were signed by both parties at the Prince's headquarters, and the camp was soon filled with rejoicing soldiery. The conference broke up with mutual expressions of goodwill. Things had changed since Alva's day, and the Spanish soldier bore as little illwill to his beggar opponent as his ancestors had borne to their hereditary foemen of Granada. The Infanta showed herself a true daughter of that Philip the Second who had welcomed Medina Sidonia as a broken fugitive with words of courtesy and thoughtful kindness. To Grobbendonck she wrote a letter filled with warm thanks and womanly sympathy. She knew that he had done his best and that he could hold out no longer against the violence of the bombardment. Her despatch to the King was couched in language which, restrained as it was, must have pricked him to the soul. "I have received letters from Y.M. of September the first upon different subjects. In reply I have the honour to inform you that the town of Bois-le-Duc surrendered to the enemy upon the 14th inst. when the garrison marched out with their arms, baggage and artillery. I have felt the loss so deeply that I can scarcely find words to express myself to Y.M. I cannot see one gleam of comfort when I bethink myself what this blow means to the Catholic Religion and to our prestige. Besides all this, Your Majesty has lost not only a most important fortress, but a great and very populous territory filled with subjects devoted, as all men know, to our faith and to Y.M. Everyone in the Netherlands is so maddened with rage and fear that I tremble every moment at the thought of some coming woe and of our total ruin. Cardinal de la Cueva is in the greatest danger for the people are throwing the blame for their misfortunes in language the most unbridled, and that utterly without thought, rhyme, or reason, upon him and upon all who bear the Spanish name. Meanwhile the enemy are revelling alike in their victory and in their opportunities. They now long for nothing, but to enter upon some greater venture, and are upon the point of advancing

with all their forces from Bois-le-Duc, as they are convinced that the country will rise and join them.

"Your Majesty's despatch as to the entry of the Imperial troops into West Friesland has been forwarded to the Emperor and to the Marquis of Aytona. It will, however, now be impossible to carry out this plan until next year, as the chance of doing it when the Duke of Friedland made up his mind to engage in the expedition this year has been lost.

"It was thought inadvisable to hand Y.M.'s letters of congratulation and thanks to Count Henri de Berg, Lucas Cayro, and Matthew Dalquen on the passage of the Yssel and on their entrance into the Veluwe as the state of affairs has changed so completely since they were written."

Such was the spirit in which the Infanta received the tidings of a loss which she had so dreaded in anticipation and of which the consequences might well prove so tremendous. To use the pithy words of a plain English officer writing from the Dutch lines six weeks before, "If this town be taken it will prove a crushing blow to Brabant, and though it may seem a paradox, will beget a truce or peace so great a wound will be on that side. If they fail they will be as abject and low retiring wholly to a defensive war, as they will be high upon so glorious a victory, it being out of question that it is the greatest work that hath been seen since the time of the greatness of the Roman Empire."¹

Strangely enough, the overtures for peace came from the victors and not from the vanquished. The wisest heads in Holland knew how greatly the financial burdens upon the country had increased, and were well aware that this increase must have its limits, "although much has been done to get us out of this state of things. Beyond all doubt, France would be delighted to see the negotiations broken off, and if they were to send us a supply of money, they would greatly stiffen the attitude of the war-party, and yet everyone knows that their subsidies are not life-annuities."

Just as the courier was on the point of setting out with the Infanta's letter to Madrid, Commissary Kessler arrived at Brussels from Rosendaal, "where he has been negotiating with the Dutch Commissioner, who has declared in substance that the Dutch are quite as ready to agree to the Truce as they were before, if for our part we will evacuate the positions which we hold beyond the Yssel, and which we have no means of

supplying. On this Kessler proposed that if we did so they should hand back Wesel to the Duke of Neuburg to whom it properly belongs, but he tells me that the Dutch deputy at once replied that his masters would never agree to this upon any terms soever. I have, therefore, sent a special agent from here to M. van Berkel to inform him, as he has, in accordance with agreement, gone to make his report to the States General, that we will accept the Truce without any mention of Wesel, and that Kessler will meet him within eight days at Rosendaal to arrange for it to be concluded, and that they should then name several persons for each side as plenipotentiaries to sign it."¹

Early on the morning of the seventeenth of September the Prince of Orange drew up the whole of his forces both horse and foot in review order under the walls of Bois-le-Duc. Two tents were pitched in front of the city Court House. In them the Prince and Princess of Orange, with the Prince of Denmark by their side took their place. Around stood a throng of those who had won fame upon the battlefields of half the European world during the long years of the conflict against Spain and Austria. Amongst them men noted the heirs of many a German Duke and Lord who had bowed his neck to Charles the Fifth at Mühlberg to exult when but a few years later the Emperor fled in a woman's clothes from Innsbrück and retired broken from before the walls of Metz. History was repeating itself. Bois-le-Duc was revenging Breda, and the tide of Spanish victory had turned never again to cover with its floods the green pastures of the Northern Netherlands.

Before the conquerors defiled the conquered, to whom defeat had brought no shame. A troop of cavalry opened their march. A long train of waggon's followed laden with the baggage of the garrison on which were seated the sick, the wounded, and some ecclesiastics, most of whom were Jesuits and Barefooted Friars. Next came a coach with the Governor's wife and her three weeks old infant. With her the Prince of Orange had a long and friendly conversation. Finally, as evening was closing in, Grobendonck himself rode up and rode away again after exchanging a few words of greeting with his conqueror. The garrison which was divided into twenty-two companies numbered about two thousand strong. Amongst them there were still about eighteen hundred able bodied soldiers, and the smart clothing and well groomed horses of the cavalry excited alike the surprise and the

admiration of the Dutch spectators. By the Infanta's order the troops made their way by Tilburg to Antwerp and were thence despatched for the most part to join the army which was being brought together at Malines to cover Brussels.

Scarcely was the garrison out of sight, when the besiegers entered the town headed by the Prince of Orange's guards. A detachment was stationed in the Beggars' Sconce.

On the morning of the eighteenth the day dawned bright and clear and a fresh breeze blew out the folds of the great flag blazoned with the golden lion rampant in its azure field and with the proud motto "I will maintain," those century old devices of the House of Orange, which was hoisted on the belfry of Saint John's. The gates were thrown open, and through them flocked crowds of boors and burghers in their gayest garb from Holland, from Utrecht, and from Brabant to gaze upon the new won town. Large stocks of salt fish and grain and oil, which had been found in the public stores, were displayed upon every stall. But for the want of powder the Governor might well have held out for many weeks longer. A few hours later the Prince entered the city but soon retired to his headquarters at Honteln. Meanwhile many of their High Mightinesses, the Lords of the States General, and of the Deputies of the Provinces, were driving in from the Hague or Utrecht in their coaches and were ceremoniously welcomed at their lodgings in the "Sun" Inn by the members of the Town Council. On the next day the nineteenth, a Wednesday, solemn services of thanksgiving accompanied by sermons preached by ministers in black gowns and Geneva bands, were held in three of the churches, which had been purified from every trace of Papistry. The Prince of Orange, the Palatine, and the Prince of Denmark were present at St. John's, and the registers of the church still contain the entries of the baptisms on that day of "Amelia, daughter of Hans Albert Best, a soldier of the Count of Hanau," to whom "Madame the Princess of Orange," stood godmother, and of "John," whose parents are not named, but who was held at the font by the Prince of Orange. By order of the States General their great victory was celebrated throughout the Provinces by a day of public fasting and of penitential prayer. Foreigners sneered at the Dutch for using Fast Days as charms to secure the aid of Providence. Perhaps, like the Greeks, they feared that Nemesis which followed at the heels of Good Fortune.¹

Thus the famous Leaguer of Bois-le-Duc reached its end. In that siege the Prince of Orange had shown himself a valiant and a knightly warrior. At all times he was to be seen where danger threatened most, and everywhere his presence fired his soldiers with fresh courage. Nor did the Spaniards belie their ancient fame. But for the faults of others Grobbendonck might well have thwarted his conqueror of his prize.

The fall of Bois-le-Duc was the signal for the withdrawal of both the Spaniards and of the Imperialists from the positions which they still held upon the Yssel.

Their difficulties as to supplies had, from the outset, been very great and even before the surrender of Bois-le-Duc Count Henri de Berg and Count John of Nassau had written to ask the Infanta for permission to retire, but, as she wished to have at her disposal the means for putting pressure upon the Dutch to facilitate the conclusion of the Truce, she had declined to grant it. This plan had been suggested to her by Philip IV. After the loss of Wesel, de Berg had, however, fallen back with the bulk of his forces to Borgoll, but had left three or four thousand men under the command of Major-General von Grodesdorf and a detachment of Imperialists under Count John of Nassau to guard the bridge head at Issel. The hardships which they suffered far exceeded any which the defenders of Bois-le-Duc had been called upon to undergo. Sickness due to hunger and to the want of the commonest necessities of life was raging, and even the Spanish veterans were upon the point of mutiny. Handbills were found in the camp which stated "that they were not going to stay and starve to death, but would go over to the other side where they would be well entertained, or at least, if they would not take service with them, would get something to buy a crust of bread. They protested that, if they did so, they could not be called "Deserters" or "Perjurers," but that they were soldiers, and men of honour who were forced to leave their colours to save life and limb." Tongues were, as the Infanta had remarked, wagging more freely in the Obedient Netherlands than they had done since the restoration of the rule of Spain. As she wrote upon the twenty-seventh of September, when she had sent Kessler back to Rosendaal with orders to accept the Truce at once on the Dutch terms, "Things are in such a state that I am forced to do so for the sake of God's service and Your Majesty's without haggling as to the conditions. This is the only way to

save what is left us, for not to speak of the disasters, the army is utterly cowed and cast down and we are in such want of everything that we have not even officers to detail to take command of castles and fortified garrisons when we require them. Both burghers and commons have lost all patience and hold language which makes me live in perpetual terror and convinces me that, if they can, they will beyond all doubt come to terms with the enemy upon their own account to save themselves from destruction. To prevent them from taking a step which would be our ruin and of which they talk openly, it is by far the wisest and best course to have the Truce concluded in Your Majesty's name. I expect a report from Kessler at any moment as to what has been settled." The mighty structure of the Spanish Monarchy seemed upon the point of breaking down. Flanders and Brabant had been the birthplace of Revolutions since the day when three hundred years before the bells of Ghent and Bruges had called the weavers from their looms to drive the chivalry of France in maddened flight from the gates of Courtray.¹

Meanwhile deserters from the stockade on the Yssel were daily flocking into Zutphen, Deventer, Duisburg and other Dutch garrisons, and dysentery and fever caused by the water from the swamps which they were forced to drink were making ever increasing ravages in the Spanish ranks.

Still, however, the invaders maintained their posts, and early in October Count Earnest of Nassau was detached with a large force to expel them. He threw a bridge of boats over the river at Ysselort, and advanced to Kheppel a position within six miles of the Spanish camp, which commanded the road by which the convoys reached their bridge. Here he entrenched himself and on the tenth of October sent a message to Count John of Nassau to offer him a free passage if he would consent to withdraw. As Count John had been instructed by the Infanta to evacuate the Veluwe rather than allow his soldiers to perish, he entered into an agreement to retire and accordingly on the thirteenth marched away to Bockold and Berg with drums beating and colours flying, and leaving behind him only those guns which he had taken at Amersfoort. His fortifications upon the right bank of the river were slighted, whilst those on the left bank were strengthened and garrisoned by the Dutch. Thus ended the invasion of the Veluwe, an undertaking which had it been well executed might have brought the United Provinces to the verge of ruin. The

conception was one which does honour to Spinola's talents as a general.¹

In Belgium the panic after the fall of Wesel had forced the Infanta to recall de Berg into Brabant and to employ his troops to strengthen the most important garrisons and to occupy the entrenchments which were hastily thrown up to defend the roads leading from the North to Brussels and to Antwerp. At Breda the garrison was in hourly expectation of the appearance of the enemy. The Baron of Balanzon was not a man to spare any precautions. By his orders the peasantry brought hundreds of waggon loads of hay and straw into the town, and one man in ten was called out to work upon the fortifications. He himself went the rounds of the sentinels by day and night and would not allow a gate to be opened except in his presence. The Spaniards, however, had not yet lost all heart, and at the end of September a picked force was despatched from Antwerp to attempt the surprise of the Flemish city of Axel. In order to reach its walls they had to cross a wide extent of flooded lands in flat-bottomed boats which they carried with them. Scarcely had they embarked when a violent storm sprang up, many of the vessels foundered, and the attempt ended in disaster. Had Orange advanced from Bois-le-Duc upon Brussels without delay the city might well have fallen into his hands. But the Prince was content with the triumphs which he had already won, and would, if left to himself, have preferred to secure a lasting peace rather than risk any longer the uncertainties of war. He saw that the United Provinces had little to gain by a reunion with the Catholics and Walloons of the Southern Netherlands, and cannot have forgotten how his father had failed in his attempt to effect it. For the moment he remained inactive and whilst Kessler and Van Berkel continued to negotiate at Rosendaal he himself entered into communications with de Berg, his old friend and near kinsman.² Faction was running high in Holland and public feeling was greatly divided as to the desirability of entering into the Truce. Many would have hailed it with delight but others, more especially those interested in the West India Company, which had expended so much treasure and blood in opening up its trade, were violently opposed to it. They urged that Fortune was in their favour and that it was as well that they should take advantage of her goodwill. In the middle of November the States General met at the Hague to discuss the Truce. The

Prince made every effort to secure a settlement, but the French at once offered the Dutch two millions of crowns [£500,000], to refuse to agree to one, "and so we may well doubt if he will succeed, unless God gives us His help." Three weeks later the Infanta was forced to admit that she saw no chance of the Dutch accepting it. The fall of Bois-le-Duc, was indeed, but the opening of a new epoch in the long drawn contest, which had already lasted for sixty-one years and which was yet to continue for nineteen more.¹

The disasters of Spain must be attributed even more to political than to military causes. It is true that the capture of the Silver Fleet by Piet Hein had depleted the Spanish Treasury at a moment, when owing to the excessive issues of brass money, their credit was already all but ruined. Yet the loss was in some degree repaired by the safe arrival of the convoys from Carthage and from the Eastern seas. This victory had, however, furnished the Dutch with resources to put a fresh army in the field, after being forced by want of money to remain inactive during the whole of the preceding summer, and had filled that army with a renewed sense of confidence in itself. The political causes which had wrought them so much evil lay far deeper. They must be sought firstly in the refusal of Spain to recognize Nevers as the successor to Duke Vincenzo II. in the Duchies of Mantua and of Monferrat, and secondly to the fact that she could only put forward grounds to justify that refusal by invoking the authority of the Emperor. But the Emperor, in his turn, was a constitutional and not an absolute sovereign and could not take action to enforce his authority except in a constitutional manner, in other words with the assent both of the Electors and of the Diet. This in any case involved both concessions and delays, and at the same time rendered it difficult for the Emperor to take any action on his own account as an independent member of the Empire to support Spain. With Spain the Electors had private reasons for dissatisfaction, and they were thoroughly determined not to allow the Empire to be involved in wars with the Dutch and in Italy merely to benefit her interests. With the Emperor it was impossible for them to come to an understanding so long as he retained Wallenstein in command of his armies even though they had refused to gratify his dearest wish by electing his son as King of the Romans. So long as the succession to the Empire remained open the interests of Spain were in the greatest danger. To

secure her own ends she had done everything in her power to strengthen the authority of the Emperor by inducing him to assert it upon her behalf in Italy if not in the Netherlands. Yet at any moment the Duke of Bavaria might be chosen as Ferdinand's successor, and, in that case, her most valued possessions in Europe outside of the Iberian Peninsula might be at the mercy of an Emperor of the House of Wittelsbach. Unfortunately, however, Bavaria was permanently alienated from her almost at this very time. Maximilian was, at heart, attached to the Emperor, and but for the reports which he received from Khevenhüller as to Rubens' negotiations in London, would, in all probability, have remained firm in his refusal to accept any overtures from France. His mind was, moreover, embittered by Spanish procrastination as to the paltry disputes as to Stein and Heidelberg, and he was convinced that the Emperor's refusal to allow Casale to be deposited in his hands was due to the intrigues of Spanish officials. In reality, although Philip IV. had rejected this proposal, when it was originally put forward by Botru, he had subsequently instructed Mirabel to do his best to secure the assent of France to the appointment of Maximilian as its custodian on conditions which would secure the rights both of the Emperor and of the Empire. It would be interesting to know the part which Khevenhüller, as Maximilian's chief informant at Madrid, played in bringing about the downfall of Spain.

But though Spain had failed to secure the support of the Empire and of the Catholic League, she might yet hope to gain that of the Emperor and of his generalissimo Wallenstein. Many thought that Friedland was Ferdinand's absolute master, but this assumption was not wholly correct. Early in 1629 Philip had received a communication from Friedland who with the Emperor's sanction had offered to take the command of an army to be employed in support of the Spanish interests in Italy. Ferdinand II., however, had attached a condition that this offer was only to take effect if the Venetians or the French either assisted Nevers or took the offensive against Spain or Savoy. Philip accepted the proposal, but, as we have seen, in his turn said that he did not wish to enter upon an expedition into Italy until he had concluded his Truce with the Dutch, and pointed out that if the Emperor's forces made a demonstration on the frontiers of the United Provinces, the negotiations would soon be terminated.

He agreed to reward Wallenstein with a principality in Italy. His letter reached Friedland whilst his own negotiations with the Danes were still in progress, and, until the Treaty of Lübeck had been signed, he was unwilling to weaken his forces by employing them in an expedition across the Alps. Before peace had been made between the Empire and Denmark, Philip IV. again changed his mind and proposed that the Imperial troops should be sent to make a diversion against France by threatening Metz. In other words Wallenstein was asked to abandon his hopes of securing an establishment in Italy which would be free from those risks which at every moment threatened his possession of Mecklenburg. But before Philip's new proposals could reach him, the Emperor and the Aulic Council had committed themselves to the Italian expedition by the seizure of the Luziensteig, had appointed Collalto in place of Wallenstein to command it, and had rendered it inevitable that an army to support the advanced troops south of the Alps should be formed in Swabia. Thus Wallenstein's plans were again rendered absolutely uncertain, although directly peace had been signed with Denmark he had sent three regiments of foot and some troops of horse to the Low Countries. Fresh complications arose at the beginning of June. By Spinola's advice Philip decided that the expedition to Italy should be put off until the following March, and, shortly afterwards, the Infanta acting without orders from Madrid, sent to urge Friedland to despatch all the forces coming from the North, with the exception of those which were already on their way to Bois-le-Duc, into West Friesland. The Duke was inclined to comply with her request, if he could obtain leave from the Emperor to do so, but the news of his complacency excited the anger of Ferdinand the Second and his advisers who were now engrossed in their dreams of restoring the Empire to its pristine lustre in Italy, and saw in Wallenstein the general who was to transform their dream into reality. Friedland, however, made up his mind to act upon his own account and in defiance of the Emperor's orders that he should send Torquato Conti to Bois-le-Duc, despatched him into East Friesland in the middle of July. A month later Philip the Fourth was sending elaborate excuses to the Emperor for the Infanta's presumption in asking Friedland for his assistance, mingled with protestations that she had done so without his orders. Yet, upon the same day, he expressed his approval to Spinola of the expedition to Friesland and his belief that it would

force the Dutch to raise the siege and to conclude the Truce. His one wish, as we have seen, was to keep Friedland and his Germans out of the Milanese nominally because of the injury which they would inflict upon those rich territories. A chance remark, however, betrayed his feelings and his suspicions, for, as he wrote, the Emperor would rue the day when he got himself into a quarrel with Spain, an event which the King seemed to regard as not impossible. Such were the relations which existed between the two branches of the House of Austria.¹

The Infanta's answer to Philip's despatch of the eighteenth of August was couched in somewhat acrimonious language. "If only Friedland's people had entered Friesland, everyone here is convinced that we should have been in a far better position. As it was the enemy had to withdraw a large force from before Bois-le-Duc to protect the Veluwe, and with the Imperialists in Friesland Y.M. can imagine how much larger a one he would have had to detach to protect that province. Under such conditions he would have had to carry on the war upon two fronts whilst conducting a most important siege. All our experts are certain that, in that case, he would have had no alternative but to raise it. But we have let our chance slip. I have sent the Duke of Friedland Y.M.'s letter of thanks for devising a scheme which must have succeeded had it been carried out at once. In that case our people might by now have been upon their march for Italy, so that we have lost time both there and here." She had sent her excuses to the Emperor for her request to Friedland to relieve Bois-le-Duc, and he had promised to send her eight thousand men for the purpose in place of those who had gone to Friesland. They had not yet, however, arrived. The Emperor, indeed, had been on the point of sending them against Mantua under Friedland. He would have done better to employ them on the French frontier or in a demonstration against the United Provinces. Had this been done the Dutch, as Philip remarked, would have concluded the Truce, and thus rendered any further thought of the secret expedition needless, whilst Friedland could do nothing in Italy except exhaust the Milanese with his quarterings. His Imperial Majesty should have left it to the Spaniards to carry into execution the ban against Nevers. In one word the loss of Bois-le-Duc was due to to the vacillation of the Spanish and Imperial Governments and to the rivalries and jealousies of Spain, of the Emperor, and of the Empire. All of them alike paid dearly for their folly.²

CHAPTER XCII.

DURING the whole of the summer of 1629, Rubens had been busily engaged in London in an attempt to bring about a peace between Spain and England which, in the eyes of the Madrid Government, appeared the indispensable accompaniment of a peace between Spain and the United Provinces. He had been despatched from Spain within a few weeks after the news of the Convention which had been concluded between France and Cordoba after the fall of Susa had reached the Court, and at a time when thanks to the efforts of Scaglia and of Barozzi it seemed as if he would have no difficulties to encounter in securing a satisfactory arrangement. Late in January, 1629, Olivares in the King's presence had explained to the Abbot the terms upon which he would be willing to negotiate with Cottington should he be sent to Spain without delay and with full powers to treat about matters in which England alone was concerned. Charles I., however, might rest assured that once he was in close relations with Spain they would advance the interests of his friends. Botru, it was true, was trying to scare them into concluding an offensive and defensive alliance with France by threats of what his King with the help of the Pope, the Venetians, and the Swiss could do to harm them in the Valtelline and in Italy, but, if England acted without delay, peace could easily be made. Scaglia at once reported this conversation to the King of England, Holland, Carlisle and Gerbier.¹

Savoy was at that moment by no means in good odour in London. It was believed, chiefly on the authority of the French ambassador, that the Duke of Savoy had been deceiving both the English and the Spaniards, and that he had taken the command of the French forces in Italy. Gerbier had great difficulty in undeceiving the King and Weston who thoroughly believed these reports, and who greatly doubted whether Scaglia was acting in good faith. Barozzi's first task after his arrival from Dunkirk where he had been detained for nearly a fortnight by contrary winds was to convince the English authorities that the Abbot was

dealing fairly with them. This he did by proving to the Council during a long sitting at which Conway was present, that the cypher letters which he had received from him corresponded with what Buckingham had said. Lord Holland was in a position to test the accuracy of his statements as after Buckingham's death he had got possession of Gerbier's cypher in the hope of using it as a means to keep all the foreign affairs in his own hands, though his expectations were doomed to disappointment. At an interview in the gallery of Somerset House the envoy was able to inform the King that his master would resist the passage of the French armies through Savoy sword in hand, and had given his explanation as to some assertions which the French had made about the treatment of the "Huguenots of Luzerne," or, as they are better known, of the Waldenses. The Duke had already spoken on the subject to Wake, and the King said that he fully believed his statements. Even at this time the fortunes of the "saints of the Alps" excited interest in England. Later in the day Lord Treasurer Weston told him "that the Council had decided to send messengers to Spain, Brussels, and Savoy, within two or three days, and if the war in Italy continued the King would intervene in it with his whole power. He said this striking his breast with his hand and speaking with the greatest vehemence so as to show me that he was telling the truth." Barozzi succeeded in worming out of Cottington what the Council had really decided about Scaglia's business, and found that the King fully approved of all that the Abbot had done, and had asked him to say that he would send an envoy to Spain if at the same time Spain sent one to England. He himself would send a person of quality to Denmark, to the Palatine, and to Holland, and would keep Savoy informed of the progress of affairs. The English were furious because they found that the French were only laughing at their proposals to treat, but, on the other hand, Carleton who had now succeeded Conway as Secretary of State was such a Puritan that he thought he gained credit by opposing the negotiations with Spain. Yet the French Ambassador despaired of concluding peace with England, and to please the Ministers kept telling them that Casale had placed itself in the hands of the Emperor and that the French King was only going to Piedmont with a small suite to visit his sister. Public feeling had been greatly roused by the news of the seizure of Orange by Richelieu's orders and everyone was saying that it was better to have the French for enemies

than for friends. Barozzi was far from being favourably impressed by the leading personages at the English Court. "When I arrived here I found the position of affairs so completely altered that I think I have done a good work in bringing them back into their present state. This is thanks to Y.R.H.'s high-minded conduct which shuts the mouths even of those who hang on to every straw to resist its effects and to leave themselves free to cling to one party or the other with the closest attachment. Carleton is a mere bungler, the Lord Treasurer is gross in body if not, perhaps, in mind. I doubt but Carlisle lets him in. Everyone would gladly be the Great Minister, and so they betray one another and others pay the piper. I have turned Evangelist for I do nothing but write day in, day out, and wherever I go I meet wild beasts. Patience, toil, and sweat are my constant guests and bed fellows. My one thought is to receive my despatches. Y.R.H. will have gathered from all this that I have had to resort to any and every means to carry out Y.R.H.'s instructions. Otherwise the business might very possibly have fallen through, as they all, including the Lord Treasurer, were under the impression that they could make peace with France and Spain at the same time." Weston to judge from his diplomatic experiences seemed scarcely the man to cope with subtle Italians like Barozzi and Scaglia. Barozzi was under the impression that by his arrival in London and his skilful representations of the ease with which, despite the capture of the Silver Fleet, Spain had got together eight million crowns in gold [£2,000,000] within a few weeks, he had prevented the conclusion of peace between France and England. This financial feat may have seemed a marvellous one to an English Chancellor of the Exchequer, but, as Scaglia pointed out, the Spaniards drew money from so many sources that their slightest effort produced very great effects.

The Savoyard diplomatist had for once, however, been completely hoodwinked and deceived by the gross-minded Weston and the bungler Dorchester. By the beginning of March Barozzi found reason to doubt whether the English Ministers were acting in good faith. All of them, especially Carleton and Carlisle, were always ready to give a hearing to any tale of the treachery of Savoy, and such rumours were known to be circulated by Carlisle's former secretary. "After they have made me sweat all the morning to put matters right they will say something that very evening which shows me that they have completely misunder-

stood my meaning." However they told him that the last answer which they had received from Paris had determined them not to conclude peace with France, but that they were willing to do so with Spain as the King had put himself wholly in the Duke of Savoy's hands in the business.¹

France, however, had an all powerful ally at the English Court. Henrietta Maria had been married for nearly four years, but it was not until the middle of February that it was known that for the first time she had hopes of becoming a mother. The King and his Council were in delight, and "His Majesty gives the Queen the greatest marks of his affection, kisses her over and over again in public, and addresses her in the most loving terms." The Puritans on the other hand, showed the utmost annoyance at the news for it was their great wish "to have the Palatine's sons established in these Kingdoms. The Spaniards would be sorry to see them succeed this King." Parliament was in full cry after Papists and Arminians. To cajole the leaders of the Opposition into voting supplies, Charles, to the Queen's indignation, promised, therefore, that no Catholic should be present at her delivery, although her mother had already arranged to send her a nurse from France, and talked of removing from her household her Scotch servant Gordon on the ground of his religion, as well as a great many French adventurers who had came over to "try their luck," and had "somehow or other" found posts in it. But though the question of the Queen's Household had been the chief pretext for the war between France and England, it appeared to have passed into oblivion, and, in the beginning of April the Queen Mother wrote privately to Charles that it would not be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement. Peace had been concluded informally in the middle of March. "All that remains to be done is to draw it up formally in such a way that it may be a little more to the King's advantage, without regard to other considerations, and, had the French ministers only sent it off a few days earlier, it would have been signed and sealed by now." Fresh difficulties, however, arose to delay its conclusion. The news of the taking of Susa created a very bad impression in England, and it was rumoured that naval operations would be undertaken against the coasts of Normandy and Britany if the French pushed on their advantages against Savoy. On the other hand reprisals against the Channel Islands were feared, whilst Charles, who had been informed by the Queen Mother that

Louis XIII. and Richelieu were determined to confiscate the goods of all the Huguenots who would not lay down their arms within fifteen days and acknowledge themselves guilty of High Treason, vowed that he would not listen to any terms from France. Once again he showed that he was as little able to stand out against the pressure of Carleton and Weston as he had been to resist Buckingham. On the twentieth of April Barozzi wrote "negotiations have been going on all this time underhand with France, and they have agreed to a Suspension of Hostilities not only out of weakness but out of a sheer taste for perfidy." The envoy had thought of leaving London at once, but had been dissuaded from doing so by Cottington who believed that France would decline to ratify the agreement and that its conclusion might still be prevented. Weston's object throughout had been to stand well with the Queen in order to preserve his post. He had never given a thought to His Majesty's prestige abroad. According to Carleton the agreement had been brought about by the Venetian Ambassador who had used the news of the surrender of Susa as a means to bring the King to accept, with some modifications, the terms offered by France which he had at first refused, and to do so in the hope that this peace might lead to a settlement between Spain, Savoy, and France. Both Carleton and Carlisle agreed in saying that England wished for peace with Spain, but Carleton stated with the utmost emphasis that Barozzi must not imagine that if he brought about such a peace he would bind England to make war for all eternity against France, as this His Majesty would never hear of and, in the present state of his affairs at home, was in no position to do. He asked Barozzi to inform Scaglia of this conversation, and, later in the day, Charles himself confirmed Carleton's statements as to his desire for peace with Spain. After this audience Barozzi again saw Carleton who told him plainly that they were only communicating with Savoy upon these subjects out of courtesy and not to give grounds for any discussion. "I replied I could give him a crushing answer, but that I would confine myself to saying that he knew well enough by long experience how devoted Y.R.H. is to the interests of England." Carlisle had told him that Cottington was to go to Spain and that Vane's instructions to induce the Dutch to agree to the Truce still held good. He blamed the Duke of Savoy for not having sent any instructions to Barozzi, and said that his silence had strengthened those who wished to secure the Queen's

favour by making peace with France. The next day Barozzi again saw the King who said that he had been obliged to accept the French terms because they promised him every satisfaction, but that he was determined to make peace with Spain, if he could secure it without binding himself to make war upon France. He thought Savoy would never join France against Spain. This was the exact opposite of what he had said when his messenger first left for Savoy. It was thought that the armistice would be proclaimed at the end of May. It was true that the French had made some informal overtures with regard to the restoration of the Palatine, but the English would have good cause to regret that they had not made peace with Spain, as they had thus thrown away all their chances of saving their kinsmen, and France alone would be the gainer. They seemed to think, indeed, that they could make peace with Spain whenever they pleased without doing anything to oblige her, and an agent had arrived from Chevreuse who urged them to push forward the negotiations.¹

Scaglia on his side saw that peace was an absolute necessity for Spain. "It may be far harder to secure peace now than it would have been a little time back, but one means of making it is still open. If we can make England see that her interest lies in the war with France, and that this King can do something for their kinsmen, we shall be much nearer a settlement. So at least most people think here, and they long more and more for peace every day. They have already written to England on the lines I have sent Y.R.H. and you might use your good offices by letting Wake know that England should take advantage of this opportunity to get better terms out of them for their kinsmen, to engage this King against France, and to induce him to get the Emperor to join him. This last is a most important matter, especially now that the Pope, as is so rarely the case, is in the French interest, for this gives the Emperor and Spain an opportunity to act together, which under any other conditions might be difficult to arrange. The point is that Peace should be concluded here, as the business in hand is not only to settle the differences between Spain and England, but to bring about a firm alliance between them, and this is absolutely necessary. Such an alliance can only be concluded where one of the principals is and whilst England is still at war with France, for under such conditions it is only natural that she should do her best to get Spain upon her side. If the arrangement is concluded upon a footing which will

make it advantageous to both powers, and at the same time defines the line which they are to follow, it will be a guarantee that the English King's relations will be satisfied, and they will certainly gain more from one made now than they could hope to gain at any other time. The general feeling here is most favourable and the gist of the whole business is to profit by this opportunity." Possibly Savoy which depended even for its supplies of powder on the English ships which called at Nice might profit by an offensive and defensive alliance between Spain and England. If, however, such an alliance was brought about upon the basis of the restoration of the Palatine, Spain might find that she had purchased the friendship of England at too dear a rate. She could only do so at the cost of a quarrel with Bavaria. Fifty years before when France was paralysed by her religious troubles and when the Catholic cause in Germany appeared about to succumb to the Counter Reformation, England might well seem to be the one power whose goodwill was of any value to Philip the Second's advisers, who knew that the Emperor and the Empire could do little or nothing to affect their interests. But the England of 1629 was no longer the England of Elizabeth. Drake and Hawkins had left no successors amongst the seamen who had failed to force San Pedro's Channel and who could only perform a stately morrice dance before the dyke at La Rochelle. At sea the most dangerous enemies of Spain were the Dutch, who with the aid of the Danes or the Swedes might threaten her even in her own waters, whilst on land the French, now united at home, might well force her to relax her hold not only upon the Netherlands but upon her rich provinces of Northern Italy. Against the Dutch and the French England could do little to assist her, and she could only find effective support in an alliance with the Emperor and the Empire. Olivares had recognized this when he broke off the negotiations for Charles' marriage in 1623, although considerations relating to the India trade had played a great part in determining his decision. That he should have been so anxious six years later to purchase the friendship of an England weakened by four years of unsuccessful war and bitter internal conflict can only be explained in the supposition that he imagined that a peace with Holland would be the necessary outcome of a peace with England, and that if he could bring the Emperor and the English to act in concert with Spain against France, the English Fleet might be employed to make a diversion against the French coasts.

It is true, that in his interview with Scaglia he had taken the line that his readiness to treat with England was conditional upon her willingness to conclude a peace relating solely to matters in which her own interests were concerned, and that his promise of support to the Palatine was couched in the vaguest language and was in most hypothetical terms. Such was the attitude which Rubens assumed during the whole of his negotiations in London, although, thanks to their own obtuseness, he was not wholly successful at the outset in convincing Charles the First and his advisers that Spain was not the absolute mistress of the Holy Roman Emperor and the Holy Roman Empire.

Scaglia's conversation with Olivares had taken place at the end of January, but it was not until the twenty-second of April that he could inform Charles Emmanuel that he had good grounds for thinking that the negotiations with England would prove successful, "for the Government here are very willing to send a Minister there upon condition, however, that the English send one here with full powers at the same time as they have promised to do. In order to leave no handle for the French to say that Y.R.H. is managing this business on hints from me, I am getting the Count Duke to send Rubens on a visit to England, as his confidant and mine. He is to be given full instructions and has every wish to be of service. Y.R.H.'s name and authority will never appear in the business until the proper time arrives. We shall thus be able to tell the French that Spain is acting upon her own account, whilst people in England will know that Rubens is there upon the Spanish service. We have as yet had no conclusive answer from the Dutch, who only give us hopes of sending one soon, but the arrival of the fleet from Terra Firma will certainly make them readier to do so."

From every line of Scaglia's despatches it is plain that Olivares firmly believed that, in the last resort, the fortunes of Spain depended upon the Emperor. If Ferdinand could keep the French in check and thus bring about a truce with Holland, "Spain will be more powerful than ever, and need set no limits to her ambitions if she has Germany with her and Holland off her hands." It was for this reason that they were so anxious to secure the recognition by the French of the Emperor's authority in Italy, although they also believed that once Nevers saw that his allies had left him to be dealt with by the Imperial authorities, he would come round to the Spanish side. Olivares, indeed, asserted

that the Emperor was inclined to favour a peace with England, that he would send a representative to Madrid to discuss the affairs of Germany, and that Bavaria shared his views.

The Count Duke ended by asking Scaglia to forward this information to London. "The Emperor ought to play his part by forwarding the conclusion of peace with both Holland and England. I think that it will be arranged with both powers, but that the Truce with Holland will be carried through first for they are expecting an answer to the offers which have been made to Orange, and which, it is said, he will give an ear to. Nothing, however, will be given out until everything is settled and some delay has been occasioned because they have left it to the Emperor to speak and consulted all the parties concerned before doing so." It cannot be said, therefore, that Spain entered into the negotiations in England without a full knowledge of the importance to her interests of the Emperor and the Empire.¹

Rubens set out from Madrid on his way to Brussels and London upon the twenty-sixth of April, 1629. Philip IV., whilst referring him to the Infanta for more detailed instructions, told him in general terms that he would make no difficulties as to agreeing to an armistice with England, during which the terms of peace might be discussed, and that he would not hesitate to conclude one with the Dutch or to induce the Emperor to come to a settlement with Denmark. Rubens, however, was not to raise the question of the armistice with the Dutch, if Kessler had already arranged it. He was also to visit Soubise in order to discuss with him the plans which had already been submitted to Rohan through Clausel. No allowance for his expenses was given him at Madrid, but Philip IV. left it to the Infanta to offer him such an "alms" as she might think fit to cover his travelling expenses. Coloma might receive a "gift," but Rubens was not a Grandee of Spain. The Infanta was also given powers to sign any armistice which might be arranged with the English or the Dutch, although she was again reminded that in her dealings with the United Provinces she must strictly follow the lines which had already been laid down for her. The Count Duke himself under Philip's supervision drew up Rubens' instructions.

When Rubens reached Brussels, he found the Infanta wholly occupied with her preparations to relieve Bois-le-Duc. Her resources were almost exhausted and she was forced to lay hands upon the money with which he had been furnished for Soubise,

excusing herself upon the somewhat ingenuous plea that she could not believe that the English would be such traitors as to make war on France within three days after they had come to a settlement with her. "For all that she has written to Spain to ask them to make a fresh provision for Soubise, as they would have time enough to get the money together whilst Rubens' negotiations are going on, especially as he had instructions not to engage himself with Soubise before the treaties were concluded."¹

Before Rubens had arrived at Brussels, de la Ville had returned to England, having been sent by the Duke of Lorraine to urge that the negotiations with Spain should be pushed forward actively. Nominally he had come upon a private visit, but was in close communication with Lord Holland. His instructions were that he should point out that France was only laughing at England, and that her one wish was to separate her from her allies and thus have her at her beck and call. On May the eighteenth Rubens set out from Brussels for Dunkirk, where he was to wait until an English vessel could be sent to fetch him. According to Hugh Ross, who was residing at Dunkirk as Agent for the exchange of prisoners, he had received strict orders not to risk his person, his commission, or his despatches, "except that it be in a ship of England, for he is mightily afraid of the Hollanders, and except a ship come to receive him here he is of intention to return a-back; he only does expect here for a resolute answer." Gerbier went to the Court at Greenwich to arrange with Carlisle for a ship-of-war to be sent across, and accordingly the "Adventure" was fitted out for the voyage and it was arranged that M. de la Ville should return with her. Before she sailed news arrived that the King of France had withdrawn from Susa to Valence on the ground that his person was in danger. The whole Exchange was ringing with the tidings, and not only was the Queen utterly disgusted by her brother's pusillanimity, but the French "no longer boast and brag, as they have been doing." Peace with France was, however, proclaimed upon the twentieth of May, and no sooner had the heralds doffed their surcoats than the ministers who had carried the negotiation through vied with one another in their expressions of goodwill to Spain. De la Ville had wished to leave London at once but remained when Lord Holland expressed to him his most fervent regret that he had supported the arrangement with France from

which they could expect neither credit nor profit. As, however, he saw that the negotiation with Spain was "in such a healthy state," he would do his utmost to ensure its success, and there was no one who was more in favour of it than himself, now that he saw how he had been deceived by the French.¹

Charles, on the other hand, did his best to show that even the keen-sighted Infanta, who, since his expedition to Madrid, had come to regard him with the utmost contempt, could be deceived in thinking that there were depths of baseness to which even Charles Stuart would be unwilling to descend. "The King," wrote Barozzi on the second of June, "has sent Gerbier to wait for Rubens at 'Argues' (Margate), and told him about the secret, that is about the condition as to making war with France, if he is really instructed to induce them to accept such a proposal in the treaty. He must upon no account breathe a word upon the subject to any minister during the negotiations, as His Majesty wishes to keep the secret locked in his own breast. Apparently Rubens will have to negotiate publicly in one way, and privately in another." It was not until the third of June that Rubens embarked on the "Adventure" whose captain during his stay at Dunkirk had been employed in making observations for the Admiralty as to the condition of the Spanish fleet. The same evening he landed at Dover, and two days later arrived in London "upon Tuesday in our Whitsun week," and was lodged in the quarters at Gerbier's house which had just been vacated by De la Ville. Although his guest was his "familiar friend," Gerbier yet made bitter complaints that the Crown did not allow him one farthing for entertaining foreign agents. As Damville's correspondent, who by some authorities is believed to have been Sir John Coke himself, wrote "Rubens is qualified as a Secretary *du Conseil Privé*, but what that is we do not yet well understand."¹

At the moment of his arrival the Court was in mourning for the King's first born son Charles, Duke of Cornwall, who had survived his birth but a few minutes. The Queen had had a difficult and painful confinement, and to this the infant's death was probably owing. For the sake of "state and dignity" she had been taken to Greenwich, despite its bad air, but no suitable preparations had been made for her reception. She was attended by a Greenwich midwife, who was afraid to deliver her, as she had only been accustomed to treat country women. A French expert, who was over eighty years of age, was, therefore, called in to assist her,

when for a time it seemed that it would be impossible to save both mother and child.

At first it was thought that the child was dead, but when it was found to be alive, "the Fathers of the Oratory, who are in the Queen's service, came forward to baptize it. The King, who had Lord Carlisle with him, refused to let them enter the room, and after making some very contemptuous remarks, Carlisle sent for a minister who baptized the child, although the Queen entreated the King to let the Fathers do so. The Prince only lived half an hour. The French here are now complaining because Carlisle prevented the performance of the Catholic ceremony, as they say he broke the Articles of the Contract to which he had himself sworn. Lord Carlisle openly says that he prevented the baptism." Time had shown that the hesitation of the Spaniards, impolitic as it may have been from a purely worldly point of view, to sanction the English marriage was justified by events.

Soon after Rubens' arrival he was visited by Barozzi, who was much gratified to learn that the part which the Duke of Savoy had played in forwarding the peace negotiations was fully recognized in Spain. A few days later he was taken to the King at Greenwich and received a most gracious reception. Charles, indeed, had already through Cottington expressed his delight to the Infanta at the choice she had made of an envoy, "not only on account of the object of his visit, but because he is very anxious to become acquainted with a person of such deserts." The Infanta, could therefore, inform her nephew upon good grounds that a general desire for peace existed in England.

Rubens began by explaining to His Majesty the nature of his instructions and that he was commissioned not only to arrange for an Armistice and a Treaty of Peace, but to promote a close understanding between Spain and England. The King, in reply, said that the arrangement with France was only an armistice which could be broken off at twelve hours notice and that he would throw it over without hesitation if he thought that, by doing so, he could come to a satisfactory understanding with Spain. "This fully confirms all I wrote the Abbot after the arrangement with France, although Rubens did not take all these protestations as ready money. As for the Armistice with Spain the King at once ruled it out and told him that he must not say a single word about it to any minister except to the Treasurer, as they would be certain to look upon it as a Spanish trick to

deceive England, and intended merely to give the Spaniards a chance of forwarding their own ends. If Spain had come into the field before France, the business might have been managed, but this was now impossible. Besides, the Siege of Bois-le-Duc greatly increased the difficulties in the way of the negotiations as they might drag on indefinitely. It would therefore be far better and more feasible to conclude a treaty of peace and an alliance between the two powers. He himself would have wished the negotiations to be transferred from Spain to Flanders. This is the exact opposite of his former intentions, as it had been his wish to send powers to Wake to treat with Y.R.H., as you may see from the Abbot's letters, although it is true that he forthwith put the idea out of his head again. It is, however, true that he wished to hear Y.R.H.'s views before coming to a final settlement about anything. As for the Palatinate His Majesty was by no means satisfied with the proposals which Rubens submitted to him by his master's orders. These amounted merely to an offer that Spain and the Emperor would endeavour to procure satisfaction for the Palatine by using their good offices through ambassadors and in other ways with Bavaria and the other parties concerned. Rubens protested in emphatic terms that people in England if they imagined that Spain could restore the Palatine and the Palatinate off hand must clear their minds of any such delusions. If the Spaniards were to tell the English that they could do so they would be deceiving them." The King's wishes, said Rubens, could only be satisfied by diplomatic negotiations, and he went on to remind His Majesty that at a moment when ill-feeling was running far higher between Spain and England, he had drawn up a report for him, which he had approved of, to the effect that England would be satisfied if Spain would consent to use her good offices for a settlement, and this document he had brought with him. Spain had refused, it was true, to agree to the proposal at the time, but he must point out to His Majesty "that he must understand once and for all that England was entirely mistaken in supposing that Spain would in any circumstances whatsoever make war on the Emperor, Bavaria, or any other power for the sake of recovering the Palatinate, for the Spanish interests which were affected by the Emperor's policy were far greater than those in which England was in any way concerned." Going on to speak of the question of sending help to Rohan and Soubise Rubens said that the King of Spain would, in no case,

waste his money upon any scheme which had to be carried out by England. Possibly to turn the conversation, Charles remarked that he was very sorry to hear of the accident which had befallen Clausel's servant who had been taken by the French and forced to throw away his credentials from Spain. When the unfortunate emissary reached Rohan's camp he was naturally enough arrested as a spy and would have been hung had he not been recognised by two of the Duke's gentlemen. This unlucky incident had delayed the conclusion of the agreement between Spain and the Huguenots. "Rubens replied that nothing could delay the despatch of reinforcements to the Huguenots, so long as England joined in supporting that party, but I suspect, by the way, that they will be utterly ruined before the relief arrives, for they are so slow in this country. He ended by saying that Spain held peace with France in the hollow of her hand, and if they could do nothing in England they could accept it at any moment." The King finally referred Rubens to Weston who would report again to him, and it would then be decided which ministers should conduct the negotiations. "This is how the treaty now stands. It is a mystery to me why they should want to negotiate in Flanders. So long as they can keep this business going they can carry on as they please and will be safe in every quarter, and need not trouble their heads whether others are wasting to nothing or not." Barozzi was more determined than ever to remain, as he foresaw that if he left the English ministers would soon forget Savoy and her interests.

After taking leave of His Majesty, Rubens received a hearty welcome from Carlisle, who invited him to dine with him, and during the rest of the week he was entertained splendidly by Carleton, Weston, and other great personages. It was settled that Weston, Cottington, and Pembroke should be the English representatives in the negotiations, and, as far as outward seeming went, no man could be more heartily welcome than the painter diplomatist. But treachery was rampant at Whitehall and as the Infanta's correspondent remarked, "You see by the few that negotiate the business how few friends you have in our Court and one of those named is not to be relied upon, there is no more well-wishers than Dorset and Arundel who is grown so forward and discontented he cares not to attend any business. The only man you may hope of is Cottington to whom Rubens may address himself being a wise and an honest and in very

good esteem with our King." It is impossible to say with certainty whether the traitor hinted at was Pembroke or Weston. A month before Rubens had reported to the King that he had ascertained that some of the English ministers sent secret information to France of everything which took place, whilst it was the common talk at every London ordinary that Carleton was in Richelieu's pay and acted as his spy. On the other hand Carlisle, to whom Rubens had been recommended by Scaglia and in whom he placed implicit confidence, was, like Lord Holland the head of the Puritan faction, furious at being excluded from the negotiations and would do everything in his power to oppose peace. He had done his best indeed to ensure that the negotiations should be left in the hands of his creature Wake who was to be transferred from Turin to Paris for the purpose, as by this means he hoped to secure the Secretaryship of State now held by Carleton for himself.

But whether Pembroke or Weston was the traitor, the standard of public morality was as low at Whitehall as it was amongst the courtiers at Vienna, and the consequences to the national interests were even more disastrous. "In other courts," as Rubens remarked, "people begin with the ministers and end with the Royal sign manual. In London one begins with the King and ends with the ministers." Hence, whatever Charles' own wishes might be and whatever engagements he might enter into, those negotiating with him could never feel certain that his ministers might not force him to take a wholly opposite course, and as every one of them was but too ready to betray his colleagues, English policy was at the mercy of the ablest intriguer. Rubens, who knew nearly every Court in civilised Europe, was amazed at the luxury and splendour of the English gentry. It was not long, however, before he was describing to Olivares the cost at which it was purchased. "All these Lords live in the most magnificent style and at an enormous expense, and so are most of them up to the eyes in debt; the first among them are Lords Carlisle and Holland, who as they keep up sumptuous tables have always a long train of hangers-on amongst the nobility, for at this court splendid house-keeping and a liberal expenditure are the road to the highest honours. I do not, however, mean to confine my remarks to these two lords only, for they hold good of many other men of rank and ministers. Most of them are men of small means, and so are forced to get a living as best they can, and are, therefore

ready enough to sell both public and private affairs for money down. I am told on good authority that Cardinal Richelieu is most liberal and that he is an expert in gaining friends in this way as Your Excellency will see from the list I enclose." The private records of many of the great families amply confirm the truth of Rubens' remarks, which go far to explain the bitterness with which political struggles were fought out at a time when a ruined gentleman saw his best chance of retrieving his fortunes in the Public Treasury. Nor was the King himself much more scrupulous than his advisers as to the expedients to which he resorted to find the means for maintaining his court in the teeth of the refusal of his Parliament to provide him with supplies. When Vane was despatched to Holland whilst the constitutional struggle was at its height during the previous March Barozzi reported in all good faith to Turin that he had instructions from the King to ask the States to advance him three millions of French Louis [£120,000] "upon the security of the Isle of Wight, which is very fertile, is quite close to Portsmouth, and is the island where the Dutch privateers put in for provisions, when they are on a cruise." It is impossible to conceive of Philip the Fourth or the Infanta Isabella entering into any transaction of the kind.

But the worst feature of English public life, so far as the relations between England and its neighbours were concerned, was the ignorance real or pretended which every one from the King to the humblest Privy Councillor displayed as to foreign affairs. Of this ignorance Charles' first conversation with Rubens gives a striking proof. He still affected to believe that Spain could sway both the Emperor and the Empire at her will, and that by a single word to Vienna Philip IV. could secure the Restoration of the Palatine. Not six years before Olivares had explained to him with unusual frankness what the relations between the two branches of the House of Hapsburg really were, and every agent who had since then tried to bring about a settlement between Spain and England had repeated the same statements with wearisome iteration. Yet in June, 1629 Charles seemed to retain not the slightest recollection that he had ever heard an argument advanced which conflicted with his own views and in his conversation with Rubens displayed an ingenuous simplicity which would have been somewhat misplaced when he set out upon his journey to Madrid in February, 1623. It is hard to say if he was speaking in good faith.

Even apart from the King's attitude the situation with which

Rubens had to deal was both difficult and complicated. There were three parties at Court. The first, headed by Lord Carlisle, wished or pretended to wish for peace with Spain and war with France, a larger party, to which Lord Holland and Weston were believed to belong, desired a general peace, whilst the third, which was supported by the French and Venetian envoys, as working for a war with Spain and peace with France. M. de Chasteauneuf was upon his way to London as French Ambassador Extraordinary and his approaching arrival had put new heart into his supporters who, meanwhile, were seeking to gain their ends through the Venetian Ambassador, whom Rubens, remembering his successes in the previous year, looked upon as the "greatest firebrand in Europe." For the moment Parliament was not sitting, but, should it meet, it was certain that the Puritans, who formed the great majority of the members, would, like their leader Lord Holland, who was always pressing for it to be summoned, be bitter opponents of a separate peace with Spain. That Weston, who was hated by them as a suspected Catholic, was in favour of such a peace would give them even firmer grounds for opposing it, for it was Holland's one wish to drive him from office.

To Rubens the vacillation which arose from the struggles between contending factions appeared simply weakness, and he was much struck by the hesitation of the English ministers in answering his question as to the reason why they showed so little desire to make peace with Spain. Barozzi thought, indeed, that he had no prospect of succeeding in his mission, and that the failure of the Huguenots in France would strengthen the hands of his opponents. In vain Rubens tried to convince Weston and his colleagues that a speedy arrangement with Spain offered the only prospect of saving Savoy from the French. They merely repeated that a peace could be negotiated as readily as an armistice, and once more protested that England was making no unreasonable request in asking Spain to give her satisfaction about the Palatinate, as all they desired was that the Spaniards and the Emperor should unite, as they themselves had proposed, in using their good offices with Bavaria and the Catholic League. They thought that the best means for commencing such a negotiation would be that the Emperor and Maximilian should send ambassadors to Madrid, with a comparatively free hand and unfettered by any decision having been previously arrived at.

Rubens replied in so many words that the Ambassadors "would have their journey for nothing unless the point had been settled beforehand." They agreed to report his answer to His Majesty, "so this may bring matters to a head and force them to take some other means to secure their ends. For instance they might send some one back to Spain with Rubens to ascertain if their proposals would be acceptable there, and, in that case, the Ministers would come to a decision, and the Ambassadors might set out." On the twenty-fifth of June Rubens had a long private interview with the King at Greenwich, of which His Majesty subsequently gave a full account to Barozzi. Anxious as Charles asserted himself to be to make peace with Spain, he said that he could not accept an armistice with that power, as to do so would be contrary to the terms of his alliance with the Dutch, whilst on the other hand he was bound by ties of blood and kinsmanship not to come to terms with His Catholic Majesty unless the Palatinate was restored. According to Rubens' letter to Olivares His Majesty went on to say that "as he knew it to be the truth that it was not in the King of Spain's power to place the whole of the Palatinate in his hands, he would be willing to conclude a peace between the two powers upon the lines of that of 1604, if the King of Spain would agree to give him the fortresses which the Spaniards hold in the Palatinate. These were his final terms, and I must say this to those whom it concerns."

Rubens declined to give a definite reply, and excused himself by saying that he had no powers to discuss such matters, which must be held over till the Peace Conference, but, that as the negotiations for a general peace, in which all the belligerents would take part, must necessarily take up a long time, he had brought with him an armistice signed by Philip IV., which would afford an opportunity for such discussions to take place.

This proposal Charles again refused to accept on the same grounds as before, but said that he wished that the peace negotiations might take place at Madrid and that the Emperor and Bavaria should be represented at them. In the meantime Philip IV. might engage himself to place the fortresses in his hands. In vain Rubens urged that he should agree in return to suspend his negotiations with France, but this the King absolutely refused to do on the ground that Sir Thomas Edmonds was just leaving for Paris, and that the French ambassador would soon be arriving in England. The only concession he would make was that he

would not, whilst the negotiations were in progress, enter into any offensive and defensive alliance with France against Spain, or renew the previous one. Even this concession appeared excessive to Weston and Cottington who told Rubens plainly that the King had gone too far. The Council would never sanction a bargain by which he gave up the whole of what he asked for to obtain a part. Charles, however, on the same evening not only renewed his promises to Rubens, but repeated them to Weston and Cottington, so upon the whole the interview seemed fairly promising, "although I know how little I can count upon these unstable English humours, which change and shift from hour to hour and always from bad to worse." As the French and Venetian Ambassadors and their supporters were working their hardest to oppose him, he had good grounds to fear that the King would not even hold to his first offer. Charles, indeed, had once more displayed his invincible ignorance of Continental affairs. "When I pointed out that the restitution of the fortresses could not be made without the consent of the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria," and that Spain would certainly not incur their ill-will to obtain peace with England, His Majesty replied that I only supposed this because I wanted to bring about the arrangement in a twinkling, but that everything depended upon the time and manner in which it was taken in hand, for both of them would listen to reason and come to terms with His Catholic Majesty. I should have gone back to Brussels to submit this answer to H.R.H. the Infanta had not Cottington pointed out that if I left England now, the negotiations would be broken off once and for all, whilst, if I waited a few days, we should be able to send off the sketch of an agreement. To gain time I agreed to his proposal although I foresee that it will be upon the same terms as the other, but I think it best to acquaint Your Excellency with this without Cottington knowing of it, as I am certain it will not be despatched until after the French Ambassador has arrived and had his audience." The King's explanations to Barozzi were in somewhat different terms to those which he had employed to Rubens. "As for the Palatinate he could see that Spain might employ the good offices, which she proposed to use, as a means for spinning out the negotiations for ever and a day. He had no wish that Spain should go to war with the Emperor or Bavaria to secure the restoration of the Palatinate, but she could easily induce the Emperor to give his word that it should be given back, and His Imperial Majesty

could insure the fulfilment of his promise without difficulty. Spain had credit enough with the Emperor to secure such an assurance and His Majesty had such confidence in him that he was certain that once he had given it he would carry it out. I think this is the scheme for an arrangement which they mean to get Rubens to put forward." On June the twenty-third "it was resolved that Sir Francis Cottington should go to Spain; you must chiefly confide in him as the man most really and resolutely determined to bring this negotiation to a good end. This afternoon, June the twenty-sixth, came the French Ambassador Monsieur de Chasteauneuf accompanied with fourteen coaches, in which were a number of ragged and tattered Frenchmen. He hath great hopes of our Queen, but as yet she troubles her head very little with matters of state, nor hath she any power with the King to hurt in that kind."¹

That Chasteauneuf would meet with a warm reception at Whitehall was now less certain than it might have been when Rubens first arrived in England. The King had been deeply hurt at the course which matters affecting Religion were taking in France, which, as he told Barozzi, "was flouting the world," although he was quite unprepared to assist the Huguenots by entering into any definite engagements with Rohan or Soubise, as he preferred to wait until peace had been concluded with Spain. "The peace with France could never lead to a war with Spain, but peace with Spain might well lead to a rupture with France." To encourage his good dispositions Rubens had ceased to press that the point about the Palatinate should be settled before the Imperial and Bavarian ambassadors set out for Spain. The Dutch Ambassadors, however, who had just arrived from Paris, reported that Richelieu had told them that he was determined to raise the siege of Casale and take the place over from the Duke of Mantua who was in no position to defend it, but that the French would not attack Spain unless the Spaniards opposed them. After Louis XIII. had got Casale off his mind, he meant to finish the Huguenots once and for all, and either force Rohan to submit, drive him into exile, or behead him. He did not intend to massacre the heretics as that would be killing half the people in his kingdom, but he would put down their Assembly and deputies, and exclude them from all dignities and public employments, so that they would have nothing left to do but to live quietly. Such were the lines of the

policy which Richelieu carried out almost to the letter as regards the Huguenots of France. He was too wise to exasperate them by futile yet irritating penal laws. Scarcely had Charles learnt of Richelieu's intentions than he had a conversation with Barozzi about reports which were in circulation as to domestic quarrels between the Prince and Princess of Piedmont in which he expressed his real feelings towards the French. "They were, he said, a set of scurrilous scoundrels, who were trying to sow discord in Your Royal Highness' family as they had done in his own. He had never been well with the Queen until he had driven all the French who were about her from his court. Now, thank God, he did not believe that there was a man or wife who loved one another more," and he went on to pour out a torrent of abuse against the whole French nation. The Dutch, too, were in great disfavour for "we hear they have not so good an opinion of our King's sister as they have had, which, together with their insolent carriage towards the English upon all occasions, hath altered our desires of their prosperity except among the soldiers, and the most malicious puritans." To please Rubens it was arranged that Cottington, although he was very anxious to stay to push his rising credit at Court, should go to Madrid in place of Carlisle, and he was also empowered by the King to assure him in reply to a question which Rubens put by Mirabel's special orders that England would not conclude any alliance with France whilst negotiations were in progress with Spain. "The King says that he trusts the French very little especially about the Palatinate." Rubens might well believe that His Majesty "was now more anxious to be upon good terms with Spain than he had ever been in his life, even when he was at Madrid."

Chasteauneuf had brought powers with him to conclude peace, and was instructed to prevent the conclusion of any settlement between Spain and England. He was also empowered to negotiate about the Palatinate and to devise means by which the French and English forces might unite in recovering it. "Cottington told me that he had seen a letter from Richelieu to Weston in which all this was set down word for word. The first fruits of Chasteauneuf's mission were that the English Ministers began to belittle the King's proposals to Rubens upon the specious grounds that Spain in collusion with the Emperor and Bavaria would be able to delay the restitution of the fortresses which she held in the Palatinate, and that by accepting them England would be

renouncing her claims to the remainder. In fact, he had great difficulty in eluding the King's request that a time should be fixed for handing them over by pointing out that Spain could not act without the consent of others. The old scheme for a marriage between one of the Palatine's children and one of Maximilian's brothers' offspring was also brought out of the archives and refurbished for the occasion, "but as they do not know the ages and sex of the latter no proposal can be made."

Barozzi's comments upon the situation were by no means wholly justified or wholly laudatory, and were tinged with the ill-will which he, like all Italian diplomatists, felt at heart for Spain. "Rubens is very well pleased with the frankness with which the King has spoken to him and to myself. He has allowed himself to say that Spain, so far as the Palatinate is concerned, could give His Majesty satisfaction, by handing back some places in the Palatinate, which were put into their hands on trust by the late King James under the obligation of restoring them. They were not taken over by Spain by capitulations or by force of arms, but were given to them as a deposit. I can only say that the Spaniards have denied that they are under any obligation to restore them on account of the rupture between England and Spain which has since taken place." A few days later he did not hesitate to assert that "Rubens leaves me in great doubt as to whether Spain means to do anything about the restitution of the Palatinate which will be of real use. When I touched this string with him, he gave me to understand clearly enough that the thought of giving it back had never even entered anyone's head in Spain, for, as he put it, such a thing would mean turning the world upside down. My own belief is that the English think that they can render themselves so indispensable to Spain and to the Emperor as to clear the way for the restitution. I cannot see how they are to do so in the state of misery in which England now is, but it is very true that the good faith and sincerity which Y.R.H. and the Abbot as your minister have shown in the service of this crown will always be recognised, and in the end, will open the eyes of the English, as it is your object to do once and for all, and make them see what treatment they have really to expect from Spain about this business." Barozzi was certainly tuning the strings to his master's "unstable humours," for at that very moment Wake was writing to Dorchester that the Duke of Savoy was much vexed because Rubens was only treating for an armistice

and not for peace. The Duke could give no advice upon the subject in the present position of affairs, as he knew that the Spaniards were annoyed with him for not handing over Trino to France in accordance with the Treaty of Susa, and suspected that Spinola, who was a Genoese, was being sent to him "for no good end." His Highness even imagined that France and Spain were forming an alliance against him. Under these circumstances Barozzi's attitude may be readily explained. It is certain that the falsified reports as to Rubens' mission which were now in circulation must have been admirably calculated to awaken the suspicions of every enemy, whether avowed or secret, of Spain. Finally upon the ninth of July Weston handed a Note to Rubens containing a definite reply from England to his proposals. Once more it was officially put upon record that England was most anxious to make peace with Spain, and that the differences between the two powers themselves could be settled with ease. The difficulty would be with regard to the King's kinsmen and friends, but as he saw that it was impossible for Philip the Fourth to arrange other people's affairs, he would content himself with his promise that he would use his influence with the Emperor and Bavaria to secure the restoration of the Palatine. For this purpose he asked that they should induce those powers to send ambassadors to Madrid to meet an English representative. "As these negotiations will require some time, the King declares by this present letter, that he will not sign Peace until the King of Spain has handed over to him the fortresses in the Palatinate which are occupied by Spain. As he knows, however, that it may be impossible for him to persuade the Emperor and Bavaria to agree to this, he adds that the King's promise will be one of the chief grounds for peace. "His Majesty engages, moreover, that he will not make any alliance with France to the detriment of Spain whilst the negotiations are going on." In a flowery letter, written in excellent Spanish, Weston after praising Rubens' zeal and diplomatic talents, informed Olivares that Cottington would leave for Madrid by Lisbon on the first of August, and that he trusted the negotiations would not be unduly prolonged, as the King desired his speedy return. By this time the Venetian Ambassador in London had informed all Europe that Rubens was engaged in treating for peace, and Charles Emmanuel had been forced to request that the fact should be officially notified in Paris so that the French might not blame him for the share

which he had taken in promoting the mission. The Infanta wrote on the subject with great reserve, and confined herself to stating that Rubens had informed her that though the English desired peace with Spain and a close union between the two powers "yet they desired that the settlement should be on a firm foundation, and that they should proceed to make peace forthwith without a preliminary suspension of hostilities, which would not in their opinion be necessary, if, as they took for granted, the peace included a guarantee for the effective restoration of the Palatine." She could only refer Rubens' report to His Majesty and leave it to him to come to the decision which he might think best. In his answer Philip said that he had heard that Cottington had been appointed envoy to Madrid. If the Infanta found this to be the case, she might notify the English Government that she was sending Coloma as his representative to London, but he was upon no account to leave Flanders before Cottington had set out. Rubens had informed the Count-Duke that the English wished for the restitution of the Palatinate, and he had, therefore, written to Aytona to ask him to communicate with the Emperor and Bavaria upon the subject. He ended by asking her to let Rubens know that whatever course the negotiations might take he was most anxious that they should not be broken off, and that he placed the greatest confidence in his tact and skilful management as the means of keeping them going.¹

Philip's letter to Aytona was couched in guarded terms, although it contained a very definite explanation of his views and left the Emperor but little scope for an evasive reply. He said that he had approved of the proposals for a settlement with England, which had been made to him by Lorraine through de la Ville, because he was well aware how far the French intrigues in England against the House of Austria had been already carried. He had consequently sent Rubens to London to carry on the negotiations which he had been engaged in from the outset, and had learnt from his reports to Olivares, that England was anxious for peace if only the Palatine's claims could be settled. Aytona must bear in mind that measures should be taken to settle this business "in such a way that the loss may not fall entirely upon me, and so as to prevent the whole weight of the war from being thrown upon my shoulders, and therefore peace must be restored by one means or another in the Empire. I can no longer bear the strain of so many wars with so many enemies solely upon

their account, and you must inquire from the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria if they will send representatives here to treat with one from England, but you must not ask this question officially and only touch upon it in connection with Rubens' letters. It is thought that the King of England might possibly be satisfied with the places in the Palatinate which he handed over to us, and strictly speaking we cannot refuse to comply with his request, and refusal would give him well-founded grounds of complaint particularly against myself.

"It is for the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria to devise the means by which they can get me and themselves out of these troubles and wars once and for all and put matters in such a state that they can get the Palatine's supporters off their hands." His one object throughout had been to secure peace on a sound basis, but if he failed to do so, to make an arrangement with the Emperor, Bavaria and the Catholic League as to the means for the prosecution of the war, so that, in any case, the Emperor and Bavaria would have to send agents to Madrid.

These instructions had not been drawn up until after a sharp discussion in the Council. Spinola and the King's Confessor had favoured a negotiation between England, the Emperor, and Bavaria, so as to free Spain from any responsibility as to the eventual settlement, for, as the Confessor pointed out, Ferdinand and Maximilian were the only persons who had really to be considered. Philip IV. could do nothing in the Palatinate without their consent, and as Santa Cruz added, peace with England could be arranged at any moment, if the Palatine's affairs were not mentioned in the treaty. Olivares, on the other hand, whilst supporting the proposal for the Conference at Madrid, wished "the whole matter to be left to the Spanish ambassadors in the Empire to decide." Bavaria might be given a hint that England might be satisfied if the Spaniards restored the fortresses which they held in the Palatinate, but would be offended were they to refuse to do so. If, however, the English were to get a footing there it would be most hurtful to the interests of all concerned, and it was for the Emperor and Bavaria to find the means of evading their request.

Philip IV. was convinced that the English were perfectly justified in demanding the restoration of the fortresses whilst his Confessor was anxious that a settlement should be effected by a marriage between one of the Palatine's children and a Bavarian. Possibly the King saw no reason to believe that the English

wished to possess themselves permanently of any part of the Rhine Valley.

However it was decided that the Emperor was to act as the intermediary with Bavaria, and that Aytona should ask him to inform the Duke that Philip IV. "would not like to take any further steps in this business without having ascertained his views and secured his consent," and wished him to send a representative to Spain. If the war was to continue they would have to enter into some definite arrangement as to the means for carrying it on. "If I chose to give up to the King of England the part of the Palatinate I am occupying, he would forthwith enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with me to the great benefit of myself and my kingdoms, but I have willingly renounced these advantages and hereby renounce them for the sake of the Emperor and of the Duke of Bavaria, and this will show people in Vienna and Munich what my offer means."

Aytona was to discuss the matter with Count Castro and Bruneau and when they had decided as to their course, he was to send Bruneau, who knew the Duke of Bavaria personally, to treat with him, and was to broach the subject to the Emperor and his ministers himself, "but you must always bear in mind that my first object is that this war shall not fall on my shoulders, and that whether for war or for peace, and it would be far the best if they can put war on one side, the Emperor and Bavaria should certainly send 'emissaries' here, if England, as we expect, sends an ambassador." A few days later, Philip wrote to the Infanta, that, as Rubens had informed the Count-Duke that the English wished that Cottington should only make a short stay in Spain, she should give instructions to Coloma that he should endeavour to contrive with as great secrecy as possible that Sir Walter Aston should be sent to replace him, as he was a person who was well meaning and devoted to their interests. "Considering, moreover, how important it is for us to gain friends in England we are trying to send Don Carlos Coloma a sum of money which he can employ there as he may think best for the purpose." It is clear from Philip's despatch to Aytona that he fully recognised that no settlement as to the Palatinate could be made without the consent both of the Emperor and of Bavaria, and that he had resigned himself to face the continuation of the war as he saw how difficult it would be for him to obtain it. Had not the fate of Bois-le-Duc swayed in the

balance, he might not have hesitated to employ the means by which alone he could overcome the reluctance of Bavaria. But the sole hope of relieving Bois-le-Duc lay in the goodwill of Friedland, and the sacrifice of Friedland was the price which he would have to pay for the help of Maximilian and of the Catholic League which even then might well arrive too late.¹

He had already transmitted to Aytona a memorandum "by a person devoted to his service," which gave a convincing explanation of the situation in Germany and showed that Friedland was at least the ostensible cause of the hostility felt by the German princes towards the House of Austria. That memorandum proved that Bavaria was the key of the situation and that until a King of the Romans had been elected the princes must necessarily hold the Emperor in the hollow of their hands.

The Princes were saying that it might be feasible to transfer the Imperial Crown from the Hapsburgs to some member of another house, and the Duke of Bavaria and his brother the "Prince" of Cologne, who was a great friend of the Duke of Saxony and some other Electors, were talked of as possible candidates. It was thought that as Maximilian had no direct heirs, he would, "as he is anxious to see the Empire perpetuated in his family," readily support his brother.

"The malcontents are asking themselves whether the Emperor or Bavaria is more powerful within the Empire itself. The possessions of the House of Austria lie for the most part in the border lands of the Empire, whereas the interior of Germany is in the hands of independent princes, of Imperial Cities, and of the Hanse towns, all of which are of more account than ever before, for they are rich, united amongst themselves, and thoroughly disaffected to the Emperor. On the other hand Bavaria holds not only his own territories and the districts which he occupies in the Palatinate, but is closely allied by ties of blood with five or six other powerful princes namely Cologne, Liege, Munster, Paderborn, Hildesheim, and others, whilst the Prince Bishop of Osnabrück is also a member of his house. They believe that Bavaria can, whenever he chooses, seize some Imperial Cities which lie either close to or within his states." Thus Maximilian could not only settle the succession to the Imperial Crown at his pleasure but controlled those territories of Northern Germany through which ran the communications between the United Netherlands and Central Europe, and could establish hostile

garrisons at the gates of Brussels and Namur, whilst Augsburg and Regensburg, the cities whence the financiers of Genoa and of Antwerp drew so much of their wealth, might at any moment see the blue and white banner of Bavaria floating over their Council Houses. It was scarcely probable that Philip IV. would quarrel with Maximilian over the Palatinate for the sake of winning peace from England, but he might be brought to consider whether he should not give up Friedland and with Friedland, Bois-le-Duc, for the sake of preventing the master of the Catholic League if not of the Empire from ranging himself with the adversaries of Spain.

The other grievances of the German princes were serious enough although, perhaps, more easily remedied. The outrages of Friedland's and of the Spanish armies could be checked by the enforcement of stricter discipline, whilst some measures could be taken "at least until a King of the Romans had been elected," to meet their complaints as to their loss of revenue by the stoppage of the navigation on the Rhine. These complaints were the more important because the three Ecclesiastical Electors and the Elector Palatine drew large incomes from their Customs, tolls, and transit dues on the river traffic.

"Some of them are thinking of asking for French help, and it must be remembered that France is the near neighbour of Treves, Spires, some heretic princes, and Strasburg, through which the French can enter the Empire without opposition whenever the "Prince" of Treves and the City of Strasburg, which is negotiating to be received under France, and is violently opposed to the Emperor, may be pleased to grant them a passage." Scarcely, indeed, had the Edict of Restitution been published than it had been rumoured in London that the Emperor had threatened to lay siege to Strasburg in order to force the magistrates to hand over the Minster to the Catholics and to expel the Calvinist burghers, and that the city had placed itself in consequence under the protectorate of Louis XIII. Alsace, as we have seen, was only in name a German province, which the Emperor, if not the Empire, regarded merely as a useful pawn for obtaining concessions from other powers. It might be possible for the Emperor to break off the relations between Strasburg and the French by occupying the city with a strong garrison, but a far safer and less invidious course would be to suspend the operation of the Edict of Restitution until after the election of the King of the Romans, who would,

it would seem, inaugurate the Golden Age by putting down the Dutch rebels and by restoring Catholicism to its pristine splendour. The writer went on to give a gentle hint to Philip IV. that the bad administration of the parts of the Palatinate which were occupied by the Spaniards not only irritated "those princes who are of kin to the banished Palatine, but also makes the name of Spain stink amongst all in Germany who accuse her of tyranny, of cruelty, and of lusting after universal Monarchy." To stop their mouths the abuses should be remedied forthwith, and the bishoprics and abbies which lay near Flanders should be given to Spanish Infantes or Austrian Archdukes. Had not the Emperor been personally popular, the princes might have shown their hand, "but they still believe that he may redress their grievances, and think it best to avoid any cause for differences amongst themselves until they see how things turn out in Italy and Flanders, and whether anything occurs in Flanders which would render it out of the power of Your Majesty, of whom they stand in mortal terror, to take action against them in Germany." Philip remarked that people in Madrid attached little importance to this note, and that he himself believed that the princes would never have aired their wrongs if their pensions from Spain had been regularly paid. He proposed, therefore, in future to charge these grants upon fixed branches of the revenues, and asked Aytona to draw up a scheme for the purpose in consultation with Castro and Bruneau, in which he should, if possible, reduce their amount.¹

It was most important that Bruneau should be in a position to satisfy those concerned that their claims would be duly met. Now as ever, anyone who had to deal with German princes might be certain that their policy was actuated by the lowest personal motives.

The writer of the memorandum was evidently acquainted with the most intricate details of Bavarian policy. The Edict of Restitution had been enacted to induce the Elector of Bavaria and the Catholic League to consent to a peace with Denmark which did not provide for the repayment of their military outlay upon the war, and was in great part Maximilian's work. Under the terms of the Edict the only two religious bodies which were tolerated within the Empire were the Catholics and the adherents of the Confession of Augsburg, and thus the Calvinists who included not only the inhabitants of the Palatinate, but the great majority

of the Protestants in Southern Germany, especially in the Imperial Cities, were treated as outlaws. Had the Elector had his way the Inquisition would have been established in Germany under the name of a creed test, and he had also suggested that Imperial Governors, who should be under the supervision of the neighbouring Catholic princes, should be placed as Inspectors in the Imperial Cities, a plan which would have made him the master of the rich towns in Swabia and Franconia, if not even of Nuremberg. It was natural, therefore, that Strasburg should be from the outset a centre of resistance to a law which affected so large a number of its citizens, and which even the Catholic League might well regard as an unwarrantable exercise of the Emperor's prerogative, for, according to the Constitutions of the Empire, the Emperor had no right to take any steps with regard to ecclesiastical property without the consent of the Diet and this principle had been formally asserted by the League itself. That for the moment, the Protestants of Northern Germany, most of whom were Lutherans, acquiesced in the transfer of bishoprics and churches to the Catholics without remonstrance is probably due to the fact that they had learnt by experience that it mattered but little to them whether the administrator of a diocese was a Danish prince or the scion of some Catholic house.¹

Notwithstanding the issue of the Edict of Restitution Maximilian still remained at heart discontented with the House of Austria. Throughout the early summer of 1629 he was meditating upon Richelieu's proposals for an understanding with France, and on the fourth of July addressed a letter to an anonymous correspondent in Paris, which his correspondent, who was almost certainly Cardinal Bagni the Papal Nuncio, discussed in several conversations with the French Minister before he answered it upon the fifth of October. His tardiness in replying shows the influence of events in Flanders, for everyone was waiting to see the outcome of the campaign in the Netherlands. In his letter the Elector was careful to avoid committing himself against either Spain or the Emperor, whilst at the same time, he did not close his door to the overtures of France. He stated that he would not take any action against the allies of the French, "unless in cases where he might lawfully be called upon to do so," whilst he would only agree to assist France in case of an "unprovoked" invasion of her territories. Richelieu rightly enough considered that if he were to conclude a treaty upon such terms,

the Elector would be able to elude his obligations under it whenever he might choose to do so, and pointed out that although Bavaria evidently wished to enter into a purely defensive alliance with France, she might yet assist the Emperor as an auxiliary, if the Empire were attacked by the French, without violating its conditions. He, however, promised that everything which had transpired during the verbal negotiations which had taken place between his agent, apparently Charnacé, and the Elector should be kept strictly secret and should not be communicated to any one in France "except the King who by temperament, is most reserved, Richelieu and myself, who are all interested that nothing whatsoever should leak out, and in this, I myself, for reasons which Your Lordship will readily understand, am the most concerned."¹

Before Bagni's reply in which was enclosed the draft for a treaty which had been drawn up at Fontainebleau on the fifth of October could reach Munich, the Duke had learnt that the question of the Palatinate had played the principal part in Rubens' negotiations in England.

From Khevenhüller Olivares had no secrets, and he was in the habit of communicating to him the despatches which he received from London. Thus by the twenty-fifth of July the ambassador had been able, as we have seen to write a full account of Rubens' conversations with Charles the First to his master. In reply Maximilian asked "why the King of England seems to wish to continue the war with Spain and has contracted an offensive and defensive alliance with France. Was this policy adopted as the outcome of his interest in the outlawed Palatine, and in the transfer of the Electorate, and still more on account of what Spain holds in the Lower Palatinate?"

On the fourteenth of August Khevenhüller had a second conversation upon the subject with the Count-Duke who informed him that Rubens reported that Charles the First had said that he would not make peace unless the Kaiser restored the Palatine to his possessions and to his electoral dignity. Otherwise he would continue the war against Spain not only within her European territories, but in the East and West Indies. Olivares had pointed out that the only reason why Spain was at war at all was in order to preserve the Palatinate and the Electorate for Bavaria. "All the world knows Your Highness to be a bold and capable general, and if only you would consent to lead an army without delay to

relieve Bois-le-Duc, upon the fate of which the Catholic Cause depends in so great a measure, the enemy would not send a man from their main army to reinforce the besiegers." Khevenhüller could only reply that it was not for the Elector to decide as to this as he was bound by the agreement which had been arrived at by the meeting of electors at Heidelberg, and they had pledged themselves not to allow themselves to be cajoled by any appeals from the Infanta. They had arrived at this decision on account of the outrages which had been committed by the Spanish and the Imperial armies. "Moreover Y.H. has, I continued, good grounds of complaint against Spain because they are withholding from you without payment both the Castle of Stein and the woods belonging to the University of Heidelberg, and also had delayed so long before they recognised you as Elector." All these were weighty grounds why they could not be given the help they asked for, and the Count-Duke had no reason, therefore, to be astonished if it was refused. "Olivares replied: This is true and means must be found to make all this good. I at once pressed for such an arrangement to be made, and as Marquis Spinola has left, I again delivered a note in writing to the King about Stein Castle and the woods of Heidelberg University and expect an answer forthwith." Thus a dispute as to the possession of a castle which did not bring in a revenue of two hundred God Guildens [£50] a year, and about the supply of winter fuel to a half ruined University were the weighty reasons which were thought sufficient to determine the policy of Bavaria at a moment when the fate of the House of Hapsburg might, perhaps, turn upon her decision. Yet, even then, Olivares could not give a final answer to these trifling requests for, in dealing with them, "various considerations had to be taken into account" at the Spanish Court. Once more the Count-Duke tried to persuade Khevenhüller to induce the Elector to relieve Bois-le-Duc, and after going over the old familiar ground, advanced the fresh and somewhat novel argument that it was not to the interest of either the Electors or of the members of the Empire that Holland should be strengthened by such an important acquisition. If the Dutch took the place, the French would be encouraged to intervene in Germany and the war would go on until the Palatine had been restored to his former greatness. Once more Khevenhüller brought the Heidelberg woods and Castle Stein upon the scene to justify his refusal and said that the Spanish Ministers were those who must bear the

shame of the excessive exactions and quarterings in the territories of the League. Olivares could only blame Spinola for having retained Castle Stein, and said that the Infanta had been instructed to pay a pension for it to the Elector. He hoped that Heidelberg University would do good work for the conversion of the Lower Palatinate. Meanwhile Wesel had been lost and the news of the Spanish defeat soon produced its effect both at Vienna and at Munich. The Emperor, it is true, promised to send reinforcements into the Netherlands and wrote to Friedland, who was at Halberstadt, to despatch a large detachment from his army at once. On the other hand he refused to name Spinola, who had just arrived in Genoa, his Commissary in Italy on the ground that Friedland and Collalto were going there with Imperial troops and so would naturally receive the appointment. Aytona, however, believed that Friedland would not leave Germany "until the game in Italy is won and it is self-evident that victory is assured." Collalto's instructions were that he should expel the French, and break with the Venetians if they made any movement to intervene. In that case the agreement with Friedland would come into force, but as some points in it were not very clear, Spinola would have to put them into shape with him and Collalto. It was possible that Friedland might esteem the actual possession of the bishopric of Halberstadt as worth more than the visions of a princely crown at Padua or at Verona.¹

If Ferdinand the Second showed signs of asserting his authority in Italy at the expense of the interests of Philip the Fourth, the attitude of the members of his Empire was from Aytona's point of view even more unsatisfactory. The Germans, particularly the Ecclesiastical Electors, were so ungrateful for all the kindness which they had received from Spain, that they were worrying the Emperor to deprive her of the Lower Palatinate and when they saw that H.I.M. would not agree to do so had pressed him to send a special envoy to Madrid to request that the Spanish forces should be withdrawn from Germany and that the Palatinate should be deposited either in his own hands or in those of someone nominated by him. Eggenberg had known nothing of this scheme until a letter from Maximilian to Bruneau had fallen into his hands in which the Duke said that Baron Cuxz had gone to Spain upon this business. In vain Aytona pointed out that his master would be greatly displeased if he were asked to do anything of the kind before a general peace had been concluded and.

that he would certainly refuse to comply with such a demand. Despite Eggenberg's efforts the envoy was duly sent off on his errand. The Electors of Treves and Cologne were in treaty with France, and the new elector of Mainz, Anselm Casimir Wambold von Umstadt was the very humble servant of Treves to whom he owed his election. He was of more malleable metal than old Von Schweikhardt, who had gone to the grave three years before. The Bavarians were utterly disgusted with the outrages which the Imperial troops, more especially those who had been sent to Flanders, had committed in the Empire, and the Emperor had no means of remedying these abuses, as he could not comply with the request of the Catholic League that he should disband his forces, and, though he did his best, could do little to restrain their excesses.

"The Elector of Bavaria has just written to the Emperor to remonstrate with him about this business in a very high tone, whilst the Duke of Saxony gave a very evasive answer to Count Trautmannsdorff whom the Emperor had sent to him to justify the issue of the Edict of Restitution. This bad feeling amongst the Electors makes me very apprehensive of some approaching change and I feel all the more so when I see the wave of French influence which is passing over all Germany and which is driven forward by the crowd of dethroned princes whose one thought is the ruin of the House of Austria. The Emperor knows this well enough, but he listens to all and sundry, and is so easy going that he believes many of them and cannot see the evil purposes of those who ply him with bad advice, and make him, on the pretext of Religion, enter upon some very risky courses. Such, for instance, was the publication of the Edict of Restitution at a moment when he had his hands full with Flanders, Italy, and Poland and had not carried through his son's election. People make out that he was talked into it by the Jesuits or rather, I should say, by Father Lammermann, his Confessor, and that the Nuncio here and the Pope put pressure upon him to comply." On the margin of the despatch another hand has noted the caustic comment, "I thoroughly agree; it is the Princes' fault." . . . "It is said that it is His Holiness' object to involve the Emperor in such embarrassments that he will be forced to leave off interfering in Italy, but it looks as if God had been pleased to perform a miracle in this instance, as He has so often done before, for up till now, the heretics in whose hands the Church property is, have not raised a murmur and the Edict is being carried into effect without the

slightest difficulty." Ten years before Ferdinand the Second had received from the lips of the Crucifix in the Hofburg Chapel the promise that he would not be forsaken, and that promise had been fulfilled by the sword of Maximilian of Bavaria. Now Maximilian of Bavaria had abandoned the Hapsburg Cause, and was, in alliance with the Pope, working, perhaps unconsciously, to bring into the field forces which were to make the triumph of that Counter-Reformation, for which he had sacrificed so much, for ever impossible. Even before he had learnt of the fall of Bois-le-Duc the Elector had shown his hand in his interviews with Bruneau, who had been with him to urge him to relieve it. Although Maximilian was now aware that Spain had refused the English offers of peace, upon the ground that she could not agree to their demand for the complete restoration of the Palatine, yet he had not hesitated to meet the envoy's request with an evasion. "It would be a better and cheaper way," he said, "if the relief of the Netherlands could be carried out by Friedland's army. It would have been easy for Giron to have raised the siege and to have carried out the rest of the plan," probably meaning the diversion against Friesland or Emden, "before he went off to Italy with his troops. It would be only possible for the Army of the League to play an indirect part in an attempt to relieve Bois-le-Duc as the Estates would never listen to a proposal to intervene upon any other terms." To Khevenhüller he gave a somewhat different explanation of his conduct. Bruneau, he said, had been with him a few days before to beg for the reinforcements. He had excused himself upon the grounds of which he had already informed Khevenhüller, and had added that he could not give any help to Spain without consulting his brother Electors and the Estates, whose consent he had not yet been able to obtain, as they were greatly embittered by the outrages which detachments of Friedland's troops had lately committed in their territories whilst on their march to Italy and the Netherlands, and, thanks to their losses, they had fallen into arrears with their contributions, were now unable to pay even their own army in Germany and could not, therefore, send their forces on an expedition into Dutch territory. The Spaniards would want at least two thousand men from them. Khevenhüller should explain to Olivares that these were the grounds for Maximilian's refusal. Apparently as an after-thought he suggested that the Infantry of the League might possibly be sent

into East Friesland, and that if Bruneau were to ask for this, he would try to get his wishes met.

If Olivares urged that the negotiations for peace at Regensburg in 1623 had fallen through mainly upon the question of the retention by Bavaria of the Palatinate and the Electorate, and that it was owing to their failure that Spain was in her present position, the Elector must tell Khevenhüller that to the best of his belief they had been broken off upon very different grounds. "England, as I have heard on good authority, knows that it was not Spain but France which used every effort with the princes and estates to carry through the Translation, whilst the late Archduke Albert and later on the Infanta Isabella herself asked for the restitution of the outlawed Palatine. We may well conjecture, therefore, that after this England," as the Elector noted on the draft in his own hand, "can have had no grounds of complaint against Spain." If the papers were looked up, it would be clear that the real reason why the negotiations fell through was because Spain would not give up the richest and best part of the Palatinate which she had occupied and was still holding, and thus England had found a pretext for attacking Cadiz in the name of the Palatine, with the result that war had followed with Spain. "It may be presumed that the moment France has concluded peace with England, she will do her utmost to prevent England from making peace with Spain." It was, in fact, her best policy to keep up ill feeling between the two powers, as she would thus divert the forces of the Spaniards from Italy, and it would, in that case, be a far easier task for her to secure her own objects in that country, whilst, at the same time she would wear down the strength of the Emperor, of Spain, and of the House of Austria, and thus give an opportunity for their rivals abroad to grow stronger. The Emperor and Spain should, said the Elector, endeavour to anticipate the designs of France by forming alliances to counterbalance her. "They ought to recognise how little they have to gain by satisfying England, which is always being egged on against them by their rivals who are in an offensive and defensive alliance with her, if to do so they have to insist upon the complete restoration of the Palatine." They would gain far more by keeping on good terms with Bavaria, and Khevenhüller should impress this upon the Count-Duke and the other Ministers if they remonstrated with him about the Elector's refusal of support. They must give Stein back to him and restore the

woods to the University of Heidelberg. The Elector could only give the Spaniards his best thanks for the insolence which they had displayed in these two instances, "and I doubt not but that you will remember to continue to do your best about the matter." In a postscript he thanked Khevenhüller for his past services. From the first Maximilian had known how hostile the Spaniards were at heart to the Transfer of the Electorate, nor can he have forgotten the bitter note in which he had compared their efforts to court the support of Saxony to the dealings between Maurice and Charles the Fifth. "Words, words, words" had been his sole comment on Olivares' honied offers to forward the Bavarian claims at the Diet of Regensburg. The time, however, had now come when he saw himself the arbiter of the destinies of Spain. Scarcely was the ink dry on his despatch to Khevenhüller, when the news of the fall of Bois-le-Duc spread through every hamlet in the German lands. The might of Spain seemed broken, and by the twenty-sixth of September Aytona, who was about to leave Vienna to assist in the administration of Belgium, reported that Marcheville had been sent to the new Elector of Mainz to notify him that Louis XIII. intended to despatch an army into Germany to free the Princes from the oppression of the Austrian House. The Elector it is true had replied in a way which satisfied the Emperor, and Bruneau was to visit him at once, but the French envoy might have better success elsewhere. Spain was no longer all powerful at Vienna, and in almost the last despatch which Aytona received before he resigned his embassy he read instructions from Philip the Fourth that he should, if possible, induce the Emperor not to send a mission to Madrid to request him to withdraw his forces from the Lower Palatinate. Such was the outcome of Spanish confidence in the German Catholics and of the sacrifices which she had made for her Austrian kinsmen. A quarrel about a paltry castle, Rubens' negotiations in London, and above all the fall of Bois-le-Duc had alienated Bavaria and were soon to throw her ruler into the arms of France.¹

CHAPTER XCIII

ALTHOUGH the fall of Bois-le-Duc had stimulated the longing of the Spaniards for peace they were now destined to reap to the full the fruit of their delays and intrigues in the past. At Vienna all minds were set upon war, and the thought of settling the Mantuan Question by peaceful means was wholly laid aside. The Empress might cherish hopes of peace, but she was deluded by her wishes. The very fact that the Spaniards wished to avert a conflict made the Emperor, Collalto, and Eggenberg more eager for one than ever. Collalto longed to raise himself to greatness on Italian fields of battle, and dragged on the Emperor in his wake, yet men muttered that Olivares in Spain, Collalto in Italy, and Eggenberg at Vienna were one mind in three bodies. There was now no longer any reason for Nevers to disguise his relations with France. "The Spaniards may say they wish for peace, but it is a mere trick to gull Y.H. and, if it takes you in, you will rue it some day."¹ Priandi, from Paris, was pressing his master to adopt violent measures. He had now gained over the Cardinal's confidant Bouteiller, and the pair were constantly urging Richelieu to send Louis XIII. with a strong force to the Italian frontier so as to oblige the Austrians to come to terms. Scarcely had the news of the fall of Bois-le-duc reached him when he was predicting that the Dutch would occupy Liege where the French would support the burghers in a revolt against the Prince-Bishop, and that if the States would grant Liberty of Conscience in their own dominions, the Spaniards would soon be hounded out of the Netherlands. He eagerly retailed the gossip of the Pont Neuf that Carthagenia had been taken by the Hollanders and another Silver Fleet by the English and was equally confident that Divine Justice was bringing Spain to ruin and humbling the pride of the House of Austria in the dust. With such advisers was it probable that Nevers would condescend to "supplicate" the Emperor for pardon, or to give three or four places to Guastalla or to compensate Savoy with £4,500 a year in Monferrat? Spinola, who had reached Genoa on September the nineteenth, in vain endeavoured

to persuade him to abandon the French cause and to recognize the rights of the Empire. His proposals were rejected with contempt.

But, meanwhile, the desire for war at Vienna was rapidly cooling down. Sweden and Poland by concluding a truce for ten years had, for the time, put an end to a contest which had seemed to be eternal, and Gustaf Adolf was now at liberty to turn his attention to the affairs of Germany, and to seek redress for those grievances against the Empire, to which even before the conclusion of the Peace of Lübeck he had called the attention of the Electors. His requests that Stralsund should be placed under his protection and that his representatives should be admitted to the Peace Conference had been ignored, and he had grounds for complaint in the embargo which had been placed upon the Swedish timber trade, and upon the export of arms into his dominions from Germany, whilst Imperial forces under Imperial generals had been employed against him in Prussia, and his kinsmen and allies had been thrust out of their dominions on the Baltic. The Peace of Lübeck had made the Emperor for a few brief months the absolute master of Germany, but to use Richelieu's words "the King of Sweden had blazed forth in the East as a new sun," and in him the German Protestants had found the "Uncatholic Messiah" for whom they were all waiting. Aytona, who was on the point of leaving Vienna for Brussels, was not slow to note the portent. As he told de Wateville, "The Duke of Friedland is making every effort to stop the war in Italy, as he is afraid that the King of Sweden may drive him out of the Duchy of Mecklenburg, now that he has concluded a truce for ten years with the King of Poland. He has declared that he will employ all his forces to restore the Dukes of Mecklenburg, and is said to have troops at Stralsund already, although there are still so many men in the Empire that they can readily defend it against a King of Sweden." Louis XIII. was reported to be with a powerful army in Champagne from which he could either invade Alsace or attempt to expel the Spaniards from the Lower Palatinate. It was true, concluded Aytona, that peace might be brought about by some extraordinary means when it was least expected, but as the King of Spain desired a lasting settlement it was most desirable that all the questions pending between Savoy and Genoa, and with regard to the relations between Savoy and Mantua, should be brought to a conclusion. Finally it was known at Vienna that Bavaria was growing more inclined to accept

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an alliance with France, and that Wallenstein had definitely decided not to leave Northern Germany, where he was detained by matters "more important, at least to himself" than were the interests of the Empire in Italy, "that is by Mecklenburg." To conciliate the North Germans he had desisted from enforcing his claims upon Magdeburg, "as he says that the Emperor has commanded him to pardon them if they will promise loyalty for the future."

Under these circumstances, at the end of October, Ferdinand II. told Agnelli that if Nevers would hand over Casale to the Imperial Commissaries, he would grant him the Investiture and the honours of his rank without further delay. "If," wrote the Bishop, "France were to send Y.H. powerful reinforcements and you thought it inadvisable in consequence to accept these proposals, there would be no need for you to break off the negotiations. You could always say that it was out of your power to divert the King of France from his purpose of carrying through a business which he has made a personal matter, and though you might promise submission, you might thus, as they say, give the Spaniards tit-for-tat. I fear, however, you have no real assurances from France." As Richelieu was convinced that if Mantua and Casale were properly fortified, it would be possible for Nevers to hold them with three or four thousand French soldiers, it might have been better for the Duke, who knew how little he could depend upon his own levies, to close with the Emperor's offers, with the mental reservations suggested to him by his ghostly father.¹

Life at Madrid, meanwhile, was flowing on in its usual course unruffled by the news of disasters in Flanders or of the dangers threatening Catholicism from the North. Maximilian of Bavaria, irritated as he was by Spanish meanness, must have stormed as he read of the welcome which had been accorded to Guastalla's heir the Prince of Guastalla. A long train of mules trapped with red leather, silver bedizened, and of footmen in liveries of green or grey, or red satin, gorgeous with gold and silver braid, opened the procession in which the Prince was brought from the royal quarters at San Geronimo to his lodgings with the Secretary of the Indies in the street of Carretas. Behind them came the Chief Constable of Madrid before the coaches of silver with red and white leather roofs or of red Persian leather lined with red satin stiff with gold embroidery, in which sat His Highness of

Guaastalla attended by the great dignitaries of Castile and Navarre and fifty coaches followed with the princes and grandees of the Spanish Court. Everywhere the windows were hung with tapestries, with carpets, and with painted cloths, whilst ladies in lace and silks or painted muslins, released for a moment from their wonted seclusion, looked down from the balconies. Yet the want of a few thousand crowns had sealed the fate of Bois-le-Duc. Even at Madrid, however, popular feeling was at length aroused and a former secretary of Inojosa's was arrested on a charge of sending threatening letters to Olivares, who, in defiance of the mob, grew every day more powerful at the Palace.¹

But when the meaning of the news from Flanders was fully realised Philip IV. determined to take vigorous action. On the twenty-sixth of October he summoned around him the Presidents of the ten Councils by which the government was carried on. Now that he had a son, he said, and the succession was assured, it was his intention to repair in person to the Netherlands and Italy. He had determined to set out as soon as he had escorted the Queen of Hungary to Barcelona and had held the Cortes there. During his absence they would act as his representatives. Three weeks before Secretary Villela had once more approached Khevenhüller to ask for the assistance of Bavaria. Again the history of Rubens' negotiations was recounted at some length, and the touching faith of Spain in the Elector's friendship and in his disavowal of an alliance with France was once more reiterated. Cottington's long delay in London had been a blessing in disguise for he had worked as hard for Spain as if he had been a Councillor of State, and, with Rubens' help, had induced Charles I. to approve of a peace which would insure the renewal of trade between Spain and England, whilst it left the Palatinate question severely alone. The Spaniards had never meant to retain that province, but had been forced to keep their troops there because England had made war upon them in the Palatine's name and so had justified them in keeping it if they chose by right of conquest. With some truth Rubens had pointed out that England had most to gain by allying herself with Spain against France and by persuading the Dutch to come to terms. If they refused to do so, the English ought to join Spain in the war against the United Provinces which were now grown so strong both by land and sea that they were a danger to all Kings and Princes, "and especially to England, which is their nearest neighbour and the most

exposed to their insults. The Dutch, indeed, are so much the more powerful at sea that they could probably make themselves the masters of England at any moment they please, thanks to their understanding with the Puritans, who are all under their thumb, are thorough malcontents and are at loggerheads with the King." Rubens had indeed all but persuaded Cottington to secure powers from Charles I. to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Spain, with a reservation as to the Dutch. It was known that Charles was averse to co-operating with France in her designs against the House of Austria, which would involve his alliance with Holland, Sweden and the German and Italian Princes, including Bavaria and many others, who if a breach took place would certainly show their ill-will to Spain, which could not even trust the Duke of Savoy. "And above all one must bear in mind that the King of England, in direct opposition to the wishes of his subjects, is keeping in suspense the union of the East India Company with the Dutch one for which Cardinal Richelieu is always pressing."

The French Ambassador had proposed that England should enter into a purely defensive alliance with France, but Rubens had pointed out that England would in such a case certainly be involved in any war with Spain in which France might engage about Italy.

The King, Weston, and Cottington were deeply grieved at the loss of Bois-le-Duc, and the excitement amongst the Catholics had been so great that to appease it rumours were circulated that the Spanish and Imperial armies would unite to retrieve the defeat. Once more the French brought forward their proposals, and taunted Charles I. with remaining an idle looker-on, whilst all Europe was arming against the House of Austria. Spain, indeed, "had never for a moment thought of giving him the slightest satisfaction about the Palatinate." France, on the other hand, hinted Richelieu, could, whenever she pleased, get Bavaria to join the League against the House of Austria, and persuade the Duke to hand over to the Palatine or at all events to his son, what he held in his states. This Maximilian would never do to oblige the Emperor or the King of Spain. With the former he was utterly disgusted, and the latter he hated so bitterly that, as a good patriot, he was going to take up arms against him in the cause of down-trodden Germany. "The Emperor, indeed, was already speaking of the intentions of Bavaria in terms which showed that

he did so upon good grounds." The Ambassador ended his disquisition by asking whether Charles I. would prefer to receive back the Palatinate, "at the intercession of France," from Maximilian who held nearly the whole of it, "or to go on worrying the Emperor and King of Spain to no purpose, as they would never give him a single rood of it." The King looked over the paper, but only said that Cottington would set out as soon as possible and so Rubens was asking that a safe conduct should be sent for him. Would Charles the First have hesitated to comply with Richelieu's suggestions about the East and West Indies, if France had secured the restoration of the Palatine? Had he complied with the wishes of Parliament, Charles I. would have ratified the agreement between the East India Company and the Dutch, for all the English traders were but too anxious to compensate themselves for the loss of their commerce with Spain by joining with the United Provinces in a raid upon her colonies. "I am certain that, in his own mind H.M. values the simple friendship of Spain far more than all the offers of France, and curses the day when he first set eyes upon the Palatine." Were Cottington "and I am quoting H.M. very words to me, to bring back the melancholy sentence of the rupture of the negotiations, he will feel the greatest sorrow at it, and will have to take a line very different from the one he would choose." But, unless he could receive some show of satisfaction, he could not throw over the Palatine altogether, although, as a matter of fact, he cared little or nothing about the fortresses in dispute. This perhaps, gave England India.

Even after he had heard of the loss of Wesel, Charles I. was still anxious to ally himself with Spain against the Dutch. He argued that, under the terms of the alliance, as it stood after being revised by Buckingham, he would not be bound to continue to take their part if they refused an offer of a truce or suspension of hostilities from the Spanish King, which contained fair and equitable terms and recognized their status as an independent nation. He was not obliged to assist them in a war which from being a struggle for their existence had been transformed into an offensive one.

The Palatine had placed himself wholly in the King's hands and had drawn up a very full form of submission to the Emperor which Cottington was taking with him. Carlisle, too, was very angry with France because his plantations in the island of St. Christopher "near Virginia," had been raided by a French

squadron under M. de Cusacq, although it was known at the time that peace with England had been concluded. It was known, too, that Cusacq had acted under express orders from Richelieu. Hence so far as England was concerned the omens seemed favourable for a peaceful settlement with the branches of the House of Hapsburg.¹

But, thanks largely to the question of the fortresses in the Palatinate, affairs at Munich were taking a course very unfavourable to the interests of Spain, although Maximilian for the moment might not choose to lay aside his mask.

In September, 1628, Nevers, through his envoy Strozzi, had been in communication with Bavaria and the other Electors and had urged them to mediate in his favour with the Emperor.

Pope Urban VIII. had supported his request and Maximilian accordingly had asked Ferdinand II. to show some moderation in dealing with the Mantuan Question. From that time it had become clear that the views of the Pope carried great weight with the Catholic League and that he could exercise a strong influence upon the course of their policy. After the failure of Charnace's mission Urban VIII. had repeatedly given instructions to his Nuncio at Paris, Cardinal Bagni, to promote a close understanding and an offensive and defensive alliance between Louis XIII. and Maximilian. Secret negotiations with this object had, as has been seen, been in progress during the whole summer and had resulted in the definite offer by France of a treaty, the draft of which was despatched from Fontainebleau on the fifth of October. In the covering despatch Louis XIII. stated that he had never discussed anything with England to the prejudice of Bavaria, and denied that he had promised to take the field in person for the restoration of the Palatine. He went on to say that he considered that in the interests of the Liberty of Germany the succession to the Empire should be taken from the House of Austria and given to Bavaria and begged the Elector to inform him under the seal of secrecy whether he was of the same opinion. It was necessary that the Election of a King of the Romans should not take place for the present or before the Imperial armies had evacuated Germany, Italy, and the Grisons. Brandenburg had already placed his vote at his disposal, and would, he hoped, do his best to induce Saxony to oppose the election of any member of the House of Hapsburg. He begged Bavaria to ascertain the views of Mainz and Treves upon the subject. Finally he pledged his word as a King that he

would do his utmost to secure the Imperial Crown for Maximilian and his heirs. He asked, in his turn, that the Elector should, either in his own name or in conjunction with the Catholic League or the Diet, represent to the Emperor that he must settle the Mantuan Question by legal methods, and pointed out that it was a matter of the gravest concern to the members of the Empire that the Emperor should claim a right to interfere at his own pleasure in questions affecting the succession to States in which there was no direct heir, as was the case in Bavaria. He was only interfering in Italy to secure the Duke of Mantua in the enjoyment of his rights under the existing treaties, and added that he was astonished that the Emperor should have allowed Spain and Savoy to divide Monferrat between them without the Imperial sanction. He had advised the Duke of Mantua to appeal to the Diet of the Empire, and was anxious to know if Maximilian thought he had been right in doing so. It would be well for the peace of Germany if the Catholic League would cast off the Emperor's yoke, whilst his armies had their hands full elsewhere. In the draft Treaty a defensive alliance between France and Bavaria for twenty-five years was proposed. France would furnish thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse to defend the states of the Elector of Bavaria or those of any other member of the Catholic League or of the Empire whom they might admit into their league by common consent. Bavaria was to furnish a force to assist France, and was to call upon the Catholic League for support if they agreed to accede to the Treaty. France engaged to uphold the Electoral dignity of Bavaria and to defend his electoral rights against all assailants, and agreed not to subsidize any power which might attack him. He named as his allies the Pope and the Venetians.

Maximilian did not accept the French proposals without hesitation. Although he quoted the views of the Ecclesiastical Electors in support of his agreement with the contention that the Empire should not be hereditary, he refused to enter into any agreement as to the election of the King of the Romans as such agreements were contrary to the Golden Bull, but said all the Electors were determined to defer an election until peace was restored. He eluded a definite reply to the offer of the Imperial Crown on the ground of the grave disadvantages of a premature agreement on the subject, and did not even give a hint of his own wishes. Finally he approved of the King's statement as to his

Italian policy, but pointed out that peace could not be restored until the Palatine allowed his claims to be settled either by arbitration or by the Imperial Courts.

It would be necessary to avoid inserting the words "Confederation" or "League" in the treaty in order to avoid a breach of the Constitutions of the Empire; it should be also expressly stated that nothing was intended to the prejudice of the Catholic Religion and that the Electoral dignity was guaranteed to the Elector and to his immediate relations. This was necessary as the Palatine also was a member of the House of Wittelsbach, whilst the guarantee should be for a limited term of years, for if the Electorate were to pass to his agnate the Duke of Neuburg Spain alone would be the gainer. He had no wish to break with either the Emperor or the Holy Roman Empire of which he was a column, but his heart's desire was that the Cardinal who had freed France from heresy should now restore the Catholic Religion in Germany to its ancient splendour.

Maximilian's attitude may be easily explained. The Imperial forces were massing in Swabia as a reserve to Collalto's army in the Grisons, and, should his relations with France transpire, might well turn their arms against him, whilst he thoroughly distrusted the coterie at Fontainebleau. He said he would sign nothing until he had in his hands a document signed by the King which might be sent by a private courier to Augsburg which was within a few hours of Munich, and care should be taken, as the bearer might fall into the hands of the Imperialists, to provide him with an uncyphered letter to the Nuncio there. Maximilian knew from Father Valerian that Wallenstein's one wish was to find a pretext for disarming the forces of the Catholic League, and that pretext might easily be afforded him by the discovery of a secret correspondence between Bavaria and France. A letter by an unnamed writer to Cardinal Barberini shows, indeed, that the Elector was in no wise under the spell of Richelieu's suave eloquence.

Cardinal Bagni, said the writer, had by his Holiness' advice and instructions commenced negotiations to bring about a close alliance between Bavaria and Louis XIII. He had now persuaded the Elector to agree in principle to such a treaty and the alliance between the two parties would shortly, it was believed, be signed and sealed, as His Eminence would have seen by the Nuncio's despatches. The deference which the King paid to the counsels

of the Holy See was so well known, that His Holiness would be performing an act worthy of his habitual zeal and piety, if he would impress upon His Most Christian Majesty that it was his bounden duty "to defend and conserve the Electoral dignity in the person of the Elector and of the Serene 'House of Bavaria,'" and to protect the Electoral States against all assailants. "Moreover as the Elector does not believe in the truth of the reports which have been spread all over the Empire that it is the intention of the Most Christian King to employ the vast army which he has brought together upon the confines of Germany to restore the Count Palatine and by doing so to stir up fresh troubles in the Empire, it would be advisable that His Holiness should deign to represent to H.M. of his own proper motion without either mentioning the Elector, or that the matter has been brought to his notice by Bavaria, that many different reports (although in very general terms) have been received at Rome upon the subject of the French armaments, and it is to be hoped that such representations would have a good effect. I am writing this with the greatest secrecy and not even the Cardinal knows I am doing it."

Under such conditions it was obviously Maximilian's best policy to avoid giving France any pretext for offence by assisting Spain, and it was not difficult for him to excuse himself for his refusal to do so on the ground of his position with regard to the Catholic League. He did not disguise from Aytona and Bruneau that he had received assurances from France that they would upon no account assist England to recover the Palatinate and that they would protect Bavaria and the other members of the Empire from the excesses of the Imperial and Spanish armies. It was solely on account of these excesses that the Catholic League had refused to assist the Infanta, except with the consent of the Diet or of the Convention of Electors. Khevenhüller duly communicated the Elector's message to Olivares, who had already learnt from Bruneau that he all but despaired of success in his mission. "The Count Duke at once sent for the Prince of Guastalla and said with great feeling to him and to myself more or less what follows: "Spain has jeopardized herself to keep the Emperor and the German Princes in the position in which they are to-day; she has ruined herself for their sakes, and they have been the cause of all these wars and of the enmity which France and England have shown her on the field of battle and at the Council Board. It is a

hard thing, therefore, that they should now favour one who has always been the adversary of the Emperor and of the Empire above the King of Spain who has done so much for them." Once more he repeated that the House of Austria had saved the Empire from the Turks, and was now fighting to defend them against such heretics as the Swedish King. All the losses which Spain had sustained in the Indies and in Flanders were due to the fact that during the Truce she had expended the blood and treasure with which she might have frustrated the designs of the Dutch to defend the Emperor. Once more he pointed out that Austria and Bavaria were natural allies, that it was the one object of France to keep them apart, and that the interest which France had shown in the transfer of the Electorate was only designed to lure the Duke "into some desperate course." Spain, on the other hand, had sought to prevent the transfer from taking place until a league could be formed to assure him in the possession of the Electorate, and they had even gone so far as to give him the title of "Elector" whilst the Prince of Wales was at Madrid. They believed the Duke's assurances that he was not in alliance with France. The object of the French was to destroy the Emperor's authority in Italy, whilst Spain wished to secure a lasting peace in Germany and to frustrate the efforts which were being made to ruin Religion. Spain was prepared to distribute the districts which she had occupied in the Lower Palatinate amongst the friends who had shared with her the dangers of this war. "The Count Duke begs Your Highness and the Emperor to send envoys to Madrid to treat with the English envoy upon this basis. Otherwise Spain will be forced to make peace with England upon terms consonant with her own interests, for she cannot continue to carry on the war by herself without assistance from her friends. I say this, Sir," writes Khevenhüller, "because I see that these Ministers are so downcast and cowed, that I cannot exaggerate their depression. Bruneau's report has thoroughly alarmed them, especially as he says amongst other things that some Electors told him that if the French King should enter Germany they will not oppose him so long as he does nothing to their detriment. If they act thus they will find themselves deceived, as their grandfathers were when Henri II. took Metz and, but for his death, would have carried his frontier to the Rhine, an object which the French have never laid aside." All the enemies of Spain said that she was no longer to be trusted,

and quoted her harsh treatment of the Emperor in proof of their statement, instancing the delay, unavoidable though Khevenhüller knew it to be, which had occurred in sending the Queen of Hungary to Vienna. The Count Duke deplored the excesses which had been committed by the Imperial and Spanish armies, and greatly regretted that Friedland's and Tilly's forces should have been quartered in friendly territories. Had all acted together measures would have been enforced to prevent those outrages, "but the chance was lost when the armies of the Emperor and the League were lying together in East Friesland." Measures were now, however, being taken for the purpose.

"He reminded us that the French and Dutch armies would have done us no less hurt and would, indeed, have taken both interest and principal." Such incidents cannot always be prevented by the sovereigns from taking place in time of war, and the best means for Y.H. to remedy these disorders, is to make the treaty with Spain which, as the season is so advanced, should be done at once. Y.H. will pardon me for employing these lengthy arguments, but I know your devotion to the House of Austria, and if you continue closely united with it, you will be forwarding the service of God and the welfare of your own states." Khevenhüller's eloquence was seconded by the Prince of Guastalla, who pointed out that the safety of the Empire and of Religion could only be secured by an alliance between the Emperor, Spain, and the Catholic League, and that the approaching arrival of the English envoy rendered it inevitable that a decision on the subject would be taken at once. The Spanish ministers knew well that their country was in grave danger and could only be saved if they abided by their agreements. Thus the moment was most favourable for a settlement. As an additional inducement Olivares offered to give the Elector complete satisfaction about Stein and Heidelberg, provided that the arrangements were affected simultaneously with the conclusion of the alliance with the Catholic League.

Maximilian, meanwhile, was carefully balancing the arguments for and against the two policies proposed.

The chief ground for preferring an alliance with France was that not only England and Holland, but also Spain, which was most anxious for peace with England, were pressing for the restoration of the banished Palatine, and if France supported them, might eventually accomplish it. It was the interest of Bavaria

to separate England from France in order to retain the Upper Palatinate and the Electoral dignity. The Emperor knew that the Duke was negotiating with France, whilst the Nuncio had written on the sixth of February, 1629, "that he had repeatedly received instructions from the Pope to bring about a good understanding and, if possible, an alliance between France and Bavaria." A purely defensive alliance as proposed by France would in no way be contrary to the duty which Bavaria owed to the Emperor and the Empire, provided the necessary reservations were admitted. The Elector was entitled to defend his rights as such, and the alliance would only come into force if they were attacked, and was of no effect so long as they were respected by the Emperor, the Empire, the Catholic League, and Spain. Only a "malicious imagination" could find a pretext in such a treaty for depriving the Elector of his Electorate. The details of the negotiations had only been kept secret because Louis XIII. had not been in a position to fulfil his engagements until France had been freed from the Huguenot danger at home. If she assisted the German Catholics the House of Austria had no reason to look upon it as an unfriendly act. Had Bavaria revealed the negotiations France would certainly have broken with him for his treachery. Saxony had made known the French proposals to the Emperor, but after refusing to accept them. If the Elector refused French help he would be left to the tender mercies of Spain.

Germany was worn out by the contributions so it would be impossible to keep up the Army of the Catholic League. Friedland's one hope was that it would be disbanded so that he might get the Empire into his own hands, as, but for Bavaria, he might do at any moment, and Bavaria could not continue the struggle much longer without the support of France, which could have no object in throwing the Elector back into the arms of Spain. Unless the alliance was a purely defensive one it might lead to difficulties with the French, as were they to invade Alsace or Sweden to land troops at Stralsund he would certainly be asked to assist the Imperialists. If, however, a settlement were brought about in Italy, such a diversion might not be made, whilst, if a purely defensive alliance existed, the Emperor and the Empire would be less likely to call upon Bavaria for help in repelling a French invasion, and it would be easier for her to find a pretext for refusing it. Thus if Friedland called upon Tilly for

help, they could always say that he had brought the attack upon himself by occupying Mecklenburg. On the other hand if the Spaniards became reasonable, and acknowledged that the Catholic League had been right in refusing to come to a breach with the Dutch by sending reinforcements into the Netherlands after the fall of Bois-le-Duc, they should not accept the proposals. On the whole, the alliance was advisable. Jocher thought it best that the treaty should be drawn up in such a form that it could be communicated to the Imperial and Spanish Governments. It would be well if the Imperialists could be expostulated with as to the errors which they had committed, and thus induced to amend them. "However, my hesitation as to the proposed alliance is now removed because I am not pledged to assist France in any given case, whereas if France were to refuse to assist the Duke, he would have no one else to look to, supposing the treaty were not to take effect." To Jocher the alliance was a counsel of despair. His remarks as to the hostile feeling which Spain, out of her desire to restore the Palatine Frederick, had always displayed towards Bavaria struck the same key as Khevenhüller's remonstrances to Olivares.

"It is well known how far the negotiations between Spain and England went during Rubens' mission, and that Spain had not only offered to restore to the Palatine all the places which she was occupying in the Palatinate, but had given hopes that the remainder of his states would be handed back to him. It is constantly asserted, and apparently upon good grounds, that as Spain must have peace with England at any price, she will comply with the request of the English that Palatine Frederick shall be included in the treaty, and has secretly promised that he shall be restored." They had also encouraged Neuburg to advance his claims to the Electorate, and had refused to give Tilly the reinforcements with which he could have annihilated Mansfeldt's army after Höchst. Nor were Stein, Heidelberg and the unpaid taxes for the garrisons in the Palatinate forgotten, whilst their insolent pretensions to make the Catholic League their puppet were duly recalled. Under such conditions an alliance between France and Bavaria which would secure Bavaria her gains might well seem natural. Maximilian cared little for Italy, and was only too eager to secure himself the wardenship of Casale even at the expense of the injured Nevers. It was nothing to Bavaria if France advanced her frontier to the Rhine. On the other hand his stake

in the Palatine's forfeited inheritance was everything to the Duke.¹

Such being the case Olivares' entreaties fell upon deaf ears, although Philip the Fourth had already in some degree drawn back from his attitude of deference to the wishes of England. Coloma received instructions not to bring up the question of the Palatine, but merely to listen to what might be said at Whitehall, and, in reply, speaking as if upon his own account, to point out the difficulties which might be raised by the Emperor and Bavaria. Richelieu, at the same time, was treating Maximilian's offers with considerable reserve. He was by no means anxious to give a definite sanction to the Elector's interpretation of the Treaty as being limited by his duties towards the Emperor and the Empire, suggesting that these could be met by a simple paragraph in the preamble, and though he gave the Nuncio a draft treaty signed by the King and countersigned by Bouteiller, "without whose signature nothing is valid," he was unwilling that Bagni should send it to Munich unless he was certain that it would be accepted there. Louis XIII. was not desirous of keeping Mantua, but only wished that Nevers' claims as to the investiture should be decided by legal means. On the other hand he would make an alliance with Bavaria and her allies to defend them against any unjust aggression, even if they remained neutral as regards the Empire, if they would ensure that the Catholic League, on their side, would remain neutral, if France, to make a diversion in favour of Nevers, were to attack any other part of the Empire. On the other hand, when the troubles in Italy were settled, the King would be ready to send his forces to join those of the League to gain full security for all the Elector's possessions, "and as he has an almost certain promise from Denmark and Sweden, should the necessity arise, and also from others, the Duke of Bavaria can then be guaranteed in the full enjoyment of his possessions whether inherited or acquired." On the other hand Louis XIII. would not make any offer to the Palatine except with the Duke's consent although it was to be understood that any terms offered must be honourable ones. He added that he was unwilling to go to war with Spain unless they meant to retain Mantua, and that he was anxious that Nevers should do homage to the Emperor and recognise him as his Feudal superior. For the moment, indeed, France was by no means willing to come to a breach with the Emperor. As Richelieu explained to the Nuncio he had come to an under-

standing with Brandenburg, and had induced the Elector to endeavour to persuade Saxony to unite with the Catholic Electors and to recognise that it would be a public scandal if the two Protestant Electors were to take up arms against them on behalf of the Palatine, although the Emperor might be the gainer by it. Richelieu urged Maximilian to cultivate a friendship with Brandenburg.

"The French King sent Charnacé to the Swede who was said to be preparing for war against the Emperor and Wallenstein, to warn him that he was very much in the wrong if he means to quarrel with the League for the sake of restoring the Palatine. If he does so the French will defend them not because they are under any obligation to do so, but because it is to their interest. The Swede had replied that he thought the request a most reasonable one, and that he was ready to meet the wishes of the French." A few weeks later it was proposed to send Marcheville to the Electors to inquire whether they wished a league to be formed to force the Emperor to disband his army, and to expel the Spaniards from their garrisons in the Lower Palatinate, which was to be left at the disposal of a Free Diet. In that case the King would assist them in any way they pleased, and with their assent would make a diversion against the territories of the House of Austria beyond the limits of the Empire. He was sending fifty thousand foot and six thousand horse under Richelieu to Italy, and was massing a large force in Champagne to be at the disposal of his friends and neighbours amongst the Electors. His one object was to free Italy and Germany from the oppression of the Austrians and to secure Public Liberty.

Maximilian's comments on these generous offers were inspired with a well merited distrust of French assurances. It was archi-false that the Emperor would not listen to the complaints of the Electors, and there was no need for them to take up arms to force H.I.M. to expel Friedland from the Empire. The King's promise of protecting the Liberties of Germany was too vague and the number of troops which he proposed to send was too large. The object of the League was to remain neutral as regarded the Emperor and the Empire, and not to involve Germany in the Italian War so that they could not wish the King to make a diversion such as that which he proposed. The League had been formed to preserve Religion and not to put pressure upon the Emperor by force of arms. In short the Duke believed that the

Catholic Electors could do much to secure their objects through the aid of the Diet, as seems to have been pointed out at their meeting at Mergentheim. He, however, thought it politic to thank Richelieu for his goodwill and to say that he had never credited the report that Louis XIII. was treating with England as to the restoration of the Palatine.

The progress of the negotiations between France and Bavaria was delayed by Jocher's illness and by a dispute as to whether the French guarantee should include the Elector's "acquired" as well as his hereditary states. To this Richelieu agreed and thus abandoned the cause of the Palatine. On the eighth of May Maximilian signed a treaty with France "for their mutual defence." The two powers agreed that they would defend one another's territories against all enemies, in case they were attacked. France agreed to guarantee the retention of the Electorate by the Elector and the House of Bavaria without any limitation of time, but Maximilian was not to be bound by any engagement under the treaty which was contrary to his oath to the Emperor and the Empire. For the moment the French were forced to accept his reservation.

As the reward of his complacency, the Elector received an assurance, dated May the seventeenth from Cardinal Bagni that "when the Swede is ready to take the field, as it is believed he will be very shortly, the King will send the said promise and guarantee from the Swede drawn up in good and authentic form to the Bavarian." Thus a Cardinal Nuncio was found willing to act as broker between the Champion of Protestantism and the Head of the German Catholic League in a matter in which the existence of that "bulwark" of Christendom the House of Austria might well be at stake. Six weeks later Gustaf Adolf and his army had landed on German soil.¹

CHAPTER XCIV

WHILST Maximilian was engaged in the all but hopeless task of reconciling his position as a member of the Empire with his private interests, France, anxious as her rulers professed themselves to be to remain at peace with Spain, was busied in stirring up every enemy of Spain and Austria in the Netherlands, in Italy, and in Scandinavia. The tone of the Infanta's despatches from Brussels grew daily more despondent. She had, indeed, few beside her to whom she could turn for counsel. Every friend of Spain was railing at Coloma and de la Cueva as the causes of the disasters, and though Coloma could be sent away as envoy to England, the Cardinal could not leave Brabant until he had satisfied his creditors, and was forced to await the arrival of his remittances from Rome. During the period of his detention he sought to justify himself to Philip IV. by endeavouring to throw the blame for the failure of the campaign upon Count Henri de Berg. He informed the King that Spanish and other eye-witnesses had informed him that the manner in which the Count had carried out the operations in the Veluwe had been most suspicious. He was abundantly supplied with ammunition, yet had left his men without a grain of powder. He had rejected Montecuculi's advice to attack Duisburg, which was garrisoned by only one hundred and fifty men, upon the most frivolous grounds. He had left the passage over the Yssel unfortified, and had he had the necessary munitions in readiness, might easily have occupied Utrecht after he had taken Amersfoort. Grobendonck, indeed, had been told by one of his kinswomen, who was in Utrecht at the time, that there was not a soldier in the place. Directly the Count had learnt of the fall of Bois-le-Duc he should have returned to Brussels without waiting to be recalled, as he was well aware that had the enemy advanced upon the city they could have entered it without encountering any resistance, and that its gates might even have been thrown open by the partisans of the Dutch within its walls. It was now easy to see why the negotiations for the Truce had been allowed to

drag on for so long, and why the Count had schemed so hard to get the management of them into his hands. His best excuse was that he had been taken in himself, but, in any case his behaviour had given grounds for the gravest suspicions.

Rumours were, indeed, already in circulation that Count Henri had been guilty of even blacker treachery. The Burgher-master of Bochoven had laid a plan before him for the relief of Bois-le-Duc. It was whispered that he had betrayed the Burgher-master to the Prince of Orange by whom he was promptly hung. The victim died protesting that he was in no wise to blame, for he had done it for the sake of his religion, and that the guilt lay upon Count Henri's head, for it was he who was the traitor. "This," wrote a monk to Philip IV., "was told me by the Catholics who were present." The King accordingly instructed the Infanta to endeavour to procure confirmation of the story from the Catholics in Holland. The Count had also refused to take any notice of a report sent to the Infanta by Father Paul, a Capuchin and a Preacher at Breda, "who had waded up to his waist after the guides into the river," to find a ford by which relief could be thrown in. Cueva's charges were certainly exaggerated but the King was in so far influenced by them that he instructed the Infanta not to allow the Count to take any further part in the peace negotiations, "as though we have no absolute proofs of his guilt, it is certain that his conduct has not been such as I can approve of." Should the Dutch submit further proposals, she was to be guided by Mirabel and Aytona in dealing with them, but he added that it would do far more harm than good if they continued to treat with people, whose heads were turned by their good fortune and who were bound hand and foot to the King of France. In December, 1629, the King of Spain was at last forced to recognize that his prospects of success through diplomacy were futile. He could only hope to retrieve his position sword in hand.¹

In Italy the outlook for Spain was equally black. Now that the French ministers were assured that the Dutch had been brought to continue the war in the Netherlands, they did not hesitate to urge Nevers to reject any proposals for a settlement with the Emperor by which they would lose the chance of winning the great prize of Casale. When Richelieu left for Lyons at the end of December Priandi informed his master that Louis XIII. only wished to show the world that he could and

would protect his friends, that Mantua would soon be relieved if the Venetians would play their part manfully, and that now the French were marching to Italy he must upon no account listen to any proposals for peace or for an armistice. His Eminence intended to fix his headquarters at Casale. Rumours were in circulation that Spinola meant to unite with the Savoyards and to take up a position at Avigliana to oppose the invaders, who had hastened the opening of the campaign in consequence. Much was hoped from the presence of a large French force under Marshals Chastillon and Marillac in Champagne as they kept both the Low Countries and Germany, where the Austrians, however, were making fresh levies, in constant alarm. By the beginning of December the Dutch had offered to break off all negotiations with Spain and to take the field with forty thousand men, if the French would declare war, but this Richelieu would not allow of before he saw how things went in Italy. Louis XIII. arranged to leave for Lyons in the middle of January, although Monsieur had not yet returned to Court. The French wished for either "a good peace or a good war" and Créquy had orders to refuse to listen to the proposals of Pancirolo, the Nuncio at Turin, and of Mazarin, who was now for the first time recognized as a Papal agent, for an armistice. Meanwhile fresh efforts were being made at Vienna to avert a war in Italy. Father Dominic de Jesu Maria, a monk well-known in Spain for his saintly life and for having predicted the Victory of the White Mountain, was sent by the Pope to exhort the Emperor to make peace, and was lodged in the Hofburg. The Father was a confidant of Agnelli's and told him that he found Ferdinand II., the King of Hungary, and Eggenberg were far more inclined to a peaceful settlement than they had been. "The Empress does not despair of a happy issue for Y.H. if you can give some proofs of your devotion to Cæsar, as you will find support." Wallenstein, likewise, was now on the side of peace. "He is afraid that some great crisis is at hand and is crying out about the war in Italy, which he is doing his utmost to avert. He needs no spur, for he says peace is so greatly to H.I.M.'s interest, but Collalto, whose one thought is that of having the command there with help from here, throws all the difficulties he can in the way of a settlement by harping on the glory which H.I.M. will win from a war." Ministers at Vienna turned a deaf ear to Friedland. When de Wateville and Trautmannsdorff were talking over the King of Sweden, Mecklenburg, and the

rising discontent in the Empire, the latter "laughed at all these rows, and said Sweden has neither men nor money and will think things thirty times over before he gets himself into a war with the Emperor who can now ride over his own ground without let or hindrance from Hungary to the Baltic Sea. I gather from all this that they don't care a pin what moves France may make and think they hold Nevers in the hollow of their hand." Possibly Richelieu's talents were as little thought of at the Hofburg as at Whitehall. "Really it is a marvel that when every prince in Christendom wishes for peace, the Emperor is longing for it, the Pope scheming for it, France clamouring for it, Venice seeking every means to bring it about, the King of Spain professing an ardent desire for it, and Y.R.H. doing your utmost heart and soul to secure it, yet no way can be found to do so. One would almost suppose that some hidden fate is driving us irresistibly in the opposite direction. As I have written to H.I.M. I believe that the Citadel of Casale is the root of all our ills. The only remedy for them would be to deposit the place in his hands as, people say, Nevers himself would be willing enough to do were he not put off from it by France and the Venetians. So far as I can see this business will never be settled unless one of the parties gives way to the other about the deposit of Casale. There is no chance of this being done whilst their strength is so nearly balanced, unless one of them is forced by sheer necessity to yield." It is a hard thing for the world when the key to an empire is grasped by feeble hands. Casale was at that day what Gibraltar, Cape Town, or Constantinople are to the men of our time, yet, when two generations later de Wateville's advice was listened to and its fortifications were demolished, the outside world neither knew nor cared whether the Austrian or the Savoyard flag floated from its towers. On the other hand Bruneau reported that the Catholic League at Mergentheim seemed inclined to allow their forces to join the Imperial army in an expedition against the Dutch, and it was thought that the Emperor would pardon Nevers if he would write him a letter asking H.I.M.'s forgiveness for what he had done, a step which the Duke had hitherto refused to take as he said he was in no way in fault. De Wateville thought that the story had only been got up to please the Empress who with Father Domenico and Father Lammermann was still working for peace. Agnelli, however, believed it to be true. Lammermann was filling H.I.M.'s mind with scruples as to the justice of

the war, but thousands of Cossack and Polish Light Horse were being levied to make an incursion into Friuli to divert the Venetians, and Pappenheim was raising men in Germany to reinforce the Spaniards in Flanders. Savoy was conciliated by a promise that when affairs in Italy were settled Ferdinand II. might possibly help her to recover Geneva. On the other hand some of the leading Ministers believed that the Emperor was so greatly irritated against Nevers that he would only grant him peace on his unconditional submission. He had been goaded into taking action but was now determined to carry on the war with his whole strength "and no one has ever before seen him so decided about anything." The Knight of Werdenberg had been sent to Wallenstein with orders that he should cross into Italy forthwith with a new army, and to warn him that the Emperor would not accept any excuse, but that if he would not obey he must resign the command. The Viennese Government had indeed no choice in the matter, for the Electors and the Catholic League were urging H.I.M. to maintain his authority and prestige in Italy so as to relieve Germany of the burden of his army. They had engaged to defend the Empire at their own expense against all foreign assailants such as Denmark, France or Sweden, and would raise forty or fifty thousand more foot for Tilly. "As to the Duchy of Mecklenburg, they are trying to come to a friendly settlement, for, the two brothers who were expelled from it intend to throw themselves at the Emperor's feet and to submit themselves wholly to his mercy, and are begging the King of Sweden not to make war on H.I.M. on their account." If the Abbot of Kremsmünster who had been at the meeting at Mergentheim was to be believed, the revelations which had been made there as to the intrigues of the French to incite the German Princes to revolt had aroused such indignation that they were now on good terms again with H.I.M. and Friedland, who, should matters get settled in Germany, would lead an army of forty thousand men from Alsace into Italy.

Meanwhile the Carnival at Vienna was at its height, and the whole city was laughing at the mistake of some "astrologers from the backwoods," who had taken the planet Venus for a comet after leaving a gay supper party, and had terrified the credulous by their predictions of coming woe. But, for a moment, there was a faint hope of peace.¹

Thanks chiefly to Mazarin, acting under the direction of Cardinal

Barberini, it was believed that a Congress would be held at Alessandria which would be attended by Richelieu, Neuburg, Collalto, and Spinola. The Emperor would withdraw his demands that his edicts should be carried out to the letter and that Mantua should be deposited in his hands as bailee. His Majesty's one thought was to turn his arms against the Turks who were then embarrassed by a Persian War, and if Denmark could be induced to take the field once more against Sweden Wallenstein would be free to take part in the contest.

Everyone, indeed, professed to desire that a war in Italy should be avoided. Spinola had brought with him full powers from Philip IV., drawn up with the approval of the Emperor, to take a decision in everything relating either to peace or war without referring to the Government at Madrid, but in agreement with the Imperial representatives. His first efforts to approach Nevers had failed, but the news of the loss of Bois-le-Duc convinced him that it was indispensable that he should renew them. Olivares, as early as the end of September, had suggested that Spinola should return to Flanders if a "creditable" arrangement had been made in Italy, and on the tenth of November, the Council of State had advised that he should be replaced at Milan by the Marquis of Monterrey. Coloma, Aytona, and Mirabel, who was now Spanish Agent at Brussels, urged the necessity of Spinola's return and of a peace in Italy especially as the Infanta seemed to be dying. Philip the Fourth himself sent instructions to the Marquis to leave for Flanders at once, whether or not the Italian peace had been concluded. He was to be replaced in his command by Count Henri and Leganes, both of whom, however, were to be under the orders of Monterrey. Should Count Henri decline the appointment it was to be offered to Tilly, unless the Emperor and the Catholic League had previously agreed to assist Spain against the Dutch. Spinola on his arrival at Brussels was to do his best to bring about a peace with the United Provinces, but was to keep the negotiations in his own hands. If they would not agree and if the Empire decided to remain neutral, "you will see how and on what terms you can propose an alliance to the Kings of France and England by offering them a part of what the rebels hold." He was, however, to make every preparation for carrying on the war, but if he could arrange a peace in Flanders, he was to return to Italy at once. Finally Philip IV. left it entirely to Spinola to decide which course he would adopt.

It was, however, impossible for the Marquis to abandon his task in Italy, and the Infanta was the first to acknowledge that he had acted rightly in refusing to return to Brussels, or to send troops from Milan to Flanders.¹

It is probable that she recognised that the fate of Milan was at stake, and that if Spain lost her hold upon Northern Italy, her possessions in the Low Countries must inevitably, sooner or later, fall into the enemy's hands. Wake surmised that Spinola saw that either the Low Countries or Italy would have to be abandoned, and that it would be easier for him to conclude peace with the French than with the States General, who would probably make exorbitant demands. If, however, he could make a settlement in Italy he would then proceed to Flanders with the Imperial and Spanish forces. Peace was desired by all parties and by none more than by the Duke of Savoy, who was forced to act as mediator, because a rupture would be the ruin of his states, although in his heart he inclined to the French interest, as he saw that the negotiations with Spinola led to no result, and asserted that he was bound by the Treaty of Susa. Scaglia was resolved to keep the negotiations in his own hands, and would not even give the Duke an account of the progress of those between England and Spain, in order that he might be able to undo his work if his master decided to come to terms with France. Colalto, meanwhile, despite Spinola's reluctance, had advanced into the Mantovano and had laid siege to Mantua, thus preventing Nevers from accepting the overtures of the Emperor, although as soon as the Imperial General learnt that France would support her claimant he agreed to a suspension of hostilities for a month. Scaglia, meanwhile, was doing his best to undermine Spinola's position. He reported to Carlisle that the Marquis "who was the best and most capable of the Spanish ministers," had been persuaded by the Infanta to abandon all thoughts of Italy in order to assist her in Flanders. As his one wish was to wash his hands of Italian affairs, he was quite ready to agree to any terms, however dishonourable to Spain they might be, which would patch up a settlement with the French. As such a settlement would be infinitely prejudicial to England, the faithful Scaglia was working his hardest to prevent it from being concluded, although those whom he had to deal with were so weak that the task demanded his utmost skill. On his return to Turin the Abbot complained to Wake that he had been deceived by Spinola, who was not the

same in Italy as he had been in Spain. If Savoy would send him to Madrid to assist Cottington he would work wonders, but Wake could only meet his suggestion with an assurance that Charles I. would not make advances on his side for a reconciliation. Under these circumstances Spinola had good grounds for distrusting Charles Emmanuel.¹

Even if Mantua and Casale were cleared of the enemy, Spain would be in a far worse position in Northern Italy than she had been previous to the war. The Emperor would have made the Empire once more a reality south of the Alps and the Italian princes, as his vassals would naturally turn to him instead of to Spain as their legitimate master. It was not until Nevers had refused to accept Spinola's overtures to secure him the investiture if he would accept Spanish protection, that the Marquis had allowed Collalto to enter Italy. The plague which had been raging in the Grisons and in the Swiss Cantons came into the country with the Imperial forces, the rinderpest followed in its wake, and Piedmont, Lombardy and Venetia were soon turned into an unpeopled desert. As early as October, 1629, the disease had appeared at Milan, but it had not spread, and masses had been performed in thanksgiving for its disappearance. Within a very few months the pestilence made famous by Manzoni had begun, but the war went on in its despite, for to Spain the fate of Casale seemed all important. Diplomatsists schemed, and Lombardy was stripped of grain for the army, whilst the sword laid waste without, and within it was as death. Wheat sold at Milan at fifty lire [£2 4s. 6d.] a bushel.²

The French had finally decided to undertake an expedition into Italy, and Richelieu was determined to make his way to Casale without letting "the Syren's song or the foeman's steel" turn him from his purpose. Priandi was in his train, and His Eminence was willing to receive the Mantuan Envoy at any time he wished. It was arranged that he should meet the army at Susa on the twenty fifth of February, and that during his stay there Mazarin and the Papal Ministers should submit the French terms to Collalto, Spinola and the Duke of Savoy who with Barberini were to meet at Asti to receive them. The conditions demanded by His Eminence were firstly that the investiture should be given to Nevers, and secondly that the Germans should evacuate Italy and the Grisons. It was thought that the Spaniards would assent to these terms to save themselves from

ruin. Meanwhile Savoy was trying to gain time so as to see whether the French would really invade the Milanese and, to make himself indispensable, was fortifying Avigliana. Still peace was hoped for as it was to the interest of all parties, and Mazarin's report of the decisions taken at Asti was anxiously awaited. The Cardinal meanwhile was at Embrun in a country which was so wasted by the plague and war that bread, oats, and forage could scarcely be got for money, and was waiting until his army could make its way by slow marches over the Alps. The Duke of Savoy was still negotiating with Spain, but it was almost impossible for Spinola to find men to send him, for though the drums were beating for recruits all over Milan few were willing to serve in Piedmont. On the second of March the Cardinal arrived in Italy and had several interviews with the Prince of Piedmont at Brusolo. Finally it was decided that Savoy should unite its troops with those of France and that the Milanese should be attacked simultaneously from both sides of the Po. The French army was to be granted a passage by Avigliana, and was to pass before the Princess of Piedmont who was most anxious to see them. For a moment it was thought that the enemy would come to terms, but when it was found that the Spaniards were fortifying Nizza and advancing on Casale, war was seen to be inevitable. "Possibly God will permit it as the punishment due to the iniquity of others," remarked Priandi who found the Cardinal very ticklish to handle, and yet Nevers depended entirely upon his goodwill. Savoy was far from secured to the French, and the Duke, who knew that they could not advance against the Milanese without his consent, was refusing to supply provisions and was fortifying Avigliana. Richelieu after displaying great patience had, in his turn seized Rivoli, which commanded the whole plain of Piedmont, and had thus forced the Duke to fall back upon Turin. The Venetians on their side refused to move, and all the eloquence of Pancirolo and Mazarin had accomplished nothing. Spinola had raised difficulties as to the Grisons and the Valtelline, and had said peace would never be made whilst there was a single Frenchman in Italy. "Nothing would please me better," retorted the Nuncio, "if you, too, gentlemen would clear out of Naples, Milan, and all Italy." This display of wit made war certain. At Vienna it was believed that Savoy was only scheming to play the broker between France and Spain, and that, as the Emperor was willing to accept any reasonable terms, peace

might still be maintained. Friedland was more opposed to intervention in Italy than ever, and had informed Werdenberg that he would be quite willing to give back Mecklenburg to its former dukes in order to secure peace, but thought that until a General Peace was arranged it would not be to the Emperor's interest that he should do so. By the end of March the Cardinal had definitely broken with Savoy, and had decided to push on to Casale, whilst Louis XIII. remained in France to hold the intrigues of Orleans' faction in check. For the moment, however, the Savoyard army remained inactive as Spinola had refused to send the Duke the reinforcements which he had promised him.¹

Trautmannsdorff, however, told de Wateville that Wallenstein was in Alsace and that he was ready to march into either France or Italy to make a diversion in favour of Savoy, and waived aside the envoy's objections that the Emperor could not sanction such a step without the consent of the Electors, with the remark that when a Prince of the Empire was in danger the Emperor would defend him whether the Electors liked it or not. That Wallenstein was really willing to march into either France or Italy at the behests of Ferdinand II. may, perhaps, be doubted. He was aware that Sweden was preparing for the invasion of Germany. Gustaf Adolf had not only increased the garrison of Stralsund, but had blockaded Rostock and Wismar so closely that the Imperialists could not send a ship to sea. Friedland in vain endeavoured to induce Christian IV. to take up arms against his Swedish rivals and to allow troops to be levied in Holstein for the Emperor's service. Grieved as the King had been by the outcome of his efforts to acquire the mastery over the North of Germany, he knew that by the Peace of Lübeck he had, contrary to all human expectation, delivered his country from a cruel oppressor without losing one foot of land whilst retaining the mastery of the sea. By the terms of that peace he determined to abide, and by those terms he was bound not to intervene further in German affairs. Christian the Fourth's refusal of his support marks the moment when Wallenstein was forced to lay aside his hopes of making the Holy Roman Empire the mistress of the seas. From that time forward he had to prepare for a defensive war on land, and his change of purpose is shown by his willingness to give up Mecklenburg at the bidding of the Emperor, who had ordered him at the beginning of December to join with Tilly in resisting the French should they invade the Palatinate.²

Spain was already negotiating directly both with Friedland and Tilly. The King had been forced out of consideration of the expense to refuse an offer from the former to march against the Dutch with thirty-five thousand foot and five thousand horse when peace was declared in Italy in return for a subsidy of one hundred thousand ducats [£25,000] a month. "He is, however, so good a general that I can only tell Y.R.H. that if we had the millions the Duke of Friedland wants for his army, we would have sent them, but we have not got what he asks." As it was expected that the Dutch would advance against Brabant from the Maas, Philip IV. would, in case they did so, send the Infanta money and reinforcements. But help from the Emperor and the Empire could only be secured at a price which Philip IV. was unwilling to pay. He refused to hand over either to Ferdinand II. or to the obedient princes the places in Juliers and the Palatinate which with Lingen he was holding as his only security for the repayment of his outlay on their conquest. Once more he reminded them of the sacrifices which Spain had made for the German Catholics. On her side the Infanta was treating with Tilly through M. de St. Espoir, the Bavarian agent at Brussels, and with Friedland through Sforza Visconti. In eloquent terms she reminded Tilly that he was "too good a servant to God and to his King" to refuse her his help. Tilly forwarded her appeal to Munich and left himself in Maximilian's hands. He was loth, he said, to break with the Catholic League, and his great age—he was but sixty-four—and bad health unfitted him for such a post. Maximilian delayed his reply, anxiously as it was awaited at Brussels, until he had consulted Cologne and Mainz. The Infanta assured St. Espoir that her nephew could not believe that Tilly would refuse her request, and that the Emperor and Spinola would urge him to comply. The Emperor, therefore, wrote to ask Maximilian to allow Tilly to enter the Spanish service. He was the only general who was competent to take the place of Spinola who was employed elsewhere on the King of Spain's service, and if he were sent to Flanders it would be of the greatest benefit to the cause of the Holy Roman Empire and of the Catholic Religion. Ferdinand's exhortations fell upon deaf ears. Maximilian knew that the Head of the Catholic Church was but too anxious for him to enter into an alliance with the French, which was certainly not intended to promote the interests of the Roman Emperor in Italy, and he had just learnt from St. Espoir

that the French Ambassador at the Hague was offering the Dutch large sums not to agree to the Truce with Spain, and was showing to his visitors the powers which he held to renew the alliance between Louis XIII. and Holland. The Government at Brussels were actively preparing for the coming campaign, whilst on their side the Gomarists "who think they would lose their present employments" were loudly calling for the continuance of the war. "It is said, however, that the States General mean to send an envoy to assure Friedland, and the Electors of Cologne and Bavaria of their goodwill to the Empire. At the same time they are getting twenty thousand muskets ready for the King of Sweden, and will send him enough shipping to transport his whole army if he will consent to invade the Empire by Emden, but it is not thought he will accept the offer." As the Elector was already aware through Cardinal Bagni that negotiations were in progress to secure an assurance from Gustaf Adolf that he would respect the neutrality of the Catholic League provided they would remain quiet should he advance into Germany, this news was not calculated to induce him to allow Tilly to be transferred. On the fourth of April he wrote a curt letter to his generalissimo forbidding him to leave his service on the ground that were he to do so, it would be the ruin of the Army of the League, and that he would involve the Empire in troubles with the Dutch. To the Infanta he said that he could not comply with her request as the Catholic League had decided at its meeting at Mergentheim that its army must be kept on foot till the troubles in Germany were settled and that Tilly must, therefore, be retained in command of it.¹

The Infanta had not been more fortunate in her dealings with Friedland, although, so far as words went, he professed himself ready at her bidding either to invade France or to attack Holland. She even went so far as to offer him the Principality of Lingen, which was in danger of being attacked by the Dutch but he refused to accept it. Philip IV. wrote with some indignation that he would never give Friedland a place which was the best base from which to attack Friesland, but in the meantime, the Infanta had sent Colonel Haccart to Tilly to discuss some plan for protecting it. In the end it was arranged that both Lingen and the garrisons in Westphalia should be handed over to the Catholic League, as it was very difficult to supply them from Belgium. On the other hand she continued to impress upon her

nephew that Friedland's demands would have to be met to the full if he invaded Holland. In so small a country the Imperial army could not live by requisitions as it did in Germany, and she was doing her best to induce him to break with the Dutch before a settlement had been concluded in Italy. Philip's only reply was an order to her to break off all negotiations with Friedland as his price was too high, and as Collalto's proposed arrangements for both Italy and Belgium were on such favourable terms that he could have sixty thousand Imperial troops for Italy at two crowns a man a month [£30,000], although he had been willing to give twelve shillings. Collalto's offer was undoubtedly due to that general's lively sense of his own interests. In March, 1630, the Emperor had definitely refused either to break with the Dutch for the present or to declare war against France unless Spain would make a diversion through Catalonia and Navarre. In consequence Philip the Fourth had sent Bruneau four hundred thousand ducats [£100,000] to purchase the support of the leading advisers of the Emperor in order to secure the publication of the Ban against the Dutch and the declaration of war against them. He was at the same time to induce the Convention of Electors to arrange for a general settlement in Germany. The Duke of Tursis was sent to Ratisbon as Spanish Ambassador Extraordinary for the same purpose. He was an old friend of Charles the First and was instructed to treat with the Palatine's representative Rusdorf, although in accordance with the usual policy of the English Foreign Office Mason, the English Minister to the Diet, had been left in ignorance of his mission. Philip IV. indeed, was but too anxious to keep the negotiations with England alive, for, as he told Bruneau, were they broken off the English would be driven into the arms of the Protestant powers of the North, whilst Spanish commerce was suffering severely from their privateers. Rubens had with difficulty, and thanks to Cottington's help, prevented a well-known English seaman, Sir William Monson from approaching Charles Emmanuel for a concession to keep up a fleet of four vessels under the Savoyard flag at Villefranche to cruise against the Turkish and Barbary corsairs. Had Monson obtained it the fleet would soon have grown to one of twenty sail and the trade route from Genoa to Barcelona would have been at his mercy, for Charles Emmanuel had never shown himself reluctant to connive at piracy. Carlisle, too, was now irritated against Spain because, in his turn, D. Fernando de

Toledo had raided St. Christopher, and at Whitehall the excuse that the Spanish Admiral had done so to expel the French was received with incredulity. The cruisers at Dunkirk, also, still continued to harass English shipping, but since Spinola's departure their upkeep had been greatly neglected. The loss of their commerce was, however, doing much to cool the fervour of the English for the once sacred cause of the Palatine.¹

Rubens returned from London to Antwerp on the eighth of April, having accomplished his very arduous task with almost complete success. When he arrived in England he had found peace just concluded with France, and the French party were at the height of their power and influence. Yet he had succeeded in arranging for the despatch of Cottington to Spain and for that of D. Carlos Coloma to Whitehall, although he had failed to secure an armistice. Scarcely, however, had Cottington sailed for Lisbon, than it was learnt that Coloma was still at Brussels where he was waiting for the arrival of his instructions from Madrid. As Weston said this meant that negotiations had been broken off and, had not the Infanta succeeded in explaining the delay, all hopes of peace would have vanished. On Twelfth Day, 1630, Coloma had been received in state at the Banqueting House in Whitehall, and even Rubens had been impressed by the splendour of the ceremony and by the long line of ladies who stood on the Queen's side "from the State to the very door," and who bandied abuse even in the presence "for spoiling one another's ruffles by being so closely ranked." On February the twenty-first Rubens was knighted by Charles I., and on his side Philip IV. wrote to the Infanta that "Anything that is done for Rubens he thoroughly deserves for his talents and for his zeal for my service." He would have been of equal assistance to Charles I., could he have made the English statesmen understand from the outset that Spain could do nothing for the Palatine without the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria. Gerbier might well take credit to himself that he and Rubens had been the chief authors of the negotiations. Had the English politicians been equally honest and well informed peace might have been signed between Spain and England and a Truce arranged between Philip IV. and the United Provinces long before the fall of Bois-le-Duc and the certainty of help from France had made the Dutch determined to end the war by expelling the Spaniards from all their possessions in the Netherlands. Gerbier

finally succeeded in recovering compensation from the Treasury for his outlay upon his guest.¹

It is strange to see the impression which England and the English Court made upon such a trained observer as the painter who had been the intimate friend of nearly every European ruler. Even Rubens was struck with the elegance of English life, and the perfect taste which characterised the homes of a rich and luxurious people "in the very depths of peace," whilst the pictures, the sculptures, and the inscriptions which were to be found in the hands of London collectors inspired him with wonder and admiration. As we read his letter to Pierre Dupuy we can realise what England sacrificed in her struggle for her liberties. It is probable that so far as the material standard of life was concerned the losses of the Civil War were not fully made good until Clive's triumphs and the trophies of the Peace of Paris had given England the riches of the Indies and America. The civilisation of England paid dearly for her freedom. In all respects, except, perhaps, as regards sanitation, the earlier years of Charles the First's reign were far more advanced than the Augustan Age of Anne. But Rubens' criticisms of English public life are even more remarkable. Although he reached England within a very few weeks after Parliament had voted the Declaration of Rights, he seems to have regarded Parliament as a factor of little or no account in estimating the position of England in reference to its relations with other powers. He understood, it is true, that English finances were to a certain extent under its control, and he was aware that the leaders of the Puritan party such as Lord Holland looked upon Parliament as an instrument through which they could secure the overthrow of opponents like Weston. But, on the other hand, he regrets that Selden should have abandoned his literary pursuits for the sake of politics which were a "calling wholly foreign to his noble talents and most exact learning," and thought he had no right to complain when he was thrown into the Tower "for his contumacy in the cause of the populace." He does not seem to have appreciated that Selden's attitude could have any influence upon the course of negotiations between England and Spain. Almost the only foreign ruler of the day who really grasped the position of the English Parliament was Maximilian of Bavaria, possibly owing to the fact that he himself, absolute or all but absolute ruler of his subjects as he was, could only play his part in the Empire,

as a defender of the Liberties of Germany through its constitutional organs, the Convention of Electors and the Diet. James the First had not been so far wrong when at his reception of a deputation from the House of Commons, he had told his servants to place chairs for the twelve Kings. The day was fast approaching when a simple burgess for Huntingdon was to be the equal of an Elector of Bavaria or an Elector of Mainz.

On the other hand Rubens fully understood the currents of Court Life and it is remarkable that he should describe Cottington, the politician who seems most clearly to have foretold the rising menace of the Dutch and whose predictions were destined to be fulfilled in the Revolution of 1688, as "the person who is in reality, if not in the eyes of the outside world, the first person in all state affairs and treasury business." Had not the Spanish Count been well aware of Cottington's transcendent ability they would scarcely have been anxious to receive a man, and that on the warmest terms of friendship, who was accused of conduct during his former residence in Spain for which any Spanish subject would assuredly have been burnt as a relapsed heretic. But, whilst Rubens was busied in his Antwerp palace in penning descriptions of the Art treasures of England, events were in progress which proved, if further proof were needed, that disputes as to Religion counted for nothing in the eyes of the politicians of Europe as compared with the interests of State. Within a few weeks after his return Gustaf Adolf was in Germany and Spinola had entered upon his last campaign.¹

CHAPTER XCV

CARDINAL BARBERINI despite his favourable reception by Collalto and Spinola had failed to bring about a settlement. Richelieu adhered to his first demands. He asked that Savoy should receive a revenue of fifteen thousand crowns [£3,750] as compensation for his claims in Monferrat, and that Nevers should compensate Guastalla. He required further that the Emperor should invest Nevers with his duchies and that the Italian princes should join with Ferdinand II., France, and Spain in guaranteeing him in the undisturbed possession of them. The Treaty of Monzon was to be strictly carried out, but the rights of the Grisons over the Valtelline were to be more fully defined, and the Swiss as well as the Emperor, France, and Spain were to act as sureties for the observance of the conditions. Finally the Imperial troops were to evacuate the Valtelline and the Leagues and to retire into Germany within fifteen days of the signature of the treaty and were never again to re-enter them under arms. Neither Spain nor Austria could accept these proposals as they stood. They insisted that Nevers, as he, in fact, had already done, should make a humble apology to the Emperor, that Savoy should negotiate directly with Mantua, and that the Imperialists and Spaniards should not evacuate the disputed territories unless France, at the same moment, handed back Susa to Charles Emmanuel and withdrew from Italy. Deputies from the Grisons had already reached Spinola's headquarters and others were expected from the Valtelline. It was necessary that they should be heard before the Treaty of Monzon was further defined. The Marquis would thus be able to make a third party responsible if he reversed any decisions taken by Olivares. Richelieu, though the French troops were to reach Casale by the fifteenth of March, took a conciliatory line in his conversations with Mazarin. The Italian Princes, said His Eminence, were only asked to guarantee the personal safety of Nevers who had requested with the same object that French troops who, however, were to be commanded by Mantuan officers under his orders and paid by Mantua, should be left in Casale.

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He did not object to the Spanish army remaining on foot to defend the Milanese, but insisted that the Imperialists should withdraw from the Grisons and the Valtelline before the French restored Susa. As Richelieu was obviously making no concessions whatsoever, Collalto urged the Emperor to continue to prepare for war. Spinola, it was rumoured, had said that had he lost a pitched battle he would not let one French soldier stay in Monferrat, and protested "alike to His Maker and to the world that he had done his utmost in the cause of peace and had not shrunk from treating as naught any consideration of his master's honour. They would not accept his terms so let him who was on his side take Saint Peter's blessing, and let him who was afraid slink off. Wise rulers showed most courage when there was most danger." He was suffering severely from gout and it was not until the middle of March that he was again able to mount his horse. At that moment Savoy and France seemed to have come to terms. The Duke, in lieu of Trino, had accepted some villages in the Canavese and had consented to allow the revenues to be collected for him by French commissioners in the name of Louis XIII. Richelieu, however, insisted that Charles Emmanuel should join him in attacking the Milanese, but whether out of fear of Spain or a sense of his duty to the Emperor, he absolutely refused to comply. Thereupon it was rumoured that the French would attack Turin and seize its ruler. Five hundred Frenchmen within the city were at once arrested, and the Duke swore that he would hang them from the battlements if one hair of his subjects' heads were injured in the quarrel. Richelieu marched upon Pinerolo, and expresses galloped from Turin to ask help from Collalto. In vain Barberini hastened to the Savoyard headquarters to prevent a rupture but matters had gone so far that his intervention was useless. The town of Pinerolo surrendered upon the twenty-second of March, its Citadel upon the twenty-ninth, and there Richelieu took up his quarters. He had already learnt that Bassompierre had succeeded in inducing the Swiss to join the French in expelling the Imperialists from the Grisons. Spinola received the news of the capture of Pinerolo whilst he was on his march towards Carmagnola, as he had hoped to make a diversion by attacking the French. He well knew the importance of their victory and at once hurried towards Asti to support Savoy, whilst Mazarin made fruitless efforts to arrange for a suspension of hostilities. On the ninth of April Barberini arrived at Pinerolo

whither he was followed next day by the Emperor's faithful confidant Father Valerian, rather with the object of ascertaining the views of the French than with any real hope of composing the dispute.

Father Valerian found that the French were using every possible means to make Charles Emmanuel distrust the Imperialists, but that, so far, their efforts had been in vain. He could only wonder that the Duke had remained faithful to his duty to the Emperor at the cost of seeing three armies contending in his territories, and of involving himself in a war with France. "I think that this war has been kindled by a Divine Decree, and I hope that, if peace is not concluded, great good will come of it. Divine Providence cannot endure seeing princes who call themselves Catholics obliged for political reasons to forward the interests of heretics and Turks. Who knows whether the time for remedying this abuse has not come, and this belief of mine makes a war which I anticipated with such dread begin to seem almost pleasurable, seeing that the cause of it, thanks to Y.I.M., is so well justified in the sight of God and of the world." He had told Richelieu that he had it in his power to settle all the troubles in Italy and the Grisons in a few hours. His Eminence, however, replied that though he could not sufficiently thank the Emperor for his goodwill and mode of proceeding they had no guarantee that if the French were out of the way the Spaniards and Savoyards would not again attack Casale and Mantua. "I said that every one about Collalto and Spinola at Carmagnola laughed at these idle fears of the French, even if they were not a mere trick, for it was impossible for the King of Spain to agree to their remaining in Italy and no one would believe that those who wished to impose such conditions sincerely wished for peace." Father Valerian, therefore, left the business alone for a day so as to see what Richelieu's intentions really were. His plan succeeded, for the French were obliged to make advances to him in order to avoid the rupture of the negotiations, and told him plainly that their King must have some passage into Italy even if he gave up Pinerolo, for, otherwise, they had no security that the terms would be observed. "On this I burst out laughing and asked whether they meant to make fun of themselves or of me." He left no argument untried to show them how dangerous the course they were taking was for themselves and how hurtful for all Christendom, "but they have got it fixed in their

heads that the Turk will come, that the Dutch will occupy Antwerp, and the like fancies." He was convinced that Richelieu entertained far-reaching views as to Italy which he could only carry out if he had a passage from Dauphiny into Piedmont in his hands. His Eminence was fortifying Pinerolo and the entrances to some other passes with this object, and desired an armistice merely in order to give him time to complete his task undisturbed. "In the meantime I would most humbly pray Y.I.M. to take it into your consideration that we have to do with a man of the keenest intellect, who is quick to seize an opportunity, ready to take any risk, overbearing, and can move France at his will as easily as I can this pen. What I dread most is that I know that his opponents are under different commanders, who I can see are not united amongst themselves, and so I fear my Lord Cardinal can flood all Italy when he will. On the other hand we must take into account our human ignorance, that we cannot read men's hearts, and that it is quite possible that the face of affairs may change in a twinkling and that what now seems impossible may prove an easy matter." Father Valerian could only console himself with the thought that as H.I.M. had hitherto used the victories which had been so miraculously granted to him for the good of Holy Faith, in the future he might be the chosen instrument for overthrowing its opponents. If Father Valerian employed the language of a missionary to the Emperor, his private "reflections" were those of a skilful diplomatist. He recognized that if the Emperor were to allow the French to remain in Susa and in Pinerolo for two years, he would leave it open to them to invade Italy at any moment they might choose and would lose all the advantages which he might gain by appearing as the Protector of the Duke of Savoy at a time when H.I.M. all but held Mantua and Casale in the hollow of his hand, and when the French were cooped up in a few Alpine vallies. In writing to Father Joseph he repeated the heads of his despatch to Vienna and said plainly that both the Austrians and the Spaniards looked upon the French peace talk as a trick to cover their ulterior designs. If he was to treat with Father Joseph he wanted deeds not words. The French proposals to allow the Imperialists to remain in the Grisons for two years on condition that they should be allowed to retain Susa and Pinerolo for the same period had been carried by Valerian to Carmagnola, and had been discussed at a midnight meeting at which, amongst others, Charles

Emmanuel, his son, Collalto, and Spinola had been present. The Duke of Savoy had with some difficulty been persuaded to consent that they should be answered to the effect that it was clear from them that the French had no wish for peace. If, however, they would agree that both sides should evacuate what they held within two months, an armistice would be concluded for five days so as to give time to draft the convention. As, however, the French seemed unwilling to accept these terms, the Cardinal Legate returned to Bologna and both sides prepared for war. The plan of campaign provided that Savoy should endeavour to hold the outlets of the vallies and thus hem in the French, whilst the Spaniards laid siege to Casale and the Austrians to Mantua. It was thought that if Wallenstein would make a diversion against France, Louis XIII. would at once sue for peace. Accordingly D. Filippo Spinola entered Monferrat and occupied Pontestura at the beginning of May almost without resistance, whilst on the twenty-third Spinola himself appeared before Casale.¹

The Governor of Casale, the Duke of Maine, was the second son of the Duke of Nevers. He was a weak, inexperienced youth, who, but for his rank, could not have exercised any authority over his subordinates. Five French regiments of foot and six troops of horse had been stationed in the town since the preceding September, but their effective strength was reduced to seventeen hundred infantry and four hundred cavalry. Their commander Jean de Saint Bonnet de Thoyras, a strong, brown-haired, blue-eyed man of forty-five, was a brave, but ignorant soldier, prompt and energetic in his actions, quick in temper yet kindly and affable, who had made his name in the defence of the Isle of Rhé. Beside the French he had at his disposal a regiment of half-trained Italian militia with a few day labourers and lackeys who had been hastily enrolled as a town guard. Neither the nobles nor the burghers, though they professed themselves devoted to their sovereign, showed much eagerness to serve. Casale ran from north to south spreading out perpendicularly to the Po. It was surrounded by a low, sloping wall backed with an earthen rampart and rising out of a wide moat. To the west of the city stood the Castle, a solid, square building with four massive towers. Between the town and the river was the weak outwork of the "Tre Venti," to the south the Citadel, a hexagonal enclosure of the same width as the city, with six bastions radiating into the plain. Those on the west, which played a conspicuous part in

the siege, were counting from south to north, Saint Charles, Saint George, and the Madonna. Two long lines of outworks, known from their shape as the "Pincers," ran westwards from the Citadel to the base of the ridge of Saint Anne, crowned with a large palace-like villa. On the summit of this ridge Spinola stationed his German auxiliaries, and the three long culverins of the Battery of Saint Andrea were to be seen projecting high above the fascines. To the north the long, low huts of the camp, sloped like waggon-tilts, were ranged in orderly rows. The besiegers' lines lay about eight hundred yards distant from the advance works of the city. To the south of the Germans were quartered the Spanish infantry, some Italians lay north of the Po. Spinola himself fixed his headquarters at the farm of Polalto, now known as La Bicocca. The low, white house with its trellised vines and terraces edged with box stands on a vine-clad slope running down to the river four hundred feet below, and lying two miles west of Casale. On the crest of the hill above stands a large farm house; westwards a ridge, with rounded summits crowned each with its church, stretches towards Turin. From the windows of La Bicocca the eye ranges northwards across the Po and plains, green in May with springing corn and rice, to where the glittering crags of Monte Rosa tower into the sky above a mass of dark blue mountains, surmounted by the obelisk of the Matterhorn. To the east Casale and its fortifications lay extended like a map. The Italian infantry were quartered hard by at the Villa of the Duchess Margaret.¹

In the meantime the French to effect a diversion had sent thirty thousand men into Savoy to attack Prince Thomas. He was forced to abandon the province and to fall back upon Conflans, which covers the road leading over the little St. Bernard Pass into the Valley of Aosta, where the Savoyards had stored their most valuable possessions. If the enemy got possession of Aosta and Ivrea the whole of the northern bank of the Po as far as Casale would be in their power and peace would be almost inevitable. Spinola was, therefore, obliged to detach six thousand Germans to reinforce Prince Thomas, and for the time abandoned the siege approaches. Both Collalto and the Genoese refused to assist him, the latter upon the ground that as the plague was raging in his army Genoa might become infected. Richelieu and Louis XIII. who had now returned to Dauphiny loudly expressed their determination to relieve Casale at all costs, but as an under-

hand negotiation between the French and the Imperialists was being conducted by Mazarin, the King for the time delayed his departure for Italy. As before, the point at issue was the question of the French withdrawal from the places they were holding in Piedmont. Richelieu explicitly told Mazarin that he could not restore them to Savoy without the express order of his master, but suggested that the Princess of Piedmont should ask her brother to consent to their evacuation. Mazarin reported the conversation to Collalto, Spinola, and Charles Emmanuel but none of them would accept the responsibility for giving an answer. Finally Collalto promised that they would hold a conference for the purpose of drafting a joint reply within thirty days, but warned Mazarin that neither he himself nor Spinola held any powers from their respective masters to discuss such proposals. Both of them agreed in thinking that if things were replaced upon the footing upon which they had been before the war, an agreement between France and Spain could be easily effected. The Emperor would certainly grant the Investiture to Nevers if due compensation were given to Savoy and to Guastalla and if the French withdrew from Italy. As, however, no meeting of the Imperial, Savoyard, and Spanish delegates took place, Louis XIII. advanced to St. Jean de Maurienne, and Mazarin took the responsibility of reporting the private views of the two generals to the French Council. He was informed that the question could not be settled upon the basis of discussions for which the other side held no powers, though the King did not wish to aggrandise himself at the expense of his neighbours. Every effort was made to strengthen the defenders of Casale, and Effiat was sent into Piedmont to encourage the troops. By the middle of July it was known at the French headquarters that the French Treaty with the States General had been signed, and that the Swedes had landed in Germany. It was clear that these diversions would greatly weaken the enemy, and it was hoped that Montmorency would be able to relieve Casale by the end of the month.¹ The plague was raging everywhere and the country was completely stripped of provisions and forage. So violent was the infection that Bassompierre notes with surprise that the King had to sleep in the fields to avoid lodging in Argentine. Wake vainly fled from town to town to escape the contagion, whilst the sick at Turin when driven by soldiers into the pest houses battered them with the corpses of the dead. All distinctions of religion were

forgotten and when Pancirolo passed through Rovigliasco, Wake himself took him wine, fruit, and candles "the first visit which had passed for a long time between a Minister of the Crown of England and the Pope." An epidemic of tertian fever, followed by the pestilence, broke out at Casale where soldiers were seen throwing themselves out of the windows or running in delirium through the streets to plunge into the Po. A green cross marked the infected houses. Notwithstanding the disease, the siege was vigorously carried on. On the twenty-fifth of May, D. Girolamo Agostini with a large force of cavalry and infantry forded an arm of the river, and stormed a detached fort which had been erected by the French on an island opposite the Bastion of the "Tre Venti." Many of the defenders were cut down on the spot. Others who endeavoured to escape by swimming were all drowned. The Casalese were greatly discouraged by this disaster, and their distrust of the French which had originated in the cowardice shown by the garrison of Pontestura was greatly increased. In vain Thoyras endeavoured to interrupt the progress of the besieger's approaches by repeated sallies. Although he reoccupied some farm houses scattered about at the foot of the hills, the Spaniards and Germans under the Duke of Lerma carried their trenches to the brink of the ditch of the Citadel in front of the Bastion of St. George, regardless of the fire from the half-moon which had been thrown up before it. The harvests were now ripening and every day soldiers and ladies went out to reap the grain in the fields near the city. They were greatly harassed by the Spanish outposts, but the bravery of a young girl named Maria Anne Novarese, who had armed herself with a musket and who often laid down her sickle to reply to the taunts of the enemy with a bullet was long remembered. The courage of the citizens was sustained by the preaching of the Capuchin Pampuro; devout ladies recited their rosaries before the images of the Virgin, and in every church in its turn the Blessed Sacrament was exposed upon the altar to the adoration of the faithful. It was noted that when in due course, the service came to be performed at that of St. Evasius, the patron of the city, news arrived that a relieving force was on its way. Within a few days after the siege was raised. A similar coincidence had happened in 1629. Nor were the French less daring than they had been before La Rochelle. On the night of the thirtieth of June the moon was at its full. The Bastion of Saint Charles and the half-moon in

front of it were known to be mined, but some gentlemen amongst whom was M. de Montausier went to drink to the health of Spinola and to dance a round on that dangerous spot. They took with them a trumpeter of horse and a blind fiddler who was well known to the garrison. Attracted by the shrill notes M. de la Serre, the commander of the bastion, made his way to the spot. He found the revellers had gone, but scarcely had he set foot upon the earthwork, when a loud report was heard, and it flew into the air. De la Serre rushed away from the shower of stones and bricks, the fiddler escaped across the ditch on a plank, but twenty-five soldiers, of whom eight were killed, were buried in the rubbish. The drums beat the alarm, the garrison hurried under arms, but the Spaniards did not move and the rest of the night passed undisturbed. On July the nineteenth it became known that the French had inflicted a severe defeat upon the Spaniards and Savoyards at Avigliana, but on the following day, the festival of Saint Margaret, loud shoutings was heard in the Spanish lines and salvoes of artillery were discharged against the city. It was soon learned that Mantua had fallen into the hands of the Imperialists who had entered it whether by surprise or through treason, on the night of the seventeenth. The Ducal Family took refuge in the Citadel, which held out for a few days longer and on its surrender were sent under escort into the States of the Church. The city underwent a three days sack by the Germans, an outbreak of the plague followed, the half of the population perished, and Mantua has never since recovered from the blow. The news came as a terrible shock to Richelieu, who fell sick through mortification and annoyance, and who could not disguise from himself that the disaster might have been prevented but for the failure of the French and Venetians to send reinforcements. Priandi could only reproach him for his negligence. Mazarin pointed out that peace would have been assured save for the loss of Mantua and the death of the Duke of Savoy.¹ Charles Emmanuel had died at an inopportune moment. He had been ailing during the spring, but had, in some degree, recovered, and had been lying at Savigliano, waiting for an opportunity of attacking the French, who after driving Prince Thomas out of Savoy into Piedmont and defeating him at Avigliana, had taken possession of Saluzzo. The Court of Savoy meanwhile, had been moving about from town to town in a vain attempt to find a refuge from the pestilence, and Madame had celebrated at Chieri

with great rejoicings the tidings of the birth of her nephew the future Charles the Second of England. The news that Mantua was in the hands of Collalto reached the Duke at Savigliano. On the night of Wednesday, July the twenty-fourth, bonfires blazed in the Castle Yard, artillery thundered and volleys of musketry rang through the night in honour of the ruin of the House of Gonzaga. By that ruin the House of Savoy gained nothing. "It was done to please the Spaniards and Imperialists into whose hands he had cast himself." Scarcely had the Duke withdrawn from the scene than he felt sick and within thirty-six hours expired on Friday, July the twenty-sixth, 1630. "His physician did write of his disease as a Pleurisy, but some who did approach nearest unto his person did die of the plague a day or two before him." In the eyes of the vulgar the Blood Royal was immune from the scourge, but, as Wake remarked, the pestilence "doth equally affright all persons of what quality or condition soever."¹ In all human eyes Charles Emmanuel was unfortunate in the hour of his death. His life's work seemed to be crumbling into nothingness. The short dark man in whose brain the quick, alert wit of the Italian was united with the cool, imperturbable resolution of the races of the North had raised the House of Savoy from the dust. His ambition had steeled him for his task, but his success had not served to calm his restless, perverse spirit, which was always burning for further conquests. It was not enough for him that he had recovered the gates of Italy from the French. He wished to unite the gates of the Alps under his sway, and by joining Provence and Dauphiny with those provinces which he already held in the basin of the Rhone, and by restoring the rule of his house in those territories of Switzerland from which his grandfather had been expelled by the Confederates at the Reformation, to reconstitute that Kingdom of Arles which had been of such importance in the early history of Italy. The Bernese frustrated his schemes of conquest in Switzerland, his attempt to surprise Geneva was foiled by an old woman, and Henri IV. by the Treaty of Lyons wrested from him all those territories north of the Rhone which had made him the master of the roads between Germany, the Valley of the Rhine and Southern France. But at the price of endless sacrifices he had gained the Marquisate of Saluzzo for Piedmont, and baffled as he was beyond the Alps he sought a fresh field for his ambition in Northern Italy, where he hoped to make good his claims to

Monferrat and to place Genoa under the Cross of Savoy. With this object he strove to unite the smaller powers of Central Europe in a League against the Hapsburgs, and intrigued to make himself the arbiter of the Holy Roman Empire. His dreams of dominating Germany vanished at the White Mountain, whilst Genoa was snatched from him by the irresolution of his English allies, paralysed by their domestic conflicts, and by the perspicacity of Lesdiguières, who had no wish to see the road to Italy closed against France by a powerful Savoy. But in his attempt to make the Holy Roman Empire a passive instrument of his ambition, Charles Emmanuel had rendered the Thirty Years War inevitable, and had thus saved the world from the control of that German civilisation, which had already displayed its real character, when the Teutonic Knights had preferred to leave Prussia heathen rather than relinquish their hold upon their Prussian slaves. Undaunted by his disappointment at Genoa, the Duke had turned to Monferrat, and to gain Trino and a revenue of £4,500, had made the Imperial Power a reality in Italy, and had become the humble bondsman of the King of Spain. The disasters in Flanders and the disputes between the Electors and the Emperor, coinciding with the final overthrow of the Huguenots, had left France free to return to her ancient policy beyond the Alps, and his hopes of conquest vanished when he saw the lilies floating over Susa and over Pinerolo. Spinola, who, not without reason, distrusted the Duke, had refused to send him reinforcements to aid him in expelling the invaders from Saluzzo. In his annoyance at this refusal he had been on the point of turning once more to Louis XIII., and had only been deterred from doing so by the rumour that Friedland was on his way to the Milanese, and by the news that Mantua was in the hands of Collalto. When he died the future of Savoy might well have seemed hopeless, plague, war, and famine were ravaging his dominions and Piedmont was at the mercy of three contending armies. Yet, despite all his failures, Charles Emmanuel had assured the destinies of his House, and by making the House of Savoy Italian, in the end made Italy a nation under a Savoyard King.¹

For the moment it was useless to continue a fruitless struggle, and his successor Vittorio Amadeo I. felt that a settlement must be effected at all costs. But the new Duke, though an experienced statesman and soldier, had not the talents of his crafty father. He determined to resist the French advance, but when

Schomberg and Marillac saw that his army blocked their direct road to Casale, they turned aside to attack Carignano. The attempt failed, but Vittorio Amadeo was obliged to fall back towards Monferrat, and the French thus gained time to fortify Avigliana, from which they could at their choice, enter the Marquisate either by the north or the south of the Po. Directly Spinola had seen that his lines were open to their attack he fortified them on both sides very strongly. By the middle of August, however, the situation in Casale seemed hopeless. The Spaniards had extended their covered ways to the foot of the Bastion of St. George, and it looked as if, at any moment, the explosion of a mine might open to them a road into the Citadel. The inhabitants began to murmur, but notwithstanding the symptoms of revolt, M. de Thoyras, after consulting his officers, determined to hold out. He encouraged, however, the principal merchants to write to Richelieu to report that the place was at the last extremity. Meanwhile the plague continued its ravages and those attacked rarely survived more than three days. Rich and poor alike fell victims. In vain the robles shut themselves up in their palaces, leaving only one narrow aperture in the barricade through which they drew up their supplies of food. The infection laughed at their precautions and their dead bodies were thrown down through the loopholes into the streets, to lie in the gutters till they could be carried by the dead carts to the cemeteries. The heat and drought were pitiless. Not one drop of rain fell in the city between the first of June and the first of September when there were copious showers.¹

Relief, however, was at hand. On the thirtieth of August rumours reached the outposts that Spinola had fallen seriously ill, the besiegers' fire slackened; on the third of September the tidings were confirmed.

The great general's life was running rapidly to its close. He had been much weakened by attacks of gout during the previous spring and had been anxious to lay down his command, but had refrained from doing so till he could crown his career by the capture of Casale. His sickness had been increased by his disappointments both military and political. Savoy had failed to check the advance of the French, Collalto had been unable or unwilling to send him reinforcements, Scaglia was intriguing against him at Madrid. The Abbot's one desire was to retain in his own hands the issues of peace and war, so as not to commit

himself to any decided policy whilst his master still hesitated whether to espouse the cause of France or of Spain. Spinola's proposals for peace, so Scaglia told Olivares, were such as could not be accepted. They offered no real security that France would evacuate Savoy even if the Imperialists withdrew into Germany, and he hinted that it had been arranged that all the states both of Italy and Germany should join in a guarantee to defend Mantua and Monferrat against all assailants, and that the Duke of Savoy should grant a passage to any French troops who might be sent into Italy for this purpose. Scaglia's hints had a substratum of truth, for in their conversations with Mazarin both Collalto and Spinola had certainly expressed an opinion that the Emperor should engage to withdraw his army from the Grisons, and had shown a willingness to allow the French to remain in Italy until after he had done so. It is not uncharitable to suppose that the Abbot was not unacquainted with the reports which had been submitted to Maximilian of Bavaria. Olivares greedily swallowed Scaglia's insinuations. The Count Duke hated the Marquis from the bottom of his heart, not only because he had first been brought to the front by Lerma, but because he had consistently opposed his policy in Flanders. He at once sent orders to Spinola with the assent of the Council of State to limit the powers which he held for concluding peace, nominally on the ground that the prestige of Spain would suffer less if the negotiations were left in the Emperor's hands. Olivares struck Spinola his deathblow.¹

At the beginning of September the Spaniards had seemed to have Casale at their mercy. Upon the third the fire of their batteries slackened and in a few hours ceased altogether. Five days later a rumour spread like wildfire through the town that a truce for two days had been concluded. For once the report proved true. On September the fourth a truce had been signed by the Marquis of Santa Cruz, who had received a commission from Philip IV. as Spinola's successor in his command, the Duke of Maine, the City of Casale, and M. de Thovras. Under its terms the French were to retain possession of the Citadel, but the town and castle were to be handed over to the Spaniards, who, however, were to restore them if a relieving force arrived before the thirtieth of October. If none appeared, the French were to surrender the Citadel and evacuate Monferrat.

Mazarin, who had taken an active part in the negotiations

visited Spinola at La Bicocca upon the seventh. He found him lying very ill, speechless, and seemingly all but unconscious. When the young secretary came to his bedside, the veteran fixed his eyes upon him, and rousing himself with a great effort, called him by his name and embraced him with affection. Then in a few broken words, which showed but too clearly the trouble of his soul, he said: "You are an honourable man, but so am I. They have robbed me of my honour." He turned himself in his bed and poured forth bitter reproaches against Olivares and the King of Spain. Then speaking once more to Mazarin he asked him as a friend if he knew of any distant hermitage to which he could withdraw himself to end his days far from the eyes of men. True to his convictions he refused absolutely to sign the truce. Mazarin withdrew and returned bringing with him the orders of the King of Spain that he should do so. Thereupon he affixed his signature to the document, repeating once more that he was a ruined man for they had robbed him of his honour. On the thirteenth Thoyras in his turn accepted the truce, and agreed to hand over the town and citadel to the Spaniards on the eighteenth. By the friendly intercession of Mazarin, he with his son-in-law Saint Aunais was received by Spinola, who pressed their hands with a soldier's courtesy, and praised them warmly for their conduct of the defence of Casale. It was the old man's last effort. As Mazarin writing to Barberini after his visit to La Bicocca says: "Spinola's illness is wholly due to his mortification because the King has taken his full powers from him, and he has, therefore, been forced to notify both his allies and the enemy of this." On the fifteenth he handed over the command to Santa Cruz, and was carried on a litter through Casale to the Po where he embarked on a boat for his castle of Castelnuovo di Scrivia. His strength gave way under an attack of malignant jaundice and he expired on the twenty-third of September, murmuring faintly "Honour and Reputation." He was sixty-one years of age. The news of his death reached Casale two days later and was received by regret even by his opponents. At Lyons, where the French Court was then residing, it excited but little attention, for the thoughts of all were absorbed by the sudden illness of Louis XIII. It had been rumoured that the Marquis was out of his mind. Philip IV. was no friend to one who had opposed his policy alike in Italy and Flanders, yet when he heard the tidings he could not but exclaim that the death of such an illustrious

commander more than outweighed the pleasure which he felt at the conclusion of peace. In his heart the monarch, perhaps, already recognised that he would have done well to listen to Spinola and to refrain from engaging on the flimsiest pretexts in the contest about Mantua, but it was not until fifteen years had elapsed that he owned to his confidant Sor Maria de Agreda that his policy as to Nevers had, possibly, in the eyes of his Divine Master, been the chief blot upon his life. The Infanta Isabella shed bitter tears when she learnt that she had lost her friend and counsellor, and celebrated his obsequies at Brussels with great splendour at her own expense. Both the Flemings and the Milanese regretted a ruler who had always treated them with kindly firmness. But, it was above all his soldiery, who had wept as they saw him departing from Casale, who mourned in him alike a loving father and a knightly leader. He had been a soldier for thirty years, but no one had ever seen him in a fit of passion; malevolence, envy, and haughtiness were alike foreign to his nature, and he was a stranger to those excesses which were the delight of so many of the great warriors of his day. That he shared their toils and hardships with his men, and was unwearying in his zeal for their welfare made the army forget the severe disciplinarian in the comrade and the friend. Even Alvise Mocenigo, the Venetian Ambassador at Madrid, who was no friend to Spain, and by long tradition the enemy of every Genoese, was forced to pay a glowing tribute to Spinola when relating to the Great Council the history of his mission. "The Marquis really deserved all praise for his great genius and worth. He was the first general of his age, our master in the art of taking fortresses whether by assault or beleaguering, in using the difficulties of the terrain to resist an enemy and in seizing the opportunity to crush him. Spinola was a man of ripe experience, amiable, generous and free-handed. He was a prudent diplomatist, very far-sighted in his schemes, and rarely left their outcome to chance. It may well be said that the Surrender of Breda marked the moment when his fame reached its meridian, from that time forth it began to decline." According to Mocenigo it was the fall of Groll, of which he tried somewhat uningenuously to belittle the importance, which finally ruined him in the eyes of Philip IV. and Olivares, nor did his enemies omit to make good use of his servility to the favourite which led him to cast a slur upon his Italian soldiers to please the Spaniards. To retrieve his position he

undertook the siege of Casale. His failure to take the city cost him his life. "But, in a word, if we consider the situation of affairs, we must acknowledge that the King has not one Spaniard at his disposal, who is capable of commanding an army or of carrying on a war. They have not yet been able to find a man to replace him as Governor of Milan." Finally the Duke of Feria was appointed to that thankless office. The Marquis had gained nothing by sacrificing himself in the cause of a country which was not his own, to satisfy an ambition which might well seem petty. But for his wish to advance his family beyond that of the Dorias whom he had chosen to regard as his rivals, it is probable that he would have lived and died a Genoese banker and would never have taken a place in history as one of the greatest if not the most successful of European statesmen and European generals. Unlike the Venetians, whose one thought it was to advance the glory of Saint Mark, the Genoese, if we except Andrea Doria, have rarely found a scope for their energies in the service of their native city. Columbus gave his life's work to Castile and to Leon; like Spinola he was rewarded with their ingratitude. Ambrogio and Federigo Spinola may have enlisted under the Spanish banners to serve their own ends, but, trained though they had been in a Genoese counting house, they quickly imbibed the feelings of those who fought by their sides. "You know full well," wrote the Marquis to Secretary Ciriza, "that Reputation is the very soul of our life on earth, and that it is to preserve that Reputation that we soldiers expose ourselves to all the hazards and dangers of war." For the sake of his reputation Spinola had given Spain not only his life but his wealth. His former income of eighty thousand crowns [£20,000] was at his death reduced to one of ten thousand [£2,500] not only by his lavish hospitality but by his gifts to influential personages at Madrid to engage them to protect him against the assaults of his open and secret enemies. Nor were his efforts to aggrandise his family more successful. His heir Don Filippo enjoyed but a moderate reputation for either courage or ability, and held no higher post than that of General of Cavalry at Milan, whilst Cardinal Spinola was in no wise distinguished either as an ecclesiastic or as a scholar. The ancient glories of the House of Spinola culminated and expired in the Marquis de los Balbases.

Yet Spinola, unsuccessful though he may have been from his own point of view, when he looked back over his life from his

deathbed at Castelnovo di Scrivia, has exercised a lasting influence upon the history of Europe. As has already been said it is more than probable that but for Spinola's naval and military policy Gustaf Adolf would never have intervened in the affairs of Germany, whilst he was the first who recognised that the master of the ports of Flanders might use them as a basis to secure the control of the northern seas, even if the mouths of the Scheldt and of the Maas were in unfriendly hands. Had not Spinola proved the strategic importance of Dunkirk and of Ostend, it is possible that Louis XIV. would never have turned his thoughts to the extension of French influence in the Spanish Netherlands. Napoleon again may have found in Spinola's efforts to effect a Continental Blockade against the Dutch the inspiration for his own attempts to bring about the ruin of England through the destruction of her foreign commerce. To these attempts the Emperor owed his downfall.

We can best sum up the thoughts of the great Marquis in the words which in the "Siege of Breda" are put in his mouth by Calderon, when to win Breda he was leaving Genoa to her fate :

" If country, honour, life itself must shape
My resolution, I can do no more
To serve my King than this and do no less
To testify my gratitude to him."

He had done his life's work for a master and for a land which were not his own. But Mocenigo was a true prophet when he said that the King of Spain would find no Spaniard to take the place of the Genoese. Spain dates her decline from the death day of Ambrogio Spinola.¹

CHAPTER XCVI

THE news of the conclusion of the truce came as a disagreeable surprise to the French Government. The courtiers threw the blame for it upon the Casalese, who, they said, had received guarantees from M. de Brézé that relief would reach them before the end of September. Priandi could only defend the citizens on the ground that they were worn out by suffering, and had so frequently seen their hopes disappointed that they no longer placed any reliance upon Thoyras' promises. Mazarin, who, as the Mantuan envoy said indignantly, was now in the Spanish and Austrian interest, wrote that the Citadel of Casale must be dismantled, so as to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Spaniards, as Mantua was too weak to hold it by herself. Upon the whole the French were inclined to agree with his opinion. They were no longer anxious to make conquests in Italy, and thought that Nevers should come to terms with Spain, and, to satisfy Savoy, should raise the fortifications of Trino. M. de Leon and Father Joseph wrote from Ratisbon that the Emperor would at once grant Nevers the investiture if he would give Guastalla three or four unimportant places, and thus satisfy Eggenberg, who was said to wish to marry his daughter to the Duke. The French were eager to secure peace if they could do so at other people's expense, and so would favour such an arrangement, without thinking of the ulterior consequences. Mazarin's advice was sound, and if Duke Charles had been farsighted enough to act upon it, Italy would have ceased to be the battleground of the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs. Richelieu had good reason not to close the door to peace, for Louis XIII. was at the end of September lying at Lyons at the point of death. The King had fallen sick of a quartan fever on Sunday, the twenty-second. By the following Friday his life was despaired of, and the Blessed Sacrament was carried to his bed-side. He rallied under the influence of a strong medicine, and, for a moment, it seemed possible that he would recover, but the Cardinal well knew that his power and influence hung upon a

thread. However, he did not give up hope, and made every effort to induce Savoy to come over to the side of France, so that Marillac, Schomberg, and La Force might march from the Po and be opposite Casale before the truce expired. Peace would have to be concluded unless the citadel could be relieved by the end of October. On the ninth of that month despatches from Leon and Father Joseph arrived from Ratisbon with the news that the Spanish Ministers said that they had not powers to sign a treaty. It was evident that they were holding their hands until they saw what would happen at Casale. The Emperor's views in the main reflected those independently expressed by Mazarin, but in addition he desired that the French should agree not to give any assistance, whether directly or indirectly, to the enemies of the Empire and of the House of Austria, and that the Treaty of Monzon should be abrogated. With less wisdom he suggested that the King of France should petition him to pardon the Duke of Mantua, and restore him to his states, after he had made his humble submission to his Imperial over-lord. Anxious as everyone in France was to end the contest, the Cardinal at once said that it was impossible to accept such conditions. He despatched an express to Ratisbon with orders to his envoys to insist that the treaty should be drawn up upon the lines which had been agreed to between Mazarin, Collalto, Spinola, and Savoy in the previous July, and that if this offer was rejected they should take their leave after issuing a protest that the rupture was solely due to the Austrians. The Cardinal at heart believed that the attempt at the relief would fail. Supplies were lacking, and the army was disorganised. He was convinced, however, that peace would be concluded, and was strengthened in his conviction by Mazarin's letters, although his own envoys thought that unless Casale was relieved, permanent peace in Italy would be impossible. The Treaty of Ratisbon, which was signed upon the fifteenth of October, was essentially a compromise, in which both France and the Emperor secured their own objects by the sacrifice of their allies. Spain was not mentioned in the first article, by which the signatories bound themselves not to assist one another's enemies directly or indirectly. The compensation to be given by Mantua to Savoy was to be determined jointly by French and Imperial commissioners, and the disputes as to Metz, Toul, Verdun, and the fortifications at Moyenvic were to be settled on the spot in

the same fashion. The Duke of Lorraine was to retain the undisturbed possession of his states. On the other hand, although Nevers was to be relieved from the Ban, to receive the investiture and to recover possession of Casale, its castle, and its citadel, Mantua was not to be restored to him until the French had handed back to Savoy Pinerolo, Susa, Bricheras, and Avigliana. The Valtelline was to be restored to the Grisons upon the same footing as it had been before the troubles, all new fortifications were to be demolished, and the old ones to be garrisoned with troops from the Leagues. The Emperor was to secure the accession of Spain and Savoy France that of Venice, and both the signatories were to give hostages to the Pope, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and some Catholic Princes in Germany to ensure that the terms would be carried out. As France still retained a pretext for intervening in the affairs of Italy, and as the question as to the Passage over the Rhoetian Alps remained as far from being settled as it had been in 1618, Spain might well have reason to blame the Emperor for his neglect of her interests. Unfortunately for Spain, Ferdinand the Second was in no position to consider any interests but his own. The Swedes were making great progress in Northern Germany, where Gustaf Adolf was now in full possession of Pomerania, although he was prevented by the army of the League under Tilly from advancing upon the Elbe, whilst the quarrels between His Imperial Majesty and the Electors, "who are always urging Cæsar to make peace in Italy," grew every day more envenomed. Peace, provided only it could be secured upon conditions which would ensure its duration, was now the one wish of all the combatants. Everything, however, so far as France was concerned, depended upon Casale.¹

The particulars of the Treaty of Ratisbon reached the Court at Lyons upon the twentieth. The news had at first been received with the greatest joy. When, however, the Cardinal had examined the terms, he flew into a fury, exclaimed that Leon and Father Joseph had far exceeded their powers in signing such a treaty, and sent off a protocol containing explanations and modifications of them without delay. "If the Emperor accepts them we shall have peace, but if he does not the ambassadors are to take their leave, and the war will continue." The King, after a severe relapse, was now convalescent, and Richelieu, who during his illness had come to terms with the

Queen Mother, "at least in seeming," and who felt his power secure, had already sent orders to Schomberg to push forward to Casale, and to storm the enemies' lines. Mazarin, however, was still active in the cause of peace. He had brought fresh proposals to Schomberg, which might possibly prove to be acceptable if the demolition of Casale was not insisted upon. He had stated that Savoy was most anxious to come to terms with France, as she was utterly exhausted, though Spain still seemed desirous of continuing the war. The Savoyards, indeed, were gainers by the Treaty of Ratisbon, as their promised indemnity of an annual revenue of £4,500 could only be paid by the sacrifice of more than half of Monferrat. But whilst these intrigues were in progress death was making ravages at Casale, where the French remained shut up in the Citadel and the pestilence was wasting away the Spanish garrison of the town. On the twenty-second of October the scene changed. The news arrived that the French army under Schomberg had reached Calliano fourteen miles away to the south. The Spaniards flew to arms. Batteries were erected on the bank of the Po, trenches were dug above and below the town, reinforcements poured in from every side. In vain the Spanish and Italian cavalry strove to stay the advancing French. The Italian horse fled in disorder at the first onset, and their officers could scarce check their tears of shame when they spoke of their flight. The Spaniards sent away their baggage trains to Valenza and Alessandria, and endeavoured to throw a bridge of boats over the river for their retreating troops. Thoyras in vain pointed out that they were violating the truce. The Spaniards mocked at his remonstrances; the batteries of the Citadel began to play upon them; as a reprisal they arrested all the Frenchmen in the town. On the twenty-fifth the Spanish regiments drew up in battle order on the plain, whilst behind their ranks thick pillars of smoke rose from their burning camps. Soon a long train of waggons rolled out of the gate of the town. Thoyras gathered his handful of horse, hastened after them, cut down the escort, and recovered the spoils of Casale. From the battlements of the Citadel the garrison anxiously followed the incidents of the skirmish, and strained their ears to the crackling of the musketry, which showed that the outposts were engaged. About noon the Spanish lines began to advance in force. Thoyras ordered the whole garrison into the field. Four regiments deployed into line, flanked by

horse who galloped hither and thither and skirmished with the small detachments thrown out by the enemy on his front. The main levies looked on, ranged for the fray and waiting with impatience for the order to attack. It was delayed, and the cause of the delay quickly became known. Mazarin was coming and going between the French and the Spaniards urging them to make peace. The Spaniards offered to give up the town if they might keep the Castle. To this proposal Schomberg refused to listen. "All," he said, "or fight." At length the young secretary so angered the Marshal by his importunity that he forbade him to come near him again, for he meant, cost what it might, to push on to Casale. He accordingly drew up his army for the advance. On the left stood the division of La Force, on the right the rearguard under Marillac, in the centre Schomberg with the main body of his troops. In all they numbered eighteen thousand men. The orders were given out. They were to charge "with lances down, heads bent, and hearts steeled to trample down all who stood up against them." On this the Spaniards begged Mazarin to go back yet once more to the Marshals with the message that they would yield to their demands if they would grant them an hour's truce in which to draw up the terms. "Do they think they can trick us," roared the Marshals, who would not listen to a word, "for they would not waste the few short hours of daylight in which they might settle their differences once and for all." The drums beat the charge the vanguard broke into a trot. "Several gentlemen, thereupon hastened from the enemy's ranks to their Excellencies, the Marshals, and asked for peace. They pledged their word that on the next day, Sunday, they would remove all their troops from the city and Castle of Casale. To this the generals agreed, and consented not to give battle." Mazarin had won the first triumph of a career which was to end by making him the master of the destinies of France. On the same evening it was arranged that the French and Spaniards should simultaneously hand over to that Duke of Mantua, who but a few hours before had been in Spanish mouths, the Duke of Nevers, the town, castle, and citadel of Casale. Thus, upon the first of November, the "Key to Italy" was again in the hands of its rightful lord. Monferrat, now a war-wasted desert, was not, however, freed from the presence of its invaders whether French, Spaniards, or Imperialists, until the following spring. All had vied with one another

in their outrages upon the hapless peasantry, but "as usual" the soldiers of the Emperor had distinguished themselves by their "barbarous" brutality. The news that Casale was free reached Paris on November the ninth, the day on which the Queen Mother and Richelieu arrived from Roanne, and was received with widespread joy. But a few hours later, on the "Day of Dupes," the Cardinal, who had been expelled from office in the morning to please the Queen Mother, returned to power in the evening, the master for life of France and of her King. The reign of Marie de Medicis was at an end, and she was to atone by a long exile for her triumph of a moment. Bassompierre, likewise, by his conduct on that fateful day, earned the undying hatred of the great minister, and a few weeks later was led a prisoner to the Bastille from which he was not to emerge for twelve years. Olivares by "dark intrigues" strove but in vain to delay the ratification of the Treaty of Ratisbon, with the sole result that he brought the Emperor to an understanding with Bavaria, which was far from being in the interests of Spain. On the other hand he had the satisfaction of signing with Cottington the long-desired treaty with England on the fifteenth of November. This treaty in the main was a renewal of that of 1604, but it was supplemented by two private agreements. Charles I., on the one hand, received full powers from the Spaniards to negotiate for a long truce on their behalf with the Dutch. By the second, Philip IV. bound himself to intercede with the Emperor and the Electors for the restoration of the Palatine to his dominions. He agreed also that he and his allies would hand back the places which they held in the Palatinate, so soon as Frederick had made his submission to Ferdinand II., and it had been legally declared that he or his sons were capable of re-entering into possession of the former territories of his house. It proved impossible for Spain to bring about the conclusion of the truce with the Dutch through the mediation of England, even if that mediation was sincerely meant. A secret treaty is said to have been signed by Olivares and Cottington in January, 1631, by which the King of England engaged to join Spain in subjugating the United Provinces, but as Charles I. hesitated to ratify it he lost the chance of claiming Philip the Fourth's mediation on behalf of his brother-in-law. Thus neither Spain nor England gained anything by a war which had been undertaken for objects in which neither had any real interest, and in pursuit of a policy which necessarily alienated the Spanish

Hapsburgs from the German Catholics. At Vienna, the failure of the Spaniards to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Ratisbon by the evacuation of Monferrat, had already done much to bring into being a community of interests between Ferdinand the Second and Maximilian of Bavaria. Gallas had threatened as early as the third of November that if the Spaniards delayed handing over Pontestura he would withdraw the Imperial troops from their army, and they had in consequence been forced to comply with his demands. Marillac, it is true, had at the same time refused to evacuate Casale, but the Emperor informed Maximilian that he did not consider the Marshal had violated the treaty. He added that Collalto was pressing him not to disband his army, but to send great reinforcements into Italy so as either to secure more advantageous terms of peace, or, if the war continued, to place himself in a better position to carry it on. It would be, wrote Collalto, for H.I.M. to induce the King of France to punish those of his servants who had infringed his orders, and to persuade the King of Spain that his soldiers "ought not to have to fight with famine as well as with the enemy." The Emperor ended by saying that he would do his best to ensure the execution of the Treaty, but that if the French meant to continue the war he counted upon the support of Bavaria and his brother Electors. In his reply Maximilian wrote that the Treaty of Ratisbon must be adhered to, and that the disbandment of the Imperial armies should therefore be proceeded with. In the end, however, it was found necessary to supplement the Treaty of Ratisbon by the Treaty of Chierasco, which was concluded upon the sixth of April, 1631, between the Emperor and France and communicated to Savoy and Mantua, who agreed to be bound by it. In the main the terms were similar to those arranged at Ratisbon, but in return for the portion of Monferrat which was handed over by Mantua to Vittorio Amadeo I., the Duke of Savoy gave the right to the French of retaining garrisons in Susa, Bricheras, Avigliana and Pinerolo, whilst both the Imperialist and the French engaged to evacuate all the other places which they held in Northern Italy. The Grisons were to be replaced in possession of the strongholds and passes in the Valtelline and Leagues, and an amnesty was to be accorded to all who had committed any act of rebellion during the troubles. This clause was to be held to include the Swiss and their allies, who were, therefore, to recover their former rights of trading with Italy.¹

Thus the war of the Mantuan Succession reached its end by an agreement which secured to France almost all the objects for which they had entered upon the contest. Casale was in the hands of a French ruler, the House of Hapsburg was shut out from the Eastern Alps, the "gates of Italy" were once more in French hands. In a word it seemed within the power of Richelieu to make himself at any moment the master of Italy from the Alps to Cape Passaro. But by a strange decree of destiny the object which France had sought for so many centuries to attain once more eluded her grasp. For one hundred and sixty years the eyes of her statesmen turned from visions of Italian conquests to those natural frontiers which had separated ancient Gaul from the Germanic lands. Even the over-weening ambition of Louis XIV. realised that to France the rich plains of Alsace and of the Rhineland and the sandy shores of Flanders were of more real value than the mulberries and vines of Lombardy, or than the syren charms of Naples and Palermo. It was not until the Corsican Bonaparte had grasped the reins of power on the Seine that Frenchmen once more fought to make France the mistress of Milan and of Naples. Spinola had taught them that Dunkirk and Ostend were of far greater importance to the rulers of Paris than the distant harbours of the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas, and the memories of Wallenstein and of Johann de Worth's Croats and Pandours were a sufficient warning to those who thought that the gap in the Vosges could be left unclosed, whilst French blood was being shed in torrents to bar the Passes of the Valtelline to the German hordes. Three centuries had yet to elapse before men realised that a free Belgium and a free Italy were the surest bulwarks of a free France. It was the failure of France to profit by the advantages which she had gained by the Treaty of Chierasco which in the end, by preserving the independence of the House of Savoy and the shadow of Italian liberty, was to render possible the re-birth of Italy as a nation. It was well indeed for Italian nationality that the Peninsula was not a mere dependency of France during the magic age of Louis the Fourteenth. A power which absorbs the world's soul by its spirit is far more dangerous to humanity than one which conquers its outward framework by the sword, and Italian civilisation might well have pined, withered, and crumbled into dust under the untempered radiance of the Sun-King of Versailles.

CHAPTER XCVII

IN January, 1631, the first period of the Thirty Years War came to its end. Denmark had disappeared from the ranks of the combatants, Italy, for a time, was no longer to be the theatre of hostilities, the Question of the Valtelline, though not yet wholly laid to rest, had ceased to be of importance, England foiled in her hopes of swaying the destinies of the world by her diplomatic skill, was sinking into the uneasy slumbers which preluded her Civil War, even the contest in the Netherlands was fast becoming of merely secondary interest. The old protagonists were leaving the scene. Charles Emmanuel and Spinola had followed Buckingham to the tomb; Conway, who since his resignation of office, had flitted an uneasy shadow about Whitehall, broken in health but till the end never forgetting to forward the interests of his son-in-law at Turin, died in Saint Martin's Street in January, 1631. As Dorchester wrote to Wake in the despatch in which he notified to him the conclusion of peace with Spain, Lord Conway had spoken to him on Wake's behalf the day "he fell sick of a sharp fever that carried him the third day after," which showed that Wake was remembered by him to the last. He was said to have died in the Catholic Faith. Inquiry failed to establish the truth of the report. His daughter Brilliana was to be one of the Puritan heroines of the Civil War, Lord Conway was not a man who was distinguished as a great soldier or a great diplomatist. He was, however, a useful servant to his country and his acquaintance with foreign affairs made him not unworthy of the confidence of one who like George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, had a far more exact knowledge of the interests of England abroad than had those who filled the public eye as the champions in Parliamentary contests of her constitutional rights. Conway had not the nerve to be a leader. His training had fitted him for a subordinate post, but he lacked the courage to take the initiative upon his own responsibility. Had he been a Mazarin, it is possible that in August, 1620, whilst he was with Spinola in the Palatinate, he might have used his instructions as the means to settle the

Bohemian difficulties and might thus have prevented the Thirty Years War. But Buckingham was far from being a Richelieu or an Olivares and had very different obstacles to overcome from those which confronted the favourite of a French or of a Spanish King. The "favourite of England" had to take into account not only his sovereign but the Parliament and, as Rubens had found, the goodwill of the sovereign was worth little to him unless he secured the approval of the ministers. The fate of Somerset, of Bacon, of Middlesex was ever before the eyes of an English favourite. His policy was, therefore, marked rather by caution than by daring and his agents were necessarily inspired by the spirit of their employer. To the student of the manners of those times Conway's papers will always be valuable.¹

At the moment of Conway's death fresh combatants were just stepping into the ring of that European contest which seemed likely to prove eternal. The first of January, 1631, saw the conclusion of that Treaty of Bärwalde, in which, with the benison of Pope Urban VIII., France and Sweden united to defend the Dutch and German Protestants against the Catholic King and the Holy Roman Emperor, whilst, on the other hand, their former champion England was reverting to her ancient policy of a close alliance with the House of Burgundy.²

The intervention of Sweden in a struggle apparently so remote from her interests was due to complex causes, of which jealousy of Denmark was no doubt one. The truth, probably, is that Gustaf Adolf, like James the First, was obsessed by the idea that the House of Hapsburg was aiming at Universal Monarchy, and in this belief, mistaken though it was, the efforts which Spain was making both through Poland and through the Imperialists to secure the control of the Baltic undoubtedly served to confirm him. He was not aware that they were solely directed against the Dutch, whom Spain wished to subdue by ruining their fisheries and their carrying trade. For this object it was necessary for her to control some port in the Baltic or on the North Sea from which her cruisers could raid the herring and the whaling fleets and the convoys which brought the wheat and the naval stores of the North to the wharves of Amsterdam. It was true that Spain was anxious to obtain the use of Polish harbours and Polish shipping, but her ends would have been equally well served had she secured the support of the Hanseatic League. Nothing, however, could convince Gustaf Adolf that the Spaniards had no intention of

restoring his rival Sigismund to the throne of Sweden for he never forgot some obscure intrigues carried on with that object, or alleged to have been so, in 1613 by Philip III. In reality so long as the Swedes did not interfere with her operations in the Baltic, it was a matter of the utmost indifference to the Spain of Philip IV. whether a Catholic or a Protestant reigned at Stockholm. It is true that as early as September, 1626, the Infanta Isabella had expressed to Tilly her belief that the Swedes intended to invade the Empire but, notwithstanding her suspicions, a year later she forwarded some proposals from Sweden for a commercial understanding to Madrid. The rejection of those proposals was due to the necessity for preventing the introduction of counterfeit brass money into Spain and to a wish not to offend the susceptibilities of the King of Poland by an understanding with his rival. It may be said, therefore, with truth that Spain had no concern either direct or indirect with the fortunes of Sweden, and that she regarded her relations with the Poles and with the Hanse Towns solely from the point of view of their effect upon the Dutch.¹

But, given Gustaf Adolf's suspicious nature, and the knowledge which he possessed of the intrigues of the Jesuits under John III. and Charles IX. to bring about an understanding between Spain and Poland, although that understanding had reference mainly to common action against the Netherlands, it was certain that the fact that the Spaniards wished to assert their power at sea in Northern waters would sooner or later bring them into collision with the Swedes. When Jutland was held by the Imperialists it was very generally believed that the Spanish fleet would co-operate with them against the Danes by seizing the Sound, and the report was received at Stockholm with the liveliest apprehension. Nor did the refusal of the Hanse Towns to ally themselves with Spain deter the Spanish Ministers from endeavouring to secure a base in the North Sea from which to attack the trade and fisheries of the Netherlands. Duke Frederick of Holstein Gottorp had never forgotten the offences which he had received from his Danish suzerain, and, within six months after the battle of the Lutter, was treating with the Infanta for an arrangement by which ships from his new port of Friedrichstadt should be permitted, even when manned by Protestant crews, to trade in Spanish seas, in return for his allowing the Catholic religion to be exercised publicly in his dominions. At the end of 1628, some months after Wallenstein's failure before Stralsund, Gabriel de Roy informed

Aytuna that the Duke of Gottorp wished to place himself under the protection of Spain in order to save himself and his duchy "from being taken in Friedland's trawl," and ruined by Friedland's quarterings. In return he offered to hand over to Philip IV. "the harbour of Sylt with a fort which he is building near it." The Duke believed that Sylt would be of great value to Spain as it would be an excellent staple for their trade and a station for their warships, and the naval stores purchased for the royal dockyards in the North might be sent there for shipment. "Your Majesty need no longer be dependent on Friedland who has done little enough so far to secure you any, though he knows well enough what he can make of them." His suggestion reached the Infanta at the moment when she was sending engineers to report upon the ports in the Baltic which were occupied by the Imperialists. These must have eighteen feet of water at low tide and thirty-six at high tide, but, as Wismar and Rostock could only be reached through the Sound, it is difficult to see how they could meet her requirements. She had, however, heard of a port in Jutland, which was still held by the Imperialists, where a hundred sea-going vessels could lie at high water behind an island. It lay twenty-three leagues north of the mouth of the Elbe, and just opposite England, whilst to its left were Holland, Friesland and Zealand. If the vessels from Dunkirk were sent there they could intercept the enemy's vessels as they came out of their ports, and, as they would be in the open sea, could make for Sylt or Flanders in any wind. This roadstead is, doubtless, the Lister Deep, which lies between the island of Sylt and the Port of Hoyer on the mainland of Holstein, and forms a sheltered anchorage in which ships can lie in twelve fathoms of water. Philip IV. was willing to accept the proposal, but pointed out that Sylt could only be occupied with the consent of the Duke of Holstein who might hand it over to him on the pretext of guaranteeing the safety of the Spanish subjects who traded to those parts. Had Spain possessed a strong navy there can be but little doubt that she might have occupied under such conditions two naval stations which would have served to bar the Baltic against Dutch trade. Thirty-six ships, however, would be necessary for the occupation of Sylt, and as sixteen had to be sent from Flanders to Spain, whilst a large fleet would have to be sent to the West Indies, where a Dutch squadron was threatening to seize Matanzas, Philip IV. reluctantly decided to postpone the execution of the

plan. By the end of April it was known at Brussels that the Dutch had occupied Sylt. As the Infanta remarked it would have been better if the Imperialists had taken the place, as Spain would thus have been put to no expense, whilst Gabriel de Roy's scheme could only have been carried out with difficulty and at great cost. Thus Spain failed to acquire one of the most important strategic points in the North Sea, but it cannot be doubted that rumours of her negotiations had reached Stockholm and had served to confirm Gustaf Adolf in his intentions of making war in Germany on the House of Hapsburg.¹

Gustaf Adolf was not an absolute monarch and it was impossible for him to undertake such far-reaching schemes without the consent of his Estates, and his whole policy, therefore had to be framed upon lines calculated to insure that consent. In the eyes of all Catholics and even of some Anglican bishops Gustaf Adolf was not the legitimate sovereign of Sweden. He held his crown as the heir of Charles, Duke of Südermania, who in 1604 had been raised to the throne as Charles IX. by a Diet which had deposed his brother Sigismund, King of Poland, on the ground that he had violated his oath to protect the Confession of Augsburg. That revolution had been the work of a small knot of nobles who wished to transform Sweden into an elective monarchy with hereditary succession in order to reduce the King to the position of a Doge of Venice and thus secure absolute power for themselves. They could not, however, carry out their designs without the support of the populace, whose forefathers but eighty years before had raised the House of Vasa to the throne. To the mass of the Swedish people the cause of Protestantism was dear, whilst the nobles who held most of the former possessions of the Church had good reason to dread the restoration of Catholic rule. They were thus enabled to carry through the Revolution with little opposition and, to secure the perpetual exclusion of Sigismund and his descendants, established the succession by law in the Protestant line with the further limitation that every member of it who married a Catholic forfeited his rights to the crown. Thus the Swedish Revolution of 1604 was in all its essential features the counterpart of the English Revolution of 1688, and like William III., Gustaf Adolf had no legal title to his position, save that which had been conferred upon him by his Parliament. He could only assure himself of the support of his people at any critical juncture by appealing to them in the name of their common Protestantism,

for it was in his quality of Defender of Protestantism that they owed him their allegiance, and, if he wished to continue to preserve it he was forced from time to time to take active measures in support of the Protestant Cause, whether the grounds on which he acted were of sufficient weight or not.¹

We have already seen that Gustaf Adolf's fears of Spain were based almost entirely upon his imagination. We have now to examine whether his fears of the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs rested upon any more substantial foundation, and, for this purpose it is, perhaps, sufficient to examine into his relations with Wallenstein, with whom as early as 1626 he had been in communication through Colonel Farensbach. At the outset of his campaign in Northern Germany Friedland had been desirous of keeping on good terms with Sweden, a power which he seems to have regarded with indifference, perhaps with a certain amount of goodwill. In October, 1627, indeed, he received a request from Gustaf Adolf that he would send a regiment into East Prussia to coerce the Elector of Brandenburg, who was giving some trouble to the Swedes, but was forced to refuse his consent for fear of causing trouble between Austria and Poland. He was of opinion that the Emperor should arrange a peace between Sweden and Poland, and should induce the Swedes to assist him by attacking Denmark through Scania and Norway, although he looked upon Gustaf Adolf as one "who keeps faith as long as it suits him." In November, 1627, he asked Arnim, it is true, to arrange a scheme for burning the Swedish shipping both in the Prussian and in the Swedish harbours so as to prevent it from being employed in attacking the coasts of Pomerania and of Mecklenburg, but he wished the execution of the plan to be postponed "as that King may find us better worth cultivating than our opponents." He excused himself for having sent a regiment to the King of Poland on the ground of Sigismund's old friendship with Austria and told Arnim that he might hint that four thousand men would follow them, with the object, however, of inducing the King of Sweden to come to terms with the Emperor. "I can assure you that if Spain comes into the negotiation between the Empire and Poland, the Dutch, who, in my eyes, are the ruin of Kings and the arch-enemy of Princes will have to give in," and if Sweden were to take part in this alliance and join in an attack upon Denmark, there could be little doubt but that the Netherlands troubles could be settled once and for all. By the middle of

December, however, he had decided that the King of Sweden was not to be trusted. He was in treaty with his brother-in-law Bethlen Gabor, and, if he could arrange a suspension of hostilities with Poland, would attack the coasts of Mecklenburg and Pomerania. When, however, Friedland found that the Poles had voted three years supplies to carry on the war, he thought that the Emperor would certainly be approached by the Swedes and that he was anxious to enter into an alliance with them. It would be as well to remind His Imperial Majesty of the claims which the Empire, as the representative of the Teutonic Knights, had upon Prussia. In reality Wallenstein, but for his fears for Mecklenburg and Pomerania, would have regarded Sweden with indifference if not with disdain and contempt, although in January, 1628, he expressed some annoyance that the King had returned no answer to his proposals for an understanding.¹

Gustaf Adolf, on the other hand, was so angered by Wallenstein's dealings with his Polish rival, that he had by that time, made up his mind to punish the Imperialists by carrying the war into Germany. He knew, however, that unless he could convince his Estates that Protestantism was in danger, he could not carry them with him into an enterprise, which, had they known of the Emperor's proposals for an alliance, they would have seen to be utterly unnecessary. Accordingly in January, 1628, whilst Wallenstein was impatiently awaiting his reply, he addressed the Diet in a secret session, and after communicating to them his decision to save the German Protestants from destruction, received their solemn assurance that they would "stand by Your Royal Majesty as honest men should, and will maintain and will sacrifice ourselves for this just cause without sparing our lives, our goods, and all that is ours." It was not, however, until Wallenstein had retired defeated from before Stralsund that Gustaf Adolf endeavoured to arrange with Denmark for a joint expedition against the Empire, nor was it until September, 1628, that Wallenstein finally refused to negotiate with the Swedes, as "they only wished to deceive him." The King had desired that Christian IV. should unite with him for the purpose of securing the restoration of the exiled princes of Upper and Lower Saxony to their dominions and thus refrained from involving himself in a dispute with Spain and the Catholic League by raising the question of the Palatinate, Christian IV. received his overtures

with mingled feelings. He counted upon pressure from Sweden as a means for procuring himself more advantageous terms of peace from the Emperor, but at the same time he was by no means anxious to see the war prolonged by the intervention of Sweden in Germany. He was a man of keener perception than the Swedish squires and was well aware of the hollowness of the pretexts upon which Gustaf Adolf wished to come forward as the Champion of Protestantism. He preferred to listen to Wallenstein's proposals for peace and yet to avail himself of Gustaf Adolf's suggestion that Stralsund, which since the autumn, had been under the joint Protectorate of Sweden and Denmark, should be represented at the Peace Conference by a Swedish Envoy, whilst he kept the Swedish army in hand for the eventuality of the failure of the negotiations. He, therefore, arranged for a personal interview with the Swedish monarch in the hope of dissuading him from an undertaking which, unless he were assured of help from Denmark, he might well hesitate to embark upon. The two Kings met accordingly at the parsonage of Ulfback near Knöräd at the end of February, 1629. The King of Sweden laboured hard to induce Christian IV. to allow him to join with him in the peace negotiations, on the understanding that if they failed, they should make common cause "against the great tyranny of the Emperor which aims at Universal Monarchy." "We must," he cried, "take God as our Helper, and not rely upon any stranger. We Danes and Swedes must do the trick." He would take the expense of the war upon himself if Denmark would join him, possibly because he may have already secured some promise of pecuniary assistance from France, and became so pressing that his guest at last said to him in confidence, "What have you got to do with Germany, my dear fellow, and what harm has the Emperor ever done you?" On this, Gustaf Adolf changed colour, walked "one or two steps nearer his Danish Majesty, and told off four points on his fingers, to wit the Emperor had expelled his friends and supporters the Dukes of Mecklenburg from their estates, he had besieged Stralsund in order to get a port in which to fit out a fleet against Sweden, he had sent forces to assist Poland and, finally, had worked against a peace between that power and Sweden." Then, shaking his fist he cried out in a fury, "You may be sure of this, my good man, that if the Kaiser had his way he would set us all by the ears, be we Kaiser, king, prince, republic, or what the devil

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you will, so that he could enslave us all by our own disunion." Possibly through absence of mind, His Swedish Majesty omitted to mention a fact which was well known at Vienna, namely that he had wished to make it one of the conditions of peace with Sigismund that the Poles should allow his troops to enter Germany through Polish territory. He may have, indeed, been unaware that Wallenstein, far from intending to attack Sweden by sea, had wished to secure Stralsund in order to prevent it from being used by the Swedes as an entrance into Pomerania. "With this outburst the conversation ended, but the two Kings, after spending a couple more days together upon the coldest terms, parted never to meet again. Their interview had but served to reawaken their former feelings of mutual "mistrust." Christian IV. had but little reason to accept these statements as simple truth. He knew that within the Empire itself Protestantism, save in a few isolated instances, such as the Palatinate, was in no real danger, although, in Germany, as in Sweden, the rulers' will was in religious matters law to his subjects. The Edict of Restitution which reiterated this fact as regards the Catholic Estates of the Empire appeared on the sixth of March, 1629. Yet when, on the twenty-fifth of April, Gustaf Adolf, who must have known that as early as January 1627 the Lutherans at Hamburg had been apprehensive that the Emperor contemplated some such measure, issued his memorandum to the Electors explaining the injuries which he had sustained from Ferdinand II. he did not say one word in it as to the fears which he entertained as to the future of the Protestant Religion. The Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony were both Protestants. Doubtless he felt that, had he done so, he would have found it difficult to put forward evidence sufficient to satisfy those who were acquainted with the facts at first hand, and who were aware that except in a few Imperial Cities in Southern Germany, as for example Strasburg, even the Edict of Restitution had been accepted without opposition. The Congress of Lübeck, however, was to furnish him with a fresh ground of offence against the Emperor and his Generalissimo, for Wallenstein, who was by no means anxious to see Sweden posing at the conferences as Protector of Stralsund, contrived upon that pretext to secure the exclusion of the Swedish envoy. Even before the sittings opened, he had despatched Arnim into Prussia to assist the Poles and half-heartedly though the general undertook his commission, Gustaf Adolf never forgot that when the

Imperialists surprised and routed his rearguard at Stum, he himself had nearly been made their prisoner.¹

Thanks to Arnim's ill-will and to the intrigues of the Polish nobles, Sigismund was forced in September, 1629, to conclude a Truce for six years with Sweden, and now that the Polish quarrel was thus off his hands, Gustaf Adolf was at length set free to prosecute his designs in Germany. Late in the autumn he secured the sanction of a Diet at Upsala for his plans for an attack on Pomerania. They were opposed upon various grounds by many leading statesmen. In an able memorandum Johan Skytte pointed out that such an undertaking would involve them in a war with the Emperor and "that it was against God and Conscience to do anything which might overthrow the Monarchy. That Monarchy was the Holy Roman Empire, the Fifth in order of those Monarchies, which had been successively instituted by the Almighty for the temporal government of Mankind, and which, in fulfilment of Daniel's prophecy, was to endure until Christ's Second Coming. In his reply Gustaf Adolf said that the Monarchy had frequently been transferred by Divine Decree from one people to another, and that in an extreme case the House of Austria might be deposed on the ground of political necessity, without the abolition of the Monarchy itself. It is probable that he had not the slightest idea of claiming the Imperial Crown for himself and, in so far, his expression of opinion was well calculated to secure him the support of Louis XIII. if not of Maximilian of Bavaria. To another objector, however, who said that the German Princes would only come over to his side if he were victorious, but would turn on him if he were defeated, the King replied that if he were the victor "they should do his bidding." In other words he meant to rule the Empire through a puppet, but not to diminish its powers. Thus to the champions of the "Liberties of Germany," the victory of Gustaf Adolf was to mean merely that a Protestant Mayor of the Palace would take the place of a Catholic Emperor. Possibly, in consequence of what transpired at Upsala, Richelieu, as he told Cardinal Bagni, despatched Charnacé to Sweden to inform the King that he would be committing an unfriendly act if he were to take any steps against the League with the object of restoring the Palatine or on any other ground. In that case the French King would defend them purely in his own interests. "The Swede replied that he thought this a most reasonable request, and promised to act in this

matter in accordance with the King's wishes." On May the seventeenth, 1630, Bagni, has we have seen, writing apparently to Jocher, said, "When the Swede takes up arms, as it is believed he will do shortly, the King will forward to the Bavarian the aforesaid guarantee and promise from the Swede in good and authentic form." It is clear from the provisions of the Treaty of Bärwalde that this "guarantee and promise," meant at the least that Gustaf Adolf would not prevent the public exercise of the Catholic Religion in any territories which he might occupy, and would recognise the neutrality of the League on condition that they should offer no resistance to him during his campaign. Charnacé's mission had originally been despatched because "the Swede was said to be preparing for war against the Emperor and Wallenstein," and the Treaty of Bärwalde signed over a year later, shows that the alliance between France and Sweden was directed solely against Ferdinand II. From the wording of Bagni's despatch of the third of January, 1630, it is evident that that alliance was not the direct work of the Pope, as was that between France and Bavaria. Gustaf Adolf had, it is true, been in communication with the French at various intervals since the Congress of the Hague in 1625, but it was apparently not until his proposed plans against Germany had been sanctioned by the Diet at Upsala that Richelieu decided to enter into serious negotiations with Sweden. Between the end of 1629 and May, 1630, however, matters had moved so quickly that the Champion of Protestantism was treating with that Champion of Catholicism, Maximilian of Bavaria through the Papal Nuncio at Paris.¹

Two days after Cardinal Bagni had despatched his assurances to Munich, the Estates of Sweden met in the Parliament House at Stockholm. The negotiations into which the King had entered at Danzig with the Imperial Commissioners had failed as the Emperor had refused to evacuate Upper and Lower Saxony and to agree not to fit out any ships of war for the future in German harbours, receiving in return the restoration of Stralsund. Moreover a plot had just been discovered for replacing the Imperialist garrison of Rügen by a Danish force so that the Danes, with the help of the Duke of Pomerania, might fall upon the communications of the Swedes should they land at Stralsund. The outbreak of war between Sweden and Denmark had only been averted by the expulsion of the Imperialists from the island by the Swedish troops before the design could be carried out. Thus the King

could only hope to restore Protestantism in North Germany by his own arms. The assembly was not unworthy of the occasion. From every corner of the land, the nobles, the clergy, the burghers and the peasants had gathered in that hall whose windows look out over the haven, thick-sown with rocky islets, black with fir, or feathered with birch, then in its first spring green, where the waters of the Malär Lake rush down into the sea at the foot of the dark red church under whose lofty aisles, now hung with the mouldering banners which Swedish valour won from the Austrian, the Bavarian, and the Rhinelanders on the battlefields of the German War, the Kings of Sweden sleep around the foremost of their line. Nor was Gustaf Adolf a presence unworthy of such hearers. In the prime of life, he was a man tall even beyond the generality of his fellow-countrymen, clean-limbed, strongly-built, and active, though somewhat inclined to corpulence. His face was full and ruddy, crowned with thick, bushy hair in colour rather like that of honey than flaxen, and his blue piercing eyes reminded all who saw him of the gerfalcons of his native hills. His bearing was full of gracious majesty, he spoke in a clear distinct tone like one accustomed to command, his answers were quick and to the point, but never sneering nor cynical. He was at once the general and the King.¹

The monarch entered surrounded by soldiers scarred in the Danish and the Polish wars, and by counsellors like Oxenstjerna, who were soon to show that men born under the Pole Star could rival in subtlety the keenest wits of the German or the Latin lands. He seated himself upon the throne where the three golden crowns glittered upon an azure field, and prepared himself to say farewell to his subjects, who, in all but name, were his equals, before he entered upon the perils of the coming war. His words were fitly chosen to fire his hearers with the enthusiasm of martyrs, and to prove to the world that he was acting with the purest and the most disinterested motives. "I take the All-Highest God, in Whose Presence I am now sitting, to be my witness, that I am not taking upon me this contest of my own free-will, or out of any lust for war, but that for divers years I have been notably moved and impelled thereto." After reminding them of the conduct of the Emperor in excluding his envoy from the Congress at Lübeck and in assisting the Poles against him, he continued, "Moreover, we are likewise called to this task by our grievously oppressed neighbours, friends, and supporters, yea,

even by exiled kings, who with all earnestness entreat us to enter into this struggle. But what above all else weighs with us is our hope that by this means we may free our suffering brethren in the Faith from the yoke of the Papists, as will, with God's help, shortly come to pass." In lofty accents he went on to point to his own desire for honour. "The more impossibilities a man overcomes, the greater honour and renown doth he win for himself, both in this present age and in all times to come . . . The greatness of our Fatherland and of God's Church, which therein abideth, are things well worthy that for their sakes we should endure hardships, yea, even Death itself." Such were the words in which Gustaf Adolf took leave of his estates before he embarked upon a contest, in which, though he was to lose his life, yet he was to make his name immortal. It would be interesting, however, if we could picture to ourselves the feelings with which Richelieu, Bagni, or Maximilian of Bavaria would have listened to this harangue, could they have been present in the diplomatic box in the "House of Knights" on that fateful day.

In all human probability they would have regarded it as one worthy of the most distinguished pupil who had ever been trained by the Fathers of the Company in that stately college where they expounded the teachings of their founder Loyola. If one thing was more certain than another it was that Gustaf Adolf was entering Germany under the ægis and with the fullest approval of His Holiness Pope Urban VIII.

He had secured the alliance of Louis XIII. by pledging his word that he would not commit any hostile act against the Catholic League to effect the restoration of the Palatine, and had but just sent his guarantee of protection through the French King and the Papal Nuncio to Maximilian of Bavaria in return for his neutrality. He must have been well aware that Maximilian of Bavaria, the man who had been the originator of the Edict of Restitution, that one tangible proof, if proof it was, of the royal assertion that Protestantism was in danger, the suggestor of that "Creed Test" which would have introduced the Holy Inquisition into Germany, was allying himself with France in order to secure himself in possession of that Electorate and of those territories which had fallen to him as the spoils of the outlawed Frederick. Yet His Swedish Majesty was entering into the contest at the earnest entreaty of an exiled king. How did he propose to satisfy Frederick's claims unless, indeed, by liberating

his "suffering brethren in the Faith" in Bohemia and in Moravia, and by restoring Frederick to the throne of Prague, whilst leaving the Protestants of the Palatinate to the tender mercies of the Catholic Bavarian and of the Catholic Bishops of Spire and Worms? We have already endeavoured to show that neither the Emperor nor Wallenstein had any wish to engage in a war of aggression against Sweden, and that they had not given any substantial assistance to Poland until after Gustaf Adolf had aided Stralsund in her revolt against the Empire. To sum up the whole argument, it would seem that Gustaf Adolf was acting upon grounds which he would not have ventured to submit to the criticism of either his Estates or of the world at large, unless, perhaps, we can persuade ourselves that he was simply the victim of his own delusions as to the Hapsburgs' desire of obtaining Universal Monarchy. The King knew that his position in the eyes of his brother sovereigns was far from being assured. He felt, maybe instinctively, that he could only legitimize it by coming forward as the Champion of Protestantism.

The situation in Germany seemed to open up to him an opportunity for doing so upon grounds which to all but a few statesmen versed in the inner secrets of diplomacy might well seem convincing, and of that situation he determined to avail himself. But had he been called upon to justify his intervention in Germany to such an expert as Christian IV., he would assuredly have found it impossible to offer any adequate proof.

It seems incredible that a man of his transcendent genius can have honestly persuaded himself that the House of Hapsburg, even if that House had been sufficiently united to act as a separate diplomatic entity, was aiming at Universal Empire, when a Chancellor of Mainz could scoff at a chimera which, as he pointed out, was utterly discredited by all well-informed people. But just as the fables of Titus Oates mark the moment when the English Revolution became inevitable, so the German Wars of Gustaf Adolf found their primal cause in the intrigues of Possevino and his Jesuit successors, who had dabbled in the politics of Scandinavia a generation before. William III., it is true, made use of the English Revolution to secure the adhesion of England to the Grand Alliance of Europe against Louis XIV., but, save for a few brief moments, William III. never professed to act otherwise than as a statesman. Gustaf Adolf in the eyes of his contemporaries and in the mouth of posterity was and is the Christian Hero. It

has been unfortunate for the character of the German nation that their greatest writers should have set up the Swedish King for their adoration upon a pedestal of their Valhalla. It is certain that save as a most able politician and as a consummate master in the art of war, the Victor of Breitenfeld has but little claim to our respect. Whatever his personal attitude towards Religion may have been, he well knew how to make Religion an instrument of state-policy.

Upon Midsummer Day, 1630, the King of Sweden landed at Usedom, an island at the mouth of the River Oder, which belonged to the Duchy of Pomerania, and thus opened the second period of the Thirty Years' War. His expectations of assistance from the Princes of Northern Germany were in a great degree disappointed. The Elector of Brandenburg refused to enter into an alliance with Sweden and though some of the Imperial Cities, of which the first was Stralsund, rallied to his cause, yet it was not until the spring of 1631 that by a treaty with Magdeburg he secured a foothold upon the line of the Elbe. Nor, despite his promises to Bavaria, did he find the members of the Catholic League prepared to remain passive spectators whilst he advanced into the heart of Germany to attack the Emperor in his hereditary dominions. Maximilian, with the greatest hesitation, had entered into an alliance with France to secure his personal interests and with the view of putting pressure upon the Emperor to dismiss Friedland. When therefore, at the Diet of Ratisbon, Ferdinand the Second had consented to cashier his generalissimo and to disband the greatest part of his forces, neither the Elector nor his colleagues, who at their meeting at Mergentheim in the previous spring had been greatly disgusted by the revelations as to French intrigues, had any object in continuing their connection with the avowed enemy of the Empire. Possibly also, Gustaf Adolf's speech at the Diet of Upsala had become known in Germany and the princes had learnt that, were he victorious, the Swedish King might prove a master even more severe than their present ruler. Consequently Tilly with the army of the League, supported by a large portion of the Emperor's forces, posted himself between the Swedes and the valley of the Elbe, so as to prevent them from entering it either through Mecklenburg or by Brandenburg and Saxony. Nor were the Protestant Electors more ready to enter into the Evangelical Alliance proposed by Sweden, as they still hoped to secure concessions from the Emperor by diplomatic

means. Thus Gustaf Adolf, although he was in possession of Pomerania, found no real support in Germany. He was forced to seek the aid of France, and the result was that Treaty of Bärwalde, in which Richelieu appeared as the humble assistant of Sweden. The objects of the alliance were firstly the joint protection of the Baltic and the North Sea by France and Sweden, secondly the restoration of the oppressed and exiled Estates throughout Germany. France gave an annual subvention of four hundred thousand thalers [£60,000] for the support of the Swedish army, but of that army Gustaf Adolf retained the sole control, whilst Louis XIII. also agreed that if victory was secured he would not intervene, unless in concert with all the members of the alliance, in the final settlement of Germany. On the other hand the Swedes agreed not to interfere with the public exercise of the Catholic Religion in any territories which they might occupy, and renewed their promise to respect the neutrality of the League provided that it would remain neutral during their campaign. As had been contemplated from the outset, the alliance between France and Sweden was in form directed against the Emperor alone.¹

But, in its essence, it was plain that the Treaty of Bärwalde was wholly inconsistent with the agreement by which France had pledged herself to protect Maximilian in the enjoyment of his states, "whether inherited or acquired." Unless with the acquiescence of Bavaria it would be impossible for France and Sweden to restore the Palatine except by force of arms, and, in that case, France would be violating her engagement not to assist any power wishing to attack the Bavarians. The Treaty between France and Bavaria had served its purpose, and the Pope, at whose instigation it had been arranged, had gained his ends. Unless Gustaf Adolf had believed himself to be secured against the hostility of the League, he might well have hesitated to invade the Empire. By his invasion, he had forced the Emperor to conclude that Treaty of Ratisbon, which had insured the withdrawal of the Imperial troops from Northern Italy and the Grisons, and had deprived Spain of the hope of placing her nominee in possession of Mantua and Monferrat, whilst the gates of the Western Alps remained under the control of France. Thus those powers in Italy who still retained their independence were at least free to choose whether they would follow the dictates of Paris or of Madrid, and no longer feared to see themselves reduced to the state of Naples or of Milan. The

Pope might be the Head upon Earth of the Universal Church, but he was also an Italian ruler, and in Urban the Eighth's eyes, the Patrimony of Saint Peter far outweighed the interests of the Catholic Church in the lands to the northward of the Alps. Provided that Spain was prevented from becoming the mistress of Italy, it mattered little to the Pontiff that France should flout her engagements to his most faithful supporter in Germany, Maximilian of Bavaria. Once more it had been proved that Religion had ceased to be the dominating factor in the State Policy of Europe.¹

Whilst Sweden was fast rising into power, the fortunes of Spain in the Netherlands were as rapidly ebbing, and for a time it almost seemed as if the Infanta, who was sinking slowly into the tomb, might die as the prisoner of Frederick Henry of Orange in her palace at Brussels.

By the beginning of December, 1629, it appeared certain that the Dutch were resolved to continue the war. The West India Company was unwilling to sacrifice the prospects for which it had already incurred such great expense, and the French, in view of the state of affairs in Italy, were more anxious than ever to prevent the conclusion of the Truce. Philip IV. could only urge the Infanta to do what she could to keep the negotiations alive, but she was to be careful to exclude Berg from them. The Belgians themselves were on the verge of revolt; they blamed the Council of State as the sole author of their misfortunes, and asserted that they were an independent state, not a mere province of Spain, and as such were entitled to conclude peace or a truce without reference to her government. The Consulta at Brussels had already pronounced a very unfavourable opinion as to Berg, who was accused of having accepted bribes when at Amersfoort for remaining inactive in place of advancing upon Utrecht, and of having exposed his army to needless risks by refraining from withdrawing from the Veluwe after the fall of Bois-le-Duc. These charges Cardinal de la Cueva was never weary of repeating, and the Infanta thought that Philip IV. alone should decide whether action should be taken upon them or not. To please the Belgians the King sent strict orders to His Eminence to refrain from further interference in affairs of state. At the same time, he despatched a monk to Brussels who had not only drawn up a plan for reorganising the Catholic Church in the United Provinces in the interests of Spain, but

had also handed a paper containing the gravest charges against Count Henri to His Majesty.

According to the Religious the Count was not only disaffected but was in correspondence with the Prince of Orange, whilst his sisters were in the pay of the Dutch. In referring the memorial to the Infanta the King wrote, "You will be advised as to the conduct of the inquiry by the Marquises of Mirabel and Aytona, whose opinion is well worth having."

The memorandum drawn up by the Religious gives a curious picture of the state of society in the Obedient Netherlands, and it is not a little significant that his statements were accepted by the Spanish Councillors of State in Belgium as, in the main, true.

"The following facts," he wrote, "are well known to all the Catholics of Holland. Firstly, the Count has always been suspected of heresy, and his sisters who live with him are heretics as obstinate as the devil, who are for ever blaspheming the Catholic Faith and the Roman Church. They are deadly enemies of the Spaniards and entertain a Calvinist Preacher in their houses and estates. They write everything that goes on in the Obedient Provinces and all that they learn from Count Henry to the Prince of Orange and to their cousin Count Culemburg, and during the Siege of Bois-le-Duc used to send off a messenger daily with letters to them so as to keep them informed of all their brother's secrets, and used to come with him to our army every day. Everyone is thoroughly convinced that his sisters are in the pay of the States General, for, though they did not get a foot of land or a brass farthing from their parents, they are buying manors and broad acres and building castles." Philip IV. notes on the margin, "It would be as well to get the countersign employed by the messengers, whom he says the sisters used to send to the Prince of Orange and Count Culemburg. It would be a great thing if you could get hold of some of the letters he says they write to them to bring forward as evidence in support of this charge, and Y.R.H. will arrange for doing so with all possible secrecy."

"Secondly, during the siege of Grave, they went to Count Maurice and told him that they knew for certain that the Admiral of Aragon had orders not to fight but only to make a demonstration. This was the cause of the loss of the town." Philip remarks, "It would be well if Y.R.H. could have the Lord

Albert's letter-book searched, may his soul rest in peace, to see if the Admiral of Aragon was given this order." As the siege of Grave took place in 1602, the ladies must have begun work as spies at an early age, for in 1626 one of them was the reigning toast at Brussels.

"Count Henri loves the said sisters with unrestrained passion, and it is very generally believed that he has had two bastard sons by them and that he still continues in the same sinful life. God knoweth the truth, but the appearances against him are great, firstly because he never will say who the mother of the two children was, but only that she was a Countess, and as noble as himself; secondly, the said sisters love his sons above everything, and have left them all their property; in the third place, the Count has had them legitimated and wishes them to succeed to his estates, though he wrongs his legitimate daughter by this: fourthly, one of his sisters' servants has declared that she assisted her mistress in childbirth; fifthly, they contrived to get their maid, who had been with them and who accused them of this monstrous conduct, hung at Maestricht, although she persisted in her accusation to the last and died asserting that it was true. We must leave God to judge of this. However, the Count ought to clear himself of this charge, as he has been promoted to so high a place."

Count Henri de Berg's other offences were less grave. His secretary was a heretic and in correspondence with the Prince of Orange and had asked that provision might be made for him in Holland, in case he should some day fall into disgrace because his misdoings had been discovered. "The Heretics say Count Henri is of their religion, goes secretly to the preaching, and has been heard to say that though his sword is the King of Spain's his heart is the Prince of Orange's." "This should be inquired into very secretly so far as regards the Secretary," notes Philip IV. To him the religious opinions of his general were no longer a matter of concern. "In the fourth place, during the Siege of Grol, a certain Catholic young lady, who was about the said sisters, came to see me. I asked her what the sisters were saying, for at that time their brother's position was such that he had either to defeat the enemy to his own great honour but quite against their wishes, or else to reap as great a harvest of shame, a thing they certainly ought not to desire. She told me that she had heard them say that Count Henri would manage things

so that he would be neither dishonoured nor defeated, and yet the Prince of Orange would take the town. It is certain that whatever he did before Grol, he did before Bois-le-Duc and other places." . . . *Note.*—"The religious who gave me this paper was asked who the young lady with whom he had this conversation is, for if she is in any place where she can be questioned this should be done. He said he did not know where she is at present, but thought she is with her parents who are named Aamant Spee, and who live half a league from Maaseyck. The father is a good Catholic and a great friend of Count Henri's. It was on account of his feelings as a Catholic that he withdrew his daughter, who is his eldest, from the service of the Count's sisters."

Other charges related to his connivance at the sale of munitions to the Dutch during the blockade of the rivers, and to his conduct at Genep. During the Siege of Bois-le-Duc, Count Henri had had an interview with the Prince of Orange within sight of one of his own ambuscades, and the Religious had also heard from a lady who owned lands in the Veluwe and who was secretly a Catholic, that the Count had boasted to the Headborough of one of her villages, also a secret Catholic, who had come to him during the raid of 1629 to treat for a composition for his mistress, that he could force the King to accept the terms of Truce proposed by the Dutch at Rosendaal. He went back to his mistress and said "Count Henri is either a traitor to the King, or mad." This was confirmed to me by the Archbishop." The Infanta was instructed to inquire from the Archbishop "to whom this article refers," and who was probably the Vicar Apostolic at Utrecht, "through some Religious who could be relied upon, what the truth as to this matter is and what he knows about it." As the King had been in communication with the Prince of Orange through Count Henri during the spring of 1629, it was difficult for him to take any notice of the charges as to the Count's secret interviews with his kinsman before Bois-le-Duc.

The Count was plotting to surprise Antwerp with the aid of the heretics and the "politicians," or in other words of the agitators who were clamouring for the recognition of the independence of Belgium, and was scheming to lay the ditch of the Citadel dry. "He will certainly succeed in his plans if the Spanish forces do not reach the place before his own do." The loss of

Antwerp would be the destruction of the Obedient Provinces, as the States of Artois and of Hainault were already talking of going over to the French because Spain could not protect them nor save the Church from ruin, the priests from being driven out, and the Churches and Monasteries from being desecrated, "to the perdition of many souls," whilst the States of Flanders and Brabant were considering the advisability of treating with the Dutch.

It would be difficult, however, concluded the King, to remove Count Henri from his command. He had great influence both in the army and, as Governor of Guelderland, in the countries beyond the Maas, and it would be well if the Infanta could suggest some means of doing so without occasioning a disturbance. A few weeks later Philip IV. sent orders to de la Cueva to leave for Rome without further delay.

By the advice of Mirabel and Aytona, the Infanta referred the charges against Berg to the Spanish Councillors of State who were in Belgium, and on the ninth of March forwarded their report to Madrid.

"We find that the Count is accused upon good grounds of three most heinous crimes, namely, of heresy and of being a fautor and encourager of heresy in his government of Guelderland, of incest with his sister and daughter, lastly of intercourse with the enemy.

"It is the opinion of many religious persons of high repute that there is sufficient proof of these charges to warrant his imprisonment so that they may be inquired into, and that if he is found guilty he should be punished accordingly. On the other hand, we have to take into consideration his rank, his long service, the employments which he holds, the fact that he exercises absolute authority in Guelderland, and lastly the natural character of the inhabitants of these countries, who often detest the punishment more than the crime itself, especially when the sentence is pronounced by foreigners and carried out in one of the provinces. We must remember, likewise, the present position of affairs in these provinces and the tendencies which they have shown during the course of the last few months. We believe, therefore, that it will be necessary to have such proof of the three charges, or of any one of them, as will not merely justify any action which might be taken against him but will satisfy the people fully as to their truth. As in such

cases as this, it is difficult to find sufficient proof and a matter of danger to procure it, we think it absolutely necessary to put the army into such a condition that it may be strong enough to make up for our other defects, and so leave us free to take action. It is true that some think that two courses are open to us in this business, namely, that the Count might either be removed from his offices so as to weaken his authority and power to do harm, or else that His Majesty might be induced to summon him to Spain for the same purpose. Both of these measures, however, would be attended with great risks as he might refuse either to lay down his employments or to go to Spain, and we should, therefore, be forced either to punish him or to deceive him, and in either case the effects would be very bad. Our best plan, therefore, will be to go on reinforcing the army here and more particularly the Emperor's troops, who are commanded by Count John of Nassau, a personal enemy of Count Henri's, and a man thoroughly to be trusted. Later on some opportunity may offer itself for taking suitable measures." He could only be removed from the command of the Cavalry by giving him some other appointment, and in that case it would be possible to name some one else to fill his posts of General and Lieutenant General of the Cavalry and General of the Artillery. These might be given to D. Carlos Coloma, as the King left the Infanta free to choose the Count's successor, and it would be impossible to persuade Tilly to accept them.

The Infanta added to the report in her own hand, "Having perused the above, I agree with the opinions of the Council therein expressed in every respect, so far as regards Count Henri, and have nothing to add to them. As to filling up his posts, we can do nothing till we have seen what the Marquis de Leganes brings with him from France, and learnt whether he will accept them. If he will, I say we should appoint the Marquis, as this will be the least difficult way of filling up so many posts. I shall make a report myself about this business to the King, and shall not give up the case as desperate until I receive an answer to the despatch I sent by the courier to Germany." The Infanta could still rely upon the goodwill of the Emperor and of Maximilian of Bavaria, and hope that they would allow Tilly to leave their service. It was not until the middle of June that Philip IV. decided to place his army in Flanders under the command of a Council of War, which included Leganes and Aytona amongst its members.¹

In the meantime fresh grounds of complaint were arising against Count Henri. With some reason the King asked how the Count could say that he had only a thousand men fit to take the field when he had so many garrisons under him, and drew two hundred and twenty thousand ducats a month [£55,000] for half pay and commissariat bread alone solely to defend the states of the Duke of Neuburg and his own government, whilst he left Lingen, "the head and heart of the provinces towards the seaboard," exposed to the utmost danger. "We should have to evacuate all those countries if the enemy besieges it as well as all Juliers, Berg, Mark and the rest, and yet the contributions of Juliers and Cleves alone would support all the garrisons we have on the Rhine. For their own credit's sake my Ministers must correct these abuses and see that the men and the money are better fitted to one another, as what we spend on Count Henri could be far better employed elsewhere." But the Infanta was powerless to interfere. "If Count de Berg is removed from his post as General of the Artillery and Lieutenant General of Cavalry without compensation, he will be driven into some desperate action," and anything he might do would be warmly applauded by the Belgians, as no charges or evidence had been brought against him publicly. At most, Coloma could be given the Cavalry, and Leganes made Lieutenant General commanding the Forces, but the Artillery must be left to Count Henri. She had, indeed, next to no Spanish and Italian troops, and feared that there would be a general mutiny unless the men were paid. Yet the pay of a soldier in Flanders was sufficiently meagre. There were sixteen tercios of Infantry, or roughly thirty-two thousand men, in Belgium, which included ten regiments of Germans, thirty-eight companies of High and Low Germans not enrolled in any regiment, forty-three of Walloons and of natives of the Obedient Provinces, six of English and Scotch, with some irregular levies, and one tercio of Irish under Lord Tyrone. Their pay came to one hundred and fifty-eight thousand crowns [£31,604] a month for half-pay, two-thirds pay and full pay, with one hundred and fifty-seven thousand [£31,400] for field allowance. The half-pay officers and volunteers got a real [6d.] a day for field allowance, but only the Italians, Spaniards, English, Scotch, and Irish got a field allowance of two plocks [2½d.] a private a day from Belgium. The allowances to the garrisons of Antwerp, Ghent,

and Cambray, all of whom were Spaniards, had been compounded for. Thus the Obdient Provinces were held for Spain either by foreigners or by their own inhabitants. We cannot wonder, therefore, that the Infanta was forced to leave Berg in the enjoyment of his offices, especially as an inquiry must have laid bare to the public the secrets of Philip IV.'s negotiations with Orange in the previous year. It is difficult to decide whether or no he was guilty of treason.¹

Neuburg, too, was breaking away from the cause of Spain. He was anxious to induce the Dutch to grant neutrality to his states, and after Philip IV. had declined to act in the matter without the Infanta's approval, entered into direct negotiations with the States General. Finally, with the King's sanction, the Infanta agreed to allow the Spanish garrisons to evacuate Juliers, Cleves, Berg, Mark, and Ravensburg, simultaneously with the Dutch, although she would not consent to pledge herself not to attack the Dutch garrisons in Rees, Emmerich and Wesel, and expressed the conviction that Neuburg would insure the public exercise of the Catholic religion in the places in which it had been practiced during the reign of the late Duke.

Such, so far as Spain was concerned, was the final settlement of the Cleves and Juliers question, which had been one of the chief causes of her interference in the affairs of Germany. To the last moment the Infanta had shown great unwillingness to allow the provinces to be declared neutral, for, as she remarked, if the Catholic troops were withdrawn, whilst the Dutch retained their garrisons in the fortresses, they would have gained all their objects, and the Duke of Neuburg had committed a great wrong against the Emperor by going to the Hague to treat for such an arrangement.²

The Dutch, indeed, were still holding out hopes of a Truce, and Kessler still came and went between Rosendaal and Brussels. Religious differences were running high in Holland, and the financial position of the United Provinces was far from satisfactory. They were convinced that whilst the war continued in Italy, Spain would be unable to prevent them from extending their conquests in the West Indies and from having a free hand in Flanders, but, on the other hand, a large party headed by the Prince of Orange saw that now that they had gained all their objects, they would do well to secure a breathing space. Consequently, the negotiations were spun out, although the terms

offered were constantly being changed to the detriment of Spain. The Infanta could only leave the decision as to the continuation of the discussion to her nephew.

Philip IV., however, still hoped to bring about a breach between the Empire and the Dutch and French. With this object, as soon as he had learnt of Gustaf Adolf's descent on Germany, he urged Wallenstein to enter France from Alsace in order to precipitate it. Yet, at that very moment, with the object of propitiating England, he had instructed his envoy at Ratisbon to treat, though in but a lukewarm fashion, for the Palatine's restoration, and a little later declined an offer from Maximilian and his brother electors to mediate on his behalf with the Dutch on the ground that he had arranged with Charles I. to do so. On the other hand, he refused to comply with the Emperor's request that he should give up the churchlands and some property belonging to the Margrave of Baden, which he held in the Palatinate, stating that he looked upon them as a pledge to secure the repayment of his outlay on the war, and was even annoyed that the Emperor should have raised the matter at a crucial stage in his negotiations with England.

Such were the relations between the two branches of the House of Hapsburg at the moment when France and Sweden were entering into an alliance to prevent that House from acquiring the dominion of the world.¹

Nor was the outlook for Spain more favourable in the Valtelline and in the Grisons, for here, too, the effect of the Dutch victories and of the entrance of the Swedes into the German war was clearly to be traced. The French, as has been seen, had never acquiesced in the occupation of the Leagues by the Austrians, and directly they had concluded the Peace of Alais, they endeavoured to induce the Swiss Cantons to allow them to recruit six thousand Swiss, and entered into an understanding with Venice at Fontainebleau in September, 1629, to restore the liberty of the Grisons. In the previous month the Diet at Soleure had been brought by the Catholic Cantons under the influence of Casati to refuse their request, but, in February, 1630, Bassompierre persuaded the Diet to rescind its resolution and two regiments were accordingly raised and at once sent into Piedmont. The removal of Wallenstein and the successes of the Swedes had a great effect in moderating the views of the Catholic Cantons, and they remained as passive onlookers when,

in accordance with the Treaty of Chierasco, the Imperial forces were withdrawn from the Leagues to resist Gustaf Adolf's advance. The Leagues, when the pressure of the Imperialists was removed, agreed in December, 1631, to raise three thousand men for the French service, but as Richelieu still feared that the Spaniards and Austrians might attempt to reoccupy the passes, he sent a large force under the former Huguenot leader Rohan to garrison them against an attack. The return of the French was fatal to the hopes of the Catholic Missions. Nominally the Catholics in cases in which they were in a majority in a parish, was allowed to hold the church and the revenues of the living, so long as their clergy complied with the laws forbidding them to appeal to foreign jurisdictions. In practice these concessions were made only to Old Catholics, and new converts were forced to attend Protestant worship, with the effect that the Church was deprived of several parishes where the majority was really Catholic. In 1632 Father Ezeckiel, the head of the Missions in the Lower Engadine, acknowledged that there was no longer any prospect of converting the Valley. The Catholics were being bought over or driven to recant by threats and violence.

Many who during the rule of the Austrians had feigned conversion went back to their former faith on the arrival of the French, and by 1633 not a single Catholic was to be found either in the Prätigau or at Davos, whilst in the Lower Engadine their number had fallen from 6,000 to 280. Everywhere the Calvinists had seized the Churches, and the revenues of the parishes, and the missionaries would have been forced to abandon the vallies, had they not entertained hopes of assistance from the French. Thanks to a few of the great lords, some of the parishes agreed to make them a meagre allowance of money which came in all to but little over a hundred scudi [£25], and to furnish them with wood for the winter. These promises were but ill kept, and the Capuchins were compelled to live chiefly upon alms, whilst their cloths were furnished to them by the Pope. The wood, promised by the villages, was often withheld, and they could say mass only in their oratories. With comic pathos the priest at Schuls complains that his sexton had been turned out of the village because he rang the great church bell for him before Mass. Such was the outcome of the effort to reconvert the Grisons to the Catholic Faith. It might have been thought that with the expulsion of the Imperialists the Grisons troubles

would have ended. Richelieu, however, alarmed by the victories of the Swedes in Germany, was afraid to increase the strength of the Protestants by wresting the Valtelline from the Spaniards and by replacing it under the government of the Leagues. Hence arose a fresh series of intrigues. It was not until 1635, after France had declared war against Spain and Austria, that Rohan was authorised to undertake the reconquest of the valley, and by the month of October his task was accomplished. The French refused to restore their conquest to their allies. The Leaguers, under the leadership of Jenatsch, once the chief supporter of the Protestant cause in the Engadine, allied themselves with Spain and Austria. A conspiracy which ramified throughout the country was organised with the utmost secrecy: in March, 1637, the French garrisons were overwhelmed by a sudden rising, and Rohan was forced to surrender to a man in whom he had placed the utmost confidence. On the fifth of May the French evacuated the territory of the Leagues. Jenatsch was looked upon by all as the saviour of his country, but his head was turned by his success, he offended his warmest supporters by his dictatorial bearing, and on the twenty-fourth of January, 1639, he was murdered at Chur.

His murder was the last scene in the tragedy of the Grisons. On the third of September, 1639, the "Everlasting Peace" with Spain was at last concluded. By its provisions the Valtelline was given back to the Leaguers, the Crown of Spain was allowed the free use of the Grisons Passes for all time to come, and the Catholic Religion was to be the prevailing religion in the Valtelline. The Protestant Leaguers had in vain endeavoured to induce Spain to give up this condition. Thus, in appearance at least, Spain had secured the prize for which for almost a generation she had been striving, and for which she had incurred the deadly enmity of France. But her victory was to avail her little, for when her long struggle with Holland was ended by the Treaty of Münster, the passage through the Grisons ceased to be of the slightest importance to her interests.¹

The Infanta did not live to see the settlement of the Grisons troubles. Her health was shattered by the misfortunes of Spain, and despite her devout resignation, she was unable to bear the shocks of the ever recurring disasters which befell her country.

If the Dutch had been inactive on land during the summer

of 1630, their fleet had been the more active by sea. The Infanta's naval forces had fallen into decay since Spinola's departure, and the Hollanders were now the undisputed masters of their own waters. For a moment she feared that they would attempt to surprise Setubal and the great salterns which were the source of so much wealth to Portugal, but in place of remaining upon the coast of the Peninsula, they pushed on to South America, and by the capture of Pernambuco laid the foundation of what, but for the mismanagement of the West India Company, might have grown into a Dutch Empire in Brazil. In the two following years their armies once more resumed operations against the Obedient Netherlands, and the fall of Maestricht on August the thirteenth, 1632, at length brought to a head the disaffection which had been rampant amongst the Belgians since the loss of Bois-le-Duc. The States General of the Obedient Netherlands met at Brussels and made overtures to the United Provinces to restore that Union of the Seventeen Provinces, which, but for religious bigotry, might have been in existence since 1577. Commercial jealousy, however, did the work which fanaticism had wrought two generations before, and under pressure from Amsterdam, which saw the doom of its prosperity in the new birth of Antwerp, the Protestants of the North declined to unite with their Catholic brethren of the South. Thus the rule of Spain in Belgium was prolonged for nearly a century, and though Holland was destined to pay dearly for its short-sighted folly, Europe still mourns the day when an oligarchy of selfish traders refused to restore the barrier which would have guarded the mouths of the Scheldt, the Maas, and the Rhine against French ambition and German greed.

To the Infanta the events of 1632 came as her death-blow. The tranquillity of her mind was, it is true, never ruffled by any material loss. When her attendants, bathed in floods of tears, came to tell her that Maestricht had surrendered, she answered with the resignation of a Christian, "In everything we must give thanks to God." Three years before, when she had become convinced that the relief of Bois-le-Duc was impossible, she had only said, "God's will be done. If He will have it so what can we do save have patience, for all things are His?" At the age of sixty-three this woman, worn by the trials of a stormy reign of over thirty years, still showed that calm courage with which she had in early middle age received the tidings, false

though they had proved to be, that her husband Archduke Albert had fallen in the rout at Nieupoort. "In everything we must give thanks to God. His will be done," had been the guiding motto of her life. To her, life as life had come to an end at her husband's death. Henceforth she had lived for duty alone. Pleasure was banished, and it was only with the greatest reluctance that she even went to Mariemont which had formerly been her most favourite resort. She laid aside her music, in which she had found her greatest delight, for her chapel had long possessed the most famous choir in Europe. She stripped herself of all worldly pomp and secretly sold her jewels in order to relieve the necessities of convents, asylums, and poor churches. Three months after the Archduke's death she assumed the habit of a Tertiary of the Franciscan Order on the feast day of its founder, October the fourth, and on the same day, a year later, she made her vows and profession before her Confessor, Father Andrew de Soto, and thus became a sister of the Order under the name of Sister Isabel. Henceforth, so far as the duties of her station would allow her, she lived by the Franciscan Rule, and her cell at Tervueren, where she spent many nights in prayer, was furnished with the austere simplicity of a Saint Clare or a Saint Theresa. She never wearied of acts of devotion, of fasting, or of pious exercises. She heard two masses daily and three on the days when she communicated. In the great heat of June she followed the procession at Corpus Christi bareheaded through the streets of Brussels, and when one of her ladies offered to hold a parasol over her, she replied, in the words her father had once used at Cordova, "To-day the sun is never too hot." Yearly, upon the Feast of the Annunciation she gathered together some of the poorest women at Brussels and entertained them to dinner. Before they sat down to table she poured water over their hands, and when they took their leave kissed them with the greatest humility. Once, a Duke of Saxony, who was a Protestant, was present at the ceremony, and was so profoundly moved by it that, as he later on acknowledged, it was the cause of his conversion. In her last illness, worn out though she was by fever, she choose to receive the Viaticum kneeling up in bed. She expired in the Palace at Brussels, at the age of sixty-seven, a little before daybreak on Thursday, the first of December, 1633. No money was to be found in the Treasury for the ex-

penses of her funeral, and she was buried in the Franciscan habit and almost without ceremony in the Choir of St. Gudule, where a plain slab still marks her tomb.¹

Such was the death scene of the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia, whose rule over the Netherlands had extended over thirty-four years. Her own letters have shown us the woman as she was. She was above all things a stateswoman and a stateswoman who was above all things a peacemaker. Her boundless charity inspired alike her private and her public life. Although her life was for the most part spent in the cares and anxieties of war, she would, had she not been misled by French intrigue, have continued at peace with the United Netherlands, nor would she of her own free will have become entangled in the network of German quarrels which in reality so little concerned the interests of Spain. But once her country was at war she devoted all her energies to insure victory, and yet never for an instant forgot to grasp at every possibility of restoring peace. Had she been her own mistress the second war with the United Provinces would, doubtless, have been ended within a few months by the recognition of their independence. She was the servant of men who could not brace themselves to sacrifice the prestige of Spain. As the ruler of the Obedient Netherlands, she did what lay in her power to restore their ancient prosperity, and she cannot justly be blamed if in a great degree she relied upon the Church to aid her in a task which, in face of the commercial rivalry of the Dutch, she could scarcely hope to carry out. Possibly if she could have secured a breathing space by a truce, she would have repaired the loss of the Scheldt by establishing new centres for the seaborne trade of her dominions at Dunkirk or at Ostend. In religious matters she was tolerant. Though she stamped out sorcery with ruthless severity, no Protestants perished at the stake, and Arminian congregations worshipped undisturbed almost in the shadow of the former dungeons of the Holy Office. Her conduct was such as to win her the respect of even her bitterest opponents, and she enjoyed alike the friendship of Maurice of Nassau and the esteem of James the First, for her charity and her wisdom were known to all. Such was the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia, daughter of Philip surnamed the Prudent, and Governor of the Netherlands, a woman who had she chanced to find a historian worthy of her might have long since been ranked amongst the women famous for all time.

We may fitly close her story by borrowing the words of her panegyrist Courvoisier. "Farewell, kindly and incomparable Princess, Isabella Clara Eugenia, farewell thou queenly, saintly soul, who hast been the chosen instrument of so many blessings to these provinces, Rejoice thee in thy Crown of Immortality, and Glory through all the ages of eternity."¹

CHAPTER XCVIII

THE death of the Infanta Isabella and the settlement of the Grisons Troubles mark the moment when the decline and fall of Spain became inevitable. Had Philip IV., when he ascended the throne, succeeded in renewing the Truce with the United Provinces, he might have ensured the continuance of the prosperity of his Empire for many years. The Duke of Luynes, to whose intrigues the rupture between the Spaniards and the Dutch was due, may justly be styled the author of his ruin. It was owing to the failure to continue the Truce that Spain became entangled in the Thirty Years' War. Her sole interest in Germany was the maintenance of her communications by land with the Obedient Netherlands, whilst the sea route was closed by a hostile fleet. Had that route been open, it would have mattered to her but little who was the ruler of the Palatinate or even, perhaps, the controller of the Rhoetian Passes, although, owing to the geographical situation of the Milanese, she could not have remained an unconcerned onlooker whilst the ownership of Mantua and Monferrat was in dispute.

The points which prevented her from coming to an understanding with the United Provinces might have been settled, though with difficulty. One was a question of sentiment, the other of material interest. The Spaniards had long been aware that they could not hope to recover any effective control over the seven provinces which had formally renounced their allegiance by the Union of Utrecht, but they were convinced that their prestige might suffer if they abandoned their nominal sovereignty over them, and that this injury to their prestige might effect them injuriously in the eyes of rival powers. To the Dutch, on the other hand, it was vital that their rights as a sovereign and independent power should be acknowledged by both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, and from their own point of view it is possible that their relations with the Holy Roman Empire were even more important than were those with their immediate suzerain. As long as they continued members of the Empire,

of which their Suzerain the King of Spain was also a member, they were, under the Imperial Constitutions, not only liable to be put in the ban of the Empire as rebels against the Emperor, but, should the King of Spain exercise his rights and call upon the members of the neighbouring Circles to assist him in putting down their rebellion against himself as Count of Holland, they might be attacked at any moment on their most open frontier. This question, however, might have been speedily settled had Spain and the Empire consented to sacrifice some empty titles. The commercial questions at issue were more complicated because of more tangible importance. Had Portugal been a manufacturing country, it might have been possible for Spain to allow the Dutch to trade directly with the East Indies. But Portugal, which had no manufactures of her own, was bound to pay for the manufactured goods and cereals which she required with the produce and bullion which she brought from the East Indies and Brazil, and the Spaniards, therefore, were forced in the interests of the Portuguese to refuse concessions to the United Provinces, which they could have made without prejudice to themselves, especially as in 1621 the merchants of Amsterdam showed little interest in the trade with America, which the Spaniards looked upon as their peculiar province. The attitude of Spain, as distinct from Portugal, towards the East India trade, was tersely summed up by the Infanta Isabella when, in 1630, she was inquiring the meaning of the clause concerning the restoration of trade on its pre-war footing in the draft of the Treaty of Peace with England. "If," she wrote, "it is intended to prevent the English from trading directly with the East Indies as they have done for so many years, it will be a mere waste of time to raise any such pretension. They will never agree to it, and the Dutch are more afraid of the competition of the English than of anything else. If both these nations could be altogether shut out from trading with India it would be all very well, but if we could expel the English and yet be left with the Dutch, they would only get the whole of the trade into their hands. They have often been at blows with the English in the East, and will be again." If, in April, 1621, Philip IV. had been in a position to consider the question of the East India Trade in the light in which the Infanta viewed it nine years later, he might possibly have remained at peace with the Dutch for the remainder of his days. The renewal

of the war in the interests of the Portuguese was the price which Spain was called upon to pay for her sharp practice in annexing their country forty years before.

It may be said that the position of the Catholics in the United Provinces might have rendered an understanding difficult. This question, however, was in reality purely a political one. A century after the Reformation, Catholicism and Protestantism had amongst nearly all Continental peoples become merely party badges, at least so far as the governing classes were concerned who looked at Doctrinal questions solely in connection with their political effects. In 1623 Cottington, whilst at Madrid, was said to have been received into the Catholic Church when he thought himself dying, and even before he left Spain to have openly scoffed at his conversion. Yet, in 1630, he was looked upon by the Spaniards as their chief friend at the English Court. Philip IV. cared little what might be the exact shade of Count Henry de Berg's religious beliefs. The Calvinist preacher Vincent, who was regarded as the very heart and soul of the Huguenot party, proposed that Rochelle should place itself under the protection of Spain, and at Milan the Inquisitor General saw himself forced to remonstrate with the Governor because Rohan's agent Clausel was seen everywhere in public with the greatest nobles. Throughout Europe the Catholics represented the Conservative party, the Protestants those who wished to substitute an oligarchy, modelled more or less closely upon Venice, for the rule of a monarchy which really exercised its functions.

Maximilian of Bavaria was far more intolerant in religious matters than was Philip IV., or, perhaps, even Ferdinand II. Yet in defence of the "liberties" of Germany he was prepared to ally himself with Gustaf Adolf, although the "Liberties of Germany," in the sense which he attached to them, certainly did not concern his own subjects to whom he was a harsh and extortionate master, and affected only a handful of princes. He was willing to associate himself with the Protestant champion solely in order to secure his own personal ends, namely to enjoy a "liberty" which he shared with three hundred other members of the Empire, of which he was one of the Electors. On the other hand, the Protestant Corporation of Hanover, which was in permanent revolt against its nominal sovereign, the Duke of Lüneburg, was most anxious to see the power of the Emperor

strengthened and, therefore, refused to assist Christian IV., who had taken up arms to increase that of the sovereign princes of the Empire.¹ In February, 1628, Wallenstein flattered himself that he could soon bring about a settlement between Philip IV. and the Dutch, the terms being that they should be granted freedom of religion, and a kind of republican government on certain conditions. He might have succeeded if Philip IV. would have accepted the position of a Doge of Venice in the Netherlands Provinces, and if their connection with the Holy Roman Empire could have been severed. The question of permitting the public exercise of the Catholic Religion was, however, complicated by considerations of practical policy. In both England and the United Netherlands the political questions which divided the masses of the people, as distinguished from the governing classes, were mixed up with disputes as to Religion itself. Doctrinal Religion, even though it may have influenced their moral conduct but little, was a reality to the masses, and it largely determined the action which they took as to temporal affairs. Though the Infanta had protected the Arminian refugees in Antwerp, the Dutch counted upon the assistance of the secret Protestants in the city when they attempted to surprise it. Philip IV., when writing to offer a subsidy from his privy purse to support the missionary priests in the Northern Netherlands, said he thought that the Catholics would be able to render great service by giving information as to the enemy's designs, "leaving altogether out of account the possibility that they may gain me the goodwill of that people by smoothing over our differences and by reminding them that they are my vassals and that they owe a duty to me. Thus this measure may be in time of great advantage to my service." He did his utmost to keep the appointment of the Irish bishops in his own hands, until he had concluded peace with England, "for the advancement of God's service and our own." Under such conditions no English or Dutch government could well have consented to allow its Catholic subjects to show their strength by exercising their religion publicly. The Dutch, indeed, after the Fall of Bois-le-duc, seized the Churches, expelled the priests, installed their own preachers in them, and maltreated the Catholics, nor did the Protestant Leaguers deal less harshly with the converts in the Engadine. Philip IV., on the other hand, upon the whole faithfully carried out his engage-

ments to protect the Protestant religion in Frankenthal, although Maximilian of Bavaria did not hesitate to undertake to convert the population of the parts of the Palatinate which were occupied by his troops by force.¹

In the light of such facts as these, we may well ask whether there are any reasonable grounds for believing that, in the time of Philip IV., Spain entertained any designs for the establishment of a Universal Monarchy or for the extermination of the Protestant religion. This question lies at the root of the history of our period. It is almost certain that this belief was a delusion, but it was a delusion which has had results which, for good or evil, have influenced the destinies of many generations, and which have endured even to our own day. James I. may have been anxious to avail himself of his foreign policy as a means for keeping the balance even between the religious parties in England, and it was with this object that he consented to become the patron of the Protestant Union in Germany. But had not the belief been generally entertained that the House of Hapsburg was endeavouring to establish a Universal Monarchy, he as a peace-loving monarch, would never have acquiesced in the project for uniting the smaller powers of Europe into a league to oppose them, and but for the hope of his support, the local troubles in Bohemia would not, in all probability, have developed into the Thirty Years' War.

Two facts are sufficient to show that Spain had no wish to extend her rule over any part of Germany. Philip IV., as has been said, refused to accept Alsace, and never attempted to annex the districts which he occupied in the Palatinate.

It may be argued that the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs was more eager for territorial expansion. Ferdinand II. in 1627 certainly showed a wish to obtain the Crown of Denmark, but Denmark was an elective kingdom, and the House of Oldenburg reigned as elective kings. They were German princes, and as such members of the Holy Roman Empire, so if the Estates deposed Christian IV., there was no reason why they should not elect another German prince in his place, more especially as Wallenstein was willing to guarantee that their liberties and the free exercise of their religion would be maintained. The Emperor had not, however, acted upon Wallenstein's suggestion that, as the representative of the Teutonic Order, he should press his claims to Prussia which the King of Poland had granted to the

Elector of Brandenburg as a Polish fief. In every other instance, in which Ferdinand II. is accused of designs of conquest, he was simply asserting his traditional and recognised rights as Roman Emperor. Even the Italian Princes regarded these rights as being still in full force. The Duke of Savoy never forgot that he was Imperial Vicar in Italy, and was always, in his quality of a Prince of the Empire, appealing to his Overlord to protect him against the French or to aid him in recovering Geneva. Gustaf Adolf also was anxious to induce Wallenstein to lend him an Imperial regiment to assist him against Brandenburg in Prussia. Did he recognise the rights of the Emperor over the Duchy? We cannot, therefore, blame Ferdinand II. for wishing to increase the power of the Empire by weakening the local jurisdictions, and by introducing hereditary monarchy, at a time when France, his most dangerous neighbour, was taking measures to strengthen the central authority. Richelieu, and not without good reason, looked upon the French Huguenots who were endeavouring in the name of Religion to break up France into a chaos of jarring states as dangerous rebels. The Treaty of Alais enabled Richelieu to secure the results in France which Ferdinand II. wished to achieve in Germany at the time when, thanks to Wallenstein, he could ride over his own lands from Hungary to the Baltic. There is no evidence to show that he wished to effect any conquests beyond the recognised limits of the Empire, and not only was he not in league with the Pope and Spain to destroy the Protestant Religion, but, as we have seen, the Pope and the Jesuits were bitter enemies of the House of Hapsburg. The story that Spain, Austria, the Papacy, and the Society of Jesus were acting in an unholy alliance to establish a Universal Monarchy and annihilate heresy is a baseless fable. The Pope was a politician. He was an Italian Prince, and in his eyes his temporal interests bulked far more largely than those of Religion, as Religion was understood by cloistered fanatics. Fifty years before, during the Siege of Leyden, the Dutch had worn in their caps crescents bearing the inscription, "Rather Turks than Papists." In 1624 the Holy Father was in alliance with the Turks against His Catholic Majesty of Spain, and a few years later the Jesuits were urging the Emperor to enforce the restitution of ecclesiastical property in order to induce the German members of the Empire to rise against him. Urban VIII. was one of those who

joined in inviting Gustaf Adolf to invade Germany, and the Nuncio at Paris forwarded the Swedish letters of protection to his allies in the Empire.

The Thirty Years War was not a religious but a political contest, and was brought about by statesmen who were the victims of their own delusions.

When the results of the long years of bloodshed came to be reckoned up, France and Sweden proved to be the only gainers. The Empire was rendered helpless. The German princes preserved their "liberties." They were free to live in a desert by selling their subjects to fight under foreign flags. Spain lost the suzerainty over the United Provinces which she had striven so hard to preserve, and Portugal which had been the cause of the renewal of the Netherlands War. She sank into decrepitude; within two generations all her Burgundian heritage had passed from her to France and Austria, and the Imperial colours flew over Brussels. England, whose King had sought to avert war at home by plunging into intrigues abroad, saw, as the outcome of the conflict between the Crown and the Parliament, which had been the result of James I.'s diplomacy, his son beheaded, and his grandson an exile. She was forced to save her liberties by calling a Dutchman to her throne, and paid the price by those wars with France, which ended one hundred and twenty-six years later at Waterloo. The United Netherlands, though they were recognised as sovereign and independent, quickly became involved, as the Infanta had foreseen, in disputes about trade with France and England which reduced them to the level of a fourth-rate power. In Germany the overthrow of the hegemony of Austria laid the foundations of the greatness of Prussia, but two hundred and twenty-three years were to elapse ere the German Empire was reborn under a Prussian Emperor. Italy exchanged her slavery to Spain for slavery to Austria and France. To quote the words of a shrewd Englishman when describing the arrangements as to Mantua, Monferrat and the Grisons Passes which had been made by the Treaty of Ratisbon, "None of these lawes verily are of that nature that for the obtaining of them there was any need to 'distribute' the quiet of so many nations, to expend such vast treasures, and to shed the blood of so many thousands." So far as Germany herself was concerned, the same words might well have been used of the Treaty of Westphalia.¹

From another point of view, however, the Thirty Years War was not without some good results for mankind. As the historian von Müller told Frederick the Great when Clive was conquering Bengal for England, "But for the Thirty Years War Your Majesty's troops might have been winning victories on the Ganges." The effects of the contest prevented Germany from becoming a colonizing power, and left the task of opening up the lands beyond the seas to nations which looked upon man as a soul and not as a machine. The war of 1914 was fought to prevent the world from becoming a Prussian barracks.

It remains, therefore, to show, if only in a brief outline, how the consequences of the Thirty Years' War have continued to influence the development of civilisation even to the present day.

CHAPTER XCIX

IN the light of all that has taken place since 1914, it may be worth while to inquire what effect the events which we have described have had upon the history of our own day. It may be said, at the outset, that the union of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia may be traced to the Thirty Years War. A real German Empire could not come into existence until the Holy Roman Empire had passed away, for, as we have seen, that empire was based upon the common citizenship of all Christian people, and thus precluded not only the idea of nationality but that of any wholly independent Christian state. The Emperor had been appointed by God as his Vicegerent in temporal affairs, and therefore every baptized ruler was responsible to him, in the same manner as he was responsible to the Almighty.

Independent nations, as we understand the term, first arose after the interregnum in the Thirteenth Century, when the Imperial throne remained vacant for a generation, nor was it until two hundred years later, that powers like France and Spain were developed out of a chaos of petty states, which had existed since the Barbarian invasions.

Even after the Reformation, the Holy Roman Empire had retained its authority over the German and Italian speaking lands, which it protected against Turkish invasions, and, but for the jealousy of his rivals, Ferdinand II. might have brought most of Central Europe under his direct control. His plans were foiled, and in 1648 France and Sweden, posing as the protectors of the liberties of Germany, laid the Holy Roman Empire in the dust by the Treaty of Westphalia. Yet Napoleon I. had been crowned Emperor of the French ere the gibbering phantom disappeared into the tomb. The fall of the Holy Roman Empire opened the way for the Hohenzollerns.

Prior to 1618 the Electorate of Brandenburg scarcely ranked amongst the leading German powers. In that year the Electors acquired East Prussia as a Polish fief. The soil of both provinces was poor, Brandenburg was excluded from direct access to

the sea, and their populations, which were mostly of Slavonic or Lithuanian origin, were far less advanced in civilisation than the Germans. Prussia, indeed, had remained heathen until the Thirteenth Century. During the first period of the Thirty Years War the Electors endeavoured to remain neutral. Gustaf Adolf forced them to take up arms as his allies, but after the Swedish defeat at Nordlingen they made peace with the Emperor. Notwithstanding their submission, none of the belligerents respected their territories. When the war ended Berlin stood a ruin in a desert. Brandenburg was saved from destruction by her ruler and by her squires. In 1640 Frederick William succeeded to the Electorate. Before his death in 1688 he had justly earned the title of the Great Elector.

Frederick William was a strong man, and circumstances played into his hands. By his marriage with the daughter of Frederick Henry of Orange, he became connected with many Protestant reigning houses, and by the Treaty of Westphalia he acquired an accession of territory which included Magdeburg. Poor as his dominions were, their geographical situation enabled him to act with an independence rare amongst German princes. With the possible exception of Sweden, he had no aggressive neighbours. Distance and the Elbe protected him from France. He had little to fear from Poland, Saxony, or Austria. His subjects were docile; the landowners, amongst whom it was a tradition to serve either in the army or in the civil administration, were devoted to their Electors; the peasantry made good soldiers. Thus he had at his command a state as highly centralised as France, without the expense and the enervating atmosphere of a Versailles.

At the outset, Frederick William maintained his alliance with France, and saw without displeasure Mazarin's attempt to establish a Rhine League under French suzerainty. When, however, his dominions had in some degree recovered from their exhaustion, it became his object to obtain an access to the sea. Under ancient family compacts, Pomerania should have fallen to Brandenburg on the extinction of its ducal line in 1637. The Swedes, however, had been granted the Duchy in 1648, and in 1675 the Elector decided to expel them from it, despite the fact that they were in the French interest. The Swedes took the offensive, and invaded the Marquisate, but were put to the rout by the Elector at Fehrbellin. The halo which had clung

round their arms since the days of Gustaf Adolf was at once dispelled. They had been defeated by a German prince and by German soldiers. The victory of Fehrbellin made Brandenburg the first power in Northern Germany. Henceforth its Elector could treat with the Empire on equal terms. He cared little for either the Empire or for the Emperor. Though a Protestant, he approved of the French seizure of Strasburg, and, alone amongst the German princes, refused to send help to relieve Vienna when the Turks were at its gates, because Leopold I. would not hand back to him the Silesian territories which sixty years before had been forfeited for treason by his kinsman of Jägerndorf. He strove without success to found a Prussian navy and to establish Prussian colonies on the Gold Coast of Africa. He did better work when he gave homes to the Huguenots who had fled from France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Had he not lent his general Schomberg to William III. the English Revolution of 1688 might well have failed.

The Great Elector's successors followed in his footsteps. Frederick I., by diplomacy and ducats, acquired the crown of Prussia. Frederick William I. conquered Pomerania, organized a powerful army, and, at his death, left an overflowing treasury. Frederick the Great made Prussia the terror of Europe. It is from his day that the enmity between Prussia and England dates. The English had saved him from ruin in the Seven Years War, but he could not forgive them for making a separate peace with France and Spain. Lord Bute's conduct has never been forgotten by the Berlin Foreign Office, and Bismarck often quoted it to show how impossible it was to place any reliance upon English statesmen. His successor Frederick William II. was to undo his uncle's work. Had he kept his engagements to his allies, the French Revolution might have been stifled in its cradle. He preferred to make conquests in Poland but Prussia gained little by his lukewarmness on the Rhine. A few years later his son saw his army and his kingdom swept away like dust at Jena. Yet United Germany was born in the dark hours which followed Frederick William the Third's defeat, and Napoleon, who, half contemptuously, had spared Prussia at Tilsit, was to live to regret his misplaced generosity at Saint Helena.

In August, 1806, Francis II. laid aside the crown of the Holy Roman Empire, to take the title of Emperor of Austria, Germany, freed from the traditions of the past, saw herself dis-

solved in law, as she had long been in fact, into a chaos which Napoleon was endeavouring to mould into a dependency of France. But for a new force, called into being by the French Revolution, she might have perished as a nation. She was saved by Nationality, that sentiment which makes men living in the same country and speaking the same tongue feel themselves of one kin.

France, before 1789, had been a nation only in name. Her government had been centralised, her aristocracy had become the household servants of their king, but her peasants and her artisans, perhaps even her middle classes, still called themselves Gascons, Bretons, or Provençals, as their forefathers had done when a King of France was but the King of Paris and of Laon. When the Convention abolished Royalty and trampled on the Church, it seemed, for a while, as if France would crumble into dust. "The Republic One and Indivisible," in whose name the Committee of Public Safety crushed insurrections with the guillotine, was no empty catchword. France was saved by the assertion of her Oneness, in other words of her Nationhood. In a few years the French were to teach the same lesson to many another people.¹

Hitherto Germany and German had been geographical expressions. An inhabitant of Germany might think of himself as a Bavarian or as a subject of the Prince of Salm Salm. To him the jumble of independent states of which Bavaria and Salm were alike members was the Empire, and in that Empire, the Tuscan, the Milanese, even the Roman were his fellow citizens. The greatest of German writers and thinkers were cosmopolitans. Schiller might declaim about Liberty: he was thinking of the liberty of Man. Goethe wore the Legion of Honour.²

Napoleon was the first who made all Germans look upon themselves as one people. The Imperial Diet, nominally to compensate the possessors of territories on the left bank of the Rhine, which had been annexed by the French, mediatized many of the smaller and ecclesiastical states, and Napoleon consolidated the larger territories which had thus been formed, into the Confederation of the Rhine. Germany grew familiar with the disappearance of her ancient masters.

Common suffering under the French occupation also brought the Germans together. They learned to feel themselves of one blood, and when the fiery furnace was heated to its hottest, the rising of Spain against Napoleon's hordes showed the world the

strength of a united people. The Germans are a nation of students and the lesson quickly bore fruit at their universities. Prussia, in a lesser degree Austria, had already, under the stress of necessity, sought salvation by internal reforms. Frederick William III. called Stein and Hardenberg to his councils, and, under their guidance, remodelled the army, abolished serfdom, and founded a university at Berlin, where the most distinguished professors taught history, philosophy, and law.

It was easy for a student of the past to convince himself that Germany had been strongest when she was most united, and the educated classes thus came to realise that in the reunion of Germany lay their only hope of breaking the yoke of France from off their necks.

These classes had long been anxious to see the tyranny of the petty princes replaced by some form of Constitutional Government.¹ This fact marks the essential difference between the Spanish and German risings against Napoleon and their results. The Spanish War of Liberation was proclaimed by an insignificant Castilian village and priests and peasants carried the fiery cross of insurrection through the Peninsula. Eventually the direction of the movement came into the hands of the educated middle classes, but when, in 1815, Ferdinand VII. was restored, he swept away the Cortes of Cadiz and its constitution, and Spain only became a constitutional country after sixty years of civil strife. The German war for Freedom was proclaimed by a Professor in a Breslau classroom. A Prussian King and Prussian nobles placed themselves at its head. Yet though the princes broke their pledge and denied their people liberty for a generation, in the end the union of Germany was brought about by a Hohenzollern and his minister, at the cost of but little German blood shed by German hands.

These facts go far to explain the subsequent history of Germany, and may throw some light upon its development in the future. The Spaniards are a clan of individualists who can be dominated only through their fanaticism. The Germans, on the other hand, are a docile flock who will follow blindly anyone whom they are trained to look upon as their leader, and whose leaders come to the front by right of birth rather than in virtue of their own personality. German history can show no Dantons or Gambettas. The War of Liberation might have failed had not the King of Prussia placed himself at its head. Austria hated

democracy even more than she detested Napoleon, and long hesitated to range herself against the French. The smaller princes, in their fear of Austria and Prussia, would not desert their allies until their existence as independent sovereigns was assured. The Treaty of Ried, by which Bavaria came over to Austria and Prussia, precluded the establishment of a German Empire. Under this agreement, the German States could only be united as a Confederation, in which the development of a strong, centralised and constitutional government was almost unthinkable. The effects of the Treaty were felt even after 1870, and did not pass away until the Entente had signed the Treaty of Versailles with the German Republic, and not with its constituent states. It is still doubtful, indeed, what form Germany will finally take.¹

The leadership of Prussia in Germany dates from the War of Liberation. Prussia had been welded into a mass of steel by the French occupation, and at the Congress of Vienna stood forth as the foremost German power. Whilst Austria obtained her reward mainly in Italy and on the Adriatic, Prussia found her compensation chiefly in Germany itself. She stripped Saxony of her wealthiest province; the acquisition of Westphalia and of the bulk of the Rhineland constituted her the Warden of the Rhine. In the Diet of the Confederation though Austria was President Prussia was all but her equal.

Yet though all hope of its realisation seemed gone, the dream of a United Germany lived on in the Universities. German History was eagerly studied, and the results did not enhance the reputation of the Hapsburgs. They had been the rulers of the Empire in its decay. The Charlemagnes, the Ottos, and the Fredericks were not of Hapsburg blood. Of all the Hapsburg line Maximilian I. alone was still remembered by his people. Charles V. had despised even the German tongue. On the other hand, those who had avenged the wrongs strangers had wrought to Germany, the victor of Fehrbellin, the victor of Rossbach, the general who struck down Napoleon, had all been Prussians, and it might well be that, if united under a Hohenzollern, Germany would renew her youth. Such were the teachings which, for a generation, were imbibed by the youths who flocked to the Prussian Universities at a time when Berlin, Bonn, and Halle to a great extent moulded European thought. The first writers and thinkers of England, though not as yet her statesmen, came under

the German spell, and the future Emperor Napoleon III. never forgot the theories as to Nationality which he had learnt in his Augsburg school. Metternich was no friend to the intellectualists, and thus Austria exercised no influence over the classes into whose hands political power was gradually passing. As the memories of the wars of the Revolution faded away, a desire for changes to improve the conditions of human life once more awoke. Greece and Belgium became nations, the French expelled the dynasty set over them at Vienna, England reformed her institutions. The death of William IV. in 1837 separated the crowns of England and Hanover, and Prussia saw herself without a rival in North Germany. His niece, Princess Victoria, who succeeded him on the English throne came under the control of a husband, in whose political creed the necessity for a strong Prussia was the first article. Prince Albert was to be one of the chief agents in bringing about the union of Germany under an Emperor from Berlin.

Queen Victoria's husband was the second son of Ernest, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, an appanage formed out of the Thuringian lands of the elder Saxon line, the brother of her mother the Duchess of Kent, and of King Leopold I. of Belgium, who, but for the death of his wife Princess Charlotte of Wales, might himself have been Prince Consort of England and whose abilities ranked him amongst the foremost statesmen of Europe. Few of the Saxon Courts had any military traditions, but, like the Hapsburgs four centuries before, the Coburgs were everywhere winning themselves thrones with the wedding ring. Their financial abilities were worthy of their nickname of the "Coburg Jews." Prince Albert had studied at Bonn, where he had acquired a profound respect for Prussia, had travelled in Italy, and had learnt statecraft at Brussels under his uncle's eye. King Leopold during his residence in England had been upon intimate terms with the leading Whigs especially with Lord Melbourne who was Prime Minister and who held the young Queen in the hollow of his hand. It was Melbourne's great wish to see the King of Hanover excluded from the succession, and he therefore readily acquiesced in the King of the Belgians' proposal for the marriage of Prince Albert with his cousin. The wooer, who, even before her accession to the throne, had won Princess Victoria's affection, was young and handsome, and, but for his acquirements in modern languages and his knowledge of the condition of Europe, might well have been taken for a

talented student of Christchurch, who was about to enter Parliament for some pocket borough. William IV., who hated the Duchess of Kent, had wished his niece to marry Prince Alexander of Orange. Her mother carried the day, but though for Queen Victoria the marriage was a happy one, it would have been well for the world if Prince Albert had never become Prince Consort of England. King Leopold sent over Baron Stockmar, a physician from Coburg, who had long been his confidant, to act as his nephew's mentor, and under Stockmar's guidance, the Prince, who in time got the management of English Foreign Affairs to a great degree into his hands, trained his wife to find her chief interests in the doings of German Courts. George III. had gloried in the name of Briton! His grand-daughter, though she would have denied it, was in mind a German.

The Revolution of 1848, that first step on the road to the World War, might never have occurred, had not Prince Albert favoured, though, perhaps, half-heartedly, his brother's attempt to secure the hand of Queen Isabella II. of Spain for Prince Leopold of Coburg, and thus brought about the dispute between England and France as to the Spanish Question, which, in a great degree, was the cause of Louis Philippe's expulsion from the French throne. The marriage of the Princess Royal with the Crown Prince of Prussia was his work. Finally, it was out of reverence for her husband's memory that Queen Victoria worked to prevent Lord Palmerston from fulfilling the obligations which England had incurred to Denmark as to Schleswig-Holstein, and Lord Palmerston, possibly against his better judgment, bowed to her will and to the short-sightedness of some of his colleagues. To save George III. from madness, Pitt betrayed the Irish Catholics, but, in 1801, a French Army of England was at Boulogne, and a Regency might have meant disaster. No such danger existed in 1864, and fifty years later England had to pay for Palmerston's compliance when the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium was torn up like a scrap of paper. Yet, had he lived, the Prince Consort might have found himself opposed to Bismarck, and Edward the Seventh's love for France may have been a reaction from his father's too reiterated teachings.

Even before the Revolution of 1848, Prussia had won the hearts of all who longed to see the new birth of Germany. When, in 1840, Louis Philippe tried to regain the prestige which he had lost by his failures in the Near East by recovering the Rhine

frontier, Prussia sprang to the defence of the threatened German lands, and was hailed by all Germans as the Warden of the Rhine. Seven years later, Frederick William IV., though with some misgivings, bestowed a shadow of Parliamentary Government upon his dominions, whilst, in Austria, Metternich, still banished the word "Constitution" from his dictionary. By this step the King of Prussia ranked himself with the German Liberals.

In February, 1848, the news that the Republic had been proclaimed at Paris stirred Germany to its depths. In March, Revolution flared up throughout the German and Austrian lands. Everywhere the sovereigns yielded to their people's demands. After desperate street fighting at Berlin the King summoned a Prussian Parliament. His brother Prince William, the heir to the throne, sought refuge in England. The Austrian Emperor, Ferdinand I., dismissed Metternich, promulgated a constitution, and in a few weeks, saw his Italian and Hungarian provinces, even Vienna itself, aflame with rebellion. For many months, as Grillparzer sang, Austria was but Radetzky's camp. Her hour was not yet come. Her Slavs and Rumanians rose to aid their Emperor against their German and Magyar oppressors; internal discords paralysed the Italian arms; Russian troops put down the Hungarian insurgents; by the end of 1849, Austria was again an absolute monarchy. A year earlier the Emperor had abdicated in favour of his nephew Francis Joseph.

Whilst old institutions were everywhere crashing down, it became plain that the cry for United Germany could no longer be withstood. The Diet was abolished, and a German Parliament was convened, elected by universal suffrage, to draw up a constitution. It included representatives from Austria, Prussia, and all the members of the Confederation. Even before it could assemble a reaction had begun. Risings of the extreme parties were suppressed in Saxony and Baden, and Prince William returned from London to take his seat in the Prussian Parliament.

The German people had, hitherto, had but little training for political life. Representative institutions had existed in most of the minor states since 1815, but they had produced few, if any, statesmen fitted to lead a great national assembly in the work of organising a new state. The foremost champions of Liberalism were, for the most part, professors, who knew the world only through books and were ill-equipped to withstand half educated

demagogues who failed to realise the distinction between theory and fact.

Dreamers and idealists crowded the benches of St. Paul's Church at Frankfort where the first German Parliament met on the eighteenth of May, 1848. The endless chatter of professors and journalists was destined to kill all hopes of a United Germany. Prussia, however, had sent to Frankfort some men of a widely different stamp. Brandenburg and Pomerania were represented by country squires and retired generals whose forefathers had raised their country from the dust under the Great Elector, and from generation to generation had died for their Kings on every battlefield from Möllwitz to Waterloo.

Amongst them sat a man, thirty-three years of age, who had already won his spurs as a champion of Conservatism and who, in after days, was to be the founder of the new Empire. Otto von Bismarck was the head of an ancient house in the Marquisate whose sons had for centuries been faithful servants of their rulers in their armies and in their civil administration. He was a doctor of the University of Göttingen, where, though famous as a beer drinker and duellist, his most intimate friend was John Lowthrop Motley, the historian of the Netherlands. After travelling in France and England, he had settled down as a well-to-do squire in Pomerania. An active magistrate, a practical farmer, the idol of his countryside, Bismarck was a loyalist to the core, though, proud of his lineage, he did not scruple to say that his family were as good as the Hohenzollerns.

In 1847 he had been elected to the Diet of Pomerania, and, after defending the Crown during the first difficult days of the Prussian Parliament, he took his seat at Frankfort with the other Prussian Conservatives. The first ardour of the Radicals had already cooled, and the Monarchist candidate Archduke John of Austria was chosen President of the Chamber and Administrator of the Empire. It was agreed that Germany should be united under a constitutional Emperor and a Committee was appointed to draw up the Constitution. Had its members been practical men, the German Empire might have dated from 1848. But whilst professors and journalists were wrangling about the "Politics" of Aristotle and the Laws of the Salian Franks, the extreme parties were everywhere preparing the way for a reaction against Liberalism itself. Austria, as has been said, was saved as by a miracle from destruction; the overthrow of the Communists at Paris led to

the election of Louis Napoleon, the nephew and heir of the great Emperor, as President of the French Republic ; in England the Chartists were laughed out of existence.

The touchstone of the German Revolution was to be Schleswig-Holstein. Both the duchies, which were inhabited by a mixed German and Danish population, had since 1461 been united with Denmark in the person of their sovereign, whilst retaining their own institutions. Holstein, indeed, was a member of the German Confederation. In March 1848 the mob of Copenhagen forced Frederick VII., who had just succeeded to the throne, to grant a Constitution under which both duchies became part of the Danish kingdom. Their populations received the tidings with indignation, and, at the instigation of the Duke of Augustenburg, who claimed to be their lawful sovereign, proclaimed their independence. Holstein appealed to the Diet for protection.

Popular excitement rose to fever heat in Germany at the sight of two German lands struggling to throw off a foreign yoke. The Parliament at Frankfort proclaimed Federal execution against Denmark and called on the Confederation to carry out its decree. Denmark replied by blockading the German rivers and asked Sweden and Russia for assistance. The attitude of Germany was not entirely disinterested. Kiel is one of the best harbours in Europe, and it was foreseen that were Kiel annexed to the German Empire, it might eventually become a naval power. A subscription was opened to build a German fleet, and London newspapers jeered at the collections in the taprooms. Alone amongst English statesmen Disraeli realised that Germany might one day aspire to be mistress of the seas. Under pressure from the Great Powers Denmark concluded an armistice in August 1848, but, after long negotiations, it was found impossible to come to an understanding as to the future of the Duchies. In the spring of 1849 hostilities again broke out, and, in the end, Denmark put down the rebellion. Anxious though the German Parliament was to support the insurgents, Prussia and Austria refused to do so, and recalled their representatives from Frankfort. Before, however, it sank into a discredited faction, the Parliament had enacted a Constitution, and had offered the Imperial Crown to Frederick William IV. of Prussia as hereditary Emperor. The King, who had been profoundly moved by the excesses of the extremists, refused to accept it at the hands of a Democracy. His refusal sealed the fate of United Germany. Prussian troops

put down a few Republican risings, and the Parliament, which finally moved to Stuttgart, was broken up by the Würtemberg police.

In an interview at Olmütz Frederick William IV. submitted to the conditions dictated to him by the Austrian Emperor. On the first of May, 1851, the Diet once more met in the Austrian Legation at Frankfort. Outwardly nothing seemed changed, but the Prussian envoy was now Bismarck, who, pierced to the soul by his sovereign's humiliation, had sworn to break the yoke of Austria from off the German neck.

The course of events favoured Bismarck's purpose. Austria, the champion of reaction and the oppressor of Italy and Hungary, alienated every Liberal in Europe, whilst by her vacillation during the Crimean War she lost the friendship of Russia, without gaining that of Napoleon III., now Emperor of the French. Prussia, on the other hand, although devoted to Russia, contrived to remain on good terms with the Western Powers, and took part in the Congress of Paris, which put an end to the contest.

Two years later, Napoleon III., to appease the Italian revolutionists, consented to ally himself with Sardinia for the purpose of expelling Austria from her Italian dominions, and of freeing Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic. War was declared in April 1859, and by the middle of June the allies had driven Austria from Milan. All Germany was in a frenzy. Prussia massed an army on the Rhine, and Napoleon was forced, without consulting his allies, to conclude an armistice which left Venetia in Austrian hands. He dared not explain the motives of his action. Every Italian looked upon him as a traitor, and it was impossible for him to carry out his scheme for forming a weak Italian confederation under the ægis of France. Italy, by her own efforts, united as a Kingdom under Victor Emmanuel II. of Sardinia, but her capital was Turin not Rome. Out of fear of the French Catholics Napoleon III. refused to allow the Pope to be deprived of the Eternal City. France forfeited the friendship of Italy, and Prussia, in the eyes of every German, stood forth as their champion against the French. The marriage of the Princess Royal of England with the heir to the Prussian throne had already united the Courts of Potsdam and St. James'.

Frederick William IV. had long been insane. On his death in the autumn of 1861, his brother William, who already governed Prussia as Prince Regent, succeeded to the throne.

An honest, narrow-minded soldier, William I. was, before all things, a bigoted Conservative. He was crowned at Königsberg with mediæval pomp, and notified the world, when announcing his succession to his people, that he reigned by the Grace of God. He may have forgotten that his ancestors purchased their Elector's hat and their royal crown. Like all true Prussians he hated England and desired to maintain a close friendship with Russia.

A few weeks after the Coronation at Königsberg the Prince Consort was borne to his grave at Frogmore, leaving a broken-hearted, helpless widow, and an heir who was, as yet, an immature and timid lad. Queen Victoria had always leaned upon others, and, in her widowhood, she found guidance in her memories of her husband's teachings. Conscientious as Prince Albert was, he looked at the world through German eyes. To him, as has been said, a strong Prussia was a necessity. Perhaps he never considered whether a strong Prussia was to the advantage of England.

Young as he was, the Prince of Wales was already affianced to Princess Alexandra the eldest daughter of Prince Christian of Glücksburg and of his wife Louise of Hesse Cassel, the niece and heiress of Frederick VII., the reigning King of Denmark. In 1852, after the suppression of the insurrection in Schleswig-Holstein, the Five great Powers had entered in an agreement, known as the Protocol of London, with Denmark, by which it was arranged that, on the death of Frederick VII., Prince Christian should succeed to Denmark and the Duchies in right of his wife. The Protocol had been drawn up by Palmerston, but, owing to a change of Ministry, was signed by his Conservative successors, to whom Queen Victoria openly expressed her dislike of it. It was also signed by Austria and Prussia, as Great Powers, but not as members of the German Confederation. It was not submitted to the Diet, although Holstein was one of the Federal States, nor was it sanctioned by the Estates of the two Duchies, and the Duke of Augustenburg, publicly protested against it. Under the ancient Imperial Constitution the Protocol would, therefore, have probably been invalid, especially as it was said to be a breach of the terms of the Union between the Duchies and Denmark. It was open to Austria and Prussia to repudiate as members of the Germanic Confederation the document which they had signed as sovereign powers.

The Schleswig-Holstein question was re-opened by the death of Frederick VII. in November 1863, and Prussia was fully prepared to avail herself of the opportunity not only for annexing Kiel but for ousting Austria from the leadership of the Confederation.

Soon after his accession William I. had become involved in a quarrel with his Parliament which refused to vote the sums required to rearm the army, and, for a time, it seemed as if he might lose his crown. In his despair the King called Bismarck to his councils and, in October 1862, appointed him Minister-President. Within a short time he had reduced the Chambers to submission and had become the master of both Prussia and her ruler.

After leaving Frankfort, Bismarck had held the Embassies of St. Petersburg and Paris. In Russia, he had learnt to know the Court and People from the Winter Palace to the peasant's hut, and to understand both the corruption which hampered the progress of the nation and the temperament of a race which can be stirred through its sympathies from docile apathy into the wildest frenzy. Realising, as he did, the power of the sleeping giant, it was his maxim that, at whatever cost, Germany must retain the friendship of Russia. At Paris he had become intimate with Napoleon III., who, in conversations at Biarritz, had confided to him his schemes for remodelling Europe. Bismarck's residence in France had not increased his respect either for the French or for their government.

William I. had no desire for the Imperial Crown, but from the moment when he took office, Bismarck set himself to the task of restoring the German Empire under the leadership of Prussia. To secure this end, Austria must be expelled from Germany, and France be kept from interfering with his plans. Russia could always be conciliated by abrogating the clause in the Treaty of Paris, which forbade her to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea.

As a first step, the Chancellor refused to allow his master to take part in a meeting of princes, which the Emperor of Austria convened at Frankfort in August 1863, to consider proposals for the reform of the Confederation. The absence of Prussia rendered the meeting a failure, but Bismarck had shown the world his attitude to Austria.

A few months later he resolved to take advantage of the situation in Schleswig-Holstein. Immediately after his accession

Christian IX. promulgated a constitution, which, as in 1848, united the Duchies with the Danish Kingdom. The Duke of Augustenburg at once put forward his claim to be their lawful Duke, and placed himself under the protection of the Diet, which called upon the Danish Government to withdraw the new Constitution. On their refusal Prussia and Austria, as mandatories of the Confederation, entered the Duchies in Augustenburg's name. The Danes, in their turn, appealed to the signatories of the Protocol of London. Napoleon III., who, it is said, had been the first to suggest to Prussia that she should occupy Schleswig as a compensation for the cession of the Rhine frontier to France, asked England and Russia to meet in a Congress to settle the dispute. English opinion was divided. Palmerston was in power, but though, as a rule, the upper classes were in favour of Denmark, many of his middle class supporters and a handful of the Whig aristocracy were against intervention. Queen Victoria, as we have seen, threw her whole weight into the scale in favour of Prussia, and her Prime Minister yielded to her wishes.¹ Denmark, despite a heroic resistance, was driven to sign a treaty by which she gave up Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg to her opponents, although a promise, never carried out until 1919, was made that the fate of Northern Schleswig should be determined by a popular vote. Thus, to all appearance, it only remained for the victors to hand over their conquests to Augustenburg and to admit the new state into the German Confederation. Bismarck, however, had other views. Augustenburg's title was by no means clear, for, as was said at the time, the Schleswig-Holstein question was so complicated that only one diplomatist understood it, and he had forgotten the solution. He determined, therefore, that the Confederation should confide the provinces on deposit to Austria and Prussia, until their rightful ownership could be decided by law. The Chancellor was acting strictly in accordance with the Imperial Constitutions, which, in so far as they had not been abrogated, remained the Public Law of Germany. The question was, indeed, almost identical with that which had led to the War of the Mantuan Succession two centuries before, and Bismarck proposed to handle it on analogous lines.

Augustenburg himself gained nothing by the war. He did not realise his position and, when asked by Bismarck to cede Kiel to Prussia, absolutely refused to do so. A few weeks later the Prussian Crown lawyers reported that he had no valid title to the

succession, a decision which was possibly correct, as the documents on which the case against Denmark was based were, by no means, beyond suspicion. It has, indeed, never been very clear how they came to light at the Castle of Plauen in 1829.¹ On this Bismarck proposed to annex the disputed territories to Prussia by right of conquest. William I., however, felt scruples as to breaking his pledges to Austria, and arranged in an interview with Francis Joseph at Gastein in August 1865, that the Diet should decide as to the ultimate disposal of both provinces, and that in the meantime, Prussia should garrison Schleswig, and Austria Holstein, but that neither power should seek to influence the opinion of their inhabitants. The Convention of Gastein left many loopholes for disagreements.

During the winter of 1865 it became plain to Bismarck and his colleagues that the moment for breaking with Austria was drawing near. At home the situation was good. The King had been reconciled with his Parliament; the army, flushed with victory, was eager for new triumphs. Abroad, the Civil War in America was at an end, and France, which was struggling to establish a Mexican Empire, saw herself threatened by the United States armed to defend the Monroe Doctrine. Austria was a prey to violent dissensions, for both Hungary and Venetia had refused to accept the Common Parliament which had been established by the Constitution of 1861, and were clamouring for independence. Italy which, under her agreement of September 1864 with France, had been forced to establish her capital at Florence, was seething with discontent against the power whose troops closed to her the gates of Rome.

In the early spring of 1866, the Austrian governor of Holstein convoked the Estates of the Duchy. Prussia immediately represented his action as a breach of the Convention of Gastein, and threatened to send troops to disperse them. A month later she concluded a treaty with Italy by which the two powers agreed to declare war against Austria within three months in order to conquer Venetia for the Italians. The Austrians had already brought the question of the Duchies before the Diet, which on the fourteenth of June decided that Prussia should retire from them at once, and pronounced federal execution against her in the event of her refusal to do so. Nearly all the larger states voted in the majority, and Prussia found supporters only in North Germany. In the Seven Weeks War which followed, Austria though victorious in Italy, was routed in Bohemia, her allies in

Germany were defeated, and the Prussians advanced within sight of Vienna. By the Treaty of Prague, Austria agreed to withdraw from the German Confederation, and recognised the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein by Prussia, which consolidated her territory by the acquisition of Hanover and other states lying between the Elbe and the Rhine. Venetia was given to Italy, but the frontier was so drawn as to leave it open to the Austrians to invade the plain of the Po at any moment. Bismarck, indeed, was, above all things anxious to make Austria the henchman of Germany, and, therefore, much against the wishes of William I., allowed her to retain Bohemia, and prevented the Italians from occupying the Trentino. He forgot, perhaps, that his trickery would not escape the notice of his allies, who were not unacquainted with the history of their country. Prussia became the head of a North German Confederation, in which though the smaller states nominally retained their independence, they were in reality reduced to the level of Swiss Cantons. The South German States remained outside it, but, in the following spring concluded treaties with Prussia by which, in case of war, their armies passed under the command of the Prussian King. Thus Germany became reunited in all but in name.

Bismarck had good reasons for postponing the formal re-establishment of the German Empire. He wished to give time for the memories of the late conflict to die away, and hesitated to risk a war with France until Germany had become one in heart.

At the outset of his reign Napoleon III. would gladly have seen Prussia strengthened, and had, indeed, said so in 1854 to Prince Antony of Hohenzollern. But, since 1854, a United Italy, which felt no love for France, had come into being upon his frontier, his attempts to free Poland and to found a Latin Empire in America had failed, and his dynasty was losing its prestige amongst his subjects. He dared not, except at a price, reverse the secular policy of France by consenting to the reunion of Germany, and the only acceptable compensation would be the Rhine frontier. Bismarck had learnt Napoleon's views at Biarritz, and was determined that, under no circumstances, would he give him the Rhineland. He knew that when the Rhenish Provinces had formed part of France during the wars of the Revolution, they had become completely Gallicized, and, if they once more passed under her flag, a German-speaking France would be brought within striking distance of the Westphalian Black Country. To

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gain time, he dangled hopes of compensation before Napoleon's eyes, and though he frustrated his attempt to purchase Luxemburg from Holland, he tricked Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, into drafting a treaty for the annexation of Belgium with his own hand, which he took care to possess himself of. The Emperor's views were no secret, and every German was convinced that the German Empire could only be re-established after a victory over France.

The Revolution of 1868, which expelled the Bourbon dynasty from Spain, furnished the pretext for the inevitable war. History showed that France could never suffer Spain and Germany to be under one control. When the French, after driving the English from their soil, saw themselves free to play a part in Europe, they turned to Italy, but when the heir of the Hapsburgs married the heiress of Castile they learnt that their interests lay in Germany. France could not see without concern a Hohenzollern at Madrid.

Soon after the Revolution Bismarck induced some Spanish Monarchists to propose Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen as a candidate for the vacant throne. Through his mother he was a kinsman of Napoleon III., and his father was the head of the Catholic branch of the Hohenzollerns, from which the Prussian branch had separated in the fourteenth century. A little later, the suggestion was brought unofficially before the Paris Foreign Office, which seems to have raised no objection to the scheme. It is possible, indeed, that at the moment, the French Cabinet regarded Prince Leopold's candidature with indifference. Spain had changed since the days of Charles V.

But Napoleon III. knew that he was a dying man. His one thought was to secure his son's accession. To conciliate public sentiment he restored constitutional government early in 1870 and decreed that a popular vote should be taken in May to sanction the new constitution and to reaffirm the hereditary rights of his dynasty. His proposals were approved of by a large majority. The minority included not only many skilled artisans but also a large number of soldiers with the colours. The Emperor realised that the army was disaffected, and believed that Victory alone could regain him its affections. He was, therefore, averse to any concessions on questions of Foreign Policy which could be represented as insults to France.

Early in July 1870, it became known that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern's candidature would be proposed to the Cortes. The opposition in the French Chambers saw an opportunity for

embarrassing the Government, and a question on the subject was addressed to M. de Grammont, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was obliged to take action and obtained assurances both from the Prince's father and from the Prussian Government that the candidature would be withdrawn. Feeling, however, was running high in Paris, and M. de Grammont sought to appease the excitement by instructing Benedetti to ask the King of Prussia personally to give him his word that it would never again be renewed. The King refused him an audience, and Bismarck altered the telegram reporting the incident in such a manner as to make the French public believe that the Ambassador had been insulted. War thus became inevitable. Within a few months Napoleon was an exile and Paris in the hands of the Germans. The publication of Benedetti's draft treaty as to Belgium had prevented England from intervening, and Russia was won over by receiving permission to keep up a fleet in the Black Sea.

On May the tenth, 1871, peace was signed between France and Germany at Frankfort. Under that treaty Alsace and a large portion of Lorraine, much of which was inhabited by a French speaking population, were handed over to Germany, and France consented to pay an indemnity of five milliards of francs [£200,000,000], and to grant preferential rights to German trade for a long term of years. Bismarck had thought of accepting the French fleet with Algeria and some other colonies in place of Alsace-Lorraine. The soldiers proved too strong for him. As the King of Prussia wrote to the Empress Eugénie, he annexed the two provinces solely on military grounds. It was true that with Metz and Strasburg in German hands, it would be impossible for France in the future to overrun South Germany, but the coal and iron of Lorraine might well make Germany the greatest industrial power in the world. In the eyes of the public the two provinces were two German lands which had been redeemed from slavery. To Bismarck it mattered little that they were French to the core, and that hundreds of thousands of their inhabitants forsook their homes to remain under the French flag.

It might have been happier for the world and for Germany if Bismarck had held to his original plan, but, in 1871, few Continental statesmen attached much value to Colonial possessions, nor could Germany have afforded to keep up both a strong navy and an overwhelming army.

France made separate treaties with Bavaria and the other South

German states which had declared war against her, although they had since become members of the German Empire.

Even before the surrender of Paris the new German Empire had come into being. Despite the opposition of William I. and his son, Bismarck succeeded in inducing the South German powers to become members of a Confederation of States, in which all the allies ranked on the same footing and which was to be presided over by a hereditary president, who, to show that he was merely the first amongst equals, took the title of German Emperor not of Emperor of Germany. The Imperial Parliament consisted of a Diet elected by universal suffrage and of a Diet of Envoys from the Federal States, which nominally controlled Foreign Policy and in which Prussia, standing alone, had not a majority. No taxation could be imposed without the consent of Parliament. In practice, however, the Emperor and his Chancellor possessed almost absolute power. The Emperor, indeed, was far more independent than the Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire had ever been. The office was hereditary in his family, whereas in the old Empire the Emperor was chosen by a College of Electors who could impose their own terms on him, and were, in no wise, bound to consider any hereditary claims. Thus great as the Emperor's powers were down to the Treaty of Westphalia, no Emperor, who cared anything for his family, could escape from the control of the Electors, whose interest it was to safeguard the Liberties of Germany. As the new Emperors were also Kings of Prussia, they were far too powerful to be kept in leash by their allies, and though Parliament held the purse strings, its functions were limited by the Constitution, nor, at first, did it enjoy much popular support. But, in a nominally constitutional government, the powers of the Crown are bound to diminish. If the German Emperors wished to reign as absolutely in the Empire as they did as Kings in Prussia, they would, sooner or later, come into conflict with their Parliament, and, in that case, would have to form a parliamentary party to support them. Such a party could only be found amongst the military and the landed aristocracy, both of whom must, therefore, be kept on their King's side at any cost. Thus the Emperor might be driven to make war abroad to save his power at home if such a war was in the interests of his supporters.

At the end of November, 1870, the King of Bavaria was tricked into signing a letter to invite the King of Prussia to assume the

title of German Emperor. William I. reluctantly accepted the invitation, and on the eighteenth of January, 1871, one hundred and seventy years after Frederick I. had been crowned as first King of Prussia at Königsberg, the new Empire was solemnly proclaimed to the sound of guns hurling shot and shell upon Paris in the Gallery of Mirrors at Versailles. Forty-eight years later it perished in the Chamber which had seen its birth. The Treaty of Frankfort and the necessity for crowning an Empire with a Cap of Liberty were the cankers which ate out its heart.

Bismarck hoped that France would be rendered powerless for half a century. His calculations proved false. Within two and a half years she had discharged the indemnity in full, and, in the spring of 1875, made some feeble attempts to reorganise her army. He determined to annihilate the hereditary enemy. Early in May an article headed "War in Sight" appeared in one of his journals, and Europe saw herself on the brink of the abyss. But William I. was old, war-weary, and too honest to lend himself blindly to his minister's intrigues. England and Russia had seen their mistake in abandoning France in 1870. The Tsar and Queen Victoria wrote to the Emperor and Bismarck's hand was stayed. The Prince never forgave the powers who thwarted his plans, and his disappointment in 1875 is one of the keys to the history of the following years.

The Treaty of Berlin which, in 1878, closed for the time the troubles in the Near East which had culminated in the Russo-Turkish war, marks, perhaps, the moment when Bismarck's power was at its height. Acting as the "Honest Broker," he contrived to render any real understanding between England and Russia impossible. Russia saw Bulgaria, which she had planned to make her instrument, deprived of Macedonia and of all access to the *Ægean*. Ostensibly, England was the cause of her disappointment, and, in revenge, she engaged in intrigues on the Indian frontier which estranged her from the Court of St. James. If she recovered Bessarabia, which she had lost by the Treaty of Paris, she forfeited as its price the friendship of Rumania whose prince was a Hohenzollern and whose armies had saved her from ruin in the Turkish war. Austria, which longed to acquire Salonica as an outlet to the Mediterranean, was allowed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they remained parts of the Turkish Empire. She thus incurred the bitter hatred of the Serbs and Montenegrins, and encroached on a field which Russia regarded

as her own. She bought support by entering into an understanding with Berlin which made her the vassal of Germany in all but in name. France was encouraged to occupy Tunis, thus mortally offending the Italians. Italy received no increase of territory and the mob clamoured for the liberation of Unredeemed Italy," which still remained in Austrian hands. An Italy at variance with France and Austria could carry little weight. Germany had no overt gains to show, but she was left the strongest European power and the only one free to choose her allies. Bismarck was not altogether satisfied with his handiwork. He acted like a vestryman, he said, when he kept England and Russia from fighting it out. Yet he had sown the dragon's teeth for the Treaty of Berlin was one of the chief causes of the war of 1914. Such was the outcome of a settlement which Lord Beaconsfield described as "Peace with Honour."

The Chancellor knew and feared Russia, and, a year later, arranged that she should enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Austria and Germany. Lord Salisbury who saw in this arrangement a guarantee for peace, hailed the news as "good tidings of great joy." He knew that William I. was weary of war and that his heir had no wish to win laurels as a conqueror.

Crown Prince Frederick the husband of Victoria, Princess Royal of England, was the hope of every Liberal in Europe. A gallant, high-bred, and accomplished gentleman, a soldier who had fought with distinction in three bloody wars, he united the best qualities of the Hohenzollerns with those of the House of Weimar, who under his great grandfather Duke Charles Augustus had made their capital the German Athens. Like Frederick the Great he loved art and literature, and, like that monarch, believed that a King of Prussia should do all in his power to promote the improvement of his people. He was the darling of his mother-in-law, and, whilst remaining a patriotic German, had learnt at the English Court that a Constitutional ruler could play as great a part as the most absolute Tsar. He was thought to be a sincere friend to England, and in Italy, where he frequently travelled, he was adored alike by King and peasant. The Crown Prince had, at first, disliked the proposal that the Kings of Prussia should become German Emperors. Once he was convinced that the measure was indispensable he had done his best to induce his father to agree to it. He was with good reason devoted to his wife.

From her infancy the Princess Royal had been her father's chosen companion. As she grew into womanhood, he trained her to fulfil his own ideals, whether in art, in philanthropy, or in statecraft. Though a German, the Prince Consort had unfortunately forgotten the position which women hold in Germany, more especially in Prussia. To the Prussian squire womanhood means what it meant to the Roman of the Punic War. The virtuous woman stayed at home, darned his stockings, and cooked his dinner. With his outside life she had no concern. He did not want her views on Overbeck or on Goethe. The word Politics should be to her unknown. Even the Queens of Prussia with one brilliant exception had been ciphers. Louise of Mecklenberg came of a house which prided itself on its descent from the Wends.

Such was the world into which the Prince Consort sent his best loved daughter in the fond hope that she might be the pioneer of English influence and culture in the dark places of Berlin. He had provided her with a Stockmar. Robert Morier, one of the most rising English diplomatists, was attached to the Legation at Berlin to advise her as to German politics. Bismarck was no Lord Melbourne. To him the interference of women in matters of state was anathema, and he hated the Crown Princess both as an Englishwoman and a Liberal. He became her bitterest foe and his hostility soon extended to her husband. The Imperial Chancellor shrank from no intrigue to deprive them of the respect and affection of their courtiers, and to make their son their enemy.

Prince William was in some sense the exaggeration of his parents' qualities. Deformed from his birth and afflicted with an affection which never left him free from pain, he might have been the changeling of his country's legends. Some malignant fairy might have presided at his cradle. He was a mass of contradictions. At times high minded, conscientious, sympathetic, at other moments he seemed to lack any sense of honour, perhaps even physical courage. On three sides his family tree was tainted with insanity. He inherited alike the obstinacy of George III., the megalomania of Paul I., and the gloomy religiousness of Frederick William IV. The Coburgs had bequeathed to him their love of art and their talent for business. His versatility was his own; he was at once a soldier, a sailor, a diplomatist, a sportsman, a theologian, a painter, and a musician. A hostile historian portrayed him not inaptly under the figure of Caligula.

At Bonn, where Count Bismarck's son had been his constant companion, he perfected himself in all the qualities of the Corps Student, and became a finished swashbuckler. In 1883 he married a daughter of the Duke of Augustenburg, a lady, whose happiness lay in her Church, her children, and her kitchen, and whose political ambitions were not likely to trouble Bismarck's slumbers. After being trained in the work of civil administration, Prince William settled down to the task of opposing his father and supporting his Mentor. His mother he already hated, partly because she was an Englishwoman, partly because of his own physical defects. Such were the chief actors in the history of the years which followed the conclusion of the Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Russia.

In 1880 Mr. Gladstone succeeded Lord Beaconsfield as Prime Minister of England at a moment when Continental statesmen were just beginning to interest themselves in colonial questions, and appointed Lord Granville as his Foreign Secretary. Both were experienced statesmen, but their training had not fitted them to deal with the situation which had arisen in Europe since 1871. Mr. Gladstone, the pupil of Canning, had, like his master, always been the champion of "small nations rightly struggling to be free." In him Italy and Bulgaria had found their best English friend. He had seen the liberation of Hungary with pleasure. Germany, however, he had never understood. To him German art and German literature were little known, and German thought he regarded with perhaps not unmerited suspicion. His few German friends had been theologians or men of letters. If he loathed Austria as the oppressor of Italy, he had closed his eyes to her conduct towards Denmark. It seemed as if to him the Teutonic nations were merely uninteresting abstractions. Lord Granville, a high bred aristocrat, trained in the British Embassy at Paris in the days of Louis Philippe, was known in diplomatic circles as "Pussy." He might have held his own with Talleyrand or Metternich; he was but ill equipped for a combat with an aurochs from a Lithuanian forest.

The world had moved since the Treaty of Frankfort. Mahan was teaching the meaning of sea power, and Seeley was showing how the wealth and greatness of Britain depended upon her possessions overseas. Improvements in the construction of railways and steamships, due to the invention of Bessemer

steel, had brought American and Australian cereals into the markets of Europe and bankrupt farmers and wheat prices falling like an avalanche made it plain that from henceforth the New World would compete with the Old in the products of the Temperate Zone.

There were, however, but few fields open for fresh colonisation. Asia was in strong hands, America was closed by the Monroe doctrine. Only Africa and the Pacific still remained comparatively unoccupied. If Germany was to become a Colonial power, it was in those regions alone that she could found an Empire, without risking a world war. Lord Beaconsfield had been the first English Imperialistic statesman since the death of Chatham, and Mr. Gladstone, the leader of a party which had always looked upon the colonies with indifference, had driven him from office largely on account of his Imperialistic aims. In theory, Mr. Gladstone sympathised with the desire of Germany to get a place in the sun, but when she founded a settlement in South West Africa, a territory to which England had some vague claims, Lord Granville mismanaged the question in such a fashion as to earn Bismarck's contemptuous dislike. Australia was offended by the German occupation of part of New Guinea, and Liverpool looked dubiously upon her activity in tropical West Africa. All the rivals of Germany joined with England in a scramble for colonies, and it seemed as if there would be a repetition of the contests which, during the Eighteenth Century, had devastated half the world. A conference at Berlin in 1885 effected a provisional settlement as to Africa, but on terms which left many dangerous questions open. Germany, however, was now recognised as a Colonial power: sooner or later a German navy must appear on the seas.

William the First's reign was at length drawing to its close. Bismarck might well doubt whether the new Emperor would retain him in his councils. For office the Imperial Chancellor, perhaps, cared little, but his dearest wish was that he might be succeeded in it by his son Count Herbert. He knew that Crown Prince Frederick was no believer in a rule of "blood and iron," but, as a Liberal, was ready to make concessions in domestic politics and eager to restrain the influence of the military party over his foreign relations. Bismarck was the maker of the Empire, and Frederick might take into account his former services. Count Herbert was only an overbearing bully, and it was almost

certain that a Liberal Emperor would refuse to employ him. But Frederick was not invulnerable.

Under the Hohenzollern Family Law, no one who was afflicted with an incurable disease could succeed to the headship of the family. If, then, it could be established that the Crown Prince was suffering from such a disease, he would have, on his father's death, to give place to his son, and his wife would lose her jointure as Queen of Prussia. As Count Herbert Bismarck was Prince William's most intimate friend, he would, probably, in that event, become Imperial Chancellor.

In the summer of 1887, the Crown Prince fell ill of an affection of the throat, and was ordered by his medical attendants to winter at San Remo. His case was an obscure one, but some Prussian specialists hinted that it might prove to be cancer. Bismarck saw his opportunity and made every effort to secure positive evidence that their diagnosis was correct. Queen Victoria, however, sent out an eminent English expert, Sir Morell Mackenzie, who, after a careful examination, denied their assumption. The dispute became embittered by questions of nationality, and for months the battle raged round the sick bed in the Villa Zirio. Prince William hurried to the spot, and, regardless of his mother's tears, strove to browbeat the Englishman into acquiescence with the verdict of his German colleagues.¹

Whilst Europe was ringing with the scandal, William I. died, and Frederick, now German Emperor, hastened home to take up the duties of his station. For the moment Bismarck was defeated, but his triumph was not long delayed. Hardly had the Mint struck the first coins with Frederick's image and superscription, when he in his turn was carried to the grave after a reign of one hundred days. With him the last hope of a German Empire under a constitutional sovereign passed away. Scarcely was his father dead when William II. seized his papers and placed all those in whom he had confided under the supervision of the police. His mother was made to feel that her power was gone. The Prince of Wales in vain remonstrated with his nephew upon his conduct. The Emperor treated his remonstrances with contempt, but he knew that when Queen Victoria died he would lose his last friend at the English Court. For the moment that mattered little. His grandmother was too narrow-minded, perhaps too jealous, to allow her heir to take any part in state business.

So far as is known, William II. never referred publicly to the events of 1888, but when in later years he, too, quarrelled with his heir and realised that his son was the darling of every bankrupt general and rowdy subaltern in Prussia, he trembled lest he, in his turn, might be forced to lay aside his crown. His trusted guards might turn Pretorians. Who can say what memories haunted him when peace and war were swaying in the balance in 1914?

During the first years of his reign William II. rightly earned the name of Emperor Restless. He flew from Court to Court like a King's Messenger, seeking friends and finding few, except perhaps at Vienna and Madrid, and boxed the political compass almost at every change of the moon. At one moment he dismissed Bismarck because he opposed his plan for summoning an international Labour Congress, at another he offended his Bavarian Allies by inscribing in the Golden Book of Munich Town Hall an assertion that his will was their law.¹ He advocated socialistic legislation based upon a contributory scheme, possibly, however, to prevent his army from being depleted by emigration, as he knew that a workman would hesitate to forfeit the money which he had paid to the State. Education was promoted mainly to provide the great manufacturers with a supply of cheap skilled labour. His most intimate friends were the captains of business, and trade and industry enjoyed his warmest support. Pomeranian squires shuddered when they heard that their King was entertaining Jews. For a time he strove hard to conciliate the French, and dreamed of entering Paris as a guest in state. When, however, Russia allied herself with France in order to secure money for her internal development, the Emperor turned to England, from which, thanks perhaps to Queen Victoria, he had already received Heligoland without any tangible return, although in 1889 Chamberlain had proposed to exchange it for German South West Africa.¹ In August, 1895, within a month of Lord Salisbury's return to office, the Emperor at Cowes Regatta personally discussed with him the subject of an alliance. The Prime Minister evaded a direct reply. A few months later, after Jameson had raided the Transvaal, William II., at the suggestion of his Colonial Minister, sent a telegram to President Krüger, which brought England and Germany to the verge of war. The mobilization of the English Fleet prevented its outbreak, but from that moment the Emperor

determined that at whatever cost he would make his Empire as strong at sea as it was on land. Possibly he never reflected that the money, which would be required to carry out his schemes, would have to be found by Parliament, and that Parliaments sooner or later might use their power to force him to conform his policy to their wishes.

The Three Emperors' Alliance had come to an end before William I.'s death, although, characteristically enough, Bismarck, unknown to his Austrian ally, had contracted a reinsurance treaty with Russia. It was replaced by a Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria and Italy, which provided that if one of the allies was attacked by two other powers its confederates should come to its assistance. On the other hand, it did not engage any of the signatories to take part in an offensive war. Italy joined the Alliance, chiefly out of annoyance at the French occupation of Tunis, and thus Bismarck's policy seemed justified by its results. The Italian fleet served to strengthen the position of the Central Powers in the Mediterranean. Colonial questions kept France and England apart, and no German statesman dreamed that England and Russia could ever come to an understanding. If, then, the Triple Alliance held together, it might hope to rule the world.

German trade and wealth were growing rapidly, and as wealth increased at home the aims of the Emperor and his people expanded abroad. The governing classes saw in a Colonial Empire a panacea for Socialism. Trade, they said, would follow the flag and the bank, and a Colonial administration would provide posts for the young men, whom the Emperor aptly styled "Hunger candidates" and the universities turned out in thousands yearly, who had studied solely to pass the examinations which exempted them from three years' military service. So-called philosophy was the curse of German education, and it was amongst them that the agitators found their best recruits. Had the training of the masses been as severely practical as it was when German handworkers were the first in the world, Germany might have been content with the conquests of her traders.

The German Empire had been cradled in the universities, and their professors could not refrain from making its greatness, the outcome of success in war, their constant theme. Nor did their ideals differ from those of the ordinary citizen. Germany

had always been a country of mercenary soldiers, in which for ages the most profitable industry had been war. Germans had fought and died as the hirelings of every sovereign in Europe. A generation had not passed since Germans had begun to fight for German ends under a German leader, and every school boy knew what Germany had gained by the wars with Denmark, Austria, and France. In their army they had now the most perfect war machine which the human intellect had ever devised. It was for them to use their power. England alone stood in their path, and England, rotten with luxury and sloth, would fall at the first touch of the German lance. The keys of London would open the gates of World Empire to Germany.

The course of events, indeed, placed England in opposition to all German colonial projects. In Africa, the foundation of Rhodesia and the destruction of the Boer Republics deprived Germany of what might have been her India. A few years earlier, during the Spanish-American War, it had seemed possible that she might acquire some of the Spanish possessions in the Pacific. On May Day, 1898, German and English squadrons were anchored off Manila, which the American Admiral Dewey was preparing to attack. The German flagship cleared for action, but when its commander asked the English Admiral his intentions, Sir Edward Chichester pointed to his guns.

Germany stayed her hand, but she turned for compensation to the Near East.

The Germans had long taken an interest in Turkish affairs. We have seen that Wallenstein had hoped to lead his army to drive the Turks from Europe, and more than once during the period between the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution, Austria had occupied parts of the Balkans Peninsula. Moltke, as a young man, served in the Ottoman army, and, on his return to Europe about 1840, induced many leaders of German thought, amongst whom was Adolf, Duke of Nassau, to study the question of utilizing Asiatic Turkey as a field for German enterprise. By 1898 the English, who looked upon the Turks as their wards, had lost all influence to Constantinople owing to their protests against the policy of exterminating the Armenians to which Sultan Abdul Hamid resorted, despite his engagements under the Treaty of Berlin. With these protests Germany refused to associate herself, and the Sultan, therefore, looked upon the German Emperor as his sole defender.

Of these conditions William II. prepared to take advantage. In the autumn of 1898 he paid a visit to Constantinople and the Holy Land, during which he not only figured as the protector of the Moslem against the Christians, but obtained for German financiers the concession of a railway through Anatolia from the Bosphorus to Bagdad on conditions which brought the Near East under German influence. India lay within striking distance, it was believed, of Bagdad, and from Aleppo it would be easy to march upon the Suez Canal. He would, thus hold the British Empire in his hands.

With one exception Central Europe from Bremen to the Bosphorus was now under his control. Austria was the bondslave of Germany; Germans ruled Bulgaria and Rumania; his sister was Crown Princess of Greece; and but a year before the Turkish Army under German leaders had taught the Greeks what German skill and discipline meant. Serbia alone was recalcitrant to German influences and the roads from the Danube to the Bosphorus ran through Serbian territory.

For the moment English statesmen took but scant notice of William II.'s activities in the Near East. To them Russia was their most dangerous rival in Asia, and France on the Niger and the Nile. On more than one occasion England and France were on the verge of war.

In 1899 the war in South Africa between England and the Dutch Republics, in which for a time it seemed as if the Boers would be the victors, led to an outburst of feeling against the English in nearly every part of the Continent. William II. has often claimed credit for refusing to join France and Russia in an attack upon England. He may have felt that it was hopeless for him to contend with her at sea, and that whilst his flag floated over Metz and Strasburg, he could place but little confidence in either of his would-be allies. Within a few months it was seen that the Boer cause was hopeless, but the contest was still lingering on, when in January, 1901, Queen Victoria passed away after a reign of sixty-four years. With her Germany lost her one real English friend.

Her successor held widely different views as to the position which England should assume in international affairs. Edward VII. was, above all things, a sincere lover of peace, but he had long mistrusted his nephew, whom he looked upon as a mad, irresponsible genius. Had he been on the throne when the

Emperor Frederick died, he might have done much to prevent Germany from becoming a menace to the world. The King, who knew France and Russia, saw that the causes which estranged them from England were comparatively trivial, and that if England were on good terms with her supposed rivals, their friendship would make for peace. German statesmen owned that King Edward had no wish to isolate far less to injure Germany. Yet for their own purposes they choose to misrepresent his ends.

In their eyes a German Emperor who was not a War Lord would be less than nothing, but in theory a German Emperor was a constitutional sovereign. Would the Parliament continue to vote the sums required to make Germany all powerful, unless they could be led to believe that the very existence of the Fatherland depended upon its sword?

For a time a France, thirsting for revenge, had figured as the danger to the new-born Empire, but, as the memories of 1870 faded away, England in the eyes of all true Prussians took the place of their hereditary enemy. Yet had the Emperor abandoned the military traditions of his house to win the laurels of a social reformer, the world war might have been averted, and he himself would have been the gainer.

William II., obstinate and weak, was not the man to free himself from the shackles of his surroundings. If he could not be the absolute master of the State, he preferred to be the bondsman of his generals rather than of a Parliament which, though he looked upon it with contempt, might one day pass beyond his control. A new spirit was springing up in a Germany which was now a nation of artisans rather than of agriculturists. As in England, the industrial might prove to be the forerunner of the social revolution. Almost for the first time, the German workman was beginning to choose his intellectual guides for himself. Government might tune the pulpit and bridle the school, yet it seemed powerless to prevent the spread of the destructive economic philosophy which had been developed by the dreams of 1848, and which was not the less dangerous because it was based upon theory rather than upon experience. For its own purposes the State encouraged, as has been said, very advanced education amongst the masses. Good non-commissioned officers were needed for the army, and cheap skilled labour for the factories, whilst only a trained bureaucracy

could carry on the administration of a country in which the State undertook to perform duties which were elsewhere left to private enterprise to discharge.

Universities were numerous, and, owing to the conditions of German public life, the influence of University teaching was felt far more deeply and in far wider circles than in England, where most members of the governing classes looked upon philosophy and literature merely as elegant accomplishments. English statesmen were trained in the justice room, in the counting house, on the village green, and at the covert side. The English Constitution was the outcome of practical experience. Venice, it is true, had served in some degree as a model to the men who, after 1688, devised the Revolution Settlement, but of all Continental statesmen, the Venetian patrician most nearly resembled the English noble. In Germany, on the other hand, thanks largely to conditions which had been originated by the Thirty Years War, theory played the part in the affairs of the State which practical experience had long held in England. Until 1870 politics concerned the ordinary citizen little, if at all. Government was in the hands of a caste, and the field of pure intellect was the only one in which men of all classes could contend upon equal terms. An intellectual German, if not of noble birth, could win his triumphs only in the lecture room or the literary reviews. Thus, when the German middle and lower classes were called upon to take a share in the Government of the State, they had only theories to guide them. In England, on the other hand, where men of widely differing social positions had for centuries played a part, however humble, in the management of public affairs, those who came to the front on the successive extensions of the parliamentary franchise had enjoyed some preliminary practical training for their task. In Germany the new leaders had had little experience of the realities of public life.

When, therefore, the German Emperor saw himself confronted by social democracy, he might well despair of finding any statesmen who were capable of bridging over the gulf which lay between absolutism and the dreams of prating demagogues. If, then, he wished to preserve the existence of the State, as he understood the State, he must preserve his army, and to preserve his army, he must, in the long run, win fresh laurels in war.

The German Army was living on its past. The pay of the

officers was small, but their social position made it easy for them to marry into the wealthy middle-class families, who could not hope by means of their money alone to obtain a footing in a society which, for centuries, had only been entered by right of birth.

William II., however, in his eagerness to forward the economic prosperity of Germany, had to a great extent broken down the barriers which had hitherto kept apart the aristocracy and the commercial classes. Some of his most intimate friends, as has been said, were millionaire traders and manufacturers, and men who had risen to riches by their own exertions found that their wealth was making them the equals, if not the superiors, of the needy landowners, whose quarterings had hitherto placed them at the head of the social world. As in France and England, money was beginning to take the place of blood.

The Emperor's example showed the middle classes that they could procure social advancement without marrying their daughters to ruined nobles. The advantages attaching to military rank were thus seriously diminished.

The old Prussian frugality had passed away. The standard of living was rising every day. The officers' messes were luxurious, and, perhaps through want of thought, the Emperor was the first to encourage their extravagance. The army could not continue to be officered by the aristocratic class, unless the pay of the commissioned ranks was increased at a time when the cost of establishing a Navy had also to be met.

How were the fresh revenues required for this expenditure to be found? The difficulty of solving this question was one of the immediate causes of the Great War. Hitherto the State had drawn its resources from direct and indirect taxation in fairly equal proportions. Direct taxation had been derived mainly from an impost on revenue. Taxation on capital, as distinguished from income, either as succession or death duties, had hardly been known, and land, especially when entailed, had been generally exempted. Yet, at the same time, taxes such as the duty on imported cereals had been imposed for the benefit of the land owners; the resultant rise in the cost of living had done much to forward the growth of Social Democracy amongst the town populations. Indirect taxation if increased would entail grave political risks, whilst a higher income tax would hamper the accumulation of capital for industrial expansion.

It would be absolutely necessary, therefore, to impose death and succession taxes, even though such taxes might force debt encumbered landowners to sell their estates. The Prussian squirearchy who, in their own eyes, perhaps in their King's, were the mainstay of the Monarchy, saw that their downfall would be inevitable. War was their one hope. A victorious peace with its indemnities from the vanquished world would, at all events, postpone their ruin. Thus the Prussian upper classes came to advocate a war of conquest at a moment when the views of the middle classes coincided with their own.

In the eyes of all Germany war was indeed a business operation which, by no possibility, could result in failure. The landowner saw taxation reduced to the minimum; traders and manufacturers laid plans to monopolise the French and Belgian coal and iron and the colonies of the three great colonial powers; the student reckoned upon fresh posts in the Government service; even the artisan dreamed of trebled Old Age Pensions and increased Insurance Benefits spent on cheapened beer. Preacher and professor alike were for ever dwelling upon war as the means of inculcating upon a world that lay in darkness the spiritual greatness of the Fatherland. German criticism, which had demolished the dogmas of Christianity, had kept alive the idea of a German God, and found in Darwin's doctrine of the "Struggle for Life" an excuse for every outrage against the moral code. East of the Elbe, neither Catholicism nor Protestantism had ever influenced the masses, and where the Russian with his Slavonic instincts for devotion to a superior being, shared his heart between his God and his Tsar, the Prussian, though half a Slav, venerated his King alone. War and Peace were in the Emperor's hands, and to choose between them lay with him.

No sooner had Edward VII. effected an understanding between France and England, than Germany had begun to prepare herself to contend for the Empire of the World. A Pan-German party was already in existence, which sought to bring all the German-speaking races under one flag, and which found its best agents in the universities. Even its more moderate members wished to annex to the Empire not only the German portions of Austria and Switzerland, but the Baltic Provinces, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Northern and Eastern France. In their eyes efflux of time was of no effect. Because Charlemagne had been crowned at St. Peter's and Frederick Barbarossa

had reigned at Arles, William II. was the legitimate ruler of Marseilles, of Genoa, even of Rome itself, with the keys of St. Peter in his gift. Their colonial projects were not less far reaching. In South America the Monroe doctrine was to be trampled under foot. Above all things it was necessary to protect the sea-road from Hamburg to the Levant by bringing Morocco under the German flag. Their aims, in short, were such as must sooner or later bring about a war between Germany and the world.

The understanding arrived at between England and France in 1904 furnished Germany with a pretext for taking action to defend her interests overseas. France recognised the special position of England in Egypt, and England that of France in Morocco, on condition that she allowed freedom of trade to continue there for thirty years. Both powers had, however, overlooked a Convention signed at Madrid in 1880, to which eighteen states, including Germany, were parties, which provided that no steps affecting commerce in Morocco should be taken without the consent of the signatories. On this ground Germany protested against the terms laid down in the Anglo-French understanding, and demanded that the Moroccan question should be submitted to an international conference which accordingly met at Algeciras. The results of the conference scarcely fulfilled her hopes. She secured a commercial position in Morocco equal to that of France, but she learnt that Austria was the only power on which she could thoroughly rely. On the other hand, thanks to the skill and tact of Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, the greatest English expert on Russia, who by King Edward's wish resided at Algeciras during the conference, the foundations were laid for a settlement between the two great Asiatic powers. It was confirmed by the King and Tsar Nicholas II. in an interview at Reval, a few months after William II., in his pique at the refusal of France to cede to him the mouths of some rivers in the Cameroons, had during a visit to Tangiers publicly recognised the Moorish Sultan as a sovereign and independent prince.

For some years Morocco continued to be the storm centre of the world. In 1908 the German Consul at Casablanca, by sheltering some deserters from the French Foreign Legion, caused a crisis which but for the prompt action of the English Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, might have led to a war. Three years

later the Emperor himself, who resented the refusal of M. Briand the French Premier, to confirm an agreement which his predecessor, M. Caillaux, had entered into for the construction of a railway between the German Cameroons and the French Congo, sent a cruiser to Agadir, a port in Moroccan Sous. War seemed inevitable. Mr. Lloyd George, however, speaking for the English Cabinet, announced that in case of hostilities England would side with France. The Emperor drew back, possibly with the less reluctance, because the report that Sous possessed rich iron-mines had proved false. As the price of his withdrawal France handed over to him large tracts of her Congo colony. For a few months peace seemed assured.

Fresh dangers speedily arose in another portion of North Africa, where of all her former possessions, Tripoli alone remained under Turkish rule. Italy had long fixed her eyes upon the ancient Cyrenaica, and when she learnt in the autumn of 1911 that Germany was asking the Porte for a lease of the Tripolitan harbour of Derna, she declared war upon Turkey to obtain the coveted province, which was ceded to her a year later by the Treaty of Ouchy.

But the Italo-Turkish conflict had already led to developments which were to end in the World War.

In the Balkans the Treaty of Berlin had proved a settlement only in name. Macedonia had been given by the Russians to Bulgaria, and had been restored to Turkey merely to become the battleground of Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians. Bulgaria, which had been divided into two provinces at Berlin, had been reunited by a revolution which had embittered her relations with all her Christian neighbours, and had exchanged the hegemony of Russia for the rule of Ferdinand of Coburg, a German princelet, whose large estates in Hungary made him the catspaw of Vienna. Her rival, Serbia, after the murder of her pro-Austrian King, went over to the Russian camp, whilst Greece, smarting under her defeat by Turkey in 1897, intrigued to obtain possession of Salonica, which Germany looked upon as her future outlet to the *Ægean*. Austria was consolidating her position in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 1903 came to an agreement with Russia, which, though nominally relating solely to the co-operation of the two powers in supervising the introduction into Macedonia of the reforms stipulated by the Treaty of Berlin, was regarded by the Austrians as a means for maintaining their

influence in the Balkans, and of opening for themselves a road to Salonica. Had the agreement of Mürzsteg been carried out, the Turkish question might have been settled peaceably.

Under the Treaty of Berlin, however, Austria merely occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in law continued to be a part of Turkey. In 1908 a revolution broke out at Salonica. Abdul Hamid was deposed, and a Liberal administration took office at the Porte, which restored the constitution promulgated by Midhat Pasha thirty years before under which Turkey was governed by a Parliament with a responsible ministry. This constitution had been suspended by Abdul Hamid, but the Revolutionists now ordered a general election throughout the Ottoman Empire and, consequently, in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The situation, thus created, was full of danger for Austria. She was ruled by minorities, and the Germans and Magyars could only maintain their predominance by keeping the other nationalities in subjection. It was plain that if the Slavs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were allowed to send deputies to Constantinople, the agitation for the re-establishment of the Kingdoms of Bohemia and Croatia would be greatly strengthened. If an all but independent Croatia united with Serbia, the road to Salonica would be closed for ever. To prevent such a crisis from arising, the Austrian Emperor proclaimed the annexation of the two provinces, and by doing so technically violated the Treaty of Berlin. The incident was of no practical importance and but for the outcries of the London Press would probably have passed unnoticed by the public. It so clearly, however, proved the attitude of Austria towards her treaty obligations that from that moment King Edward VII. is said to have looked upon a European war as a certainty. Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed himself independent, taking the title of Tsar, and though a general conflict was averted, the racial struggle in Macedonia grew every day more embittered. Germany was the chief gainer by the revolution, for Enver Bey, the guiding genius of the new government had, whilst Turkish Military Attaché at Berlin, been completely won over by William II., who now seemed to be the master of the Ottoman Empire.

Few, if any, imagined that the small Balkan powers could be brought to unite to defend their freedom, and to liberate their brethren still under Moslem rule. An Englishman accomplished the miracle.¹ Mr. J. D. Bouchier, a former Eton master, had

long been the Correspondent in the Balkans of the London "Times," and in carrying out his duties not only acquired the confidence of the Balkans statesmen, but came to look at the Balkan problem from the standpoint of the native populations themselves. In 1910, when travelling in Macedonia, he had learnt from a leader of the guerrillas, whose internecine warfare was desolating the province, that much as the Greeks and Bulgarians hated one another, they both saw their common enemy in the Turks. He came to the conclusion that it might be possible to form a Balkans League to expel the Ottomans from Europe. Despite the illwill of the English Foreign Office which, though without any real grounds, was afraid of offending Russia, he laid his views before M. Gueshof in Bulgaria and M. Venizelos in Greece, and by emphasizing the opportunity presented by the Italo-Turkish War, induced them to unite in an alliance to free Macedonia, and to divide the conquered territories upon an equitable basis. To this alliance Serbia and Montenegro subsequently became parties.

In the summer of 1912 Bulgaria called upon Turkey to carry out these reforms in Macedonia to which she was pledged by the Treaty of Berlin. Her request was refused. In October the four powers declared war against the Porte, whose forces were scattered and ill-prepared for resistance. Within a few weeks the Greek flag was flying over Salonica, and the Bulgarians had driven back the Turks behind the lines of Tchataldja, the last defence of Constantinople, and with Serbian help were besieging Adrianople. The Great Powers were thunderstruck by the victories of people whom they had looked upon as their helpless prey. Germany urged the Sultan to hold out; the Russian Minister at Sofia burst into tears when he learned that the Bulgarian cannon could be heard at Stamboul.

But for the breakdown of their transport and the ravages of the cholera in their ranks, the Bulgars might have hoisted their flag by the Golden Horn and crowned Tsar Ferdinand, who had already purchased his Imperial Crown at the expense of the Treasury, Emperor of the East in Santa Sofia. Ferdinand knew that Russian opinion was divided as to the advisability of annexing Constantinople, and that many, including M. Sazonoff, the Foreign Minister, and even the Tsar, would have been satisfied with permission for Russian war vessels to pass through the Straits.¹ To England Bulgaria owed her existence,

and Ferdinand's intimates whispered that were he allowed to take the Imperial title, he would willingly see England holding the same position on the Bosphorus as on the Nile. The German Emperor would not have been ill-pleased had such an apple of discord been thrown into the Mediterranean area.

It might have been well, however, had England favoured the creation of a Balkans League, to which Rumania was a party. Had such a barrier stood in the way of the military expansion of Germany, it would have mattered little whether the Bagdad railway belonged to German capitalists. As long ago as 1903 Lord Lansdowne had definitely stated that the Persian Gulf was an English sphere of influence, but so long as Germany refrained from trespassing upon its shores, the economic ownership of Mesopotamia in no way concerned the defence of India. Germany might thus have obtained a valuable sphere for development without giving any cause of offence to her rivals.

The alliance between the Balkans States was quickly dissolved. The extent of the Bulgarian victories had not been foreseen, and no provision had been made to compensate the Serbians for the assistance which they had given the Bulgarians during their Thracian campaign. The Greeks had entered Salonica two days before the Bulgarians arrived, and were casting greedy eyes on all the points with Greek populations on the Ægean coastline, including Kavalla the natural outlet for Bulgaria to the Mediterranean. Italy refused to allow Serbia to obtain a harbour on the Adriatic, yet Greece and Bulgaria denied her access to any Macedonian port. Thus Serbia, despite her sacrifices, remained an inland power. A conference of the belligerents assembled in London to conclude peace, and in May, 1913 Sir Edward Grey induced them to sign a Treaty of which the conditions satisfied none of the signatories. Turkey lost all her possessions in Europe save Eastern Thrace, but the frontier was so drawn as to shut out Bulgaria from the Sea of Marmora; Serbia was obliged to hand over her much prized conquest of Scutari to Albania, which became an independent state, but her frontiers were extended westwards to meet those of Montenegro, and with Greece and Bulgaria she received a large share in Macedonia, thus altogether closing against Austria the road to Salonica; Greece was given Kavalla, and left Bulgaria with only the roadstead of Dedeagatch as an Ægean harbour.¹

Even before the conclusion of the Treaty of London, Austria, which had seen the Serb victories with the utmost jealousy, had urged Italy, though without success, to join her in an attack on Serbia, whilst Bulgarian forces were skirmishing with the Greeks in Eastern Macedonia. Scarcely had the terms of the Treaty become known, when Tsar Ferdinand, at the instigation of Austria, invaded the territories granted to Greece and Serbia, where his armies committed fearful atrocities. Unexpectedly, however, the Rumanians, with whose request for Silistria and an extension of territory in the Dobruja he had refused to comply, invaded Bulgaria and advanced almost to Sofia, whilst a Turkish force broke into Thrace and reoccupied Adrianople. Ferdinand sued for peace and in September, 1913, by the Treaty of Bucharest, ceded almost all his acquisitions in Macedonia to Serbia, recognised Kavalla as Greek, restored Adrianople to Turkey, and handed over large portions of Northern Bulgaria to Rumania.

Ferdinand vowed revenge, and his thoughts turned to Germany and Austria. Serbia now commanded every road from the Danube to Salonica and Constantinople, and was not only in the Russian interest but was always ready to intrigue with the disaffected Southern Slavs in the Austrian dominions. If, then, Austria Hungary was to survive, she must efface Serbia from the map, and Bulgaria could greatly facilitate her task. Germany would view the situation in the same light as her allies, for William II. was more eager than ever to make Turkey a German province in all but in name, and, as has been said, Serbia alone stood in his path. England was anxious to treat with him about the Bagdad Railway, and though he knew that if he interfered with Serbia he might bring Russia and France into the field he was willing to take the risk. He counted on the assistance of Italy and on the neutrality of England, hampered, as he believed, by her troubles at home.

It was already clear that a successful war was the only means by which Germany could maintain her social system unchanged, and that she could never hope for a more favourable opportunity. Francis Joseph and his nephew Archduke Franz Ferdinand seemed her devoted slaves.

The Archduke was the Austrian Emperor's nephew, and had become heir to the throne on the murder of Crown Prince Rudolf. A pupil of the Jesuits, he supported the Vatican, and was thought

to favour Germany. His position was a difficult one. He had made a morganatic marriage with Countess Sophie Chotek, the daughter of a Bohemian noble, and thus his wife and children were excluded from the Imperial though not from the Hungarian throne, whilst his connection with the Slavs estranged him from the Magyars. William II., who had persuaded Francis Joseph to create the Countess Duchess of Hohenburg, endeavoured to induce the Archduke to join Germany in a war against Russia in return for receiving Poland and the Ukraine as kingdoms for his two sons. It is believed that such an agreement was concluded between them in June, 1914, at Köpernischt, the Archduke's Bohemian Castle, but it is doubtful whether the Archduke would have observed it had he survived his uncle. His one object was to strengthen Austria by satisfying the claims of the conflicting nationalities, and to liberate her from her thralldom to Germany. He well knew that William II. had been intriguing to secure the Crown of Hungary for his son Eitel Fritz, and it is, therefore, possible that the German Emperor, on his side, may have felt some uncertainty as to his confederate's goodwill. Yet to him victory was becoming more necessary every day.

Social Democracy was rapidly increasing in Germany. Though the arrangement of the constituencies for the Imperial Parliament and the antiquated electoral franchise for the Prussian Diet prevented the return of a Social Democratic majority to either body, yet the results of the General Election of 1912 showed an enormous increase in the Democratic vote, even if many of the middle classes voted with the Socialists merely to mark their opposition to the Government. The army at the same time was becoming discontented at the protracted peace, and its standard of discipline was degenerating. Loud complaints had been heard, especially in the Universities, when the Agadir question was settled peacefully, and during the debate on the subject in the Parliament, the Crown Prince, who was present as a spectator, loudly applauded the speakers who criticised the policy of pacificism. He was ordered back to his regiment at Danzig, but every messroom resounded with his praises. Some of the higher officers of the Army were said to be prepared to take part in deposing the Emperor, who had good reason to know that such a project might well prove successful. In his hour of need he would find few to die in his defence.

The centenary of the War of Liberation was celebrated in 1913. Patriotic feeling was stirred to its depths, and a tax on capital was levied, as one had been a hundred years earlier, to strengthen the Silesian frontier against the supposed perils of the Russian strategic railways. But the gulf between the Army and the civil population was steadily widening, and a conflict which took place between them at Saverne, a frontier garrison in Lorraine, brought matters to a head. The law courts pronounced in favour of the civilians, but the Highest Command overrode their decisions, and declared that the Army was above the Law. Parliament, despite the protests of the Socialists, approved of the conduct of the military authorities. On the thirty-first of May, 1914, the Emperor prorogued the session in person, but when he left the hall the Socialist deputies refused to rise. From that day he must have been convinced that war alone could enable him to retain his power.

The pretext for a conflict was not long delayed. A few days after the interview at Köpernischt, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, when visiting Serajevo the capital of Bosnia, were murdered by a youth who professed to be the avenger of his fellow countrymen the Austrian Serbs. The real history of the Crime of Serajevo has yet to be written.

The news reached William II. at Kiel, where he was celebrating the completion of the Baltic Canal. His only remark was, "We shall have to begin again."

Archduke Charles, who by his brother's death became heir to the aged Francis Joseph, was a young man whom the Court of Vienna had kept in the background on account of his supposed Liberal sympathies. His wife, Princess Zita, a daughter of the exiled Duke of Parma, was the child of a house who never forgot that they were the descendants of Henri IV. of France. Neither of them had any love for Germany or her ruler. It was obvious that if William II. was to profit by his understanding with Austria, he must act during the lifetime of Francis Joseph, a man of eighty-four, who had just recovered from a serious illness. He decided, therefore, that Austria must be forced into a war with Serbia, and found willing abettors in Count Berchtold, the Austrian Imperial Chancellor, and Count Forgatsch, the mainspring of Hungarian Foreign Policy, both of whom bitterly hated the Slavs and their protagonist Russia. Had his political prospects been less clouded, William II. would

no doubt have postponed the conflict, for his naval preparations were incomplete, and he knew that if peace continued a few years longer, Germany would be the mistress of the commerce of the world. Russia, on the other hand, would have finished her strategic railways.

Fortuitous circumstances were, at the moment, influencing military opinion in Germany in favour of immediate action. During the debate in the French Senate on the Army Estimates in May, 1914, Senator Humbert had shown that France was utterly unprepared to take the field, whilst the English naval expert, Admiral Sir Percy Scott, had published an article to prove that the submarine, an arm in which Germany was strong, had made it impossible for large war vessels to keep the sea.

If, then, William II. once more sheathed his sword, he might be hounded from his throne, and locked up, perhaps, in a madhouse like Louis II. of Bavaria or his great uncle Frederick William IV., whilst the Crown Prince reigned as regent. Was it worth while to sacrifice himself in what might well be a useless attempt to preserve peace? From the fateful Council at Potsdam, which, on the fifth of July, decided upon war, William II. fled in his yacht to Norway. May not the olive groves of San Remo have come up before his eyes amid the fjords and rocks? A German *Cæchylus* may yet put on the stage the Hohenzollern Orestes. Ere he returned to Berlin the die had been cast.

On the twenty-third of July Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia, which had been drawn up in concert with the German Ambassador at Vienna and revised by the German Foreign Office, in which she accused the Serbian Government of being the accomplice of the Archduke's assassins, and called on her to accept conditions which would have made her an Austrian vassal. Serbia, nevertheless, under pressure from France and England, accepted all the articles but three, which related to the suppression of certain newspapers and the presence of Austrian officers at the trials of persons charged with being implicated in the conspiracy. The Austrian Government treated the Serbian refusal as a deadly insult, and declared war on Serbia, after Germany had declined to take part in a Conference to deal with the question. Francis Joseph was tricked into signing the declaration. Russia mobilised some army corps, and the military party at Berlin, by publishing false news as to a general German mobilisation, led the Russian

War Office to extend the measure to the whole Empire. Germany immediately declared war against Russia and a few hours later against France.

No one doubted that Germany would be the victor. William II. saw himself at Paris. The date was fixed for his state entry into the city, and provision made for his triumphal banquet. But Nemesis was turning her wheel. England, with reluctance, threw her sword into the scale against him, and his dreams of "wearing his crown," like his Norman namesake, at Westminster as the Abbey bells rang Christmas in, were sent from the ivory gate. He had boasted that he would return a conqueror to Berlin ere the autumn leaves had fallen, but the poplars by the Marne had not yet yellowed when the modern Attila found his Chalons on the banks of the river which had witnessed the overthrow of his spiritual father.

The entrance of Great Britain into the war had been wholly unexpected by the German General Staff, who had never believed that England would carry out her pledges to defend the neutrality of Belgium. They had gained little by their violation of their own. The gallant resistance of the Belgians completely disorganised the German time-table of operations, and the atrocities which they committed in every town and village which they occupied turned public opinion against them throughout the world. Nor had they counted upon the brilliant advance of the Russians into East Prussia, which for a moment spread terror to the gates of Berlin. Their defeat on the Marne proved to the German generals that it would be impossible for them to overwhelm France by a rush, and within six weeks after the outbreak of war, they had become convinced not only that victory was hopeless, but that, very possibly, they would in the end be vanquished. Had Maubeuge held out longer, the Emperor might have found his Sedan on the Aisne. The entrance of Turkey and Bulgaria into the arena as his allies served only to prolong the contest. But William II.'s heart was hardened. His wisest councillors might whisper of peace; to him an unsuccessful war meant the ruin of his dynasty. For over four years the puppet Emperor was made to drench the world in blood to save their crown for the Hohenzollerns and their pinchbeck privileges for the Prussian squires. It was decreed that the very success of their more than Macchiavellian policy was to bring them to ruin.

Their chief adviser Ludendorff thought that by bringing about a revolution in Russia he would drive her from the field. His plan succeeded, and within a few months his agents had turned a once flourishing empire into a howling waste. William II. gained little by his cunning statecraft. Providence in its justice turned his weapons against himself. The Russian Terrorists found eager imitators in Germany, where, thanks to the propaganda work of the great English publicist Lord Northcliffe, disaffection was spreading through the fleet. In November, 1918, a mutiny amongst the sailors at Kiel, quickly followed by a military rising at Berlin, brought about the proclamation of a Republic and the deposition of the Emperor, who fled from his well-protected retreat at Spa, amid the hootings of his guards, to take refuge in Holland. His dupes had already met their fate. Charles VIII. of Austria, the representative of the monarchy which Cæsar founded at Pharsalia, had retired to Switzerland, Ferdinand of Coburg had resigned the Bulgarian crown to his son, and the Sultan, under the guns of the English fleet, sat waiting for the order to depart to Asia. A strange coincidence, as has been said, had been connected with the signature of the Armistice with Austria which had driven the Hapsburgs from the throne, and given back freedom to Bohemia. On that day, Sunday, the third of November, 1918, Saint Matthew's story of the Tribute Money was read as the Gospel at the altar of every Anglican Church. Was it remembered that those same words had fired the warriors who, on Sunday, the eighth of November, 1620, had gone forth from the mass to bear Cæsar's eagles to victory over the Bohemian rebels at the White Mountain? It is possible that if the Austrians, who were then snatched from destruction, had rendered "to God the things which are God's," the war of 1914 might not have laid their empire in the dust. They had put too much stress on the injunction, "to render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's."

On the eleventh of November, 1918, the representatives of the German people signed an Armistice with Marshal Foch, the Generalissimo of the Allied armies, at Compiègne, and the war which had been begun to make Germany the mistress of the world was ended by her downfall. Had it continued but a few hours more, aeroplanes would have laid Berlin in ashes, and the German armies in Belgium must have surrendered unconditionally.

Since Austria first attacked Serbia four years and four months before, twenty-three nations had proclaimed war against Germany, and five others had broken off diplomatic relations. Only Spain, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Switzerland, Abyssinia, Persia, and a few South American Republics were still neutral. For a moment it had seemed as if she wished to force the Dutch and Swiss to defend their homes against her hordes, and Spanish neutrality hung on a thread.

The terms of the Armistice, though drastic, were less severe than those imposed upon her allies, yet it is said that Foch, who drew them up, never expected that any German would be found to sign them. He had failed, perhaps, to take into account the business instincts of the race. The plenipotentiaries knew that if the war went on through the winter, their country would be as completely ruined as she was in 1648. The allied troops kept watch on the Rhine, and the fleet was handed over to the Allies, but Berlin remained unoccupied, whilst Vienna, Buda-Pest, Sofia, and Constantinople opened their gates to their conquerors. Doubtless Berlin would have shared the same fate, had not the Allied Cabinets dreaded that the collapse of the Provisional Government might break down the last barrier which held back the onrush of the Russian Revolution. To this extent the Germans profited by their intrigues. The future will show whether it would have been better for the world had Prussia been made to drain the cup of humiliation to the lees. Those to whom the war is due should have been taught that war means loss as well as gain. The German workshop must bear its share of the guilt, but the chief authors of the world's ruin are to be found in the German mess, in the German Embassy, and in the German classroom.

In January, 1919, the representatives of the Allies met at Paris to draw up the terms of peace, and to lay the foundations for the reconstruction of three continents. Russia and Montenegro were alone absent. To them their gallant efforts had brought nothing but disaster. On the other hand, Poland and Bohemia had sent their representatives and the accents of every civilised tongue were to be heard in the halls of the French Foreign Office.

The guidance of the Congress was in the hands of a Supreme Council, which was composed of the heads of the embassies of the five principal allies, France, England, Italy, Japan, and

America. Had Lord Kitchener's hopes been realised, England would have played the deciding part in the Congress of Paris. But the war had lasted too long; England seemed all but exhausted, and men thought that America, which had harvested the gold of the world before she entered the battlefield at the eleventh hour, had alone the strength to continue the struggle should Germany prove recalcitrant. It was inevitable, perhaps, that the Allies, at least in appearance, should dance to the pipings of Washington.

Three personages dominated the Assembly, but not one of them had been trained in the methods or was guided by the practice of professional diplomatists. France and England were represented by their Prime Ministers, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George; the President of the United States, Wilson, appeared in person. M. Clemenceau sprang from a middle-class family in La Vendée, a province whose sons cling to old traditions and to old memories. Under the Second Empire he had as an exile learnt to know England and America. Since the beginning of the Third Republic, he had been the terror of the Chambers. It was only when his predecessors, M.M. Ribot and Painlevé, had brought the Allied cause to the brink of ruin, that the "Tiger of Montmartre," as he was called from the constituency where he had practised medicine, and which he had for long represented, had been made dictator. A few months had justified his choice. He had induced Mr. Lloyd George to agree to the appointment of Ferdinand Foch as Generalissimo, thus securing for the Allies that unity of command which for nearly four years had been the secret of German success. In March, 1918, German shells were falling in Paris, and Amiens; nine months later the British Guards were standing sentinel on the Rhine Bridge at Cologne. M. Clemenceau had frequently visited Germany, and had convinced himself that, despite their strong local feeling, neither Saxon nor Bavarian would acquiesce in complete separation from the Empire. Mr. Lloyd George, in his mental qualities, was the opposite of the French Premier. A Carnarvonshire Welshman, born in a land whose inhabitants are cut off from the world alike by their situation and their language, he combined the fiery nature and the stealthy cunning of the Celtic peasant with the training of a provincial solicitor. He never freed himself from the atmosphere of the Baptist Chapel or the thought

of the village polling booth. Wales is a country of narrow memories. Unlike the Irishman or the Breton, the Welsh have no religious ties with a wider, living world. If they would divert their thoughts from the sordid round of the market place or the farm, they turn by instinct to the gloomiest records of the Hebrews, or to the melancholy strains of their own bards. They are intensely national, because their language alone saves them from racial death. Welsh nationality is in Mr. Lloyd George's very soul. His Welsh instincts have left their mark on the Treaty of Versailles. His nominal colleague, Arthur Balfour, a wealthy aristocrat with the blood of the Cecils in his veins, had during his whole life been dealing with international affairs, of which the Premier knew less than nothing, but he was essentially a dilettante and a philosopher, a Liberal by disposition whom circumstances had made a Conservative leader, and a man with whom anything mundane counted for little.

The American President, Mr. Wilson, was a man of another type. He came of a line of Cumberland yeomen who for three generations had been settled in the States, and had inherited from them some of the mysticism which hangs about the fells. His training had been purely academic, and had tended, therefore, to keep him apart from the stern realities of practical life. In temperament and in mentality the President perhaps resembled the German Emperor, but circumstances had made him the autocrat, not of an Empire, but of a class-room. Like William II., he may at times have imagined himself inspired, but with inspirations of a far more kindly nature. Possibly amongst great historical figures he finds his closest prototype in Mahomet, but Mahomet had toiled as a camel driver and had fled from his enemies into the wilderness before he published the Koran. From the headship of Princeton University Mr. Wilson, at the whim of a newspaper proprietor, had been summoned to be Governor of New Jersey and from thence as Democratic President to the White House at Washington. He owed his election largely to Irish and German American votes. Of Europe he knew little save from the knowledge which he had gained during a few flying visits. Largely owing to his influence, the United States had remained neutral during the first years of the world war, and it was not until after his re-election to office that Germany had, by her persistence in sinking merchant ships, forced him to enter the field against her. In the President's

eyes the object of the contest was to make democracy safe and to end war for ever, by bringing about a permanent League of Nations. Neither cessions of territory nor indemnities were to be demanded by the victors; at most Alsace and Lorraine were to be restored to France, and the Turks were to be sent back to Asia. He forgot that under the constitution of the United States the Treaty-making power lies with the Senate, in which he had not an assured majority, and he started for Europe without consulting the leaders of the Republican opposition as to their views about the settlement. He had taken the lead in opening the negotiations for the Armistice, and it was alleged by the Germans that they had signed it on his proposed terms.

The President was little known in Europe, where the American system of Government was, as a rule, equally little understood. It was unfortunate, therefore, that from the moment when he set foot in Liverpool he was acclaimed by all, from the King to the dock labourer, as the destined saviour of Mankind. Not every brain can stand Hosannas nor remember in the hour of triumph that the road from Bethany ended in the Street of Pain.

Such were the personages who dominated the Congress of Paris, and they formed a strange contrast to the statesmen who drew up the Treaty of Vienna. Wellington, Castlereagh, Talleyrand, and Metternich had no illusions. They cared nothing for popular aspirations, and may never have heard of the principle of nationality, but their handiwork kept, in the main, peace unbroken in Europe for forty years. But the men who drafted the Treaty of Versailles were idealists and demagogues, whose mental training had been derived from books, and whose influence had been won through the ballot box, and who, therefore, were temperamentally unable to take any clear line of action without considering how it would influence the outside world, whether well or ill-informed. It might have been well had the soldiers, who won the war, drawn up the peace.

The Supreme Council tried to secure two incompatible objects. A League of Nations, founded on the basis of reconciliation by mutual forbearance, was to unite mankind for all time, and yet the wrong doers were to be punished, reparation assured to their victims, and material guarantees exacted to prevent

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the vanquished from preparing for revenge. The Last Judgment was to be conducted on the principles of the Sermon on the Mount. The task was one too great for human intellects to compass, and, it may be feared, was very imperfectly achieved.

Many months were spent in drawing up the Covenant for the League of Nations, which at President Wilson's request, was incorporated in the Treaty, in order to facilitate its acceptance by the American Senate. No effective steps, however, were taken to provide the League with the material instruments required to enforce its decisions upon recalcitrant members, but an article in the Covenant which laid down, though in vague terms, that every individual signatory was pledged to aid the League in carrying them out against an offender provoked violent opposition in the United States, on the ground that they would thus for all time be committed to intervention in European affairs.

When the Covenant of the League of Nations had been drawn up, the Supreme Council at length turned to the work of drafting the conditions to be exacted from Germany and her allies. France, bleeding at every pore, and remembering but too well that, since the commencement of the French Revolution, her soil had been occupied five times by armies from beyond the Rhine, was above all anxious for reparations and security; England, crippled by a struggle in which her enemies had employed every trick which the most devilish ingenuity could suggest, longed for their punishment. America alone, which had suffered but little from the war, which had millions of German and Irish voters on her electoral rolls, and whose chiefs of finance were for the most part of German origin, could come forward as the magnanimous philanthropist. To a certain extent she achieved her purpose. William II. was allowed to remain in his Dutch exile, and with the full assent of M. Clemenceau, Coblentz and Cologne were left under the German flag. The German Colonies were divided amongst their conquerors as mandatories of the League of Nations with provisions for the well-being of their inhabitants. England, however, prevented the definition of the Freedom of the Seas, in the sense in which it is understood by American jurists, from being incorporated in the Treaty. She knew what the Right of Search and the Blockade had done for the Allies in the late war.

The terms presented to Germany were severe, but, so far as

they regarded the geographical distribution of the world, they were inspired almost solely by the principle of Nationality at the expense of strategic and economic considerations. The new map of Europe and the Near East seemed a patchwork designed by a lunatic. History went for nothing. Language alone was recognized as the title to the status of nationhood. Tribes, which since the earliest times, had never enjoyed the privileges of independence became sovereign states. Russia was cut off from the Baltic by a mosaic of republics, which had derived their civilisation from Germany or Sweden, and which had hitherto been under the control of the descendants of their German conquerors. To Mr. Lloyd George Esthonia, Lettland, or Lithuania was the equal of Spain or France. To one nation only which had been freed from the Russian yoke, he was thoroughly hostile. The Freedom of Poland had been the dream of Liberals for generations and France sought in an alliance with a strong Poland the security against Germany which she had hitherto found in her alliance with Russia. The English Premier, at the last moment, caused the claims of Poland to Upper Silesia to be submitted to a popular vote, and would gladly have denied her access to the sea.

So far as her territorial losses were concerned, Germany escaped comparatively lightly. She restored Alsace Lorraine to France, and handed over West Prussia and the Polish districts of Posen to Poland, but the fate of Schleswig and of the Mazurian districts of East Prussia, as well as of Upper Silesia, was left to be determined by a popular vote. In the end, though Denmark recovered the Danish portions of Schleswig, Germany retained Kiel, whilst East Prussia remained German, and Upper Silesia was divided. Danzig was made a Free City, and Memel was reserved as an outlet for Lithuania to the sea. France, as some compensation for the destruction of her coal mines, was allowed to occupy the Saar district for fifteen years. Finally the Hohenzollerns were deposed, and the Republic agreed to hand them over to the allies, should they return to Germany, to be placed on trial for their crimes.

Once more Germany was the gainer by her treatment of Russia. The Allies were, above all things, anxious to maintain the Government of the Republic in existence not only as the sole means for insuring that the treaty should be carried into effect, but in order to hold back the influx of Russian doctrines into Western Europe. With this object they not only left it to Germany to punish the

war criminals, but allowed her to retain the most important industrial districts of Silesia, and refused to sanction any extension of the French Zone of Occupation. Their foresight was in some degree repaid when the Republic put down the Communist risings at Munich and in the Ruhr Valley with a severity which the Empire had never dared to exercise.

They showed, perhaps, less foresight when they conducted their diplomatic relations with Germany in a manner which achieved the complete unification of the Empire. The former Imperial Constitution had recognized the status of the members of the Confederation as independent sovereign states, united with one another by Treaties which exactly defined their relations with the central power. As we have seen, France, even after the establishment of the Empire, had concluded separate treaties with Bavaria and the other South German States. In the Republican Constitution, however, the various members of the Empire were described as "Lands" or "Provinces," and their relations with the Central Authority were laid down in a law enacted by a National Assembly; in other words, Bavaria and Wurtemberg were reduced to cantons, whose status was that of Geneva or the Grisons in the Swiss Confederation. Thus, as in any imaginable republic representation is based upon population, the preponderance of Prussia has been stereotyped in perpetuity, whereas, had the powers concluded treaties with every member of the Confederation separately, it might have been possible so to remodel the territorial divisions of Germany as to abolish the Prussian supremacy, without doing any violence to the feelings of the populations affected. The inhabitants of Prussian Saxony, which was annexed to Prussia in 1815, still describe themselves as "Must be Prussians," and the Hanoverians feel little attachment for their fellow citizens in Brandenburg. Since 1918, seven principalities in Thuringia, proud as they were of their ancient independence, have voluntarily united into Thuringen Land, and Saxe-Coburg has annexed itself to Bavaria.

Austria-Hungary was far more harshly treated than her ally. Regardless of the economic relations of the Danube basin, all her Slav and Ruman territories were wrested from her, and Vienna was left to fall into ruin as the capital of a few Alpine pastures. Italy may yet regret the policy which by driving the Austrian Germans into the arms of Germany may give her Germany as her neighbour on the Brenner. The reconstruction of the Danubian

and Balkan lands was carried out by men who looked upon the theory of Nationality almost as a gift from Heaven. Had they devoted as much attention to the formation of a Danubian League and a Balkans League as they gave to their schemes for clondlands, they might have done something to ensure the continuance of Peace. That Bulgaria was deprived of her outlet to the Ægean, and that the Turks, despite Mr. Lloyd George's solemn pledges, were left at Constantinople, whilst Asia Minor was divided up into European spheres of Influence were worthy pendants to the other arrangements of the Conference. In Asia, the Japanese were allowed a position in China which the Americans looked upon as likely to deprive their trade of an "Open Door" into the Celestial Empire, and which the Chinese resented as an interference with their independence.

Such were the series of Treaties concluded at Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, and Sèvres between the Allies and their late enemies, and which, for a time, seemed only to have sown the seed of fresh wars. The refusal of the American Senate to sanction the Treaty of Versailles, on the ground that it involved the United States in obligations abroad, or to join England in guaranteeing to protect France against Germany struck a heavy blow at the foundation on which the League of Nations has been reared. It is difficult to realise how a body which America and Russia have refused to join and from which Germany is as yet excluded can do much to secure the peace of the world. Nor is a Russia shut out from the sea likely to acquiesce in the destruction of the work of Peter the Great, or to remain content whilst Kronstadt is commanded by Finnish and Esthonian batteries. The aristocrats of the Congress of Vienna were wiser in their generation than the democrats of the Congress of Versailles.

Such has been in outline the History of Germany from 1631 to 1920, perhaps rather from the Treaty of Westphalia to the Treaty of Versailles. It shows how profoundly the Thirty Years War has influenced the destinies of Mankind. Had Germany retained the place which she held in Europe until 1618, it is probable that France and England would have remained second-rate powers, and that Democracy in its modern form would not have come into existence. In 1618 Germany possessed the skilled industries and to a large extent controlled the capital of the world. Not twenty years had elapsed since that fourth of August 1598, when Queen Elizabeth, by abolishing the secular privileges of the Hansa, had,

for the first time, left the trade of England free. When the Thirty Years War began, England and Holland had, to a certain extent, become competitors with Central Europe through their intercourse with Russia and the East Indies, but their relations with America were only contraband. Had the Hanse Towns at that time come to an agreement with Spain on the terms offered to them in 1627, Spain, with their aid, might have retained all her American and most of her East Indian possessions. Under such conditions, France and England could scarcely have become Colonial powers.

Nor would the preponderance of Germany have proved less inimical to the development of democracy. German mentality has never looked with favour upon the Rights of Man as an individual. In the earliest times the freemen lorded over a population of slaves. In later days the so-called "Liberties of Germany" concerned only her rulers; their subjects had but to obey. Even the Reformation was, in the main, the work of the princes. Religion, as such, has rarely played the part in German public life which it has played in Scotland or in England. We may, perhaps, therefore argue that a strong central power in Germany would have confined the effects of the French Revolution within the borders of France.

During the Thirty Years War the wealth of Germany vanished, and her population was reduced from sixteen to four millions.

The Peace of Westphalia left the Empire the shadow of a shade. For five generations Germany was divided into three hundred and fifteen all but independent states in which the prince and the state were one, and the well being of everyone of its members depended upon his favour. Few or no accumulations of private capital existed. No undertaking of any magnitude could be carried out without the assistance of the state. Thus the importance of the State personified in its ruler and acting through a bureaucracy as its agent was enormously enhanced, and to ensure its smooth working the individual came to be looked upon merely as a part of the state machine. Civil and military life were organised on the same pattern. The subject, like the soldier, had to carry out his superior's commands without question. It was for the ruler alone to decide as to the means for promoting his well-being, both in this world and in the next.

Politics played no part in the life of the ordinary man; Religion was, as yet, confined within the bounds of dogma, so, if he wished

to exercise his higher reasoning faculties, he must do so on theoretical subjects alone. Thus, apart from such subjects as Law and Medicine, Philosophy and Philology held the chief place in advanced education. Providence, it was said, had bestowed upon the German Universities the Empire of the Air. As the State recruited its servants from amongst the educated classes, theory, as apart from practical experience, came to assume an undue importance in their mental equipment. To the German of the early Nineteenth Century, Philosophy was all that the Bible was to John Bunyan or to Burns' cottar. This was more especially the case in Protestant Germany.

The Thirty Years War had left, as we have seen, Brandenburg and the other Prussian lands east of the Elbe with their non-German and half-Christianised populations as the sole nucleus round which a new Germany might one day be built up. The half Slavonic Prussians were as clay in the hands of their ruler and in Prussia alone of Western lands was it possible for the ruler to obtain a complete mastery over his subjects' minds without sharing his power with a church. It was a disaster, therefore, that the Empire was refounded by a Prussian, for Prussia was the only intelligent despotism in the world, and Prussian ideals had little in common with those of Western Europe or even of the rest of Germany. Yet through the force of circumstances those ideals did much to transform the mentality of other nations in a sense wholly contrary to their traditional development.

The meteor-like rise of Germany and the military and economic successes apparently obtained by its administration did not fail to lead thinkers to consider the part which the State might play in the promotion of human happiness. In English eyes the State had, hitherto, been a policeman. It left the individual free to develop in any way which might increase the well-being of Society and of himself. The work of administration was, in the main carried on by unpaid agencies. Even the semi-socialistic Elizabethan Poor Law had been administered by elected municipalities and by justices, themselves the largest taxpayers, who, though appointed by the Queen's Lieutenant, had little inducement to disregard the opinion of their neighbours. The central government counted for scarcely anything with the masses.

It was only after the French Revolution that Englishmen began to take a different view of the functions of the state, and for this change of outlook the influence of Germany has been mainly

responsible. During the greater part of the Eighteenth Century German thought carried little weight in England. It so happened, however, that the Augustan Age of German Literature coincided with a moment when the Revolution had discredited everything French, and thus German theories came to occupy a somewhat undue position in English intellectual life, especially at the Universities, at a time when political power was passing into comparatively inexperienced hands. Owing largely to the Prince Consort, Germany continued to exercise the influence over English education which she had thus acquired until the rapid progress made by the German Empire convinced a class of public men, who were influenced by theoretical knowledge rather than by practical experience, that social betterment could best be insured by following German methods. To this cause we may assign both the excessive growth of bureaucracy since the establishment of Democratic government, a growth which has not taken place in the United States, and also the development of Socialism as a revolutionary force. Socialism, indeed, in a great measure springs from the belief that the State is all powerful. Consequently, those who wish to promote the well-being of Mankind must bring the State under their control. Of this doctrine Class warfare is a natural corollary.

Lastly we have to consider whether or not the German Republic is established on a firm basis, and whether militarism has been permanently banished from the German mind.

History gives us little ground for hope. The German has been accustomed to obey and from his earliest years has been trained to look upon himself not as a man but as a part of the state machine. He has rarely shown any political initiative. Hence it is but reasonable to suppose that the control of the State will remain in the hands of those who have hitherto carried on the administration, and no task is more difficult than that of transforming the mentality of bureaucrats and of soldiers. Yet, if Peace is to be preserved, it is indispensable that the German Republic should be governed in reality, not merely in appearance, by men to whom Prussianism is an anathema. The expulsion of the Hohenzollerns counts for nothing if the mantle of Frederick the Great has fallen on the shoulders of the new rulers of Germany.

The power of Prussia sprang from the Thirty Years War and we may, therefore, look upon that war as one of the primary causes of the contest which has drenched the world in blood. A

Germany united, as but for Gustaf Adolf it might have been, under a Hapsburg, might have remained inert and stagnant; a Germany united under rulers inspired with the spirit of the Hohenzollerns has proved a curse to Mankind.

Those who are called upon to take part in public life, more especially those whose work it is to deal with the relations between peoples, may, perhaps, study the history of that war with profit. It may teach them how much nations may have to suffer from the mistakes of those set over them, and how the consequences of those mistakes may endure even to the tenth generation. Democracy is now its own master. May it realise that the lessons of the past are not without value to the present!

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	2	[<i>Mantua</i> , Francia, 676, Priandi to Duke, 7 January, 1628.]
23	1	[<i>R.H.M.C. Aldeburgh</i> , pp. 289-294, especially to Corporation, 1626, July 12.]
	2	[Do., <i>Aldeburgh</i> , pp. 289-294, Certificates from the Deputy Lieutenants of the county of Suffolk for assistance for Aldeburgh.]
26	1	[<i>Coke Papers</i> , cit., Vol. I., 1627.]
27	1	[<i>Turin</i> , Spagna, 19, Tarantaise, 22 June, 20 March, 13 April, 1627.]
29	1	[<i>Villa</i> , op. cit., pp. 459-473, Spinola to Philip IV., 17 April, 1627. (Simancas, Est. leg., 2,318.) Do. to do., Brussels, 22 July, 1627. (Do., leg., 2,319).]
30	1	[<i>Brussels</i> , E. et G., 196, Philip IV. to Infanta, 23 April, 1627. Droysen, G., cit., Vol. I., pp. 34-49, as to Philip II's Plans.]
31	1	[<i>Forster</i> cit., Vol. I., pp. 124-126, Wallenstein to Arnim, 2 Nov.; pp. 143-144, do. to do., 21 Nov.; pp. 147-149, do. to do., 22 Nov.; p. 152, do. to do., 23 Nov.; pp. 155-156, do. to do., 24 Nov., 1627.]
32	1	[<i>Turin</i> , Ing. 4, Bundle II., Scaglia, Brussels, 13, 14 May, 1627.]
36	1	[Do., Scaglia, Amsterdam, 12 June. The Hague, 22 June, 26 July, 4, 29 Aug., 1627.]
	2	[<i>Villa</i> , op. cit., p. 466, Spinola to Philip IV., Brussels, 22 July, 1627. (Simancas, Est. leg., 2,319).]
37	1	[<i>Rooses</i> , Rubens, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 254-255. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 13 May; p. 258, Note; pp. 264-265, 28 May; p. 269, 4 June, 1627. Gachet, Rubens, op. cit., pp. 126-128, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 1 July, 1627.]
38	1	[<i>Villa</i> , op. cit., pp. 459-473, Spinola to Philip IV., Undated, Brussels. (Simancas, Est. leg., 2,041.) Do. to do., Brussels, 20 Oct., 1627. (Simancas, Est.

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- leg., 2,319.) Council of State, 6 Nov., 1627. (*Simancas, Est. leg.*, 2,041.) *Brussels, E. et G.*, 132, Antonio Martinez to Spinola, 4 Aug., 1627. *H.M.C. Rep.*, *Earl Cowper, Vol. I., Coke Papers*, 1627. *Gachet*, Rubens, op. cit., Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 12, 19 Aug., 2 Sept., 1627.]
- 2 [Gachet, op. cit., pp. 135-136, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 19 Aug., 1627.]
- 3 [Villa, op. cit., pp. 459-473, Spinola to Philip IV., 1627, *let. cit. Mantua, Francia*, 676, Priandi, 30 Oct., 20 Nov., 1627.]
- 39 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 197, Philip IV. to Infanta, 11 Nov., 1627. Infanta to Philip IV., 11 Dec., 1627.]
- 2 [Gachet, op. cit., pp. 258-259, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, Antwerp, Undated, 1630.]
- 40 1 [Turin, Ing. 4, Bundle II., Scaglia, London, January, 1628.]
- 2 [Villa, op. cit., pp. 460-473. (Cf. *Simancas, Estado, leg.*, 2,041, Council of State, 6 Nov., 1627.)]
- 41 1 [Villa, op. cit., Spinola to Philip IV., 4 Jan., 1628. (*Simancas, Est. leg.*, 2,319.) Infanta to Philip IV. (*Sim.*, *Est. leg.*, 2,320.) *Rooses*, op. cit., Vol. IV., p. 163. *Gachet*, op. cit., pp. 157-158, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 15 Jan., 1628. *Mantua, Francia*, 675, Priandi, 20 Nov., 1627, as to the ruinous state of Fort Sandvliet.]

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- 42 1 [Mantua, Francia, 675, Priandi, 8 Feb., 23 Oct., 1627.]
- 44 1 [Turin, Ing. 4, Bundle II., Scaglia, London. (An undated paper addressed to the Prince of Piedmont. In Scaglia's handwriting.) Probably dates from the beginning of 1626, but is with papers of 1627-1628.]
- 2 [Cf. *Mantua, Francia*, 675, Priandi, 9 January, 1626.]
- 3 [Do., Priandi, 9, 14 March, 1626.]
- 4 [Do., Priandi, 18 July, 1626.]
- 46 1 [London, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 34,311, Wake to Conway, 14 Sept., 1626.]
- 2 [Do., do. to do., 5 Oct., 1626.]
- 3 [Mantua, Francia, 675, Priandi, 3 October, 1626.]
- 47 1 [Turin, Ing. 4, Scaglia, London, May, 1626.]
- 2 [Mantua, Francia, 675, Priandi, 19 Sept., 3 Oct., 1626.]
- 51 1 [Bassompierre, op. cit., ed., 1875, Vol. III., pp. 254-282, His Mission to England. *Mantua*, do., Priandi, 21, 27 Dec., 1626.]
- 2 [Do., Priandi, 8 Feb., 1627.]
- 52 1 [Do., Priandi, 23 Oct., 1627.]
- 2 [Bassompierre, Vol. III., pp. 290-292.]
- 3 [Mantua, Priandi, 24 April, 1627.]
- 4 [Coke Papers, cit., 1627.]
- 5 [Genoa, Let. Min., No. 2,543, Vienna, 26. Celio Levanto to Senate, 27 February, 1627.]

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53	1	[<i>Mantua, Francia</i> , 675, Priandi, 15 May, 1627.]
	2	[<i>Coke Papers</i> , April, 1627.]
	3	[<i>Mantua</i> , Priandi, 9 April, 1627.]
	4	[<i>Coke Papers</i> , April, 1627.]
	5	[<i>Mantua</i> , Priandi, 9 April, 6, 20 June, 16 Aug., 1627.]
54	1	[<i>Mervault</i> , "Histoire du dernier Siège de la Rochelle," sub dato, 23 July, 1627. <i>Bassompierre</i> Ed., 1692. Vol. II., pp. 492 et seqq. Cf., p. 410. Ed., 1875, Vol. III. pp. 290-292.]
55	1	[<i>Mervault</i> , op. cit., Oct., 1627, Instructions to Deputation from La Rochelle to Charles I. Reply of Louis XIII. <i>Bassompierre</i> , op. cit. Vol. II., pp. 402 et seqq. <i>Mantua</i> , Priandi, 16 Aug., 1627.]
56	1	[<i>Bassompierre</i> [Ed., 1692], Vol. II., p. 410. <i>Murray, John</i> , "Guide to France," Vol. I., pp. 191-192.]
57	1	[<i>Coke Papers</i> , 1627.]
58	1	[<i>Krüner</i> , op. cit., pp. 99-101. For Rusdorf's life after leaving England, <i>id.</i> , pp. 101-122.]
59	1	[<i>London, Brit. Mus., Add.</i> , 34,311. Wake, 27 Aug., 1627; 18 Dec., 1630.]
61	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 196. Infanta to Philip IV., 23 May. Do. E. et G., 197. Philip IV. to Infanta, 1 June, 1627. (Printed in C. Villamecil, "Rubens, Diplomatico Español," p. 138.) Do. to Mirabel, 1 June, 1627.]
	2	[<i>Brussels</i> , do., 196, Philip IV. to Infanta, 11 April, 1627. <i>Rooses</i> , op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 77-80. Do., pp. 115-117. Gerbier to Rubens, 6 Sept., 1627. <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 197, D. Diego Mexia to Philip IV., 8 June, 1627.]
62	1	[<i>Rooses</i> , op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 90-95, Carleton to Conway, 13 July, 1627.]
	2	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 197, Philip IV. to Infanta, 15 June, 5, 7 Aug., 1627.]
63	1	[<i>Mantua, Spagna</i> , 617, Striggi, Madrid, 21 Aug., 1627.]
	2	[<i>Mervault</i> , 22 July, 10 Aug., 1627.]
64	1	[Do., 27 Oct., 1627, <i>Mantua</i> . Do., Priandi, 16 Aug., 1627.]
	2	[Do., Priandi, 16 Aug., 2, 16 Oct., 1627.]
65	1	[Do., Priandi, 24 Sept., 2, 8, 16 Oct., 1627. As to the English inclinations of the Rochellers, Cf. Priandi, 16 Aug., 1627. <i>Mervault</i> , Jan., 1628.]
66	1	[<i>Mantua</i> , Priandi, Despatches quoted and <i>Mervault</i> , 23 Oct., 1627.]
	2	[<i>Mantua</i> , Priandi, Aug., Sept., Oct., 1627, <i>lett. cit.</i> For Aerssens' engineer Cf. <i>Mantua, Francia</i> , 673, Priandi, 22 Nov., 1625, and as to Dyke, <i>Mervault</i> , 17 Oct., 1627. <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., p. 337.]
67	1	[<i>London, Brit. Mus., MSS. Dept., Harl.</i> , 6,988, Charles I. to Buckingham 22 July, 2, 20 Sept., 1 Oct., 6 Nov., 1627. King of Bohemia to do., 26 Dec., 1627. Queen of Bohemia to do., 16 Jan., 1628.]
69	1	[<i>Mantua</i> , Priandi, Sept., Oct., 1627. <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., pp. 292-329.]
71	1	[<i>Mantua</i> , Priandi, Nov., 1627. <i>Turin</i> , Ing. 4, Scaglia, London, 21, 24 Nov., 1627. <i>Mervault</i> , Oct. 8, 11, 17 Nov., 1627. <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., pp. 319-329.]

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72	1	[<i>London, Brit. Mus.</i> , Wake, 26 Nov., 10 Dec., 1627.]
	2	[<i>Turin, Ing. 4</i> , Scaglia, London, 1 Nov., 1627.]
	3	[<i>Turin, do.</i> , Scaglia, The Hague, 11 Sept., 1627.]
74	1	[<i>Turin, Ing. 4</i> , Scaglia, Brussels 13 May. Amsterdam, 10 June, 1627. <i>Brussels E. et G.</i> 196. Infanta to Philip IV., 23 May, 1627.]
75	1	[<i>Roses</i> Vol. IV., pp. 70-72, Rubens to Gerbier, 19 May; pp. 268-269, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 4 June, 1627.]
77	1	[<i>Turin, Ing. 4</i> , Scaglia, The Hague, 12 July, 1627.]
	2	[<i>Roses</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 47-49, Gerbier's account of the origin of his negotiations with Rubens. <i>Gachet</i> , Preface, p. xxxv., Rubens' negotiations with England.]
78	1	[This letter is in the Archives of Mantua. Information from Cav. A. Luzio.]
	2	[<i>Roses</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 42-49, p. 59, Spinola to Gerbier, 24 Feb.; Buckingham to Gerbier, 9 March, 1627.]
79	1	[<i>Roses</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 47-49, p. 61, Buckingham to Gerbier, <i>let. cit.</i>]
80	1	[<i>Roses</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 57-58, Gerbier to Rubens, 9 March; pp. 59-60, Buckingham to Gerbier, <i>cit.</i> ; p. 65, Memorandum by Charles I.; p. 66, Buckingham to Rubens, 19 March, 1627, p. 67, Infanta to Philip IV., 17 April, 1627. (<i>Two letters</i>).]
	2	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 196, Infanta to Philip IV., 23 May, 1627, <i>cit.</i>]
81	1	[<i>Turin, Ing. 4</i> , Scaglia, The Hague, 12 July, "Answer of England to Savoy as regards Mediation," 4 Aug., 11 Sept., 1627.]
83	1	[<i>Turin, Ing. 4</i> , Scaglia, London, 1, 21, 24 Nov., 14 Dec., 1627, endorsing Buckingham's "Answer to proposals made by the Danish Ambassador," 28 Dec., 1627. "What the King of France said to the Danish Ambassadors about 20 Sept., 1627, when they were leaving for England," also for Buckingham's views.]
84	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 197, Philip IV. to Infanta, 15 June. Infanta to Philip IV., 22 July, 1627.]
85	1	[<i>Roses</i> , Vol. IV., p. 98, p. 102, pp. 120-122, Gerbier to Rubens, 15 Sept.; pp. 122-130, Rubens to Gerbier, 18 Sept., 1627.]
86	1	[<i>Do.</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 131-133, Mexia to Olivares, 18 Sept., 1627.]
	2	[<i>Reigersborch</i> , <i>op. cit.</i> , pp. 90-92, Reigersborch to Grotius, 4 Oct., 1627.]
	3	[<i>Bering-Lüsberg</i> , <i>op. cit.</i> , Section III., pp. 349-360, <i>Times</i> "Historians, etc.," <i>op. cit.</i> , Vol. XXIV., Turkey.]
87	1	[<i>Reigersborch</i> , <i>op. cit.</i> , pp. 91-92, Reigersborch to Grotius, 9 Oct., 1627. Cf. Note 1, p. 92.]
	2	[<i>Do.</i> , pp. 89-90, Reigersborch to Grotius, 25 Sept., p. 97. <i>Do. to do.</i> , 23 Oct.; p. 105, <i>do. to do.</i> , 30 Dec., 1627.]
	3	[<i>Roses</i> , Vol. IV., p. 136, Rubens to Gerbier; p. 137, Gerbier to Cerusac, 25 Sept., 1627.]
88	1	[<i>Do.</i> , Vol. IV., p. 139, Conway to Gerbier, 4 Oct., 1627.]
	2	[<i>Do.</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 123 <i>et seqq.</i> , Rubens to Gerbier, 18 Sept., 1627.]
	3	[<i>Mantua, Spagna</i> , 617, Striggi, Madrid, 4 Sept., 1627.]

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90	1	[<i>Rooses</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 140, <i>et seqq.</i> , Council of State, 6 Oct., 1627.]
	2	[<i>Do.</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 158-159, Rubens to Spinola, 17 Dec., 1627, enclosing Gerbier's letters; pp. 161-162, Spinola to Rubens, 21 Dec., 1627.]

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92	1	[<i>Coke MSS.</i> , 1627, do., April, 1627, for Pennington.]
	2	[<i>Mervault</i> , 20-23, Nov., 1627.]
	3	[<i>Bassompierre</i> , Ed., 1692, Vol. II., pp. 438-441. Ed., 1875, Vol. III., p. 337.]
93	1	[<i>Mervault</i> , 28 Nov., 25 Dec., 1627. <i>Murray, John</i> , "Guide to France," Vol. I., pp. 191-192.]
	2	[<i>Mantua</i> , Priandi, 13, 20, 27 Nov., 1627. <i>Rooses</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 338-339, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 16 Dec.; pp. 340-341, do., 30 Dec., 1627.]
	3	[<i>Coke Papers</i> , Nov., Dec., 1627.]
97	1	[<i>Mervault</i> , 3, 11, 15, 23, 30 Jan., 30 March, 1628.]
	2	[<i>Coke Papers</i> , Dec., 1627; Jan., Feb., 1628.]
98	1	[<i>Cal. State Papers, For. Venetian</i> , Vol. XXI., p. 39, Zorzi to Doge, Paris, 31 March, 1628.]
99	1	[<i>Mervault</i> , 29 Feb., 12-13, March, 1628.]
100	1	[<i>Rooses</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 356-357, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 27 Jan., 1628. <i>Gachet</i> , p. 165, J. Dupuy to Gevaerts, Paris, 24 Jan., 1628. <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., pp. 353-355. <i>Villa</i> , pp. 461-472, <i>Mervault</i> , 28 Jan., 1628.]
101	1	[<i>Mantua</i> , Priandi, 3, 7 Jan., 22 Feb., 1628.]
102	1	[<i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , p. 101, 20 May, 1628, Zorzi to Doge; pp. 52-53, do. to do., 12 April, 1628. <i>Gachet</i> , pp. 191-193, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 27 April, 1628.]
103	1	[<i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , pp. 71-72, Alvise Contarini to Doge, London, 29 April; p. 91, Giovanni Soranzo to Doge, Hague, 15 May, 1628. (<i>Cf. Gachet</i> , pp. 198-199, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 1 June, 1628), p. 173, Zorzi to Doge, 10 July, 1628.]
105	1	[<i>Turin, Ing.</i> 4, Bundle II., Scaglia, London, 11 Feb. 15, 29, March, 1628.]
106	1	[<i>Do.</i> , Scaglia, London, 29 March, 1628. <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> ; p. 71, Contarini to Doge, 29 April, 1628.]
107	1	[<i>Turin, Ing.</i> 4, Scaglia, 4, 17 April, 1628. <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 198, Infanta to Philip IV., 14 April. Philip IV. to Infanta, 1 May, 1628. <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> ; p. 173, Zorzi to Doge, 10 July, 1628. <i>Cf.</i> , do., p. 73.]
108	1	[<i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., p. 360, p. 362.]
	2	[<i>Do.</i> , Vol. II., pp. 454-457, pp. 465-476 (ed. 1692). <i>Mervault</i> , 13 Jan. 4 Feb., 12-13 March, 1628.]
110	1	[<i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. II., pp. 477-482 (ed. 1692), Vol. III., pp. 371-376 (ed. 1875). <i>Mervault</i> , 11-18 May, 1628. <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , Zorzi, 14 June, 1628.]
111	1	[<i>Do.</i> , p. 131, Contarini, 15 June; p. 132, Soranzo, 19 June, 1628. <i>Rel. Parliament</i> , Vol. I., p. 467, D.N.B., Vol. X., p. 430, Clarke, Edward.]

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112	1	[<i>Cal. S.P. For.</i> , Ven. XXI., p. 110, Soranzo, 12 June; p. 121, Contarini, 15 June, 1628. <i>Mervault</i> , 22-30 Jan., 1628.]
114	1	[Ven. XXI., Preface, pp. x.-xi. for Denbigh's expedition; pp. 109-110, Contarini, 30 May; p. 157, do., 15 June, 1628. <i>H.M.C. Rep.</i> , Plymouth, p. 542.]
	2	[<i>Mervault</i> , 21, 24 May, 13 June, 1628.]
	3	[Ven. XXI., p. 151, Contarini, 15 June, 1628.]
115	1	[<i>Coke MSS.</i> , cit., 1628.]
	2	[<i>Mervault</i> , 21 May, 10, 15 June, 1628. <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., pp. 377-379. Ven. XXI., pp. 100-101, Zorzi, 26 May, 1628.]
116	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 631. <i>Corr. Hist.</i> , 1628, "Advis d'Issoire, 25 May, 1628.]
117	1	[<i>Mantua, Francia</i> , 676, Gazzoldo to Duke. Camp at Maran, 25 May, 1628.]
118	1	[<i>Mervault</i> , 1 June, 1628. <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., pp. 377-379.]
119	1	[<i>Coke MSS.</i> , cit., 1628.]
	2	[Ven. XXI., p. 107, Contarini, 29 May, 1628.]
120	1	[<i>Coke MSS.</i> , cit., 1628.]
	2	[<i>Cotton, Sir Robert</i> , "The Dangers wherein this kingdom now standeth, and their remedy," pp. 12-16.]
121	1	[<i>Cotton</i> , cit., pp. 12-16.]
	2	[<i>Do.</i> , p. 1.]
	3	[<i>Do.</i> , pp. 16-21.]
122	1	[<i>Bacon</i> , "Considerations touching the Warre with Spaine, etc.," pp. 42-45, <i>Coke MSS.</i> , cit., 1626, 1627, 1628. <i>Cotton</i> refs., cit.]
123	1	[<i>Royal Hist. MSS. Comm. Reports</i> . Rye, p. 185, p. 189, pp. 190-191; Wodehouse, E. R., pp. 440-451; For Recusants, p. 445, p. 449; Kenyon, pp. 33-35; Delawarr, p. 289; Yarmouth, pp. 309-310; Aldeburgh, cit., Lowndes, G. A., News of Rochelle, 11 July, 1628. <i>Coke MSS.</i> , cit., 1626, 1627-1628. <i>Cal. S. P. For.</i> Ven. XXI., pp. 357-360. Contarini, 25 Oct., 1628. <i>Winchester, County of Hampshire. Records of J.P.'s in Quarter Sessions, Liber Ordinum</i> (1628-1649), April 2, July 2, Dec. 31, 1628.]

As to Isle of Wight.

- London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I.*, Vol. 80, No. 68. *Docquet*. Vol. 8, Nov. 14, 1624. [Conway Papers.] Vol. 89, No. 138 [Conway Papers.] Orders for Isle of Wight, 15 Aug., 1626. Cf. "Privy Council Register" a few days earlier. "*Times*," 14 Nov., 1905, "Nomination of Sheriffs." Vol. 89, No. 138 [Conway Papers.] Instructions to Captain General of Isle of Wright, 15 Aug., 1624. As to Deputy Lieutenants Inspecting Arms. *S.P. Dom., Jas. I.*, Vol. 156, No. 4, Cecil to Conway, 26 Dec., 1623. *Coke MSS.* As to Swansea, *R.H.M. Comm. Rep.* Delawarr, p. 290, 16 July, 1628.]
- 2 [R.H. MSS. Comm. Rep., Lowndes, G. A., "News of Rochelle," 11 July, 1628.]

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124	1	[<i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , pp. 118-119, Zorzi, 12 June, 1628. <i>Mervault</i> , June 10, 24, 1628.]
	2	[<i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , p. 173, Zorzi, July 10 1628.]
127	1	[<i>Lefebvre</i> , op. cit., Vol. II., pp. 502-508. <i>Gibbs, George</i> , "Life of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham." Zouch's Epitaph. <i>S.P. Dom. Charles I.</i> , 1627-1628 ; p. 456, 1627, Dec. 3, Hipposley to Buckingham ; p. 457, Dec. 8, "Plans for seizing fortified town in France," <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> ; p. 215, 1628, Aug. 7, Angelo Contarini, Rome ; p. 248, Corner, Turin, Aug. 29 ; p. 628, do., Dec. 29, 1627. [<i>Cf. Index</i> , p. 686]. <i>London, Brit. Mus.</i> , cit., Wake to Conway, Feb. 10, 1629. <i>Mercure Français</i> , Vol. 14, No. 208. <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , p. 279, Angelo Contarini, Rome, 9 Sept., 1628. For Dalbier's Cavalry, <i>Cf.</i> , do., p. 211, Contarini, London, Aug. 7, 1628.]
	2	[<i>Mervault</i> , June 16, 30, July, 1628.]
	3	[<i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , p. 173, Zorzi, July 10, 1628. As to Richelieu's letter, <i>Cf. Mervault</i> , July 8, 1628.]
128	1	[<i>Coke MSS.</i> , July, Aug., 1628. <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , p. 243, Contarini, 22 Aug., 1628.]
129	1	[<i>Coke MSS.</i> , July, Aug., 1628.]
	2	[<i>Mervault</i> , July 26, Sep. 14, 1628. <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , p. 225, Contarini, 14 Aug., 1628 ; pp. 316-317, Contarini to Zorzi, Undated.]
130	1	[<i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , p. 233, Contarini, 28 Aug. ; p. 236, Vincent to Rochelle, 17 Aug. ; p. 243, Contarini, 22 Aug. ; p. 260, do., 2 Sept. ; p. 289, do., 14 Sept. ; pp. 295-299, do., 16 Sept. ; pp. 308-310, do. to Zorzi, 26 Sept. 1628.]
	2	[<i>London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Harl.</i> 6,988, f. 55. Queen of Bohemia to Buckingham, 16 Jan., 1628, K. of Bohemia to do., 26 Dec., 1627.]
	3	[<i>Mervault</i> , Sept. 4, 14, 1628.]
132	1	[<i>Mervault</i> , pp. 224-228, Aug. 23, 1628. <i>D.N.B.</i> , Vol. X. ; p. 67, Charles I., do., Vol. XXV. ; p. 429, Henrietta Maria, do., Vol. LVIII. ; p. 336, Villiers, George, 1st Duke of Buckingham, <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> ; p. 262, Contarini, 2 Sep., 1628.]
135	1	[<i>Harleian Miscellany</i> , Vol. 8, <i>Wotton, Sir Henry</i> , "A Short View of the Life and Death of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham" ; pp. 620-624. <i>Somers Tracts</i> , Vol. 10, <i>Wotton, Sir Henry</i> , "Some Observations by way of parallel of Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, and George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham." ; pp. 162-165, <i>Cotton, Sir R.</i> , op. cit. ; pp. 16-21, For Gage, <i>Cf. Mantua, Venezia</i> , E. XLV. 3, Francesco Battuino, Venice, 22 Oct., 1622.]
136	1	[<i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , pp. 237-238, Soranzo, Hague, Aug. 21 ; p. 282, do., Sept. 11, 1628.]
137	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 199, Infanta to Philip IV., Sept. 21 ; Philip IV. to Infanta, Oct. 24 ; Infanta to Philip IV., Dec. 7, 1628. <i>Genoa, Let. Min.</i> , 2,434, <i>Spagna</i> , 25, Pallavicino, 6 Oct., 1628. <i>Turin, Spagna</i> , 19, Mont-

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	houx, Madrid, 5 Oct., 1628. <i>Mervault</i> , Sept. 28, 1628. <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , p. 331, Mocenigo, Madrid, 7 Oct., 1628.]
138	1 [Mantua, E. XLV. 3, Venezia, Parma, Venice, 8 Oct., 1628.]
139	1 [Cal. S.P. For., Ven. XXI., Contarini, 22 Aug.; p. 262, do., Sept. 2; p. 289, do., Sept. 14, 1628.]
140	1 [Cal. S.P. For., Ven. XXI., pp. 296-297.]
	2 [Brussels, F. et G., 199, Infanta to Philip IV., Sept. 6, 1628.]
	3 [Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI., p. 296, Contarini, 16 Sep.; pp. 354-355, Zorzi, 21 Oct., 1628.]
141	1 [Mervault, Sept. 4, 12, 14, 19, 1628.]
	2 [Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI., p. 305 Zorzi, Sept., 1628.]
	3 [Mervault, Sept. 28, 1628.]
142	1 [Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI., pp. 308-310, Contarini to Zorzi, 26 Sept., 1628.]
144	1 [Do., pp. 316-317, Contarini to Zorzi, Undated; pp. 325-327, Zorzi, Etre, Oct. 2; p. 355, do., 21 Oct., 1628. <i>Mervault</i> , 28, 30 Sept., 3, 4, 7 Oct., 1628. <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., pp. 396-427.]
145	1 [Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI., pp. 308-310, Contarini to Zorzi, Sept. 26; pp. 316-317, do. to do., Undated; pp. 325-327, Zorzi, Oct. 2, 1628. <i>Mervault</i> , Oct. 7, 1628. <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., pp. 402-407.]
146	1 [Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI., pp. 348-349, Zorzi, 15 Oct.; p. 350, do., 16 Oct.; p. 355, do., 21 Oct.; p. 360, do., 23 Oct., 1628. <i>Mervault</i> , Oct. 15, 1628.]
147	1 [Mervault, Oct. 10-20, 1628.]
148	1 [Mervault, Oct. 21, 23, 1628, <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., pp. 407-410, <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> ; p. 360, Zorzi, Oct. 25, 1628.]
149	1 [Mervault, Oct. 26, 29 Nov. 1, 8, 1628, <i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. III., pp. 409-410, <i>Cal. S. P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> ; p. 360, Zorzi, 23 Oct.; p. 365, do., 26 Oct.; p. 368, do., 31 Oct., 1628.]
151	1 [Gotton, op. cit., pp. 12-21, Mantua, Francia, 675-676, Priandi, <i>passim</i> . <i>Coke MSS.</i> , 1626, 1627, 1628. <i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> ; pp. 357-360, Contarini, 23 Oct., 1628.]
	2 [Contarini <i>ut supra</i> .]

CHAPTER LXXXII.

153	1 ["Considerations touching a Warre with Spaine, etc.," written by the Rt. Hon. Francis, Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Albans," pp. 42-46.]
156	1 [Casale, Strambosio, "Memorie Storico-Critiche della Città di Casale-Monferrato," Vol. I., pp. 32, 36, 37, 42, 132, 165, 168, 169, <i>Foro</i> . "Raccolta di diverse carte interressanti l'illma. Città di Casale," etc. Vol. II., Documenti 16, 21, 25, 43, 45; <i>Giorcelli, Dottore Giu.</i> "Documenti Inediti o poco noti della Città della di Casale," pp. 9-13, Doc. 1. As to the grant of Pope Leo. X. in 1516, Private information from Cav. A. Lurio.]

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| 158 | 1 "The Cambridge Modern History." Vol. XIII., Genealogical Tables, Nos. 67, 69, 75.] |
| | 2 [Munich, Reichs. Arch., 30 J.K. 195. Brussels, 12 Sept., 1626. Mantua, Spagna, 617, Striggi, 13, 29 March, enclosing Memorial to Philip IV. As to Sabbioneta, September, October, 1626. As to position of Monferrat, do., Jan. 5, Jan., 1626. Olivares to Marchese Giovanni Gonzaga, 3, 19 March, 1626. Striggi to Duke of Mantua, 13 March, 1626. As to Sabbioneta, do., Corte Cesarea, 495. Agnelli, Prague, 28 Feb., 1628. Nugent, op. cit., Vol. III., p. 28, The Cremonese; p. 29, Mantua. Khevenhüller, op. cit.; Part X., p. 1711; Part XI., p. 30, The Succession to Mantua, 1627-1628; p. 32, The position of Spain as to Mantua and Monferrat, 1628.] |
| 159 | 1 [As to Duke Vincenzo II's marriage, Information from Cav. A. Luzio. London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add. 34,311. Wake to Conway, 14 Dec., 1626. Mantua, Spagna, 617, Striggi, 10 Feb., 11, 29 March, 14 April, 18 June, 1627.] |
| 160 | 1 [Do., Striggi, 18 June, 1627. Gachet, op. cit., pp. 157-158. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 15 Jan., 1628. Wake, cit., 28 April, 1628. Information from Cav. A. Luzio.] |
| | 2 [Mantua, Francia, 675, Priandi, 3, 31 Jan., 1627; Wake, cit., 14 Dec., 1626.] |
| 161 | 1 [Mantua, Striggi, cit., 18 June, 15 July, 1, 10 Aug., 4, 5, 18, 27 Sept., 13 Nov., 4 Dec., 1627; do., Correspondenza di Mantova, E. II. 8, 2,777; Babin to Nevers, 8 April, 1627.] |
| 162 | 1 [Do., Striggi, cit., 24 March, 14 April, 8 July, 1627. As to Carducci and Eugenio Caxesi, Information from Major Coulson, Librarian, Free Library, Hereford. As to Charles I. and the Mantuan Gallery. Wake, cit., 28 April, 1628. Note 1, p. 160, ante, and Information from Cav. A. Luzio.] |
| 163 | 1 [Do., Striggi, cit., 10 Aug., as to Father Tamudio; 11 Aug., 1627, Tarantaise's death.] |
| 166 | 1 [Turin, Spagna, 19, Tarantaise, 5 May, 25, 28 June, 1 Aug., 1627. "Best Furniture of Mgr. the late Abp. of Tarantaise." Saputi, 5 Aug., 1627.] |
| 167 | 1 [Mantua, Spagna, 617, Striggi, 10, 28 Aug., 4, 5 Sept. (To Chancellor Striggi), 18, 27 Sept., 13, Nov., 4 Dec., 1627.] |
| | 2 [Do., Striggi, 1 Oct., 1627.] |
| 168 | 1 [London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add. 34,311. Wake, 17 Dec., 1627. Khevenhüller, op. cit., Part X., 1711; Part XI., p. 30 cit. Rooses, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 346-347, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 6 Jan., 1628. Wake, cit., 1 Jan., 1628. Mantua, Francia, 675. Priandi, 3, 7, 22 Jan., 1628. London, Brit. Mus., MSS. Dept. Add. 28,474, Aytona to Philip IV., 23 March, 1628, quoting Philip IV. to Aytona, 12 Feb., 1628, enclosing Cordoba's despatch of 27 Dec., 1627.] |
| | 2 [Wake, cit., 31 Dec., 1627.] |

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- 169 1 [Wake, cit., 31 Dec., 1627, 1, 14, 21, 28, Jan., 1628.]
- 172 1 [London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add., 28,474, Aytona, 23 March, 1628, and letters, cit. p. 168, Note 1, ante, Philip IV. to Aytona, 12 Feb., 1628; Cordoba to Philip IV., 27 Dec., 1627; Wake, cit., 1 Jan., 1628.]
- 178 1 [London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Eg., 2,053, ff. 232-239, 1628, Jan. 12, Olivares' "Voto" in the Council of State as to Mantua and Monferrat. Turin, Spagna. Tarantaise, May-June, 1626; As to Savoy and Flanders, Do., Ing. Mat. Pol., 1, No. 356, "Instructions to Marquis di San Germano to present to Charles I. the rights which Vittorio Amadeo had to succeed to Flanders on the death of the Infanta Isabella."]
- 179 1 [Aytona, cit., 23 March, 1628, Ph. IV. to Aytona, 16 Jan., 12 Feb., 1628; Do. to Cordoba, 16 Jan., 12 Feb., 1628; Wake, cit. to Conway, 21, 28 Jan., 1628.]
- 180 2 [Mantua, Francia 675, Priandi, 3, 7, 22 Jan., 1628.]
- 180 1 [As to the Jesuits and Spain, Symonds, J. A., "History of the Renaissance in Italy," "The Catholic Reaction," Part I., p. 232. Note 1, Mantua, Corte Ces. 495, Agnelli, 18 March, 1628; 26 March, 1629. As to Lammermann, Aytona, cit. to Ph. IV., 23 Aug., 9 Sept., 1628; Ph. IV. to Aytona, 11, 30 Oct., 1628.]
- 181 2 [Aytona, cit. to Ph. IV., 23 Aug., 1628.]
- 181 1 [Mantua, Corte Cesarea, 495. Agnelli to Duke, Prague, 26 Feb., 1628.]
- 183 1 [London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add., 28,474, Cordoba to Philip IV., 27 Dec., 1627; 16 Jan., 1628. Philip IV. to Cordoba, 16 Jan., 1628. Do., to Aytona, 12 Feb., 1628.]
- 184 1 [Do., Philip IV. to Aytona, 12, 15 Feb.; 22 April, 1628. Do., to Cordoba, 15 Feb., 1628. Aytona to Philip IV., 23 March, 1628.]
- 189 1 [Mantua, Corte Cesarea, 495, Agnelli, 26, 28 Feb., 4 March, 1628.]

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

- 190 1 [Villa, op. cit., pp. 461-472, Rooses, op. cit.; Vol. IV., pp. 175-177. Gerbier to Rubens, 18 Feb., 1628.]
- 192 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 126, Spinola to Infanta, Madrid, 1 May, 1628; Olivares to Spinola, Aranjuez, 30 April, 1628.]
- 193 1 [Mantua, Corte Cesarea, 495. Agnelli, Prague, 26 Feb., 1628. Villa, op. cit., pp. 461-472, Rooses, op. cit., Vol. IV.; pp. 175-177. Gerbier to Rubens, 18 Feb.; pp. 177-179, do. to do., 18 Feb.; p. 183, Council of State, Madrid, 29 Feb., 1628; pp. 193-194, Rubens to Vosbergen, 18 March; Rubens to Spinola, 30 March; pp. 210-214, Gerbier to Rubens, 15 April; Philip IV. to Infanta, 1 May; Infanta to Philip IV., 30 May, 1628; As to Spinola's arrival at Madrid; pp. 381-382, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 23 March; pp. 402-403, do. to do., 11 May, 1628.]

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194	1	[<i>Mantua</i> , Agnelli, cit., 4, 18 March, 1628.]
196	1	[<i>Aytona</i> , cit., 23 March, 15, 28, 29 April, 1628. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 4 March, 8, 22, 29 April, 1628.]
198	1	[<i>Aytona</i> , cit., Despatches cited. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit. Despatches, cit. and 13, 28, 29 May, 1628.]
	2	[<i>Rooses</i> , op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 422-423, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 19 May, 1628. <i>Wake</i> , cit. to Conway, 18 April, 5 May, 1628. <i>Gachel</i> , op. cit., pp. 157-158.]
199	1	[<i>Cf. Ante</i> , p. 198, Note 1.]
	2	[<i>Wake</i> , cit., 12 May, 1628. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 13 May, 3 June, 1628.]
200	1	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 20, 28 May, 3, 15, 27 June, 11 July, 1628. As to Grand Duke of Tuscany and Denmark, <i>London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add.</i> 28,474. Philip IV. to Aytona, 16 March, 1628.]
	2	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 28 May, 1628.]
201	1	[<i>Aytona</i> , cit. Aytona to Philip IV., 23 March, 28, 29 April; Philip IV. to Aytona, 1 May, 12 June; Aytona to Philip IV., 6 Sept., 1628; For the Question of the Trial of the Claims of the Appiani to the Succession to Piombino, <i>Cf. Genoa</i> , Let. Min., 2,543 <i>Vienna</i> 26, Celio Levanto to Doge, Vienna, 11, 18, 26 Feb., 1625. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 28 May, 1628.]
202	1	[<i>Mantua, Francia</i> , 676, Gazzoldo to Duke, 25 May, 1628.]
203	1	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 10, 15, 27 June, 1628.]
	2	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 27 June, 1628, <i>let. cit.</i>]
204	1	[<i>Turin, Vienna</i> 8, <i>Wateville</i> , Vienna, to Duke, 27 June, 1628. <i>Mantua, Agnelli</i> , cit., 11, 22, 26 July, 1628. <i>Wake</i> , cit., 19 May, 9, 23, 30 June, 1, 14 July, 18 Aug., 18 Sept., 1628.]
	2	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 22 July, 26 Aug., 1628.]
206	1	[<i>Turin, Wateville</i> , Vienna, cit., 2, 16, 23 Aug., 1628. <i>Mantua</i> , Agnelli, cit., 26 July, 1, 12 Aug., 1628. As to Maximilian's relations with the Emperor, <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 126. Infanta to Spinola, 31 May. Bruneau to Infanta (Cypher), Bruneau to Infanta, Creutznach, 18 May, 1628. <i>Aytona</i> , cit., 28 April, 1628. <i>Riesler</i> , op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 328-334.]
209	1	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 16, 21, Aug., 1628. <i>Mantua, Francia</i> , 676. <i>Gazzoldo</i> , 29 July, 15, 23 Aug., 1628. <i>Wake</i> , cit., 18 Aug., 18 Sept., 1628.]
213	1	[<i>London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add.</i> , 28,474, Philip IV. to Aytona, 6, 10 July, 1628. Aytona to Philip IV., 23 Aug., 6 Sept., 1628. <i>Cf. Wake</i> cit., 14 April, 1628. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 21, 23 Aug. 1628. As to Verdun, <i>Mantua, Francia</i> , 675. Priandi, 15 Jan., 1627. For similar Imperial Claims as to Metz, do., Priandi, 12 Dec., 1627. <i>Cf.</i> , do., 13 May, 1628.]
216	1	[<i>Aytona</i> , cit., 23 Aug., 6 Sept., 1628.]
	2	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 30 Aug., 6 Sept., 1628.]
218	1	[<i>Aytona</i> , cit., 6 Sept., 1628.]
219	1	[<i>Wake</i> , cit., 18, 22 Sept., 1628. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 13, 23 Sept., 21, 28 Oct., 1628.]
220	1	[<i>Agnelli</i> , 11, 16, 17 Nov., 1628. <i>Aytona</i> , 25 Oct., 8, 29 Nov., 1628.]
221	1	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 16 Nov., 1628.]

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- 222 1 [Aylona, cit., 25 Oct., 25 Nov., 1628. Agnelli, cit., 17 Nov., 1628.]
- 2 [Aylona, cit., 13 Dec., 1628. Agnelli, cit., 16, 17 Nov., 16, 22 Dec., 1628.]
- 3 [Agnelli, cit., 23 Nov., 1628.]
- 223 1 [Gachet, op. cit., pp. 210-212, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 14 July, 1628, Mantua, Francia, 676, Gazzoldo, 7 Oct., 1628.]
- 2 [Agnelli, cit., 23 Nov., 1628.]
- 224 1 [Wake, cit., 10 Nov., 1628. London, S.P.O., S.P. For. Savoy and Sardinia, 14, l. 108. Carlisle and Wake, 11 Nov., 1628.]
- 225 1 [Bryce, Viscount, "The Holy Roman Empire," *passim*. Hjarne, H., op. cit., pp. 108-112.]
- 226 1 [Agnelli, May, June, 1628. As to Treaty of Constance, 21 Aug., 1628.]

CHAPTER LXXXV.

- 231 1 [Villa, op. cit., pp. 462-474. Brussels, E. et G., 126. Spinola to Infanta, 1 May. Olivares to Sp., 30 April. Inf. to Sp., 30 May, 1628. Rooses, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 402-404, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 29 Dec., 1628. Gachet, do., Rubens to Gevaerts, 29 Dec., 1628.]
- 2 [Brussels, E. et G., 198. Inf. to Ph. IV., 2 Jan. Ph. IV. to Inf., 17 Jan. Inf. to Ph. IV., 31 May, 1628. Mantua, Corte Cesarea, 495. Agnelli, 9 May, 1628.]
- 232 1 [Forster, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 194-195. pp. 333-334. Wallenstein to Arnim, 5 May, 1628.]
- 2 [Genoa, Vienna, 26, Celio Levanto, Hamburg, 2, 10, 16, 23 Jan., 27 Feb., 1627. Riezler, S., op. cit., Vol. V., p. 335. Cambridge Modern Hist., Vol. XIII., Genealogical Tables, 60, 93.]
- 234 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 196. Inf. to Ph. IV., 2 Feb., 23 May, 1627. [Cf., Brussels, E. et G., 195. Do. to do., 22 Dec., 1626.] Ph. IV. to Inf., 28 Feb., 23 May, Do., 197. Do. to do., 14 Oct., 1627. London, S.P.O. S.P. For., Poland 4, Gordon to Conway, 29 May, 6 June, 16 July. "Overtures from the Emperor and Spain to their loyal subjects, etc." Endorsed "Propositions made in the name of the King of Spain to the Senate of Dantzic," 8 Oct. 2, 18 Dec., 1627. Forster, Vol. I., pp. 194-195. Droysen, G., "Gustaf Adolf," Vol. I. pp. 319-331. Gindely, A., "Geschichte des Dreissig-jährigen Krieges," Chaps. IV., V.]
- 235 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 198, Inf. to Ph. IV., 12 Feb., 1628. London, S.P.O., S.P. For., Poland, 4 Gordon, 16 July, 8 Oct., 2 Dec., 1627. Boring-Lüsberg, pp. 323-363. Sec. 3, Campaign of 1628-1629. Forster, pp. 194-195, p. 199, pp. 381-383, Wallenstein to Arnim, 2 Aug., 1628. Do., Vol. I., 2nd Part, Chapter XIII., pp. 1-21. Mares, op. cit., Vol. II., p. 49. Gindely, Chaps VII., VIII.]
- 238 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 198, Ph. IV. to Inf., 17 Feb., 1628. London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add. 28,474. Philip IV. to Cordoba, 16 Jan., 1628, mentioning letter to

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- Aytana. *Forster*, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 182-193, Wallenstein to Arnim, 3, 23, 28 Jan., 1628. Cf. *Khevenhüller* (Cf. p. 189), op. cit., Vol. XI., pp. 621-627. *Droysen*, G., op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 65-66, pp. 309-348. *Hjarne*, H., op. cit., pp. 17-20, pp. 100-108.]
- 238 2 [Baring-Lüsberg, op. cit., Section III, pp. 323-363 Campaign of 1628-1629. *Forster*, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 199-249, Siege of Stralsund.]
- 239 1 [Villa, op. cit., pp. 462-474.]
- 2 [Cf. *Brussels*, E. et G., 199, Infanta to Philip IV., 21 Dec., 1628. Do., 200; Do. to do., 6 Jan., 1629, Mentioning Philip IV. to Infanta, 14 Dec., 1628. *London*, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add. 28,474, Aytana to Philip IV., 29 Nov., 1628. *Riezler*, S., Vol. V., p. 335.]
- 3 [Brussels, E. et G., 198, Philip IV. to Aytana, 10 March, 1628.]
- 240 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 126. De Berg to Spinola, 13 Feb. Spinola to Infanta, 11, 30 April. Infanta to Spinola, 31 May, 1628.]
- 2 [Brussels, cit., Spinola to Inf. 11, 30 April. Inf. to Spinola, 31 May, 1628. Do., E. et G., 189. Inf. to Ph. IV., 14 April, 31 May, 1628.]
- 243 1 [Do., E. et G., 126, Spinola to Inf., 1 May. Do., 198, Ph. IV. to Inf., 1 May. Inf. to Ph. IV., 30 May, 1628. *Turin*, Ing. 4. *Bundle II.*, Undated, Scaglia, London, probably Dec., 1627. *Roses*, cit., Vol. IV., pp. 183 et seqq., Spanish Council of State, 29 Feb. Rubens to Vosbergen, 18 March, 1628.]
- 245 1 [Munich, *Reichs. Arch.*, J.K., A., 195, 30 1626. Paris, 6 Dec., as to Marcheville. *Riezler*, S., cit., Vol. V., pp. 283-284, pp. 328-334. *Gachel*, cit., pp. 175-177, Rubens, 9 March, 1628. *Ranke*, *Gesch. Wallensteins* Cap. III. *Brussels*, E. et G., 126, Inf. to Spinola, 31 May, 1628, enclosing two letters of Bruneau's, one of which from Creutznach, 18 May, 1628. *Mantua*, *Corte Ces.*, 495, Agnelli, 4, 18 March, 8, 15 April, 1628. As to the election of the King of the Romans, Cf., 26 July, 1628. *Forster*, cit., Vol. I., pp. 65-76. The College of Electors and Mecklenburg, pp. 291-295. Wallenstein to Arnim, enclosing his Patent for Mecklenburg, 6 Feb., 1628. As to Wallenstein and the Turks, pp. 143-144. Do. to do., 21 Nov., pp. 253-254, 26 Nov., 1627, pp. 280-281; 28 Jan., pp. 321-322; 20 March, pp. 334-335; 5 May, pp. 395-396; 9 Sep., 1628. *Hjarne*, H., cit., pp. 85-91; *Riezler*, S., cit., Vol. V., pp. 283-284, p. 328, p. 334.]
- 247 1 [Cf., Page 245, Note 1, ante, and *London*, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add. 28,474, Aytana, 28 April, 1628.]
- 2 [Baring-Lüsberg, cit., Sec. III., pp. 323-363, Winter of 1627-1628, March, 1628. *Forster*, cit., Vol. I., p. 289. Wallenstein to Arnim, 9 Feb., 1628. For Wallenstein's negotiations with Sweden, pp. 124-126, 2 Nov., pp. 143-144, 21 Nov., 1627.]
- 248 1 [Do., pp. 320-321, 328, W. 20 March, 6 May, 1627.]
- 254 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 126, Infanta to Spinola, 31 May, 1628, enclosing Bruneau's letters, cit.]

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- 255 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 198, Infanta to Philip IV., 14 April, 30 May, 7 June, 1628. Philip IV. to Infanta, 1 May. Do., 199. Infanta to Philip IV., 2 July, Aug., 6 Sept. E. et G., 126. Spinola to Infanta, 30 April, 24 July. Infanta to Spinola, 4, 13 Aug., 1628. Gachet, op. cit., Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, pp. 198-199, 1 June; pp. 207-208, 22 June; pp. 210-212, 14 July; pp. 215-217, 16 Aug., 1628.]
- 2 Brussels, E. et G., 199, Infanta to Philip IV., 6 Sept., 1628. Wake, cit., 28 Jan., 21 Feb., 8, 10, 11 March, 19 May, 23, 30 June, 4 Aug., 1628. Rooses, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 163, et seqq. Turin, Ing., Bundle II., Scaglia, London, 1, 24 Nov., 14 Dec., 1627; 15 March, 1628. London, S.P.O., S.P. For. Savoy-Sardinia, 15, f. 130, Instructions to Lord Carlisle, Undated.]
- 256 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 199, Infanta to Philip IV., 7 June, 1628. Turin, do., Scaglia, 1 Nov., 14 Dec., 1627, Gachet, op. cit., pp. 183-184, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 13 April, pp. 198-199, 1 June; pp. 202-204, 15 June, 1628. Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI., p. 92, Soranzo. Hague, 15 May, 1628.]
- 257 1 [Turin, Spagna, 20. "Relatione del Trattato col Inghilterra, 1628." Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI., p. 361. Soranzo, 23 Oct., p. 386. Senate to Zorzi, 11 Nov., 1628.]
- 260 1 [Cf. supra, and Turin, Spagna, 19. Monthoux, Madrid, 31 Oct., 1628. Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI., p. 331. Mocenigo, Madrid, 7 Oct., 1628.]
- 261 1 [Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI., pp. 308-310. Contarini, Windsor, 26 Sept.; p. 355, Zorzi, 21 Oct.; p. 368, Do. to Contarini, 31 Oct.; p. 411, Zorzi, 11 Nov.; p. 428, Corner, Turin, 10 Dec.; p. 428, Soranzo, 10 Dec.; p. 429, do., 11 Dec.; pp. 440-441, do., 18 Dec.; p. 431, Contarini, London, 22 Dec., 1628; pp. 491-492, do. to Zorzi, 20 Jan., 1629. Wake, cit., to Conway, 10 Nov., 1628. London, S.P.O., S.P. For. Savoy-Sardinia, 14, f. 139, Carlisle to King, Turin, 22 Nov., 1628. Villa, op. cit., pp. 464-474.]

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

- 264 1 [Gachet, op. cit., pp. 207-208. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 22 June, pp. 215-217, 16 Aug., pp. 221-224, do., to Gevaerts, Madrid, 29 Dec., 1628. Rooses, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 232-234. Rubens' journey to Spain, Aug.-Sept., 1628, pp. 445-447. Rubens to Jacques Dupuy, 20 July, 1628, p. 456. Note. State of Spain, 10 Aug., 1628. Wadsworth, James. "The Present State of Spaine," pp. 83-84. Turin, Spagna, 20. "Convenienze per Stabilimento e Perpetuatione della Monarchia di Spagna." Khevenhüller, op. cit., Part XI., p. 890, "The State of Spain in 1629."]
- 265 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 198. Infanta to Philip IV., 31 May. Do., 199. Do. to do., 2 July, 3, 13 Aug., 1628. Rooses, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 402-404. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 11 May, 1628. Gachet, op. cit., pp. 207-

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		208. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 22 June, pp. 210-212, 14 July, 1628.]
266	I	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 199. Infanta to Philip IV., 6 Sept., 1628.]
267	I	[<i>Cal. S.P. For. Ven. XXI.</i> , p. 361. Soranzo, Hague, 23 Oct.; p. 386, Senate to Zorzi, 11 Nov.; p. 391, Mocenigo, Madrid, 15 Nov.; pp. 394-396, Contarini to Zorzi, Undated; pp. 394-396, do. to Doge, 18 Nov.; pp. 445-447, do. to Zorzi, 22 Dec., 1628; pp. 491-492, do., 20 Jan., 1629; p. 424, Anteloni, Naples, 5 Dec., 1628. <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 199, Philip IV. to Infanta, 24, 31 Oct., 4, 18, 26 Nov., 1628. <i>London, S.P.O., S.P. For., Savoy and Sardinia</i> 14, f. 72, "Considerations touching a war or peace with France or Spain"; do. f. 132, Wake to Conway, 31 Jan., 1629. <i>Wake, cit.</i> , Wake to Conway, Und., Jan., 1629. <i>Turin, Spagna</i> , 20, "Relatione del Trattato col Inghilterra 1628," cit.]
272	I	[<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 631. <i>Corr. Hist.</i> , 1628. "Advis de Rotterdam," 31 Oct., 17 Nov., 1628. Do., <i>E. et G.</i> , 126, Spinola to Infanta, 13 Oct., Inf. to Sp., 4 Nov., 1628. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , Part XI., p. 400, p. 877, p. 879, p. 882. <i>Morre, G.</i> , "Description of Tombs in Old Church at Delft," etc., p. 5. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 14-17. Rubens to Gevaerts, Madrid, 29 Dec., 1628. <i>Gachet</i> , do., pp. 221-224, <i>let. cit. Gemoa.</i> Let. Min., 2,434. <i>Spagna</i> 25. Pallavicino, Madrid, 23 Dec., 1628; 6 Jan., 1629. <i>Turin, Spagna</i> , 21. Scaglia, Madrid, 3 Jan., Three Letters marked in a contemporary hand, "Beginning, Jan., 1629." Do., <i>Ing.</i> 4. Barozzi, Brussels, 8 Jan., 1629. <i>Reigersborck</i> , cit., pp. 108-110, R. to Grotius, 6 Jan., 1629. As to Botru's mission. <i>Turin, Spagna</i> , 20, Monthoux, Madrid, Dec., 1628. Do., 21, Scaglia, Madrid, 3, 27 Jan., 1629. <i>London</i> , cit., Aytona to Ph. IV., 25 Oct. 13 Dec. (enclosing letters from Cordoba of 17, 25 Nov.), 1628., Ph. IV. to Aytona, 4, 21, 29 Jan., 1629. <i>Wake</i> , cit. to Carlisle, 11 Dec., 1628. <i>Mantua</i> , cit., Agnelli, 27 Dec., 1628. <i>Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K.S.</i> , 377/48. "Spaniens Procedere gegen Bayern," cit. " <i>Corr. de Don G. de Cordoba con. Felipe IV., etc., sobre la guerra promovida en el Monferrato</i> , 1628." Cordoba to his brother Fernando, 7 Jan., 1629. <i>Wake</i> , cit., to Conway, 20 Dec., 1628.]
274	I	[<i>Mantua</i> , cit., Agnelli, 18 Dec., 1628; 3 Jan., 7 Feb., 1629. <i>Turin, Vienna</i> , 8. Wateville, 8, 21 Oct., 22 Nov., 1628. 10, 17, 31 Jan., 1629. Do., <i>Spagna</i> 19, Monthoux, 3 Dec., 1628. <i>Mantua, Corte Ces.</i> 495. Agnelli, 21 Oct., 1628. <i>London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept. Add.</i> 28,474, Aytona, 25 Oct., 25 Nov., 13 Dec., 1628, 17 Jan., 1629. Philip IV., 4, 21, 29 Jan., 1629. <i>Corr. de Cordoba</i> , p. 383, Cordoba to Fernando, 21 Jan., 1629.]
	2	[<i>v. Moor</i> , op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 862-867. <i>Ragas</i> , op. cit., pp. 254, <i>et. seqq.</i> <i>Rissler</i> , S., op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 323-326.]

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| 275 | 1 [Cf., p. 274, Note 2, <i>supra</i> , and <i>Chur, Mappa</i> 53. 1628 July 24, Ferdinand II. informs the French Ambassador that he has ordered the Grisons to refuse a passage to the French troops. 1629, Aug. 8, The Three Leagues sign the Erbvereinigung with the House of Austria. Do., <i>Mappa</i> , 54. "Ueber die Einführung der Capuchiner Mission in Unterengadin, Prättigau, und Munster, 1621-1622" (1633).] |
| | 2 [Agnelli, cit., 7 Feb., 1629. <i>London, Brit. Mus.</i> , cit., Ph. IV. to Aytona, 4, 21 Jan., 9 Feb., 1629, quoting Mirabel, 25, 28 Dec., 1628. <i>Munich</i> , cit., "Spaniens Procedere," etc.] |
| 276 | 1 [Agnelli, cit., 14, 22 Feb., 1629. <i>Riezler</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 351-352. <i>Corr. de Cordoba</i> , pp. 370-372. C. to Fernando, 16 Dec., 1628, pp. 376-377. Do. to do. 7 Jan., 1629.] |
| 277 | 1 [Bassompierre, cit., Vol. IV., p. 2. <i>Corr. de Cord.</i> , pp. 388-390. Duke of Savoy to Cordoba, 1 Feb., pp. 393-395. C. to Fernando, 9 Feb., 1629, pp. 400-404. Savoy to Cordoba, 22 Feb., 1629. <i>Riezler</i> , S., op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 338-340. <i>Aytona</i> , cit., to Philip IV., 13 Dec., 1628. Agnelli, cit., 7, 14 Feb., 1629. <i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 J. K. 234. (Marcheville (?) to Elector of Treves, Undated (about February or March, 1629).)] |
| 278 | 1 [Baring-Lüsberg, pp. 323-363, Campaign of 1628-1629. <i>Forster</i> , op. cit., Vol. I., 2nd Part, pp. 1-21, including "A Report from Wallenstein and Tilly to the Kaiser and Maximilian of Bavaria on Northern Affairs." <i>Turin</i> , Ing. 4, Barozzi, London, 18 Feb., 1629. <i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 J. K., 234. Elector of Cologne to Elector of Mainz, 13 May. Maximilian to Elector of Cologne, 22 May, 1624.] |
| 280 | 1 [Do., <i>Geh. St. Arch.</i> , K.S. 279/36, "Quæstio if it is advisable for Bavaria to treat with France (circa, 1630)" K.S. 272/5, "Memorial to Elector, 13 November, 1629." Do., <i>Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 J.K. 238. Nuncio Cardinalis (Bagni) to Dominus Jocher, Paris, 26 December, 1629. <i>Forster</i> , Vol. I., pp. 406-409, Wallenstein to Arnim, Boitzenberg, 29 Nov., 1628. <i>Riezler</i> , S., op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 338-340.] |
| 282 | 1 [Bassompierre, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 2-6. <i>Waks</i> , cit., 9, 20, 24 Nov. (to Conway), 6, 9, 11, 20 Dec., 1628 (to Carlisle). <i>Turin, Spagna</i> 20 Gio. Fr. Gandolfo, Bp. of Ventimiglia to Duke, Madrid, Dec., 1628.] |
| 283 | 1 [<i>Turin, Ing.</i> 4, Barozzi, Brussels, 8 Jan., Dunkirk; 22 Jan., Margate; 23 Jan., London, 13 Feb., 1629.] |
| 286 | 1 [<i>Turin, Spagna</i> , 21, Scaglia, Madrid, 3 Jan. Letters undated, but labelled January, 14, 19, 1629. Do., <i>Vienna</i> , 8, Wateville, 2 Aug., 1628, 16, 31 Jan., 1629.] |
| | 2 [<i>Turin</i> , Wateville, cit., 10 Jan., 28 Feb. (referring to Duke's letter of 2 Feb.), 1629. <i>Mantua</i> , Agnelli, cit., 17 Jan., 1629.] |
| 287 | 1 [<i>Corr. de Cord.</i> , cit., pp. 388-390, Duke of Savoy to Cordoba, 1 Feb., pp. 400-404, 22 Feb., pp. 393-395. Cordoba to Fernando, 9 Feb., 1629. <i>Waks</i> , cit., to Conway, 24 Feb., 1629.] |

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| 291 | I | [<i>Corr. de Cord.</i> , cit., p. 404. Savoy to Cordoba, 23 Feb., pp. 407-409, 27 Feb., pp. 409-412. Treaty of Susa, 11 March, 1629, pp. 413-437. Battle of Susa. Treaty of Susa, pp. 459-462. Cordoba to Fernando. Undated. <i>Bassompierre</i> , cit., Vol. IV., pp. 7-22. <i>Wake</i> , cit. to Conway, 31 Jan., 10 Feb. To Lord Dorchester, 4, 16, 18 March, 1629. <i>Turin, Spagna</i> , 21, Scaglia, Madrid, 19, 26, 27, 29, 31 Jan., 6, 13, 15, 17, 22, 28 Feb., 2, 3, 5, 12, 16 March, 1629.] |

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

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| 293 | I | [<i>Corr. de Cord.</i> , cit., pp. 413-437, pp. 459-462. Cord. to Fernando, Undated, pp. 476-477. Savoy to Cordoba, 28 March, pp. 487-491. Cordoba's Instructions to D. Martin de Aragon, 9 April, pp. 492-494. Cord. to Fer., 9 April, 1629. <i>Wake</i> , cit. to Dorchester, 17, 18, 25 March, 10 April, 13 May, 1629. <i>Casale, Foro II. Documento</i> 126. Treaty of Susa, 11 March, 1629.] |
| 295 | I | [<i>Corr. de Cord.</i> , cit., pp. 459-462. Cord. to Fer., Undated Cf., <i>Wake</i> , cit. to Dorchester, 9 May, 1629.] |
| | 2 | [<i>Ven., XXI.</i> , cit., p. 350, Zorzi, 16 Oct., 1628.] |
| 297 | I | [<i>London, S.P.O., S.P. For. Savoy and Sardinia</i> , 14, f. 167. Conway to Carlisle, 3 Dec., f. 202. <i>Wake</i> to Rohan, 29 Nov., 1628. <i>Cambridge Modern History</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 135-136. "The Huguenot War of 1629." <i>Mantua, Francia</i> 676. Gazzoldo, 25 May, 1628. As to Clausel, <i>Turin. Spagna</i> , 19. Monthoux, Madrid, 26 Dec., 1628. (Clausel's views as to the Palatinate.) 7, 18 Feb., 1629. For Wake and Clausel, <i>London, Brit. Mus.</i> , cit. <i>Wake</i> to Dorchester, 17 March, 10 April, 21 June, 1629. Cf., <i>Milan, Royal Archives</i> , "Documenti Diplomatici di Filippo IV," 1629. June, <i>Registro</i> 435 (?) for a complaint from the Holy Office, as to the manner in which the Spanish nobles showed themselves in public with Clausel during his visit to Milan.] |
| 298 | I | [<i>London, S.P.O., S.P. For. Savoy and Sardinia</i> , 15, <i>Wake</i> to Carlisle, 17 March, 16 May, 1629. Do., <i>Brit. Mus.</i> , cit. <i>Wake</i> to Dorchester, 10 April, 13, 23, 26 May, 3 June, 1629. Do., to Carlisle, 23 April, 1629] |
| | 2 | [<i>Bassompierre</i> , op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 26-53. <i>London, Brit. Mus.</i> , cit. <i>Wake</i> to Dorchester, 4 July, 1629.] |
| 299 | I | [<i>Bassompierre</i> , Vol. IV., p. 46. <i>Cambridge Modern History</i> , Vol. IV., pp. 135-136. <i>Ragaz</i> , op. cit., pp. 254 et seqq. <i>Moor</i> , Vol. III., pp. 868-869.] |
| 301 | I | [<i>Corr. de Cord.</i> , cit., pp. 476-477. Savoy, pp. 478-491. Pasero to C., 31 March, 9 April. C. to Don Martin de Aragon, 9 Apr., 1629. <i>Wake</i> , cit., <i>Wake</i> to Dorchester, 10 Apr., 13 May, 1629. <i>London, S.P.O., S.P. For. Savoy and Sardinia</i> , 16. To Wake, 20 Apr., Wake, 2 May, 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 2 Apr., 1629. <i>Turin, Vienna</i> , 8, Wateville, 4, 11 Apr., 1629.] |
| 302 | I | [<i>Turin, Spagna</i> , 21. Scaglia, Madrid, 6 Feb. to 16 March, 1629. <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit., pp. 108-110. R. to Grotius, 6 Jan., 1629. <i>London, Brit. Mus.</i> , cit. Philip IV. to Aytona, 28 Feb., 1629.] |

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		<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 200. Philip IV. to Infanta, 14, 28 Feb., 1629. <i>Turin, Scaglia</i> , cit., 22 Mar., 1, 10, 22 April, 3 May, 1629.]
303	1	[<i>Munich, Reichs-Arch.</i> , 30 J.K.A., 232. "Instructions from the Electors of Mainz, etc., to their Envoy to the Kaiser, 19 April, 1629." <i>London, Brit. Mus.</i> , cit. Philip IV. to Aytona, 4 April, 1629.]
304	1	[<i>London</i> , cit., Philip IV. to Aytona, 5 April, 1629. <i>Turin, Vienna</i> , 8, Wateville, 28 Dec., 1628; 21 March, 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 14, 22 Feb., 7, 17 Mar., 1629. <i>Cf.</i> , do., 9 June, 1629.]
305	1	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 28, 31 Mar., 1629.]
306	1	[<i>Do.</i> , 26 Mar., 1629.]
307	1	[<i>Do.</i> , 26 Mar., 1629. <i>Cf.</i> , do., 18 Mar., 1628.]
308	1	[<i>Do.</i> , 26 Mar., 19 May, 1629. <i>Aytona</i> , cit., 8, 29 Nov., 1628. Philip IV. to Aytona, 6 Apr., 1629, quoting Aytona's letter of 15 Feb., 1629, enclosing Wallenstein's message. <i>Genoa, Vienna</i> 26, Celio Levanto, Hamburg, 16 Jan., 1627. <i>Förster</i> , op. cit., Vol. I., 2nd Part, pp. 1-21, pp. 34-38. Wallenstein to Arnim, 9, 14, 15 Apr., 1629, pp. 41-47, do. to do., 4, 5, 10, 23 May, 4, 27 June, 1629. As to the loyalty of Hanover to the Empire in 1625. <i>Cf. Bering-Liisberg</i> , pp. 323-363. Campaign of 1625 (Sept.).]
309	1	[<i>Aytona</i> , cit. to Philip IV., 15 Feb. Philip IV. to Aytona 6 Apr. Sforza to Wallenstein, Madrid, 6 Apr., 1629.]
310	1	[<i>London</i> , cit., Philip IV. to Emperor, 3 May. Do. to Aytona, 5 May, 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 25 Apr., 2 May, 1629. For the alleged bribe to Eggenberg. <i>Cf. Mantua, E. II.</i> 8, <i>Corr. di Mantova</i> , 2,777. Babin to Nevers, 8 Apr., 1627, cit.]
311	1	[<i>Genoa</i> , Let. Min. 2,434. <i>Spagna</i> , 25, Pallavicino, 1 May 1629. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 28-30. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, Madrid, 22 April, pp. 33-34. Philip IV. to Infanta, 27 April, 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 19 May, 1629.]
	2	[<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 19 May, 1629. <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 3 May, 1629.]
312	1	[<i>London</i> , cit., Aytona to Philip IV., 9 Sept., 1629. <i>Riesler, S.</i> , op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 363-367. For Christian IV. policy as to the Ecclesiastical territories in North Germany. <i>Cf. Bering-Liisberg</i> , op. cit., Section III., p. 305-318, under years 1618-1621, also <i>Riesler, S.</i> , op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 271-272.]
	2	[<i>Nancy. Bibl. Mun. Fonds de Lorraine</i> . "Histoire de Charles IV., Duc de Lorraine." MSS. <i>Anonymous</i> , based in part on Memoirs by Father Donat, (Confessor to Charles IV.), and written during his lifetime, p. 49, pp. 56-74. <i>Digot, A.</i> , Histoire de Lorraine, Tome 5, pp. 162-166. <i>Riesler, S.</i> , op. cit., Vol. V., p. 334, pp. 338-340, pp. 341-345, for Edict of Restitution. <i>Hanoiaux, G.</i> , cit., Vol. I., pp. 166-167, pp. 428-429, for Richelieu and Lorraine.]
313	1	[<i>Cf. ante</i> , p. 312. Note 2.]
	2	[<i>Cf. ante</i> , p. 312, Note 2. <i>Mantua, Priandi</i> , cit., 15 Jan., 1627.]

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314	1	[Nancy, "Histoire de Charles IV.," cit., pp. 74-75.]
315	1	[Munich, <i>Geh. St. Arch. K.S.</i> , 279/36. "Notes to Card. Richelieu on the terms of the Secret Articles offered to Bavaria, Susa, 12 March, 1629," and Reply by Elector of Bavaria. <i>Riezler</i> , S., Vol. V. pp. 338-340, for Charnacé's Mission.]
317	1	[London, <i>Aytana</i> , cit. to Ph. IV., 9 June, 1629, quoting Ph. IV. to Aytana, 5 May, 1629. <i>Munich, Geh. St. Arch., K.S.</i> , 292/5. Khevenhüller, 5 May, 1629.]
319	1	[Agnelli, cit., 20 March, 9 June, 1629.]
	2	[<i>Aytana</i> , cit., 9, 17 June, 1629.]
320	1	[<i>Aytana</i> , cit., 27 June, 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 16, 23 June, 1629. As to Ph. IV. Cf., Ph. IV. to Aytana, 5 May, 1629. <i>Corr. de Cord.</i> , cit., pp. 518-519. C. to Philip IV., Undated, but 27 May, 1629.]
321	1	[<i>Ragaz</i> , op. cit., pp. 234, <i>et seqq.</i> <i>Moor</i> , op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 862-867. <i>Chur</i> , Mappa 54, 6 Aug., 1626. Ferdinand II. invests Bp. Joseph Mohr with the Imperial Regalia. 1630 (?), "Vera et genuina Relatio status Ecclesiæ Catholicæ in Rhœtia."]
322	1	[<i>Moor</i> , op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 868-869. <i>Riezler</i> , S., Vol. V., pp. 338-340.]
324	1	[<i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> 232. Elector of Mainz, etc. Instructions to their Envoy with Emperor, Heidelberg, 19 April, 1629, cit. For feeling of Catholics towards the Palatine, Cf. <i>Turin, Spagna</i> 19. Monthoux, Madrid, 26 Dec., 1628, quoting Col. Clausel, cit. Do., No. 234. Emperor to Elector of Bavaria, 11 April. Bp. of Würzburg to Maximilian, 2 May. Electors of Cologne and Treves to Maximilian, 7 May. Elector of Cologne to Elector of Mainz, 13 May. Maximilian to Elector of Cologne, 22 May, 1629. Do., No. 232. Ferdinand II. to Maximilian, Vienna, 16 May, enclosing letter from Infanta to Emperor, Brussels, 2 May. Maximilian to Emperor, 23 May. Maximilian to Aytana, 24 May, 1629. <i>Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K.S.</i> , 292/5. Khevenhüller to Elector, Madrid, 2, 26 June, 10, 24, 25 July, 1629. Do., <i>K.S.</i> , 377/48. "Spaniens Procedere gegen Bayern." "Wie sich die Spanier gegen Churfürsten von Bayern ertragen." <i>Riezler</i> , S., Vol. V., pp. 338-340, pp. 347-348, pp. 351-352, pp. 354-356. <i>London, S.P. For. Savoy and Sardinia</i> , 16, f. 173. Conway to Wake, Greenwich, 15 June, 1629.]
325	1	[<i>Forster</i> , op. cit., Vol. I., 2nd Part, pp. 1-21. <i>Bering-Liisberg</i> , pp. 364 <i>et seqq.</i> , Section IV. "The Peace of Lübeck, 1629," "Christian IV., after the Peace," for description of Otto Venius' picture. Rosenberg is a palace near Copenhagen.]
	2	[<i>Hjarne</i> , H., cit., pp. 100-108. <i>Droysen</i> , G., "Gustaf Adolf," Vol. I., pp. 354-369. "Peace of Lübeck, Vol. II., pp. 1-26. "Settlement of the Quarrel with Poland." <i>Forster</i> , Vol. I., 2nd Part, pp. 1-21, and for Arnim in Poland, pp. 32-55. Wallenstein's correspondence with Arnim, 22 Jan.-19 July, 1629. <i>Turin, Vienna</i> 8. Wateville, 26 Sept., 1629.]

- PAGE. NOTE.
- 330 1 [London, Brit. Mus., cit. Aytona to Philip IV., 4, 15 July, 1629. In his despatch of 15 July, Aytona refers to Philip IV.'s letter of 16 May, delivered to him by Count Sforza on 4 July, and that of 11 June. *Corr. de Cord.*, pp. 459-462. Cord. to Fernando, Undated, pp. 489-491. Cord. Instructions to D. Martin de Aragon, 9 April, 1629. *Reigersborch*, R. to Grotius, 6 Jan., 1629.]
- 2 [Mantua, Corte Ces., 495. Agnelli, 11, 14 July, 4 Aug., 1629.]
- 332 1 [Cf. ante p. 330, Note 2, and Agnelli, cit., 22 Aug., 1629. For Wallenstein and his interests in Magdeburg and Mecklenburg, Cf. Agnelli, cit., 14 Feb., 14 July, 4 Aug., 1 Sept., 27 Oct., 1629. Turin, Vienna 8, Wateville, 3 Oct., 1629. For Wallenstein's personal appearance, Cf. Forster, Vol. I., 2nd Part, p. 75.]
- 2 [Agnelli, cit., 11, 18, 22, 23 Aug., 1629.]

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- 331 1 [Corr. de Cord., cit., pp. 492-494. Cord. to Fern., 9 April, p. 505. Do. to do., 28 Apr., p. 511. Richelieu to Cord., 11 May, pp. 518-519. Cord. to Philip IV., Undated, but 27 May, p. 521. Cord. to Fern., 27 May, 1629. London, cit., Philip IV. to Aytona, 5 May, 1629.]
- 335 1 [Corr. de Cord., pp. 525-527, Cord. to Fern., 27 May, 1629.]
- 336 1 [Munich Geh. St. Arch., K.S., 292/5. Khevenhüller to Maximilian, 5 May, 2 June, 1629. Turin, Spagna, 21 Scaglia, 3, 16, 17, 31 May, 1629. Villa, cit., pp. 544-547.]
- 337 1 [Turin, Vienna, 8. Wateville, 2, 16, 23 May, 6, 13, 20 June, 1629. Corr. de Cord., p. 525-527. Cord. to Fern., 27 May, p. 477. Duke of Savoy to Cord., 28 March, pp. 546-547. Pasero to Cord., Undated, 1629.]
- 338 1 [Corr. de Cord., pp. 525-527, Cord. to Fern., 27 May, pp. 530-538. Do. to Philip IV., 27 May, 1629.]
- 339 1 [Do., pp. 541-545, Duke of Savoy to Cord., 8 June, pp. 546-547. Pasero to Cord., Und., pp. 548-556. Duke of Savoy to Cordoba, 9 to 26 June, 1629. On money matters, especially 20 June.]
- 340 1 [Turin, Spagna, 21. Scaglia, 31 May, 1629.]
- 342 1 [Turin, Ing. 4. Barozzi, London, 14 May. Spagna 21, Scaglia, 19, 26, 27 June, 1629. Cf. Riezler, S., Vol. V., pp. 347-348.]
- 343 1 [Turin, Spagna, 21. Scaglia, 3, 5, 8 July, 1629.]
- 2 [Do., Scaglia, 9 July, 1629.]
- 346 1 [Wake, cit., to Dorchester, 4 July, 1629. Corr. de Cord., pp. 546-548. Savoy to Cord., 8 June, pp. 557-561. Cord. to Philip IV., 4 July. Do. to Fern., 4 July. Card., Savoy to Cord., 7 July, pp. 562-570. Cord. to Olivares, 4 July. Do. to Fern., 4 July. Savoy to Cord., 7 July, p. 571, 12 July. "Copy of Minute of Letter from Secretary Antonio de Navas Nimes, 18 July, 1629 to Cord." Villa, pp. 544-552. Wake, cit.

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- to Dorchester, 12 July, 1629. *Gasale, Foro II., Documento* 126. Louis XIII. to Thoyras, 12 June, 1629. *London, Brit. Mus.*, cit. Philip IV. to Aytona, 8 Aug., 1629. *Agnelli*, cit., 11, 14, 18 July, 4, 8, 22 Aug., 1629.]
- 347 I [Aytona, cit., to Philip IV., 15 July, Philip IV. to Aytona, 8, 18 Aug., to Spinola, 22 Aug., Undated, to Nuncio. Undated, Aug., 1629. *Corr. de Cord.*, pp. 541-545. Savoy to Cord., Let cit., 8 June, pp. 557-561, Cord. to Philip IV., 4 July, 1629.]
- 348 I [Agnelli, cit., 4, 22 Aug. 1, 8, 15, 22 Sept., 6 Oct., 1629.]
- 349 I [London, *Brit. Mus.*, cit., Philip IV. to Aytona, 18 Aug. To Spinola, 22 Aug., 1629. For the influence of the Waldenses in N. Italy Cf. *London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept.* Catalogue of the Royal MSS., 14a, XIII., pp. 1227-1283. "Relatione di Savoia fatta dal Smo. Signor Franco. Molino l'anno, 1586, p. 1234." The Registers of the Archives of Milan in Philip IV.'s time are full of reports from the Holy Office as to the clandestine sale of books on the Index, etc.]
- 350 I [London, *Brit. Mus.*, cit. Philip IV. to Spinola, 22 Aug., 1629. *Agnelli*, cit., 8 Sept., 1629.]

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- 351 I [Reigersborch, op. cit., pp. 110-111., R. to Grotius, 6 Jan., 1629.]
- 355 I [Brussels, *E. et G.*, 126. Infanta to Spinola, 7 Jan. (Mentioning his letters of 3 and 13 Dec., 1628.) Spinola to Infanta, 23 Jan., 24 March, 1629. Do., *E. et G.*, 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 25 Jan., 13 Feb., 1629. *Rooses*, op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 10-11. Rubens to Peiresc, 2 Dec., pp. 14-17. R. to Gevaertius, 29 Dec., 1629. *U.O.B.*, "De Handel," cit., pp. 25-32. *Reigersborch*, cit., pp. 112-113. R. to Grotius, 8 April, 1629.]
- 356 I [Brussels, *E. et G.*, 200. Philip IV. to Infanta, 30 Jan., 14 Feb. Infanta to Philip IV., 3 March, 1629.]
- 357 I [Brussels, *E. et G.*, 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 3, 27 March. Philip IV. to Infanta, 12 March, 1629. Do., *E. et G.*, 126. Spinola to Infanta, 4 March, 1629. *R.H.M.C. Rep.*, *Earl Cowper*, Vol. I., *Coke Papers*, 1629. Letters to Damville. *Turin, Ing.* 4. Barozzi, London, 18, 27, 28 Feb., 4, 16 March, 1629. Do., *Spagna*, 21. Scaglia, Madrid, 29 Jan., 1629. Cf. Barozzi, London, 20 Apr., 1629. *Villa*, cit., pp. 475-500.]
- 358 I [Rooses, cit., Vol. V., pp. 60-63. as to Sir John Coke, Damville's letters and the Infanta, Cf. Do., Vol. IV., p. 69 and Brussels, *E. et G.* 191, Philip IV. to Infanta, 3 July, 1625, as to the agents established by Inojosa in England. *R.H.M.C. Rep.*, *Earl Cowper*, Vol. I., pp. 386-387, To Damville, 5 June, 1629. *Turin, Ing.* 4, Barozzi, London, 20, 21, 29 April, 9, 14, 21 May, 1629.]

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| 361 | 1 | [<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 200. Philip IV. to Infanta, 5 April. Infanta to Philip IV., 29 April (quoting Philip IV., letters of 10 March, 13 April), 1629. <i>Turin, Ing.</i> 4. Barozzi, 6 May, 1629.] |
| | 2 | [<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 3 May, 1629. Do., <i>E. et A.</i> 632. <i>Corr. Hist.</i> (Jan.-March, 1629). Cueva to Coloma, 7 Feb. Spies' Advices, 10 March. Do., <i>E. et A.</i> 633. <i>Corr. Hist.</i> (April-July, 1629). Grobbendonck to Infanta, 11 April. Balanzon to Infanta, 18 April, 1629. <i>Reigersborch</i> . cit., pp. 112-113. R. to Grotius, 8 April, 1629, <i>Khevenhüller</i> , op. cit., Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i>] |
| 362 | 1 | [<i>Nugent</i> , op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 215-217, "Bois-le-Duc."] |
| 363 | 1 | [<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 632, cit. Cueva to Coloma, 7 Feb. "Clan" to the Infanta, 1 Jan. Balanzon to Infanta, 14 Jan., 11 Feb. "Spies' Advices," 10 March. Do., <i>E. et A.</i> , 633, cit. Grobbendonck to Infanta, 11 April. Balanzon to Infanta, 18 April, 1629.] |
| 364 | 1 | [<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 631. <i>Corr. Hist.</i> , 1628. D'Aubermont to Grobbendonck, 22 Jan., 1628.] |
| 366 | 1 | [<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 632, cit. Wassenaer to Grobbendonck, 4 Jan. Grobbendonck to Infanta, 6 Jan., to De la Faille, 6 Jan. Infanta to Grobbendonck, 9 Jan. Bishop of Bois-le-Duc to Infanta, 20 Jan., 1629.] |
| 367 | 1 | [<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 633, Grobbendonck to Infanta, 11, 18, 20, 28 April. Balanzon to Infanta, 18 April, 1629.] |
| 368 | 1 | [<i>Brussels</i> , cit., Grobbendonck to Infanta, 28, 29 April. De la Faille to Grobbendonck, Infanta to do., 29 April, 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit. Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i>] |
| 369 | 1 | [<i>Cf.</i> Ante, p. 368, Note 1, and <i>Brussels</i> , cit. Infanta to Berg, 30 April, 1 May. Grobbendonck to Infanta, 1, 2 May, 1629.] |
| 370 | 1 | [<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 3 May. Philip IV. to Infanta, 14 May, 1629. <i>London</i> , cit., Philip IV. to Aytona, 6 April, 5 May. Do. to Emperor 3 May, 1629. <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 200. Proclamation of Philip IV., 5 May, 1629. <i>Turin, Spagna</i> , 21. Scaglia, Madrid, 17 May, 1629. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V., p. 54. John Meinis to Lords of Admiralty, Dover, 25 May, 1629.] |

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| 372 | 1 | [<i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 J.K.A. 232. Infanta to Emperor, 2 May. Emperor to Maximilian, 16 May. Aytona to Maximilian, 16 May. Max. to Emperor, 23 May. Max. to Aytona, 24 May. [<i>Cf.</i> Do., 30 J.K.A., 195. "Memorandum presented by Count Frankenberg to Olivares, and his answers, 14 Oct., 1626.] Max. to Electors of Cologne and Mainz, 8 April. Instructions from Elector of Mainz, etc. to their Envoy with the Emperor, Heidelberg, 19 April, cit. [<i>Cf.</i> Do., <i>Brusselsche Antwort bei Mansfelds</i> |
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		Feldzuge, 1625.] <i>London</i> , cit., Aytona, 17 June, 1629. <i>Turin</i> , <i>Vienna</i> 8, Wateville, 2, 16, 23, 24 May, 6 June, 1629.]
373	1	[<i>Munich, Reichs Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> , 234. Emperor to Max., 11 Apr. Mergentheim to Max., 29 Apr. Instructions of Elector of Mainz, etc., cit. Bishop of Würzburg to Max., 2 May. Elector of Cologne to Elector of Mainz, 13 May. Max. to Elector of Cologne, 22 May. Do. 232. Colonel Gubern to Tilly, 6 May, 1629.]
375	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 633. Grobbendonck to Infanta, 8 May, 1629. <i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> , 232. Gubern to Tilly, Lingen, 6 May, 1629, cit. <i>Dublin. Trinity Coll., MSS. Dept.</i> , No. 806. <i>Miscellanea</i> , p. 363. "The Order of the Prince of Orange, his encamping and seige of Bois-le-Duc, and what observed there, July, 1629." <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit., pp. 116-118. <i>Reigersborch</i> to Grotius, 27 May, pp. 121-124. Do. to do., 20 July, 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit., Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i>]
376	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 633, cit. Grobbendonck to Infanta, 13, 15 May. Infanta to Grobbendonck, 19 May, 1629. <i>E. et G.</i> 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 17 May, 1629. <i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> 238. Father Alessandro to Kuttner, Rome, 20 May, 1629.]
377	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 17, 18 May, 1629. <i>London</i> , cit. Philip IV. to Aytona, 5 May, Aytona to Philip IV., 9 June, 1629. <i>Turin, Vienna</i> , 8, Wateville, 16 May, 1629. Do. <i>Spagna</i> 21. Scaglia, Madrid, 17, 19, 31 May, 1629.]
378	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> 200. Philip IV. to Infanta, 25 May, 1629.]
	2	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 27 May, 1629. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 41-42, quoting Infanta to Philip IV., 17 May, 1629.]
380	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 3 June, 1629.]
382	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 633, cit., Grobbendonck to Infanta, 21 May, 2, 9 June, 3 July. Infanta to Grobbendonck, 9, 24 June, 1629. <i>Reigersborch</i> , pp. 116-118. <i>Reigersborch</i> to Grotius, 27 May, 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i>]
384	1	[<i>Dublin, Trin. Coll. MSS. Dept. Miscellanea</i> , No. 806, p. 361. Capt. Coldwell to Sir Abra. Williams, Leaguer before the Bosch, 26 July, p. 362. Sir Edward Vere to Sir Abra. Williams, do., 8 Aug., 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 19 May, 24 July, 1629. <i>R.H. MSS. Comm. Rep., Round James</i> , pp. 277-278. Letters of Robert, Lord Oxford, from before Bois-le-Duc, 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , op. cit., Part XI., pp. 831 <i>et seqq.</i> <i>Green, Mrs. M. A.</i> "Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia," pp. 268-270. <i>Reigersborch</i> , pp. 121-124. N. van R. to Grotius, 20 July, pp. 777-778. J. Van R. to Grotius, 28 July, 1629.]
385	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 126. Infanta to Spinola, 18 May, 3 June. Spinola to Infanta, 6 June, 1629.]

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| 386 | I | [<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 126. Spinola to Infanta, 12 June, 1629. <i>London</i> , cit. Aytona to Philip IV., 15 July (quoting Philip IV. to himself, 11 June), 1629.] |
| 388 | I | [<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 3 June, 1629. <i>Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K.S.</i> , 292/5. Khevenhüller to Maximilian. 25 July, 1629. <i>H. MSS. Comm. Rep. Earl Cowper. Coke MSS.</i> , Vol. I., 1629.] |
| 392 | I | [<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 126. Spinola to Infanta, 20 June. <i>Do., E. et G.</i> , 208. Philip IV. to Infanta, 3, 6, 23 June. Infanta to Philip IV., 10 July, 1629.] |
| 394 | I | [<i>Do., E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 10 July. Philip IV. to Infanta, 10 July. <i>Do., E. et G.</i> , 208. Infanta to Philip IV., 10 July. <i>Do., E. et G.</i> , 126. Infanta to Spinola, 10, 26, 30 July. Spinola to Infanta, 20 June, 26 July, 1629. <i>Munich, Geh. St. Arch., K.S.</i> , 292/5. Khevenhüller to Max., 2 June, 1629.] |

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| 396 | I | [<i>Turin, Vienna</i> 8, Wateville, 11 July. <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 28 July, 9 Sept. <i>Do., E. et G.</i> , 125. Infanta to Spinola (misplaced), 30 July, 1629. <i>Dublin, Trin. Coll.</i> , cit. Sir E. Vere, 8 Aug., 1629, cit. <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit., pp. 777-781. Jan van R. to Grotius, 28 July, 25 Aug., 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , op. cit., Part XI., pp. 831 <i>et seqq.</i>] |
| 397 | I | [<i>London</i> , cit. Aytona, 15 July, 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 18, 23 Aug., 1629. <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 28 July, Philip IV. to Infanta, 18 Aug. (quoting letter from Aytona of 18 June), 1629.] |
| 398 | I | [<i>Munich, Geh., St. Arch.</i> , K.S. 292/5. Khevenhüller to Max., 26 June, 10, 24, 25 July, 14 Nov. Olivares to Kh., 21 Aug. Max. to Kh., 18 Sept. Memorial to Elector, 13 Nov. cit., 1629. <i>Riesler, S.</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 338-340, 347-348; 351, 352. <i>London</i> , cit. Philip IV. to Aytona, 8 Aug., 1629.] |
| | 2 | [<i>London</i> , cit. Aytona to Philip IV., 15 July, 9 Sept. Philip IV. to Aytona, 26 July, 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 18 Aug., 1629. <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 28 July. Philip IV. to Infanta, 18 Aug. (enclosing a copy of his letter to Spinola of the same date. Cf. <i>London</i> , cit. Philip IV. to Spinola, 22 Aug.), 22 Aug., 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit., Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i>] |
| 399 | I | [<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 301. <i>Corr. de l'Infante Isabelle avec Olivares</i> . Olivares to Infanta, 24 Feb. Infanta to Olivares, 17 March, 1624.] |
| 402 | I | [<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 26 March, 19 May, 1629. <i>Genoa, Let. Min.</i> 2,543. Vienna 26. Celio Levanto to Senate, Hamburg, 27 Feb., 1627, cit. <i>London</i> , cit., Philip IV. to Aytona, as to negotiations between Strasburg and France, 26 July, 1629. Cf. <i>Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K.S.</i> 292/5. Memorial to Elector, 13 Nov., 1629 cit. As to attitude of Sweden Cf. <i>Turin, Vienna</i> , 8. |

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		Wateville, 26 Sept., 3 Oct., 1629. As to campaign in Veluwe. <i>Dublin, Trin. Coll.</i> , cit. Sir E. Vere, 8 Aug., 1629, cit. <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit. N.v.R., 20 July, J.v.R., 28 July, 28 Aug., 1629 cit. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit., Part XI., pp. 851 <i>et seqq.</i>]
404	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 10 July. Philip IV. to Infanta, 26 July, 1629.]
406	1	[<i>Turin, Vienna</i> 8. Wateville, 15 Aug., 1629. <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit., J.v.R., 25 Aug., 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit., Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i> <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 18, 23 Aug.; 1 Sept., 1629. <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 9 Sept., 1629. Do., <i>E. et A.</i> , 634. <i>Corr. Hist.</i> (Aout.-Déc., 1629). In the series for Aug. and Sept., are numerous letters from Bois-le-Duc, and de Berg's army. A copy of an Extra Edition of the "Amsterdamsche Courant," for Aug. 14 or 15, containing the news of the Capitulation of Amersfoort is enclosed in one of them.]
408	1	[<i>Munich, Reichs A.</i> , 30 J.K.A., 195. Memorandum from Count Frankenburg to Olivares, etc. 14 Oct., 1626 cit. <i>Turin. Spagna</i> , 18. Tarantaise, 26 Oct., 28 Nov., 1624. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 13 May, 1629. <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit., J.v.R., 25 Aug. Do., pp. 782-783. Do., 31 Aug., 1629. <i>Nugent</i> , cit., Vol. III., p. 346. "Emmerich," "Wesel."]
410	1	[<i>Reigersborch</i> , cit., J.v.R. 25, 31 Aug., 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit., Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i> <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 9 Sept., 1629. Do., <i>E. et A.</i> , 634, cit., Grobbendonck to Infanta, 18 Sept., 1629. Do., <i>E. et G.</i> , 194. Infanta to Philip IV. 16 Feb. 1626.]
411	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 9 Sept., 1629. <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit., J.v.R., 25, 31 Aug., 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit., Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i>]
412	1 2	[<i>Reigersborch</i> , cit., J.v.R., 31 Aug., 1629.] [<i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit. <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit. <i>Brussels</i> , cit. Infanta to Philip IV., 9 Sept., 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 1 Sept., 1629.]
413	1	[<i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit. <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit. <i>Dublin, Trin. Coll.</i> , cit. Sir E. Vere, 8 Aug., 1629, cit. <i>Brussels</i> , cit. Infanta to Philip IV., 9 Sept., 1629.]
415	1	[<i>Turin, Ing.</i> 4. Barozzi, London, 3, 4, 12, 20, 24 Aug., 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 18, 23 Aug., 1, 8 Sept., 1629. <i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 634, cit. Grobbendonck to Infanta. "The Surrender of Bois-le-Duc," 18 Sept. Cardinal de la Cueva to Spinola, 22 Sept., 1629.]
417	1	[<i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit. Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i> <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 28 Sept. Do., <i>E. et A.</i> , 634. Infanta to Grobbendonck, 18 (?) Sept. 1629. <i>Dublin, Trin. Coll.</i> , cit. "The Order of the Prince of Orange, his encamping, etc.," cit.]
418	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 28 Sept., 1629. <i>Reigersborch</i> , cit., J.v.R., 31 Aug., cit. Cf. Do., 28 July, 1629.]
419	1	[<i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit., Part XI., pp. 631, <i>et seqq.</i> U.O.B. "De Kinderdoop de Gereformeerden," Door Prof. Dr.

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| | <i>S. D. van Veen.</i> [Baptism in the Reformed Church], pp. 22-23.] |
| 421 | 1 [Brussels, <i>E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 28 Sept. Do., <i>E. et A.</i> , 634. Card. de la Cueva to Spinola, 22 Sept., 1629. <i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit., Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i>] |
| 422 | 1 [<i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit., Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i>]
2 [<i>Khevenhüller</i> , cit. Part XI., pp. 831, <i>et seqq.</i>] |
| 423 | 1 [Brussels, <i>E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 14 Nov., 3 Dec., 1629.] |
| 426 | 1 [Cf., London, <i>Aytana</i> cit. Correspondence between Philip IV. and Aytana, cit. and Ph. IV. to A., 18 Aug. Philip IV. to Spinola, 22 Aug. and Undated. Philip IV. to Aytana, 1 Sept. Aytana to Philip, 9, 26 Sept., 1629. Brussels, <i>E. et G.</i> , 201. Philip IV. to Infanta, 18 Aug., enclosing a copy of his letter to Spinola of the same date, 1629. Do., <i>E. et A.</i> , 1,188 bis. "Négo-ciations de Paix qui eurent lieu en 1629, entre les députés des États des Provinces obéissantes de S.M. et les députés des États des Provinces rebelles." Drawn up in connection with the negotiations which took place in the Autumn of 1632 between the Dutch and the States General of Belgium.]
2 [Brussels, <i>E. et G.</i> , 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 9 Sept., 1629.] |

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| 427 | 1 [Turin, <i>Spagna</i> , 21. Scaglia, Madrid, 27, 29 Jan., 1629. Do., <i>Ing.</i> 4. Barozzi, London, 20 April, 1629. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 33-34. Philip IV. to Infanta, 27 April, 1629.] |
| 430 | 1 [Turin, <i>Ing.</i> 4. Barozzi, London, 25, 30, 31 Jan., 13, 18, 27, 28 Feb., 4, 8, 10, 14 March, 1629. Do., <i>Spagna</i> , 21. Scaglia, 29 Jan., 1629. As to the Waldenses, Cf. London. <i>S.P.O.</i> , <i>S.P. For.</i> Savoy and Sardinia, 14 f., 71. "Petition in favour of the inhabitants of Lucerne" [i.e. Luzerna], 9/19 Nov., 1628.] |
| 432 | 1 [Barozzi, cit., 13, 28 Feb., 8, 10, 20, 26 March, 2, 12, 20, 21, 29 April, 3, 9, 21 May, 1629. Scaglia, cit., 29 Jan., 1629.] |
| 435 | 1 [Scaglia, cit., 31 Jan., 6, 22 Feb., 2 March, 10, 22 April, 1629. Barozzi, cit., 27 Feb., 12 April, 1629. For Savoy and English ammunition. Do., 27 Feb., 1629.] |
| 436 | 1 [Brussels, <i>E. et G.</i> , 208, Ph. IV. to Inf., 27 April, Inf. to Ph. IV., 17 May, 1629. Genoa, <i>Spagna</i> , 25. Pallavicino, Madrid, 1 May, 1629.] |
| 437 | 1 [Barozzi, cit., 19, 21 May, 2 June, 1629. Brussels, <i>E. et G.</i> , 208. Cottington to Coloma, 22 May (Copy), Coloma to Cottington, 3 June (Copy), 1629. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V., p. 47. Ross to Boswall, Dunkirk, 28 May, p. 54. Meinis to Lords of Admiralty, Dover, 25 May, 1629 cit.]
2 [Barozzi, cit., 2, 6 June, 1629. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V., p. 54. Meinis to Lords of Admiralty, cit., 25 May, O.S., p. 56. Dorchester to Dudley Carleton, Greenwich, |

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- 27 May, 1629. As to the attitude assumed *publicly* by Charles I. with regard to the inviolability of the Treaty with France, Cf. *London, S.P.O., S.P. For. Savoy and Sardinia*, 17, f. 21. "Articles received by His Majesty from M. Barozzi, August, 1629. "(1) That the Treaty with France is only an honourable suspension of arms, which may be broken if Spain gives satisfaction in the matter of the Palatinate." Do., f. 26. "His Majesty's reply to M. Barozzi's articles delivered at Oatlands the 11 August, 1629." "(1) The Treaty with France is a renewing of the ancient friendship between the two Crowns, which His Majesty will observe inviolable."
- 446 1 [Barozzi, cit., 27 May, 6, 10, 13, 22, 24, 28, 30 June, 1629. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 201. Infanta to Philip IV., 3 June. Do., *E. et G.*, 208. Do. to do., 10 July, 1629. *R.H. MSS. Comm. Rep. Earl Cowper*, Vol. I. *Coke MSS.*, 1629, June. To Damville. *Roses*, cit. Vol. V., pp. 57-58. Rubens' interview with Charles I., 3 June, pp. 60-63 (*Note*). The Infanta's relations with Sir John Coke, pp. 74-90. Rubens to Olivares, 30 June, 1629.]
- 450 1 [Barozzi, cit., 24 June, 2, 16 July, 1629. *Wake*, cit., 21 June, 4 July, 1629. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 208. Infanta to Philip IV., 10 July. Philip IV. to Infanta, 6 Aug., 1629. *Roses*, cit., pp. 92-93. Rubens to Olivares, 2 July, pp. 98-100. Do. to do., 6 July, p. 97. Edmonds, Paris, to Dorchester, 4 July, pp. 108-111. Weston to Rubens, 13 July, pp. 111-112. Do. to Olivares, 10 July (O.S.), pp. 115-117. Rubens to Olivares, 22 July, pp. 119-122. Do. to do., 22 July, pp. 110-111. Wake to Dorchester, 18 July, pp. 103. Note 2. Philip IV. to Aytona, 6 April, p. 107. Note 1. Sir B. Gerbier to Dorchester, 13 July, pp. 126-128. Rubens to Olivares, 22 July, pp. 129-132. Do., 22 July, 1629. *Rankin*, "Marquis d'Argenson," etc., pp. 99-101.]
- 453 1 [*Roses*, Vol. V., pp. 135-145. Reports of Spanish Council of State, 24 July, 1629. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 208. Philip IV. to Infanta, 18 (?) Aug., enclosing a copy of his letter to Aytona, 18 Aug., 1629. Cf. *London* cit.]
- 455 1 [*London*, cit., Philip IV. to Aytona, 26 July, 1629. Barozzi, cit., 20 March, 1629, as to the French and Strasburg.]
- 456 1 [*Riesler*, S., cit., Vol. V., pp. 341-345.]
- 457 1 [*Munich, Reichs. Arch.*, 30 *J.K.A.* 238. "Di Fontainebleau li 5 di Ottobre, 1627." A series of letters, enclosing a Draft Treaty of the same date between France and Bavaria. One of them mentions Maximilian's letter to the writer of 4 July, 1629. Cf. *Munich, Geh. St.A.K.S.*, 279/36. Notes to Card. Richelieu, etc., on the terms of the Secret Articles offered to Bavaria, Susa, 12 March, 1629.]
- 459 1 [*Munich, Geh. St.A.K.S.*, 292/5. Khevenhüller to Elector, 26 June, 10, 10, 24, 25 July, 14 Aug. Olivares

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| | to Khevenhüller, 21 Aug. Khevenhüller to Elector, 8 Sept., 13 Nov., 1629. Do., <i>K.S.</i> , 377/48, Spaniens <i>Procedere gegen Bayern.</i> , cit. <i>London</i> , cit. Aytona to Philip IV., 9 Sept., 1629. <i>Riezler</i> , <i>S.</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 338-340.] |
| 463 | 1 [<i>London</i> , cit. Aytona to Philip IV., 9, 26 Sept., 1629. <i>Munich. Geh. St. A.</i> , <i>K.S.</i> 292/5. Elector to Khevenhüller, 18 Sept., 1629. <i>Turin</i> , <i>Vienna</i> 8, Wateville, 3 Oct., 1629.] |

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| 464 | 1 | [<i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 22 Aug., 1, 15, 22 Sept., 6 Oct., 1629.] |
| 466 | 1 | [<i>Mantua, Francia</i> , 676. Priandi, Paris, 24 Aug., 14, 20, 22, 30 Sept., 1629. <i>Agnelli</i> , cit., 27 Oct., 1629. <i>Turin</i> , <i>Vienna</i> 8. Wateville, 26 Sept., 3, 8 Oct., 1629. <i>Munich, Reichs Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> , 238. Gustaf Adolf to the Electors, Stockholm, 25 April, 1629. <i>Droysen</i> , <i>G.</i> , cit., Vol. I., p. 369, quoting Reichel, Vice Chancellor of Bavaria, to the Elector of Mainz, as to the "Uncatholic Messiah," and Richelieu's <i>Memoirs</i> for the "Rising Sun."]
467 1 [<i>Munich, Geh. St. A. K.S.</i> 292/5. Kh. to Elector, 13 Nov., 1629. <i>Genoa, Spagna</i> , 25. Pallavicino, 6 Oct., 1629.]
470 1 [Do., Pallavicino, 29 Oct., 10 Nov., 1629. <i>Munich Geh. St. A.</i> , <i>K.S.</i> , 292/5. Villela to Kh., 6 Oct. Kh. to Elector, 13 Nov., cit., 28 Dec., 1629. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 168-223. Rubens to Olivares, 24 Aug., 2, 21 Sept., 1629. <i>Riezler</i> , <i>S.</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 352-353.]
478 1 [<i>Munich, Reichsarch</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> , 238. Di Fontainebleau, 5 Oct., 1629 with enclosures, cit. <i>Lit. D.</i> Maximilian's answer. Nuntio, 13 Nov., 1629. Reply to letter of 5 Oct., by Dr. Jocher. To Card. Barberini, 29 Oct. Do., <i>Geh. St. Ar. K.S.</i> 292/5. Kh. to Elector, 24 Oct., 13 Nov., cit. Elector to Kh., 18 Sept., 23 Oct., 1629. <i>Riezler</i> , <i>S.</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 351-356. <i>Munich, Geh. St. A.</i> , <i>K.S.</i> , 279/36. "Quæstio if it is advisable for Bavaria to treat with France, 1630." <i>London</i> , cit. Aytona, 15 July. Philip IV. to Aytona, 22 Aug. Do. to Spinola, 22 Aug., 1629. <i>Ragaz</i> , cit., pp. 254 <i>et seqq.</i>]
480 1 [<i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> , 238. Nuntio, 13 Nov., 1629, cit. To Card. Barberini, 29 Oct., cit. Card. Bagni to Jocher, 26 Dec. Nuntii Literæ, 26 Dec., 1629. Nuntio, 3 Jan., 1630. Marcheville's Instructions. Do., No. 246, To Nuntio, 29 Jan. Card. Bagni, 17 May, 1630. Do., <i>Geh. St. Arch. K.S.</i> 279/36. Quæstio cit. To Card. Bagni, Munich, 3 Jan. Card. Richelieu, 27 March, 1630. Do., <i>K.S.</i> , 279/18. "Treaty of Mutual Defence between France and Bavaria, 8 May, 1630." <i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 208. Philip IV. to Infanta, 5 Nov., 1629.] |

CHAPTER XCIV.

- 482 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 208. Infanta to Philip IV., 28 Sept., 14 Nov. Cueva to Ph. IV., 3 Oct. Ph. IV. to Infanta, 13 Dec., 1629. Do., No. 202. Do. to do. 8 Jan., 1630. Do., E. et A., 634. Cueva to Spinola, 22 Sept., 1629.]
- 485 1 [Mantua, Francia, 676, Priandi, 30 Dec., 1629. Do., 677, 4 Jan., 1630. Agnelli, cit., 27 Oct., 8 Dec., 1629. Turin, Vienna 8, Wateville, 5, 12 Dec., 1629; 2, 9, 23, 30 Jan., 6, 13, Feb., 1630.]
- 487 1 [Do., 27 Feb., 6 March, 1630. London, cit. Philip IV. to Aytona, 1 Sept., 1629. Brussels, E. et G., 201. Infanta to Ph. IV., 14 Nov. Wake, cit. Wake to Dorchester, 20, 24, 30 Sept., 4 Oct., 1629. Villa, op. cit., pp. 547-555, 570-579.]
- 488 1 [Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K.S.M. 322/3. 20 Jan., Scaglia to Spinola, 28 Jan. Spinola to Bruneau, 10 Feb., memorial to Spinola from Scaglia, 1630. Mantua, E. xlix. 3, Milano, 1759. Marioni 9 Jan., 1630. Priandi, cit., 4 Jan., 6 Feb., 1630. Wake, cit. W. to Dor., 14, 24 Oct., 3, 15, 22 Nov. London, S.P.O., S.P.For. Savoy and Sardinia, 17, Wake to Dorchester, 31 Aug., 24 Sept., 4, 24 Oct., 3, 22 Nov., 1629. Bremio, "Cronaca Monferrina," pp. 575-577.]
- 2 [Mantua, Milano, 1759. Pietr' Ant. Marioni to Duke. Milan, 14 Nov., 1629. Milan., Arch. di Stato. Doc. di Filippo IV. Reg. 437 (?), July-Aug., 1630. Wake, cit. W. to Dor., 28 Aug., 1630. Bremio, cit., p. 584. Revue de Paris. Juillet, 1903. Batiffol, Louis. "Souvenir d'un Siège, 1630," pp. 314-317. Munich, Geh. St. Arch., K.S.M., 322/3. Emperor to Maximilian, 20 Feb., 1630.]
- 490 1 [Priandi, cit., 16 Jan. 6, 14, 18 Feb., 9, 10, 19 March. 1630. Wateville, cit., 13, 20, 27 March, 3 April, 1630. Wake, cit., 23 Jan., 13, 19, 24, 28 Feb., 6, 18, 22, 31 March, 1630. Villa, op. cit., pp. 579-592. Bassompierre, cit., Vol. IV., pp. 72-128.]
- 2 [Wateville, cit., 30 Jan., 20 March, 15 April, 1630. Agnelli, cit., 8 Dec., 1629. Hjarne, H., op. cit., pp. 112-116. Bering-Liisberg, op. cit. Sec. IV. Pp. 364 et seqq. Christian IV. after the Peace of Lübeck.]
- 492 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 202, Philip IV. to Infanta, 1 Feb., 31 March. Infanta to Philip IV., 9 March, 1630. Munich, Reichs Arch., 30 J.K.A., 238. Infanta to Tilly, 4 Jan., 26 March. Tilly to Maximilian, 12 Feb., 12 March. Max. to Tilly, 26 Feb., 4 April. Infanta to Max., 26 March. Max. to Infanta, 4 April. St. Esprit to Max., 3 March. Emperor to Tilly and Max., 13 March, 1630. Genoa, Spagna, 25. Pallavicino, 15 Feb., 1630.]
- 494 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 202. Philip IV. to Infanta, 31 March. Do. to Bruneau, 14 March. Emperor to Philip IV., March. Infanta to Philip IV., 29 April, 18 May. Do., No. 203. Philip IV. to Infanta, 3 June, 1630. Rooses, cit., Vol. V., pp. 225-226. Rubens to Olivares,

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- as to Monson; pp. 243-244. Rubens to Infanta, 23 Nov., 1629; p. 299, do. to Dorchester, 30 June, as to Tursis' mission; p. 337, R. Mason to Sir H. Vane, Ratisbon, 15 Oct., 1630.]
- 495 1 [Brussels, E. et G., 268. Infanta to Ph. IV., 28 Oct., Ph. IV. to Inf., 5 Nov., 1629. *Rooses*, cit., Vol. V., pp. 243-244, Rubens to Infanta, 23 Nov.; pp. 251-252, do. to do., 14 Dec., 1629; pp. 259-260, Philip IV. to Inf., 2 Jan.; p. 250, Dorchester to Cottingham, describing Coloma's reception, Jan.; pp. 280-287, do. to do., 31 March; pp. 271-274, Gerbier to Cottingham, 27 Feb.; p. 291, Balthasar Moretus to Pierre Linellius, 8 April, 1630.]
- 496 1 [Gachet, cit., pp. 228-230, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 8 Aug.; pp. 233-234, do. to M. de Peiresc, 9 Aug., 1629. *Rooses*, cit., Vol. V.; pp. 80-82, Rubens to Olivares, 30 June; pp. 115-122, do. to do., 22 July, 1629; p. 292, Rubens on Buckingham's collections. *Brussels*, E. et G., 208, Coloma to Cottingham, 6 Nov., 1628.]

CHAPTER XCV.

- 501 1 [Munich, Geh., St. A. K.S.M., 322/3, 1630. Card. Richelieu's proposals for peace. Spinola's and Collalto's replies to these proposals, 6 March. The Nuncio Panzirolo, Alessandria, to Turin, endorsed "per Mazarinum Turinum scriptum," 8-22 March, Collalto to Emperor, 1630. "Quello che Giulio Mazzarino ha riferito essergli stato risposto dal Carde di Richelieu verbalmente," 12 April, Father Valerian to Father Basil. Do. to Emperor. 17 April, do. to Father Basil, to Emp. to Father Joseph. "Privato Riflesso del Padre Valeriano, etc.," as to Richelieu's proposals about Susa and Pinerolo. *Wake*, cit. Wake to Dorchester, 23 Jan., 13, 19, 24, 28 Feb., 6, 10, 18, 22, 31 March 3, 8, 21 April, 9, 10, 14, 18 May, 1630. *Mantua*, E. XLIX., 3, *Milano*, 1759. Marioni, cit., 12 March, 19 April, 7 May, Giorgi to Duke, Milan, 20 March, 1630. *Riezler*, S., op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 351-352. *Bassompierre*, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 72-128, under 21 Jan., 1630. *Villa*, op. cit., pp. 579-592. *Bremio*, op. cit., pp. 580-584. *Batiffol*, op. cit., p. 292.]
- 502 1 [Giorcelli, "Documenti inediti o poco noti della Cittadella di Casale, Tavola I." *Batiffol*, op. cit., pp. 293-296. *Bremio*, op. cit.; pp. 583-584, 587-588. *Villa*, cit., pp. 579-592. Private information from Dr. Giu. Giorcelli of Casale Monferrato.]
- 503 1 [Munich, *Reichs Arch.*, 30 J.K. 246. Giulio Mazzarino, Moriana, 4 July, 1630. *Priandi*, cit., 19 March, 9, 12 May, 9 June, 10, 15 July, 1630. *Wake*, cit., Wake to Dorchester, 24, 25, 29 May, 13, 29 June, 6, 13, 20 July, 1630. *London*, S.P.O. S.P.For. Savoy and Sardinia 18. Wake to Dorchester, 30 May, 1630. *Batiffol*, cit., pp. 296, 300, 305, 308, 311-314. *Bremio*, cit., pp. 583, 584, 588. *Villa*, cit., pp. 579-592. *Bassompierre*, cit., Vol. IV., pp. 72-128.]

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| 505 | 1 | [<i>Wake</i> , cit., Wake to Dorchester, 6, 13, 20 July, 10 Sept. 1630. <i>Priandi</i> , cit., 4 Aug., 1630. <i>Marioni</i> , cit., 26 June, 1630. <i>Bremio</i> , cit., pp. 584-594. <i>Batiffol</i> , cit., pp. 293-317. <i>Bassompierre</i> , cit., Vol. IV., pp. 111, 116, 117. As to the Duke of Savoy's death, Cf. <i>Wake</i> , cit., Wake to Dorchester, 27 July, 1630. <i>London</i> , S.P.O., S.P. For. Savoy and Sardinia, 18. Wake to Duke Vittorio Amadeo I., 29 July, 1629. <i>Defoe</i> , "Memoirs of a Cavalier"; pp. 17-28. As to the Fall of Mantua. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V.; p. 312, Rubens to Peiresc, Aug., 1630.] |
| 506 | 1 | [<i>Wake</i> , cit., W. to Dor., 27 July, 1630. |
| 507 | 1 | [<i>Wake</i> , cit., W. to Dor., 27 July, 1630. <i>London</i> , <i>Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept.</i> Royal MSS. 14.A. XIII. <i>Molino</i> , <i>Fran.</i> "Relatione di Savoia, 1586," pp. 1236-1239. <i>Italo-Raulich</i> , "Carlo Emmanuele di Savoia," Vol. I., p. 85. <i>Hanotaux</i> , G., cit. "Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu," Vol. II., Part I., pp. 143-149.] |
| 508 | 1 | [<i>Wake</i> , cit., to Dorchester, 8, 28 Aug., 3 Sept., 1630. <i>Priandi</i> , cit., 4 Aug., 1630. <i>Marioni</i> , cit., 26 June, 1630. <i>Bremio</i> , cit., pp. 591-594. <i>Batiffol</i> , cit., pp. 314-320. <i>Villa</i> , cit., pp. 579-592.] |
| 509 | 1 | [<i>Marioni</i> , cit., 6 March, 1630. <i>Villa</i> , cit., pp. 579-592. <i>Batiffol</i> , cit., p. 320.] |
| 513 | 1 | [<i>Casale</i> , <i>Foro II.</i> , cit., Doc. 128. Terms offered to the Duke of Maine by Marquis Ambrogio Spinola, 6 Sept., 1630. <i>Priandi</i> , cit., 28 Sept., 9 Oct., 1630. <i>Wake</i> , cit. Wake to Dorchester, 3, 10 Sept., 3 Oct., 10, 12, 18 Dec., 1630. <i>Bremio</i> , cit., pp. 593-595. <i>Batiffol</i> , cit., pp. 320-322. <i>Villa</i> , cit., pp. 579-606, especially pp. 593-594, pp. 726-729. Extract from "Relatione di Spagna," by Alvise Mocenigo, Venetian Ambassador to Spain, 1626-1631. <i>Rooses</i> , cit., Vol. V., pp. 339-341. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, Oct., 1630. <i>Calderon de la Barca</i> , P. "El Sitio de Breda," cit. Act. II. Sc. 1. For Philip IV. and Sor Maria de Agreda Cf. <i>Hume</i> , <i>Martin</i> , "The Court of Philip IV."] |

CHAPTER XCVI.

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| 516 | 1 | [<i>Priandi</i> , cit., 28 Sept. 9, 12, 19, Oct., 1630. <i>Casale</i> , <i>Foro II.</i> , cit., 1630, Oct. 13. "Tractatus Ratisbonæ."] |
| 520 | 1 | [<i>Priandi</i> , cit., 27 Oct., 11, 15 Nov. 8, Dec., 1630. The Despatch of 15 Nov. gives an account of the "Day of Dupes." <i>Munich</i> , <i>Geh. St. Arch. K.S.</i> , 322/3. Emperor to Maximilian, 13 Nov. Max. to Emperor, 28 Nov., 1630. <i>Brussels</i> , <i>E. et G.</i> , 203. Philip IV. to Infanta, 28 Aug., 20 Sept. Infanta to Philip IV., 10 Oct., 1 Nov., 18 Dec., 1630. Do., No. 204. Philip IV. to Infanta 7, 15 Jan. Infanta to Philip IV., 19 Feb., 1631. This volume, which extends to April, 1632, gives full accounts of the negotiations for a Treaty between Spain and England against Holland mentioned in the text. <i>Casale</i> , <i>Foro II</i> , Doc. 131. Treaty of Chierasco, 6 April, 1631. <i>London</i> , S.P.O., S.P. For. |

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Savoy and Sardinia 17., f. 260. Dorchester to Wake, 8/18 Jan., 1629/30 (sic). *Bassompierre*, Vol. IV., Preface, pp. XIV.-XVII. *Batiffol*, cit., pp. 322-326. *Bremio*, cit., pp. 596-403.]

CHAPTER XCVII.

- 523 1 [London, S.P.O., S.P. For. Savoy and Sardinia, 17, f. 260. Dorchester to Wake, 8/18 Jan., 1629/30 sic). This date should be 1630-1631, as the despatch announces the conclusion of peace with Spain. *D.N.B.* XII., 51 "Conway (Viscount), Edward," gives the date of his death as 3 Jan., 1630/1.]
- 524 2 [Hjarne, H., cit., pp. 122-123.]
1 [Droysen, G., cit., Vol. I., pp. 34-39, 65-66. Hjarne, H., cit., pp. 17, 21, 28-29. *Bering-Lüsberg*, cit., pp. 323-363. Sec. III. on p. 349, quoting *Brussels, E. et G.*, 630. *Corr. Hist.* 6. Inf. to Tilly, 9 Sept., 1626, printed in "Corr. de Tilly," "Hist. de Tilly," by Cte. de Villermont. As to the Brass Money, Cf. *Wadsworth*, cit., pp. 83-84. *Khevenhüller*, cit., Part XI., pp. 890, et seqq. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 195., Inf., 12, 22 Dec., 1626, as to Eric Larsen's mission.]
- 526 1 [Cf., p. 524, Note 1, ante, and *Brussels, E. et G.*, 196. Inf. to Ph. IV., 4 Jan., 22 April, Ph. IV. to Inf., 8 Jan., 28 Feb., 1627. Do. 200. Infanta to Philip IV., 6 Jan., 27 March, 29 April. Philip IV. to Infanta, 20 Jan., 12 March, 1629. *Genoa*, Vienna 26. *Levanto*, cit., Hamburg, 2 Jan., 16 Jan., as to Christian IV. quarrel with Duke Frederick of Holstein (Cf. as to Christian IV's violent temper *Bering-Lüsberg*, cit., Pp. 364 et s., "Christian IV. after the Peace of Lübeck"), 5 March, 1627. *London*, cit., Aytona, 29 Nov., 1628. *Droysen, G.*, cit., Vol. I., pp. 293-300 as to Spain and Sweden before 1618. *Reigersborch* cit., pp. 89-105. *Reigersborch* to Grotius, 25 Sept., 9, 23 Oct., 13 Nov., 15, 30 Dec., 1627. As to Sylt and Liister Deep. Cf. *Johnson, William*, "Sailing Directions, etc." (Amsterdam, 1614). "The West Coast of Denmark." *Times Atlas*, Map 35. *Hjarne, H.*, cit., pp. 100-108.]
- 527 1 [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 195. Infanta to Philip IV., 12 Dec., 1626, styles Eric Larsen the envoy of the Duke of Sudermania. *Barozzi*, cit., London, 9 April, 1629, as to the Anglican Bishops and Gustaf Adolf. *Droysen, G.*, Vol. I., pp. 29-36. As to Eric Larsen's mission, Cf. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 195. Infanta to Philip IV., 12, 22 Dec., 1626. Do., 196. Philip IV. to Infanta, 23 April, 1627.]
- 528 1 [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 178. Philip IV. to Infanta, 17 Jan., 1627. *Forster*, cit., Vol. I., 65-75, Oct.-Dec., 1627., pp. 116-160. *Wallenstein* to Arnim, 9 Oct., 2, 15, 21, 22, 23, 26, 30 Nov., 13, 20 Dec., 1627, pp. 257-274. Do. to do., 3, 6, 7, 11, 15 Jan., 1628.]
- 531 1 [*Hjarne*, cit., pp. 100-108. *Bering-Lüsberg*, cit., pp. 323-363. The Winter of 1628-1629. Peace of Lübeck.]

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- Droysen*, G., Vol. I., pp. 354-369, Vol. II., pp. 1-2.
Riesler, S., cit., Vol. V., pp. 323-324. *Forster*, cit., Vol. I., As to Stralsund, pp. 212-213 and Wallenstein to Arnim, 20, 21, 22, 23 Dec., 1627, 9, 27 Feb., 1628., Vol. I., 2nd Part, as to Arnim and Poland, pp. 34-52. Do. to do., 9 April to 27 June, 1629. *Wateville*, cit., Vienna, 19 Nov., 1628. *Munich, Reichs Arch.*, 30 J.K., A. 238. Gustaf Adolf to Electors, Stockholm, 25 April, 1629. *Levanto*, cit., Hamburg, 2, 16, Jan., 1627.]
- 532 1 [*Forster*, Vol. I., 2nd Part, pp. 21, *et seqq.* *Droysen*, G., Vol. II., pp. 1-7. *Hjarne*, H., cit., pp. 106-116, For attitude of Christian IV. towards Sweden in 1629-30, *id.*, pp. 112-116. *Wateville*, cit., Vienna, 26 Sept., 30 Oct., 12 Dec., 1629. *Agnelli*, cit., 27 Oct., 1629. *Munich, Reichs. Arch.*, 30 J.K., 238. Di Fontainebleau, 5 Oct., 1629, and enclosures, Nuntio, 13 Oct., 1629, Responsio ad lit., C.D. ex Fontainebleau q. erant, 5 Oct., 29 missa. To Card. Barberini, 29 Oct., Nuntio Cardinalis to Dominus Jocher, Paris, 26 Dec., 1629. Nuntii Literæ, 26 Dec., 1629. Nuntio, 3 Jan., 1630. *Marcheville's*, Instructions. Do., 246. Cardinal Bagni, 17 May, 1630. For Gustaf Adolf's campaign in Germany up to Treaty of Barwalde, 11 Jan., 1631, and for the Treaty itself, Cf. *Hjarne*, H., pp. 116-123.]
- 533 1 [*Hjarne*, H., pp. 112-116, *Swedish Intelligencer*, Part III., p. 188, for Gustaf Adolf's personal appearance, etc.]
- 535 1 [*Cf.*, page 327, Note 1, and page 531, Note 1, *ante*, and *Hjarne*, H., cit., pp. 115-116. *Riesler*, S., cit., Vol. V., pp. 341-345, 351-352, 363-365. *Munich, Reichs. Arch.*, 30 J.K. 238, cit., Nuntii Literæ, 26 Dec., 1629. Nuntio, 3 Jan., 1630, cit. Do., *Geh. St. Arch.*, K.S., 279/36. "Quæstio if it is advisable for Bavaria to treat with France, circa 1630," cit. Do. K.S., 279/18. "Treaty of Mutual Defence, etc." between Louis XIII. and Maximilian, 8 May, 1630. *Barozzi*, cit., 9 April, 1629.]
- 537 1 [*Hjarne*, H., cit., pp. 116-123. *Droysen*, G., cit., Vol. I., pp. 34-49. *Riesler*, S., cit., Vol. V., pp. 363-365. *Wateville*, cit., 9 Jan., 6 Feb., 1630.]
- 538 1 [As to Maximilian and France, Cf., Page 335, Note 1, *ante*, and *Riesler*, S., cit., Vol. V., pp. 338-340. *Casale, Foro II.*, cit. Doc. 130, 1630, Oct. 13. "Tractatus Ratisbonæ."]
- 543 1 [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 201. Infanta to Ph. IV., 14 Nov., 6 Dec. Ph. IV. to Inf., 13 Dec. to Spinola, 13 Dec. Cueva to Ph. IV., 3 Oct., 1629. Do., 202. Ph. IV. to Inf., 8 Jan., 28 Feb., 31 March. Inf. to Ph. IV., 16 Feb., 9 March, quoting Council of State, 5 March, 1630.]
- 545 1 [*Brussels*. Do. 203. Inf. to Ph. IV., 27 July, 20 Aug., 1630. *Wateville*, cit., 8 Oct., 1629. *Genoa, Spagna*, 25, Pallavicino, Madrid, 15 Feb., 1630.]
- 2 [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 203, Ph. IV. to Inf., 20 July, Inf. to Ph. IV., 20 Aug., 1630. *Munich, Reichs Arch.*, 30

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- J.K., 249. Inf. to Neuburg, 21 Sept., 1630. Do., *Geh. St. Arch., K.S.*, 261/6. Maximilian and Elector of Cologne to Infanta, 18 Feb. Inf. to Max., etc., 20 March, 1631, agrees, if Juliers is neutralised, to allow Lingen to be raised although it will be disadvantageous to her interests.]
- 546 I [Brussels, E. et G., 201. Inf. to Ph. IV., 14 Nov. Ph. IV. to Inf., 13 Dec., 1629. Do. 202. Infanta to Philip IV., 9 March, 26 April. Ph. IV. to Inf., 27 May, 1630. Do., 203. Philip IV. to Inf., 2, 24 June, 15 July, 28 Aug., 20 Sept., 8 Dec. Inf. to Ph. IV., 6, 27 July, 20 Aug., 1, 24 Nov., 1630. Do. 204. Ph. IV. to Inf. 15 Jan. Inf. to Ph. IV., 19 Feb., 1631.]
- 548 I [Moor, cit., Vol. III., pp. 867-869. Ragaz, cit., pp. 244, et seqq., Bassompierre, cit., Vol. IV., pp. 90-91. Chur. Bisch. Arch., Mappa 53. 1628, July 1, Bp. Joseph Mohr of Chur to Abp. of Mainz. 1629, 6 Aug., Kaiser Ferdinand II. verleiht dem Bischof Joseph Mohr die Kais. Regalia. 1630 (?) "Vera et genuina Relatio status Ecclesiae Catholicae in Rhætia." Do., Mappa, 54. 1632, Father Ezechiel reports on the state of the Lower Engadine, Nov. 8. 1633, Jan. 21, "P. Trinco avvisa Mons. Vescovo del numero dei cattolici che si ritrovano nell' Engadina bassa, etc."]
- 552 I [Bruxelles, E. et G., 203. Infanta to Philip IV., 19 June, 27 July, 1630. Times' "Historians' Hist." cit. "The Netherlands." Villa, cit., pp. 664-667, quoting. Courvoisier, "Le Sacré Mausolée ou les parfums exhalants du tombeau de la Sér. Princesse Isabelle Claire Eugénie, etc.," by Jean Jacques Courvoisier (Bruxelles, 1634) dedicated to Marques de Aytona.]

CHAPTER XCVIII.

- 554 I [As to the Infanta and English trade with the East Indies, Cf. Brussels, E. et G., 203. Infanta to Philip IV., 10 Oct., 1630.]
- 556 I [Cf. Bering-Liisberg, cit., pp. 323-363, as to the position of Hanover in the autumn of 1625, and as to Lübeck. As to Lübeck in 1627, Cf. Levanto, cit., Hamburg, 27 Feb., 1627.]
- 557 I [Cf. Brussels, E. et G., 202. Ph. IV. to Inf., 8 Jan., 1630. Do., E. et G., 203. Ph. IV. to Inf., 24 Aug. Inf. to Ph. IV., 26 Sept., 1630, as to the relations between Philip IV. and the Dutch, English, and Irish Catholics. Riezler, S., cit., Vol. V., pp. 323-324, as to Maximilian of Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate. Forster, cit., Vol. I., p. 328. Wallenstein to Arnim, 6 Feb., 1628, as to Wallenstein and the Dutch. For Philip IV. and Frankenthal, Cf. Brussels, E. et G., 191. Inf. to Ph. IV., 24 Oct., 1624. Do., 192. Ph. IV. to Inf. 20 Jan., 1625.]
- 559 I [As to Spain and Alsace. Cf. supra passim. Riezler, S., cit., Vol. V., p. 335, for Spanish refusal of Jutland and Schleswig from Emperor, Dec., 1627. For Swedish request for the loan of Imperial troops in East Prussia, Cf. Forster, Vol. I., pp. 124-126. Wallenstein to

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Arnim, 2 Nov., 1627. As to Emperor and Denmark. Do., pp. 162-163, 13 Dec., 1627, pp. 257-258, 3 Jan., 1628, and remarks on pp. 182-183. As to the Emperor and Prussia. Do. pp. 143-144, 21 Nov., 1627. For the Dutch and the Catholics of Bois-le-Duc. Cf. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 201, Ph. IV. to Inf., 13 Dec., 1629. As to the Mantuan War, Cf. *Defoe, D.*, *Memoirs of A Cavalier*, pp. 17-25.]

CHAPTER XCIX.

- 564 1 [For French provincial feeling before 1789 and the position of Marseilles, etc., in Public Law, Cf. *Louvet de Mazamet, Charles*, "Histoire de la Révolution à Marseille et en Provence depuis 1789, jusqu' au Consulat." [Marseille, 1838.] quoted by *Lombard* "Un Volontaire de 1792." [Paris, 1903], p. 3 and remarks pp. 1-13.]
- 2 [Cf. *Bryce, Viscount*. "The Holy Roman Empire," cit., for Joseph the Second's visit to Rome.]
- 565 1 [Cf. Weizhaupt, the Illuminati of Würzburg, and K. Fr. Wm. II. of Prussia.]
- 566 1 [Cf., *Alison, Sir Archibald*, "The Lives of Lord Castle-reagh and Sir Charles Stewart," [London, 1861, 3 Vols.] under Oct., 1813, for the Treaty of Ried.]
- 575 1 [For Queen Victoria in 1864 Cf. *Capt. Lytton Strachey*, "Queen Victoria," who says H.M. sided with Austria in 1866.]
- 576 1 [The documents were, it is said, discovered at Plauen Castle, Schleswig in 1829.]
- 586 1 [For Bismarck and the Emperor Frederick's illness and accession Cf. *Rodd, Sir J. R., G.C.B.*, etc., "Social and diplomatic Memories." [London, 1 Vol., 1922.] p. 56, pp. 112-115, pp. 144-148, analysing Bismarck's statements in his "Reflections and Reminiscences," Vol. II., pp. 330-331.]
- 587 1 [*Rodd*, op. cit., pp. 201-2, shows that William II. was gravely offended by Bismarck's aspersions on his father's memory in connection with the publication of the Emperor Frederick's Diary by Professor Geffcken, for which Cf. op. cit., pp. 156-160.]
- 2 [For Mr. J. Chamberlain and Heligoland in 1889, Cf. *Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. A., M.P.* "Life of Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, M.P.," 2 Vols.]
- 597 1 [For Mr. J. D. Bouchier and the Balkans War of 1912-13, Cf. *Rankin, Lt. Col. Sir Reginald, Bt.* "The Inner History of the Balkans War," 1 Vol., pp. 1-135.]
- 598 1 [For the attitude of Russia during the negotiations which preceded the First Balkans War, and as to the offers of Bulgaria with regard to Constantinople in 1912, Cf. *Buchanan, Rt. Hon. Sir George G.C.B.*, etc. "My Mission to Russia and other Diplomatic Memories," Vol. I., pp. 119-135, p. 181. For Russia and the Conference of London in 1913, Cf. Do., Vol. I., pp. 128-135.]

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Abp. = Archbishop. Archbishopric.
 Abt. = Abbot.
 Adm. = Admiral.
 Admin. = Administrator. Administration.
 Ag. = Agent.
 Amb. = Ambassador.
 Archd. = Archduke. Archduchy.
 Arm. = Arminian.
 Aus. = Austria, Austrian.
 Bat. = Battle.
 Bav. = Bavaria, Bavarian.
 Belg. = Belgium, Belgian.
 Ber. = Berlin.
 Bp. = Bishop, Bishopric.
 Bo. = Bohemia, Bohemian.
 Brand. = Brandenburg.
 Brus. = Brussels.
 Bulg. = Bulgaria, Bulgarian.
 Cap. = Captain.
 Capn. = Capuchin.
 Card. = Cardinal.
 Cath. = Roman Catholic.
 C.L. = Catholic League (Germany).
 Chan. = Chancellor.
 Chas. Emm. = Charles Emmanuel I., Duke of Savoy.
 Chas. Pr. Wales. = Charles, Prince of Wales (King Charles I.).
 Comm. = Commandant.
 Confed. = Confederation.
 Conf. = Conference.
 Const. = Constable.
 Conv. = Convention.
 Ct. = Count.
 Ctss. = Countess.
 Dan. = Danish.
 Den. = Denmark.
 Dipl. = Diplomatist.
 D. = Duchy, Duke.
 Dss. = Duchess.
 Du. = Dutch.
 E. = Earl.
 El. = Elector, Electorate.
 El. Pal. = Elector Palatine.
 Emp. = Emperor, Empress, Empire.
 Eng. = England, English.
 Env. = Envoy.
 Ev. Un. = Evangelical Union (Germany) cf. "Protestant Union."
 F.M. = Field Marshal, Maréchal.
 Ferd. II. = Emperor Ferdinand II.
 Fr. = France, French.
 Fran. Jos. = Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria.
 Fred. Hen. = Frederick Henry of Nassau Orange, Stathalter.
 Fred. Wm. II., III., IV. = Frederick William II., III., IV., Kings of Prussia.
 Gent. = General.
 Ger. = Germany, German.
 Gen. = Genoa, Genoese.
 Gov. = Governor.
 Gris. = Grisons.
 Holl. = Holland, cf. "United Provinces."
 Hung. = Hungary, Hungarian.
 Imp. = Imperial, Imperialist.
 Infa. = Infanta of Spain, Savoy.
 Infe. = Infante of Spain, Savoy.
 It. = Italy, Italians.
 K. = King.
 Lea. = League.
 Ld. = Lord, Baron.
 Lorr. = Lorraine, Lorrainer.
 Mant. = Mantua, Mantuan.
 Mar. = Margrave.
 Marq. = Marquis, Marquisate.

Max. Bav. = Maximilian I., Elector
(Duke) of Bavaria.

Min. = Minister.

Monf. = Monferrat.

Ph. III. = Philip III., King of Spain.

Ph. IV. = Philip IV., King of Spain.

Pol. = Poland, Polish.

Pom. = Pomerania, Pomeranian.

Port. = Portugal, Portuguese.

Pres. = President.

P.M. = Prime Minister, Premier.

Prin., Prss. = Prince, Princess.

Prot. Pr. = Protestant Preacher.

Prot. = Protestant.

Prot. Un. = Protestant Union, Ger-
many, cf. "Evangelical Union."

Pruss. = Prussia, Prussian.

Qu. = Queen.

Roch. = Rochelle.

Russ. = Russia, Russian.

Sail. = Sailor, Seaman.

Sav. = Savoy, Savoyard.

Sec. St. = Secretary of State.

Sold. = Soldier.

Sp. = Spain, Spanish.

Stm. = Statesman.

Swe. = Sweden, Swedish.

Switz. = Switzerland, Swiss.

Try. = Treaty.

Turk. = Turkey, Turkish.

Un. Prov. = United Provinces cf.
"Holland."

Valt. = Valtelline.

Ven. = Venice, Venetian.

Vt. = Viscount.

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